jbocre: Bear goo

melting gummy bears

Bear goo has become an iconic phrase in connection with xorlo. The background of it is that there is no consensus on whether or not lo cribe can refer to bear goo. Arguments for both sides have been brought forth, and it tends to come down to philosophy. It also turns out that the question of bear goo is a broader one than xorlo. Below is a casual conversation about bear goo, which was held at the end of July 2013 on the #lojban IRC channel on freenode.

Day 1

selpa'i

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Btw, I would like to point out that the reason I kept saying "bear goo aside" when we were talking about xorlo was because I knew you were strongly opposed to the idea and I didn't want the discussion to revolve around something I felt was not central to the current point under discussion, and not because I thought bear goo was unthinkable.

selpa'i

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doi la latro'a :)

Ilmen

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just for refreshing my memories, what is the difference (now) between PA broda and lo PA broda?

selpa'i

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pa da poi ke'a broda vs zo'e noi broda gi'e zilkancu li PA lo broda

Ilmen

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.i je'e .ui ki'e la selpa'i

latro'a

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also, that zilkancu equation is a slight problem

latro'a

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since if you count off by units of the whole lo broda ball, you will always get 1

selpa'i

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Surely, in a ready-made universe, bear goo must seem terrifying.

latro'a

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that is, making that equation makes sense requires a little bit of circularity, in artificially defining zilkancu to be distributive in its 3rd argument

latro'a

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I still think bear goo is a dumb idea in the first place, but again, xorlo comes down to what zo'e is and what broda'ing means, not really what lo means

latro'a

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if people come to a consensus that bear goo meets the definition of cribe, then the fact that it doesn't meet the definition of "bear" is superfluous

latro'a

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the difference is that I completely reject that "anything to do with bears" i.e. zo'e ne lo ka cribe matches lo cribe

selpa'i

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I understand. You view the universe as a set of predefined individuals, simply put. Not everyone does that, but it's common in math and classical logic.

latro'a

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that's orthogonal to what I just said

latro'a

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it's also a bit deceptive; I wouldn't say it's true or false, however

selpa'i

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Not really. You want to define a priori all the things that cribe and give them a single type.

selpa'i

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I think.

latro'a

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not at all

latro'a

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this is simpler than that: I just don't think bear goo cribes

latro'a

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there's no a priori universal classification of cribe here

latro'a

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I just never thought bear goo actually cribe'd, and that it was silly to say it did

selpa'i

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There is, but it might be subtle. You're saying the node that cribe is on ends at bear goo.

latro'a

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there are still valid questions about whether things do: does a bear corpse cribe? how long after death does it stay that way?

latro'a

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again, no

latro'a

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there's a gray area

latro'a

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bear goo is just way past it

selpa'i

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But it sounds like you want to define a priori how far cribe can go in either direction, and have that be absolute for every time and place.

latro'a

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nope

selpa'i

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Not?

latro'a

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I just don't think bear goo is ever there

latro'a

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the gray area moves

latro'a

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bear goo is just beyond the boundary, and by a long shot

latro'a

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so it's never caught

latro'a

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really, we agree on more than you think when I say that "I reject bear goo"

selpa'i

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And you cannot imagine any context where it moves far enough to encapsulate goo?

latro'a

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indeed

latro'a

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that's not a damn bear, that's all there is to it

latro'a

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once you've turned it into goo, it came from a bear but isn't one

selpa'i

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But then the limits of your cribe are more rigid than mine, and obviously this goes for all broda.

latro'a

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I think the difference is fairly marginal

latro'a

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and again, bear goo doesn't really have anything to do with it, it doesn't change anything, it just changes the predicate

selpa'i

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I could construe a context where cribe is enough/appropriate to identify/distinguish between different animals having been in some place, or maybe when following a trail.

latro'a

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xorlo didn't have anything to do with it

latro'a

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then you're still not talking about a bear's physical presence at this moment

latro'a

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(actually, I'm not even really sure what you were going for with that comment)

selpa'i

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Let's say you and I are out in the jungle and following a trail.

selpa'i

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We come across some goo.

selpa'i

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We're trying to find Bear.

selpa'i

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But there are other animals there too

selpa'i

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So cribe or not.

latro'a

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if you said xu ta cribe I would say ki'a

latro'a

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seriously

latro'a

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not even ua nai

latro'a

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(there's unfortunately not a thing between, where you say you understand the syntax but don't understand the basic semantic assumptions)

selpa'i

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Okay. Now let's go the other direction, towards the root node.

selpa'i

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Say in said jungle, there live different animals: bears, birds, and tigers (or whatever).

selpa'i

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They are rare, so we see them rarely if at all. You and I take different paths through the jungle and meet again at the end of the day.

selpa'i

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You ask me "how many animals did you see?"

selpa'i

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I say: "Two. But I didn't see Tiger."

selpa'i

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Maybe I could add "I came across a big flock of birds this noon"

selpa'i

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I'd assume you to ki'a or something again.

selpa'i

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Obviously, you say, I saw more than two animals if there was a flock of birds

latro'a

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correct

selpa'i

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But then!

latro'a

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that one would be more like na'i, however, as it isn't just "wtf?", it's "that's not consistent"

selpa'i

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Okay, but I think it makes sense to say I saw only two animals; the bear and the bird.

latro'a

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I disagree

selpa'i

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I know!

latro'a

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you saw two danlu gunma, one of which is a singleton

selpa'i

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That's why I am saying you are tending towards a ready-made universe.

latro'a

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not really

latro'a

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it's dynamic

latro'a

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there's fluctuation from context and so forth

selpa'i

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It doesn't seem very dynamic.

latro'a

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but there's also some things that are just blatant, like a flock of birds not being an animal

selpa'i

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To you it surely seems that way. :)

latro'a

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but this is just a question of definitions to me, still: "made up of animals" and "is an animal" are completely different predicates, surely

selpa'i

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I don't see where your view is dynamic.

