xorlo & mi nitcu lo mikce
[http://www.lojban.org/tiki/Am%20experimentally%20cross-posting%20to%20wikidiscuss-list.%20If%20it%20works,%3Cbr%20/%3EI'll%20discontinue%20the%20thread%20from%20Lojban%20list. Am experimentally cross-posting to wikidiscuss-list. If it works, I'll discontinue the thread from Lojban list.]
xorxes: > --- And Rosta wrote: > > But let me reask my question, because it hasn't been > > answered yet. "PA broda" can apply to PA subkinds of Brodakind > > or to PA things that are classified as having the property of > > being broda. > > Right, but {lo} does not make that distinction. A subkind > of brodakind is nothing but a thing classified as having the property > of being broda.
This can't be right. Subkinds of, say, Mr Dog exist by virtue of being conceivable/imaginable, whereas instances of Mr Dog, viz things that I classify as having doghood, exist by virtue of having material existence (since that is a necessary condition of doghood). I accept that this is an ontological distinction. But I think it's a distinction it is needful to be able to make somehow.
> > — Xorlo generalizes over that dichotomy, which is > > fair enough, but since it is a distinction that underlies the > > two nonspecific readings of "I need a doctor", it would be > > nice to have a way of making the distinction if one wanted to. > > I'm not sure it is a pure dichotomy. {mi nitcu su'o lo mikce} > can't have the "I need any doctor" reading. Neither of two > "I need any doctor" possible readings in fact: "I need any individual > who is a doctor", or "I need any kind of doctor".
Yes, you're right, & I was wrong on that point.
> > That is, given "mi nitcu re mikce", it would be nice to > > have a way of signalling whether the truth-conditions of > > the sentence are to involve checking through the subkinds of > > Mr Doctor (& seeing whether I need exactly two of them) > > That's exactly what it always involves. The tricky part is > figuring out what counts as a subkind in the given context. > Perhaps in the case of doctors there are usually only two > obvious choices: either specialists of a given speciality, or > individuals. But for other brivla there may be other options. > > > or, > > on the other hand, checking through the things in the material > > world that are classified as having the property of doctorhood > > (& seeing whether I need exactly two of them). > > The (present?) material world is not especially favoured by the > _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, although it is a very > frequent obvious choice in many contexts.
Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of doctorhood in the world in which I need them. In other words, that one can go out into the world in which my needing occurs, and find & grab hold of these two individuals that are doctors.
For clarity, a second example: There is an ambiguity in "I drew two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate two unicorns". How can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted to do so?
> > I'm not saying that this is something the BPFK gadri proposals > > should have covered; but I find it hard to imagine how > > the distinction could be marked other than by gadri and, > > obviously, the matter occurs to me because in ancestral > > versions of xorlo the distinction was made. > > I think that unless the grammar is to impose an ontology, > that distinction can't be made with gadri. One way to make > it is through prediacates: "is a subkind of", "is an instance > of"
I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance of lo mikce" would not guarantee that we are referring to actual instances; we could be referring to imaginable instances. That's why I can't see how to do it without involving gadri. (More precisely, I can't see how to do it without having a way to distinguish quantification over subkinds from quantification over instances.)
--And.
On Tue, Jan 11, 2005 at 07:42:32PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > [http://www.lojban.org/tiki/Am%20experimentally%20cross-posting%20to%20wikidiscuss-list.%20If%20it%20works,%3Cbr%20/%3E%3E%20I'll%20discontinue%20the%20thread%20from%20Lojban%20list. Am experimentally cross-posting to wikidiscuss-list. If it works, > I'll discontinue the thread from Lojban list.]
It works, except that now there's forum topic named "Re: lojban Re: xorlo & mi nitcu lo mikce", which is why I asked you to start threads using the forum, so the subject line could be preserved.
Oh well; it's no big deal.
-Robin
Sigh! Incoherent as I believe xorlo to be (as presented anyhow) and consequently so likely to come up with unexpected changes, I did think that it had finally gotten away from trying to fit intensional objects in with extensional ones and (apparently felt to be related) abstracta in with concreta. How uncharacteristically sanguine of me. Assuming that & is correctly presenting an intended option in xorlo (and the responses seem to assure this), the muck — which is nicely sorted out in the old Lojban — is with us again. I am really sorry that there are so many people who cannot handle intensional objects and abstracts in Lojban (though presumably they can in their native language, if not very consciously) but they aregoing to turn up whatever you do so learn to deal with them. In ancient Lojban (before some change or other that I have lost track of) there were (as there were always are) two ways to deal with intensional cases (failures of quantification and identity): designate some places as intensional contexts or designate those places as requiring situational terms (terms for events or properties or some other abstract thing). Without one or the other of these — it doesn't matter which and old Lojban used a mixture, which is fine too -- semantic ambguities and invalid inferences will be supported on the grammatical level. We had all that is needed, we just consistently refused to use it, claiming, I gather, that it was somehow "wrong," (meaning generally that when we made untinking translations from English — or carried our English or whatever habits over to Lojban, we failed to use the right forms and so said something we did not mean, since English (and SAE languages generally) is notoriously bad (see the history of western Philosophy)in this area. Rather than devoting a small amount to time to learning to do things right, an enormous amount to time has been spent in trying to find a way to make our natural English habits correct in Lojban. Pooh! X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: clifford-j@sbcglobal.net Precedence: bulk Reply-to: wikidiscuss-list@lojban.org X-list: wikidiscuss
> xorxes: > > The (present?) material world is not especially favoured by the > > _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, although it is a very > > frequent obvious choice in many contexts. > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous > claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of > doctorhood in the world in which I need them. X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 Sender: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org Errors-to: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org X-original-sender: jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar Precedence: bulk Reply-to: wikidiscuss-list@lojban.org X-list: wikidiscuss
That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the property of being a doctor".