latro'a

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suppose you have a live bear

latro'a

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it goes about its life, throughout its life it's a bear

latro'a

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it dies

latro'a

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immediately after it dies, I still identify it as a bear

selpa'i

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Dynamic to me would at least imply that i can call a flock of birds a single bird.

selpa'i

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Since, at the beginning of our journey, went out to find three animals: bears, tigers, birds.

latro'a

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sorry, can I finish my example?

selpa'i

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Please.

latro'a

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was distracted for a sec

latro'a

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so the bear dies, and immediately after it dies, I identify it as a bear: it has bear teeth, bear claws, bear fur, bear shape, etc.

latro'a

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as it decays, it starts looking less like a bear

latro'a

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its fur falls out, its teeth and claws decay

latro'a

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eventually its skin is removed

latro'a

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etc.

latro'a

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much later, it is composted and incorporated into the soil

latro'a

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by the time it is in the soil, it is most definitely not a bear

latro'a

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but it is not determinate a priori when exactly it stopped being a bear

selpa'i

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But it's decided a priori that being in the soil is when it stops.

latro'a

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that is, there's a period when it was definitely a bear, extending throughout its life and through some of the aftermath of its death, and a period when it is definitely not a bear, long after its death, but there is a period where it is merely "bearish", and whether "bear" actually applies to it depends on other factors

latro'a

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I would say yes, but that has more to do with "bear" than anything else

selpa'i

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How exactly is bear goo different from a decayed, toothless, bald bear?

latro'a

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na'i; you haven't said how decayed it is, and even in the state of decay it's a gray, contextual area

selpa'i

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If a truck *just* ran over it, everyone who is present does know it's a bear.

latro'a

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you're asking me to make a universal statement about something that I was just saying wasn't universal

Visirus

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Was a bear

latro'a

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was a bear, correct

latro'a

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the transition needn't be gradual like the decay in the forest

selpa'i

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No, but you just said after its death it's still a bear?

latro'a

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it can be abrupt

latro'a

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it's still a bear because it's recognizable by its current features as such

selpa'i

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It's both dynamic and not dynamic at once it seems.

latro'a

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in different senses yes

Visirus

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It's a corpse, more logically

selpa'i

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Why are those features only of a visual nature?

latro'a

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not just visual

selpa'i

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A bear that got squashed and remains in the same place is recognizable by being in the same spot.

latro'a

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that's using external information

selpa'i

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Is this forbidden a priori?

latro'a

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that's a good question

latro'a

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I don't have a good answer, but my initial reaction is to say yes

Rnuomer

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since I started learning lojban I've been thinking everything in terms of verbs

latro'a

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put it this way, if you can't imagine walking up to the scene with no information whatsoever and saying ta [ca] cribe, it's not a bear

selpa'i

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The ready-made view is *very* strongly prevalent on IRC nowadays, that's why I imagine it's hard to see the other view.

latro'a

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I still don't like this "ready-made" description

Rnuomer

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so I'd think "Is the thing bear-ing?"

latro'a

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it's inaccurate

Rnuomer

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if so, it's a bear

latro'a

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I don't know what a better term is, but only part of the system is static

latro'a

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much of it is dynamic

latro'a

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because as I said, there's no definite transition point where it stopped being a bear

latro'a

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on the other hand, there is a region that is definitely bear and a region that is definitely non-bear

latro'a

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but the middle is gray, fluid, and indeterminate

selpa'i

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There are some absolute classifications you are applying on the universe and then use them once and for all, even if some things are dynamic, you have just shown that some things are not, for example the limits of cribe seem rather clear, and a flock of birds is never a bird.

latro'a

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the limits of cribe aren't

latro'a

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but yes, a flock of birds is never a bird

selpa'i

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How can you say that if lo cipni is Bird? Then you must forbid that interpretation, which is a very ready-madeist (sorry) thing to do.

latro'a

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hrm, I need to play with this issue

latro'a

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that last point is a good one

latro'a

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my internal resolution comes from my previous interpretation, which is more self-consistent than my current, somewhat wishy-washy one

latro'a

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which is to say that lo za'u cipni cu cipni is a distributive statement

latro'a

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but this is incompatible with the sruri lo dinju gi'e krixa perspective

latro'a

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(which I still don't actually like, but for more practical than philosophical reasons)

latro'a

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when I say "internal resolution", I mean the answer that manifests before I've had to compare perspectives etc.

Rnuomer

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I don't suppose my idea makes any sense =:x

latro'a

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it's between the two, Rnuomer

latro'a

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I prefer to think of selbri as noun-verbs, and consider the best brivla to have place structures that are neither truly nounish nor truly verbish

Rnuomer

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I think a selbri is more a verb tho

latro'a

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note that in lojban, the issue you're talking about wouldn't happen, selpa'i

latro'a

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you would've said mi viska lo cipni

latro'a

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not "I saw a bird"

latro'a

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and I wouldn't have concluded it was singular

latro'a

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where we perhaps run into trouble is mi viska lo pa cipni

latro'a

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if a flock of birds cipni, then lo pa cipni is ambiguous as to whether it is actually a flock or not

Rnuomer

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seeing as sumti are definitely nouns

Rnuomer

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(right?)

latro'a

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despite seemingly being explicitly singular

latro'a

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sorta; in english nouns are themselves content-words

latro'a

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in lojban the only sumti that are content-words are KOhA

latro'a

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cf. "dog" vs. "gerku"

selpa'i

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Had a phone call.

Rnuomer

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and sumti with LE + selbri are "something that [selbri]s"

Rnuomer

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pe'i

latro'a

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my notion of noun-verb is a bit vague; the point is that it has to do with both a state of being and a state of action

latro'a

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nounish selbri are about states of being; verbish selbri are about states of action; noun-verbish selbri build in both, describing what something is via what it does and vice versa

selpa'i

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<latro'a> note that in lojban, the issue you're talking about wouldn't happen, selpa'i -- I think it would. Consider mi viska [lo] ci danlu.

latro'a

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can we jump down a little?

latro'a

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because I think we already hit the heart of the issue

latro'a

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namely

latro'a

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can lo *pa* cipni be a flock?

Rnuomer

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what is the difference between lo and loi then?

latro'a

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loi is explicitly non-distributive

latro'a

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lo is explicitly not explicit about distributivity

latro'a

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(nor about whether distributivity even makes sense, if there are no quantifiers present)

xalbo

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I don't feel comfortable with lo pa cipni being a flock. I'm ok with saying of a flock that it cipni. I have not yet reconciled this...

selpa'i

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Yes, lo pa cipni can be a flock, or conversely a flock can be a cipni pa mei

selpa'i

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In my view.

latro'a

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that's philosophically robust but pragmatically awful, pe'i

Rnuomer

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well

Rnuomer

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is the flock birding together as one unit?

Rnuomer

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or do they each individually bird, as a mass?

Rnuomer

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a mass of birding things?

Rnuomer

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(shush me if I'm being dumb though =:x)

latro'a

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selpa'i's view is that the answer is "both", I think

selpa'i

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The fact that you consider it pragmatically awful when it is the cognitive/natural language approach is surprising.

latro'a

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my reason that it is pragmatically awful is that there is literally no way to make it explicit that you're talking about "one bird" in this framework

xalbo

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I think each of them birds separately, and so we have more than one thing that birds.

latro'a

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that's how I would think of it as well

latro'a

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lo za'u cipni cu cipni and lo pa cipni cu cipni are different types of statements to me

Rnuomer

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I think the issue is we haven't defined what birding is

latro'a

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that's what I was saying above with cribe: this is more about what the predicate means than what lo means

selpa'i

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One of the main issues is that this is about whether or not it *can* be defined.

latro'a

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true

latro'a

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there's also a question of local definition vs. global definition, if you claim that any definition at all works

Rnuomer

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I'd use like a checklist sort of thing

latro'a

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I don't claim global definition

latro'a

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but I do claim local definition

selpa'i

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In a ready-made universe, it would be. In the couterpart model, it would be considered impossible, because of an inifinity of nodes.

Rnuomer

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does it have feathers? check; does it chirp? check; etc.

Rnuomer

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oversimplifying but the idea is that

latro'a

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the issue is when it fails some attributes but clearly satisfies others

Rnuomer

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then I'd think there's a difference between typical & nessessary traits of a bird

latro'a

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similar to what I was describing, yeah

latro'a

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the problem is that you then have a rabbit hole

Rnuomer

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=:3

xalbo

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I tend toward prototype logic. I have in my head an image of the prototype "Bird", and things either fall into the empirical cluster in thingspace that triggers that concept, or they don't.

xalbo

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Things at the edges get iffy, and then I back up and start having to talk about what they actually are.

Rnuomer

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perhaps we can pick an easier example

latro'a

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we've written down three metaphors for the same thing

selpa'i

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I can introduce some other points, like "We all have the same Furby". (but let's hear out Rnuomer)

Rnuomer

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e.g. flying

Rnuomer

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I mean "what does it take to qualify as "flying""

Rnuomer

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we can clearly say that someone standing on the ground is in fact not flying

Rnuomer

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relative to the ground, anyway

xalbo

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.ie

Rnuomer

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so one of the conditions of "flying" would be uhh

Rnuomer

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not... standing on the ground?

selpa'i

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I child that's being held up into the air might exclaim "look mommy i'm flying!"

Rnuomer

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would he be, though?

latro'a

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(my view: lo verba cu lifri lo ka vofli kei gi'e nai vofli

latro'a

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but that's somewhat orthogonal to the general topic)

xalbo

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Yes, but I think that child would not be speaking truly. That same child might then say "Look, I'm a kitten" while scampering on all fours.

Rnuomer

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if the only thing in the checklist is "not on ground" then we'd call that flying

selpa'i

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And it will say "Look, I'm taller than you" while standing on a stage.

Rnuomer

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however, there are probably more things to test for for "flying"

latro'a

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interestingly

latro'a

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that one actually works in lojban

latro'a

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and not nearly as well in english

latro'a

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mi galtu je nai clani zmadu do

Rnuomer

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so you'd need enough items on the list to define what "flying" is

latro'a

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the problem with such a list is that the list elements have lists

xalbo

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I'd say that x flies iff x is in an atmosphere in a gravity well, and supported by the atmosphere and not by any solid object.

latro'a

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eventually something is primitive

xalbo

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Interestingly, vofli2 makes balloons not qualify, though my mental model of "flying" fits them.

Rnuomer

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can something fly through space, tho?

xalbo

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Under that model, no.

latro'a

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we internalize it as such, but the physics are actually completely unrelated

xalbo

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(Which means it doesn't match my use of the word "fly" either. Damn.)

Rnuomer

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also

Rnuomer

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I have a teddy bear on my bed, can we say that it is bear-ing?

xalbo

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I contend that it neither bears, nor cribe.

Rnuomer

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we could call it "le cribe" though

latro'a

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I just had a slight weird math-epiphany

latro'a

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le is unrelated to whether it actually bears

Rnuomer

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le blanu cribe

latro'a

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the epiphany was a neat metaphor

selpa'i

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I would postulate that the majority of branches indeed lack terminal nodes.

xalbo

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Does a bear cribe in the woods?

latro'a

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for this linguistic discussion along with a concept from probability

latro'a

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anyone care to hear it? I can give an intuitive description of the math

latro'a

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it'll take about a paragraph

xalbo

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Will it fit in the margin? Do tell.