> In other words, > that one can go out into the world in which my needing occurs, > and find & grab hold of these two individuals that are doctors.
By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of things that we may make reference to in a given discourse. In one context, {lo mikce} may have a single referent in the universe of discourse, in other contexts it may have more than one. In any context, {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two of the referents of {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the universe of discourse) are such that I need them. In that discourse, I don't need any of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from all the referents in the universe of discourse).
> For clarity, a second example: There is an ambiguity in "I drew > two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate two unicorns". How > can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted to do so?
Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is like "I took a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew two unicorns" that is like "I made two unicorns out of clay"? maybe we can distinguish them with different predicates:
mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna I picture-created two unicorns.
mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna I picture-copy-made two unicorns.
You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't eat them into existence, so that would be the difference between those predicates.
> > I think that unless the grammar is to impose an ontology, > > that distinction can't be made with gadri. One way to make > > it is through prediacates: "is a subkind of", "is an instance > > of" > > I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance of lo mikce" > would not guarantee that we are referring to actual instances; > we could be referring to imaginable instances. That's why > I can't see how to do it without involving gadri. (More > precisely, I can't see how to do it without having a way > to distinguish quantification over subkinds from quantification > over instances.)
Would that require fixing the universe of discourse to the one set of referents we all agree are true material indivisible objects in the real meterial world, irrespective of context? I don't think that's desirable, but I'm not sure it's even possible. For some broda we may all agree on what counts as a true individual concrete real single broda for any and all contexts, but for many broda we won't, it will depend on context.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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(This was sent to pc privately by mistake. I don't know if pc's post was sent to the forums list or just to me, probably just to me but intended for the list. pc, if you still have your post you may want to repost it, as I have not included everything in my response.)
> This notion of "universe of discourse" is fraught > with practical difficulties e.g., are things in > the physical environment in the universe or not
In some contexts they are, in other contexts they are not.
> and, if not, how can I then introduce them,
Mentioning something immediately introduces it into the discourse.
>or , > if so, what is excluded?)
There is no general answer. When I say that there is nothing in the box, air molecules are normally excluded from the universe of discourse, but once I mention them, we have to admit that there is something in the box after all.
> but it also does not > solve the {mi nitcu lo mikce} problem, which is > about scope, not range: {mi nitcu lo mikce} does > not generally even entail (let alone be > equivalent to) {lo mikce zo'u mi nitcu my}, since > whatever doctor(s) we pick is not needed for > another would do as well.
In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of discourse contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for those who don't mind that picture. If you can't picture doctors as just doctors, and you necessarily must picture them as an aggregate of many individual doctors, each considered separately, then you must take another course, for example (mi nitcu lo nu da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats me" or something like that. Here you are picturing all {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr Someone-Treats-Me" that you need, but some people mind doing this abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to abstract than people.
> > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but > > you can't > > eat them into existence, so that would be the > > difference > > between those predicates. > > Category mistake. Pictures of unicorns aren't > unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) — see > the fronting problem again if nothing else.
That seems like an ontology issue. Are teddy-bears bears? CLL says they are, if I recall corrrectly. I say it depends on the context (maybe that's what CLL says too). The same with pictures of unicorns. I don't think there needs to be a special gadri to sort teddy-bears from more central bears, or drawn unicorns from clay unicorns from flesh-and-blood unicorns.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
John E Clifford wrote:
>Sigh! > >
Why has the new proposal been met with universal acceptance, even by the esteemed Dr. Rosta?
Why have you failed to offer an alternative proposal lacking in the perceived defects, or succeeded in defending the previous system as it was?
-- "The more you tighten your grip, Tarkin, the more star systems will slip through your fingers."
> --- Jorge Llamb�as > wrote: > > Mentioning something immediately introduces it > > into the discourse. > > But, in order to mention it and thus bring it > into the universe, it has to be somewhere already > (in some sense).
Well, if it was somewhere already, we could define that somewhere as the one true universe of discourse fixed once and for all for every utterance in every context. I don't think there is such a somewhere.