latro'a

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you can imagine, without having to go through all the math, a process of diffusion in a force field

latro'a

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that is, a particle moves around randomly in space, but depending on its position in space it may be pushed more in one direction or another

latro'a

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you can now imagine labeling two distinguished regions A and B; A definitely has some property and B definitely doesn't

latro'a

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(the physical example is a chemical system, where A is definitely reactants and B is definitely products)

latro'a

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this diffusion system induces a function called a committor, which is the probability of getting to B before going back to A, from each point x

latro'a

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the committor is a "reaction coordinate", in the sense that as it increases, the system is "more B-ish", and as it decreases, the system is more "A-ish"

latro'a

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going back to the force field for a second, in physical examples the force field is the gradient of some energy, that is, the system tries to decrease in energy for the most part

latro'a

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now that we have an energy, we can talk about temperature; specifically, in these systems the committor depends strongly on the temperature

latro'a

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when temperature is low, the energy is the dominant contributor, the system stays away from high energy areas, and the committor abruptly goes from near 0 to near 1 as you pass over an energy barrier

latro'a

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when temperature is high, the energy is a less important contributor, the system goes pretty much everywhere, and the system gradually transitions from near 0 to near 1

xalbo

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temperature, in this case, is the amount of randomness in the motion of the particles?

latro'a

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right

xalbo

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je'e do'u continue

latro'a

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the application here is to consider A as "~P", B as "P", and T as a fuzziness parameter: P is more or less fuzzy depending on the size of T

Visirus

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I like this metaphor

latro'a

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if T is very low, P is essentially sharp; there's a very small "gray area" where P "is debatable", and otherwise everything's crisp

Visirus

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Very much

latro'a

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and the reverse when T is high

Visirus

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It's an inverse proportional relationship

Visirus

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It's like saying, vagueness vs precise meaning.

latro'a

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you can stretch the metaphor a tad further, and imagine the diffusion as your mind going about its process of figuring out whether to assign a given input x to A or to b

latro'a

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*B

latro'a

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for "low T" or an input near A or B, it's a quick process which almost always has the same outcome

latro'a

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for "high T" or input near the dividing surface, it can be a gradual process, and you sometimes conclude A, sometimes B

Visirus

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Why only A and B?

Visirus

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There can be other options

latro'a

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it could be n-ary

Visirus

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Yup

Visirus

{{{2}}}

lojban therefore represents a sort of most probably logical instead of perfectly logical

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but unless the predicates depend on one another you could probably call that diffusion in several separate binary systems at once

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and yes, perfect logic requires perfect definitions

Rnuomer

{{{2}}}

so in the syntax, there's no real difference between "lo ractu" and "lo gleki ractu?"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

there's a tanru-parse in the second one

latro'a

{{{2}}}

at top level there's not, at mid-level you can distinguish

Visirus

{{{2}}}

But otherwise, no. It could be the T is high enough to mean either.

Rnuomer

{{{2}}}

but the truth value conditions are the same?

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Why not?

Rnuomer

{{{2}}}

the seltau doesn't matter, right?

Rnuomer

{{{2}}}

or do I understand wrong =:x

Visirus

{{{2}}}

The seltau is telling you the area of T that it is more probable to be

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Narrowing

Visirus

{{{2}}}

lo mlatu includes lo cladu mlatu then

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Additionally, imagine the T of a gismu being centered on it and the seltau narrowing the field. Then it's hierarchical.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Therefore you can say lo cribe goo and lo goo cribe and they don't mean the same thing.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Since lo goo cribe is an entirely different T than lo cribe goo, you can't refer to bear goo as just lo cribe. It's a different logical subsection

Day 2

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Expanding the field analogy a little bit, imagine something, say some goo on the ground.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Now, this goo is primarily a type of goo

Visirus

{{{2}}}

or something or other having to do with goo

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It is possible that it's from a bear

Visirus

{{{2}}}

But, the goo itself is primarily a different fuzziness region, T, than bear

Visirus

{{{2}}}

"bear goo" would then therefore lie outside the T of bear

Visirus

{{{2}}}

And cannot be termed lo cribe

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It's like electrons with different orbitals.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'm not sure why you're using the letter T btw

latro'a

{{{2}}}

T in the analogy was temperature, not a region of description space

Visirus

{{{2}}}

That's what this is.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Probabilistic space.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Such as, an electron is most likely at point A but can be contained anywhere within region T

Visirus

{{{2}}}

And is, and is not, simultaneously at all such points.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

lo mlatu may or may not be lo cladu mlatu

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I know, I'm talking about the symbol T

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it's taken already

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Fine, call it Pspace

Visirus

{{{2}}}

lol

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's also taken, lol

latro'a

{{{2}}}

albeit by computer scientists

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but really, T is an important aspect of this, because it has to do with how sharply you care to delineate regions of the description space

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Not at all

latro'a

{{{2}}}

"hot" discussion is metaphorical, fluid, open, informal; "cold" discussion is rigid, crisp, logical

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It's just incredibly unlikely that lo mlatu is lo gerku so it's negligible to the point of practically being 0

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I think we're talking about different things...

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Yes.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

I'm talking about a probabilistic model.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I know, but the model naturally includes a temperature

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the volatility, informality, whatever you want to call it is intrinsic

latro'a

{{{2}}}

sometimes we want to have crisp, clean definitions; other times we don't

Visirus

{{{2}}}

This is more akin to a quantum field theory I think.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that would also have a temperature once you go to the thermodynamic limit

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'm saying that there's not a fixed probability measure

latro'a

{{{2}}}

when you're joking around among friends, terms blur and mix more freely than when you're in a courtroom

Visirus

{{{2}}}

So, you see, you can define mlatu as being fully defined at whatever A is in English.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's contradictory

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Wait

Visirus

{{{2}}}

But

latro'a

{{{2}}}

English is subject to this same probabilistic interpretation, if not more

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It can exist anywhere within the field of lo mlatu

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you can't grab a natlang to use as a base

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Ok

Visirus

{{{2}}}

mlatu

Visirus

{{{2}}}

the A point of it

Visirus

{{{2}}}

the end node

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It doesn't matter the language

Visirus

{{{2}}}

In lojban, lo mlatu includes all lo seltau mlatu

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(as an aside, quantum is not purely probabilistic; if that were the case, transitions between observable states would be impossible)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but yes; broda is a less crisp region of description space than brode broda

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Well, quantum tunneling is what electrons do to jump energy levels.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Yes

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Now,

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's not a particle effect

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it's a wave effect

latro'a

{{{2}}}

which is why it's not pure probabliity

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It's probabilistic is the point.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(also, not every quantum transition is a tunneling process)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(tunneling is a rather specific type of process where a nonclassical transition occurs)

Visirus

{{{2}}}

You're pointing out irrelevancies.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

s/nonclassical/classically forbidden

latro'a

{{{2}}}

sorry, my remark was just an aside that you replied to :)

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Ok

Visirus

{{{2}}}

mlatu is defined at whatever point A may be

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I would interpret a given selbri as itself being a potential

latro'a

{{{2}}}

in this model

Visirus

{{{2}}}

If something has a high probability of lying within the lo brode mlatu space, it's a lo mlatu

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it's not "defined at a point", instead it's a potential on the whole space

Visirus

{{{2}}}

But mlatu itself is defined at a point.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

perhaps, perhaps not

latro'a

{{{2}}}

depends on if you claim that there is a crisp region at all

latro'a

{{{2}}}

with mlatu in particular there probably is, but with other selbri this may not be so obvious

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Under this, if something is observably primarily something and you call it that, then you can't take out the tertau

Visirus

{{{2}}}

er

Visirus

{{{2}}}

seltau

Visirus

{{{2}}}

lo goo cribe

latro'a

{{{2}}}

sure; seltau tighten the potential

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Yes

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but a different tertau gives you a different potential altogether

latro'a

{{{2}}}

with different structure

Visirus

{{{2}}}

YES

Visirus

{{{2}}}

My solution to the bear goo problem.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it's not entirely a solution, because you have to get people to agree that the goo is or isn't a bear

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It can be a bear type of goo

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it can also be a goo bear

Visirus

{{{2}}}

but if you look at goo and call it a bear, you'd better have a damned good reason

latro'a

{{{2}}}

which is the whole problem

latro'a

{{{2}}}

yes

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but xorlo basically suggests that the reasons don't have to be as good as you might exepct

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Without explanation, you cannot change the potential

latro'a

{{{2}}}

*expect

latro'a

{{{2}}}

given context

latro'a

{{{2}}}

well, it changes itself

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's the difficult part

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Because one would expect something to lie within a certain potential

latro'a

{{{2}}}

T goes up and down with context, and terms even shift in their meaning, which changes the potential

Visirus

{{{2}}}

If you change it all willy nilly like, they'll be, obviously, confused.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

sure

latro'a

{{{2}}}

on the other hand, if you define lo broda as zo'e ne lo* ka broda, where "lo*" is a magic thing that makes a ka like we normally use it, then it's not confusing

Visirus

{{{2}}}

So, one must always use the most obvious potential based on as little outside context, unless it's already given that both parties know such context.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

since bear goo does in fact have something to do with being a bear, even if it isn't itself *actually* a bear

latro'a

{{{2}}}

eh, that doesn't exactly fix it, though, because we don't talk about the potential directly

Visirus

{{{2}}}

You'd have to think about it.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

consider selpa'i's example from yesterday

Visirus

{{{2}}}

If I know it's bear goo but you don't, it's almost intentionally confusing to call it lo cribe

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if a flock of birds cipni, and you see one flock of birds, then you saw lo pa cipni, even if the flock had 10 birds in it

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and yes, of course there's deceptiveness, that didn't need a probabilistic interpretation to be concluded :)

Visirus

{{{2}}}

The probabilistic interpretation makes so much sense though imo

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it helps, yes

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but really the end point here is "be communicative"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

which doesn't need any formalism whatsoever

Visirus

{{{2}}}

A computer could use the probabilistic engine to determine better translations for ideas natlang <-> lojban

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if one person thinks cribe means "living bears" and the other thinks it means "anything having to do with bears"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

then they're not being communicative

Visirus

{{{2}}}

The person thinking living bears is wrong then

Visirus

{{{2}}}

because that's a seltau

latro'a

{{{2}}}

not...exactly

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'm using english as metalanguage here

latro'a

{{{2}}}

so don't gloss cribe as "bear"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you can restructure the description space so that cribe is "living bears" and cribe morsi is "bear corpses"

Visirus

{{{2}}}

a dead bear has a potential of being called lo cribe and lo xadni.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that depends on the structure of the description space being used by the person

Visirus

{{{2}}}

The potentials are so close though, because of the nature of the vagueness of the thing, that it's a choice.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you draw that conclusion from natlang interpretation more than anything else mio

latro'a

{{{2}}}

*imo

latro'a

{{{2}}}

there's no particular reason why bear corpses *must* be bears

Visirus

{{{2}}}

The potential for the thing you're naming

latro'a

{{{2}}}

is the one that you have in your mind

Visirus

{{{2}}}

It has potential to be other things

latro'a

{{{2}}}

not theirs

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's the whole problem

latro'a

{{{2}}}

one person's potential may rise sharply when you pass over into the "dead" region

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the other's may not

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Yes, consider all, or as many as possible, and determine the most likely based on as little context as possible. Only immediate observables.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if you can

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the problem is that this formalism doesn't help you perform that "figuring it out" process

Visirus

{{{2}}}

A computer could use it to better translate things

latro'a

{{{2}}}

maybe; they have to have information about attributes that make things more bearish or less bearish

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Using a sort of tag cloud format

latro'a

{{{2}}}

which ultimately comes down more to something like Rnuomer's checklist, much different from xalbo's "prototype" model

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Go on...

latro'a

{{{2}}}

which for a computer would be more neural network: when presented with a bear-candidate, what fires? how does this compare to something that we definitely call a bear?

latro'a

{{{2}}}

for example, to me a living bear is more bearish than a bear corpse

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Yes

latro'a

{{{2}}}

even a fresh one

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'd still call a fresh bear corpse a bear

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but my potential has gone up by that point

latro'a

{{{2}}}

then as it decays it goes up further, and sometime before the point where I can't even tell it was a bear, the potential is so high that it's not worth thinking about

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Then you can't call it a bear

latro'a

{{{2}}}

by that point, sure

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'm describing my potential, though; others' potentials are different

Visirus

{{{2}}}

The area in between is the fuzzy

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I think selpa'i's potential rises less sharply as the bear dies

latro'a

{{{2}}}

based on our discussion

latro'a

{{{2}}}

in general I think selpa'i is "hotter" than I am, in this formalism

Visirus

{{{2}}}

If the world were the movie Equilibrium, this would be no issue.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

na slabu

Visirus

{{{2}}}

You can't remove all the uncertainty, but you can diminish most of it. Definitions need to be specific, or people may speak with the knowledge that no matter what, they'll never be able to completely remove the fuzziness from the meaning.

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Meh

Visirus

{{{2}}}

.i mi xagji

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

To me it's very difficult to priorly define a personal scale of potential, as everything is highly sensitive to context; the psychology isn't static throughout time. Making up a scale here and now is to some extent futile (or requires a *lot* of imagination and foresight) as the universe "collapes" time and again and needs to be re-differentiated each time.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

one nice thing about this model to me is that the actual *potential* changes much more slowly than T

latro'a

{{{2}}}

at least for me

Visirus

{{{2}}}

Remove context

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Impossible.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I may fluctuate in how much I care about the boundaries between concepts

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

And undesirable at least for me.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but the boundaries themselves (in the sense of the potential, not sharply delineated regions) move slowly

latro'a

{{{2}}}

for example

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the fact that a bear corpse is less bearish than a living bear

latro'a

{{{2}}}

is an invariant for me

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the idea that a bear corpse *is a bear*

latro'a

{{{2}}}

is not

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the probability is always lower, but it could be a difference of 1 vs. 0.9 or 1 vs. 0.5

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the tricky thing about all this is that there is SOME effective nonexistence of context

latro'a

{{{2}}}

er

latro'a

{{{2}}}

nonrelevance I guess

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if there weren't we would never be able to communicate

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Or we grow up learning our language in a context.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Which might be the same thing effectively.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

not....exactly

latro'a

{{{2}}}

context isn't relevant if it's constant

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

That's basically what I said (meant).

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'm saying that there are some basic assumptions that are so absurdly hard to break that it doesn't matter, or at least so it seems

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if there weren't, we wouldn't be able to depend on those assumptions to communicate

latro'a

{{{2}}}

a blunt example: "assumption" does not mean "fish", ever

Ilmen

{{{2}}}

lo se sruma / lo finpe

latro'a

{{{2}}}

perhaps one sensible assumption is that the potential is finite on a bounded region, where the bounds are invariant

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that is, there are some things that might in a bizarre context be bears, but aren't ruled out a priori

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and some things that are usually bears, and some things that are always bears

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and then everything else is never ever a bear-

latro'a

{{{2}}}

on a more practical note

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Could your model be called a dynamic-range-but-definitely-always-some-endpoint Ready-Madeist view?

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Since your dead bear scale is flexible-ish, but always has some endpoint.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

And this would fit with your idea of there being things that can never ever cribe

latro'a

{{{2}}}

especially with something that's not even done

latro'a

{{{2}}}

"perhaps one sensible assumption"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I didn't postulate anything >.>

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

No, sorry, I didn't even refer to your last idea

latro'a

{{{2}}}

then there's absolutely nothing to get the static endpoints from

latro'a

{{{2}}}

because prior to that I'd only said that there are "practical static endpoints", which means it's not in the model at all

latro'a

{{{2}}}

just a consequence

latro'a

{{{2}}}

so, no, don't call it that

latro'a

{{{2}}}

anyway

latro'a

{{{2}}}

on a more practical note

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

I vaguely remember you saying that at some point, a cribe stops cribe'ing absolutely (though not in those words).

latro'a

{{{2}}}

eh, I try to avoid fatci and its english counterparts

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Even if you didn't settle on anything.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

I'm just trying to comment on those points

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'm not sure whether that postulate should be built into the model, or if you should instead have an unbounded potential that just tails off for most predicates

latro'a

{{{2}}}

so don't quote me on it being built in

latro'a

{{{2}}}

because it's not

latro'a

{{{2}}}

ANYWAY

latro'a

{{{2}}}

been trying to change the subject for 5 minutes

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I'd like to try and work out the lo du'u mi viska pa loi za'u cipni cu nibli lo du'u mi viska pa lo cipni thing

latro'a

{{{2}}}

"I see a flock of cipni; a flock of cipni cipni's; therefore I see one cipni (namely, the flock)"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

provided loi za'u cipni cu cipni, everything else passes through

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I should have said "one flock", however, not "a flock"

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Interesting, you seem to be taking this whole thing from a whole 'nother angle.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

This is an entirely different dimension of the "I see one bird" thing.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

In my example, it was about slicing up the universe in such a way that a flock of birds (all of a single species probably) are seen and described as a single bird, because in that particular universe the distinction between those individual flock members doesn't exist.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

There literally is only one bird there.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

This is what happens in a non-ready-made universe. The universe always starts out as a big clump, and can be sliced up in infinitely many ways, and then stuff happens post-differentiation.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

In a ready-made view, the universe gets sliced up once and never collapes again.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

In non-RM, it always goes back to a clump.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I know

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but *even in this view*

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you can have it that single birds cipni and flocks of birds cipni

latro'a

{{{2}}}

then take a bunch of single birds, put them in a group

latro'a

{{{2}}}

say that the group cipni

latro'a

{{{2}}}

see the group

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and now say that you saw only one thing that cipni

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

lo pa tadni cu sruri lo dinju

latro'a

{{{2}}}

indeed

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

It's a good point.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

It's a somewhat related, but really quite distinct phenomenon, not really hinging on any ready-made talk.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it definitely doesn't require any ready-made hypotheses

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Right.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

all it requires is that in a given context you accept that a group made up of brodas is a broda

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

With loi things seem a bit unsettled, but you can do this with just lo.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

with loi it depends a bit more on the predicate, arguably

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

loi having the problem of possibly adding properties (or removing) from the single broda

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but I would be inclined to agree with it for cipni and such

latro'a

{{{2}}}

at least, naively

latro'a

{{{2}}}

this "gotcha" makes me hesitant, but if I hadn't considered it, I would have no issue with loi cipni cu cipni

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

lo ci cipni cu cipni .i pa lo cipni cu go'i

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

why not pa cipni cu go'i

latro'a

{{{2}}}

uhh

latro'a

{{{2}}}

avoid go'i, please

latro'a

{{{2}}}

because attempting to answer your question confused me

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you replaced the only sumti that was filled

latro'a

{{{2}}}

so it wasn't clear whether go'i was actually just cipni or "the previous sentence's cipni"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

in idiomatic lojban it'd be the former if all the sumti were replaced

latro'a

{{{2}}}

at any rate, pa da cipni definitely doesn't happen

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but you could group the universe such that pa da cu cipni gi'e gunma

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's the problem with masses, the speaker is free to build and dismantle them

latro'a

{{{2}}}

also, these outer quantifiers play differently with "cognitive" predicates vs. "noncognitive" predicates

latro'a

{{{2}}}

for example, if I see a flock of 10 birds, pa cipni cu zvati is false, but mi viska pa cipni can be true

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if I see the flock but can't pick out individual birds

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(maybe make it 1000 birds)

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

You can look at the flock, see individual birds, and still claim that pa cipni cu zvati (because extra birds don't add a count to how many different birds you perceive), that's the example I explained earlier.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

It's most simple to imagine (I think) if you let all the flock be eagles, then an eagle more or less doesn't change that there is just one bird, namely the eagle.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's deceptive at best

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you observe pa cipni cu zvati, but you're wrong, because the components are also birds

latro'a

{{{2}}}

a problem is that in fact a very large number of cipni are present

latro'a

{{{2}}}

supposing there's 10 birds in a flock present, then you have the 10 singletons, the 45 pairs, the 120 triples, etc.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

so many hundreds of cipni are "present"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

because every subgroup *exists*, even if not every subgroup *matters*

latro'a

{{{2}}}

in fact an even larger number of subgroups *exist* when you start allowing for bird goo; for example, a whole bird+another bird's liver is perhaps a cipni too

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

See, this is why I keep thinking that you are RM-ist. And this is not in any way meant in a bad way, it's simply a different perspective. Either you can't perceive the universe non-RM, or you just find it horrible. Which is it?

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Because I am trying to explain that they don't, in a way, exist.

ksf

{{{2}}}

rm?

ksf

{{{2}}}

and latro'a is completely right from a set-theoretical POV btw.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Of course.

ksf

{{{2}}}

...assuming that birds are distinguishable, though.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Math is usually ready-made.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I can understand it, but I don't see the problem in regrouping in a non-RM setting

latro'a

{{{2}}}

1) there are 10 birds, as we understand it in english

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Can you imagine there being a universe where number doesn't exist?

latro'a

{{{2}}}

2) groups of birds are birds

latro'a

{{{2}}}

er

latro'a

{{{2}}}

groups of birds are cipni

latro'a

{{{2}}}

conclusion: >1000 cipni exist

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and while I can imagine it, it's sufficiently impractical that I don't really care to bother

latro'a

{{{2}}}

xorlo isn't worth sacrificing outer quantifiers as a concept for

latro'a

{{{2}}}

nothing is, really

latro'a

{{{2}}}

we need them to be communicative

latro'a

{{{2}}}

there's a point when I stop caring about the philosophy of all this because it's so far down the rabbit hole that it doesn't mean anything anymore

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I feel the same about most of the attempts that have been made at formalizing subjunctivity

latro'a

{{{2}}}

anything that involves outer quantifiers not meaning what they should mean is so far down the rabbit hole that it's gone to china and back 1000 times already

latro'a

{{{2}}}

going back to my example

latro'a

{{{2}}}

supposing there are 10 birds the way we mean it in english

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

What they should mean? They still do what they do, namely they quantify over something. They don't tell you what the domain of discourse is, or about cardinality, but why should they?

latro'a

{{{2}}}

why are there only 10 cipni, if we acknowledge that groups of birds are birds

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the problem is that you can't change the domain of discourse

latro'a

{{{2}}}

so we have to have a sane one

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

I can't change it?

latro'a

{{{2}}}

there's no explicit way to set it, no

latro'a

{{{2}}}

not in lojban

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

So?

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

There is always one.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that means you need a sane one

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Isn't "sane" extremely subjective?

latro'a

{{{2}}}

yes, hence the whole probability discussion

ksf

{{{2}}}

as soon as you equate singletons and sets you get every imaginable kind of decidability problem.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but one in which "there are 10 birds" means "there are 10 possible regroupings of birds" is not sane

latro'a

{{{2}}}

period

ksf

{{{2}}}

"sane" isn't subjective when what you're saying triggers the halting problem.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and I don't see why, even in a non-RM setting, the speaker shouldn't be allowed to freely regroup things

ksf

{{{2}}}

what's the problem with using cmima, anyway?

latro'a

{{{2}}}

if you can regroup things and also can express that there are 10 birds on a branch in the sense that english means, then you're going to have to have that a flock of birds isn't a bird

latro'a

{{{2}}}

sets are awkward as hell for a lot of reasons

latro'a

{{{2}}}

they don't actually do anything other than cmima

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and se mei

latro'a

{{{2}}}

they *encode* other things

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but that's indirect

• ksf says: If you want to speak about permutations of sets of birds, speak about permutations of sets of birds, not birds.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

On IRC, as noted, RM is the prevalent mode.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the issue is that we've acknowledged that lo za'u broda cu broda and that lo za'u broda cu [do something that they can only do as a group]

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and that this is at the same level of predication

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(I've proposed having distinct CU for different levels of predication more than once)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(I've never liked masses-as-sumti)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(it's orthogonal to the real issue, which is how the plural entity behaves)

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

(if a mass has other properties, than it is good to have it as a sumti)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's one way to look at it

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but there's a different one

latro'a

{{{2}}}

namely that it has different properties *in different senses of "have property"*

ksf

{{{2}}}

...you don't have to equate sets and single birds for that to work. you just have to have a cardinality function that's defined over the intersection of 'Set a' and 'a'

latro'a

{{{2}}}

a plural group of students has a collective property of surrounding the building and an individual property of screaming

latro'a

{{{2}}}

the big gap that this opens is that it may not always make sense to assume that a mass is openable

latro'a

{{{2}}}

but then you just respond to an individual statement with na'i and all is well

ksf

{{{2}}}

if you want to do some mathematical woo-hoo to get formulas to look nicer you can define "cipni" to be "set of birds with cardinality 1".

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you're not going to be able to do this with sets

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you can go ahead and give up on that

tsani

{{{2}}}

Hm.

tsani

{{{2}}}

I've read all the backscroll and I have an idea.

• ksf thinks his definition is mathematically sane and not actually different from what latro'a wants

tsani

{{{2}}}

It seems like we can preserve the formal definitions of the gadri proposal, even if we throw "loi broda cu broda" being true out the window.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

ksf: not really; there are fundamental obstacles to actually building this sort of thing up from set theory

latro'a

{{{2}}}

in particular the old "what are the members of pi?" question

latro'a

{{{2}}}

set theory is terrible

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it's an awkward foundation that is really only nice because it shows that you don't have to assume that much to get off the ground

ksf

{{{2}}}

oh, I was talking about sets as a data type. I'm into type theory, myself.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and then godel showed that you don't even get off the ground anyway

tsani

{{{2}}}

If we consider the definition of the inner quantifier, lo PA broda = zo'e noi ke'a broda zi'e noi zilkancu li PA lo broda, it turns out that inner quantifiers just need to "quantify" over instances of lo broda

tsani

{{{2}}}

Then, we say that lo broda can just *produce* any type.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

we actually talked about that yesterday

latro'a

{{{2}}}

and noted that it's disastrous

tsani

{{{2}}}

The Gadri Proposal therefore implies selpa'i's earlier statements.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

for the exact reasons we were talking about

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

tsani: What do you mean by type?

ksf

{{{2}}}

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intuitionistic_type_theory

tsani

{{{2}}}

In a way you'd phrase it, 'lo doesn't have a type'.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

ksf: yes yes, I know what you're going for, but that doesn't work either

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

If you're saying that lo can stand in for lo'i, then I'd disagree.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

language is more complicated than a robust formalism

tsani

{{{2}}}

selpa'i: that doesn't really matter right now.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Okay, "no type" doesn't sound like "producing any type"

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

I'm really only trying to understand you.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

you're speaking from different formalisms

latro'a

{{{2}}}

as in, your protest to "can produce any type" is relative to an untyped formalism

latro'a

{{{2}}}

afaict

tsani

{{{2}}}

You reject types throughout Lojban, don't you, selpa'i, so I'm surprised that you're not just agreeing.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Let me explain.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

I can make it quite concrete: I don't consider lo ro ninmu in do melrai lo ro ninmu to "stand in" for lo'i ro ninmu.

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

Instead, my definition of traji doesn't use a set.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(btw, ksf, I don't want to be rude, but I'd appreciate if you stopped with the set theory/type theory discussion; it's been beaten to death by this community already, and it's long since accepted that it's not adequate)

tsani

{{{2}}}

Yeah, that much I know.

tsani

{{{2}}}

We've all basically thrown lo'i out the window.

ksf

{{{2}}}

well, at least type theory has a chance of describing predicate logic sanely, but I understand.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

predicate logic isn't adequate, either

ksf

{{{2}}}

and there goes the myth :)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's part of the point of this discussion

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(that's also long since accepted, afaict)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

(so yeah, not adding anything here)

tsani

{{{2}}}

If lo broda is explicitly not explicit about distributivity (in other words, it can produce individuals or collectives) then the zilkancu equation of the gadri proposal lets lo pa cipni be a flock of birds *without saying that a flock of birds is a bird*.

tsani

{{{2}}}

(That's the main difference that I'm pointing out.)

latro'a

{{{2}}}

I still question whether that's what was actually intended

selpa'i

{{{2}}}

tsani: Depends on what you mean by types again. I don't reject the idea that a du'u cannot dacti, so clearly I agree with types, so what exactly do you mean? If you mean that I find rigid-typing a bit inconvenient (i.e. sumti places being super limited in what they can take), then yes, I do.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

in the zilkancu equation

tsani

{{{2}}}

I agree that it may have been unintentional on xorxes's part, but to be honest, and being somewhat acquainted with his ideas by proxy of selpa'i, then I'm inclined to think that this awkward consequence was intentional.

latro'a

{{{2}}}

also

latro'a

{{{2}}}

an obvious terrifying corollary

latro'a

{{{2}}}

lo ci cipni can be 3 arbitrarily nested bird groups

tsani

{{{2}}}

yup

latro'a

{{{2}}}

it could even just be three different ways of breaking up all of the birds into groups

ksf

{{{2}}}

what about ditching distributivity in favour of polymorphism?

tsani

{{{2}}}

Also, that being said, lo broda can produce things (in one context) that do not broda (in another context).

latro'a

{{{2}}}

that's "explicitly not explicit about distributivity"

latro'a

{{{2}}}

already done

To be continued?...