> In particular, suppose I say > "some cows" or "there are cows that," what cows > have introduced? the ones that satisfy the rest > of the sentence?
No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some cows" "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces cows. {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo bakni} and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni} to have referents in the universe of discourse. The quantifiers just quantify over those referents, they don't introduce them.
> But the rest of the sentence > comes after the introduction — the cows have to > be there in order to go on. And what if I am > wrong? I have introduced cows apparently but none > of them have the properties involved. So, maybe > by mentioning cows I introduce the lot of them. > But then, what is excluded — I mentioned > physical objects too, so are all of them in or is > it specific?
{lo dacti} in principle could have a single referent, "Mr Object".
> I suspect this is all terminological, that > "universe of discourse" here means something more > restricted than usual (what has actually been > mentioned and perhaps what is going to be > mentioned in the foreseeable future, abstracted > from the broader notion of, say, the range of > quantifiers or the like). A smidge of > clarification might be handy here — and maybe > some new terminology as well.
You're welcome to suggest other terminology, but I think "universe of discourse" is fairly standard.
> > >or , > > > if so, what is excluded?) > > > > There is no general answer. When I say that > > there > > is nothing in the box, air molecules are > > normally > > excluded from the universe of discourse, but > > once > > I mention them, we have to admit that there is > > something in the box after all. > > I didn't ask for a general answer in the sense of > a list of allthe things that are always in the > universe of discourse, only criteria for deciding > whjat is in and what is not. Obviously > everything tha has been mentioned explicitly is > in. Almost as obviously, some other things, > implicit in what has been said or about to be > mentioned, are also in, but what are the limits > — by rule, not by list
I don't know the rule. Relevance will probably be the most significant factor.
> > In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of > > discourse > > contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for those > > who don't mind that picture. If you can't > > picture > > doctors as just doctors, and you necessarily > > must > > picture them as an aggregate of many individual > > > > doctors, each considered separately, then you > > must > > take another course, for example (mi nitcu lo > > nu > > da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats me" > > or > > something like that. Here you are picturing all > > > > {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr > > Someone-Treats-Me" > > that you need, but some people mind doing this > > abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" > > abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to > > abstract > > than people. > > Ah, the history of Philosophy: those who ignore > it are doomed to repeat it. This is the kind of > metaphysical argle-bargle created by not paying > attenmtion to logic (or being to lazy to use it). > There is no Mr. Doctor (shouldn't that be "Dr. > Doctor"?) and if there were, he would be of no > help in satisfying a person's needs. Only a real > concrete doctor will do that, and further one who > is in the appropriate relation to the needer -- > treating him, say.
Mr Doctor (or Dr. Doctor if you prefer) is of course real and concrete. Just like an event of a doctor curing me has to be real and concrete in order to be any use to me. I have no need for an event of a doctor curing me if the event is not real and concrete.
> The fact that we cannot > identify beforehand who that doctor is, indeed > that the need is indifferent to that issue, does > not mean that there is an indifferent doctor who > is needed or an unidentified one. It only means > that the quantifier involved is within the scope > of the needing. > As for Mr. abstractions just being a variant of > event abstractions (and sometimes property or > truth function or... abstractions), the Lojban > answer is simply NO. The event, property, and so > on abstractions are inherent in Lojban; the Mr. > abstractions — assuming that it could be given > some meaningful interpretation (and all serious > attempts at this have failed so far) — is a new > thing, not already provided for. That it is > being used to hi-jack an existing construction, > which had a perfectly good but different meaning, > does not mean that it was laready in Lojban. It > is a foreign import and needs to be marked as > such.
It was first introduced in Loglan by JCB, so it can't be all that new.
> > > > You can draw two unicorns into existence, > > but > > > > you can't > > > > eat them into existence, so that would be > > the > > > > difference > > > > between those predicates. > > > > > > Category mistake. Pictures of unicorns > > aren't > > > unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) -- > > see > > > the fronting problem again if nothing else. > > > > That seems like an ontology issue. Are > > teddy-bears bears? > > CLL says they are, if I recall corrrectly. I > > say it depends > > on the context (maybe that's what CLL says > > too). The same > > with pictures of unicorns. I don't think there > > needs to be a > > special gadri to sort teddy-bears from more > > central bears, > > or drawn unicorns from clay unicorns from > > flesh-and-blood > > unicorns. > > I agree, this is not a gadri issue — unless you > want to use the "what I am calling" aspect of > {le} to deal with the eccentric cases. You > might, of course, say it is a brivla issue: what > exactly does a certain predicate mean (I take it > that this is the solution proposed for teddy > bears). So, if {pavyseljirna} refers simply to a > shape (as Kung Sun Lung would have us believe) > then painting a picture of a unicorn presents no > problem: there is the unicorn I painted a picture > of, namely the shape of the picture itself. This > of course makes for some very strange aesthetics: > it become hard to define realism, for example, or > portraiture in particular. And it is rarely what > we mean. >
(I think I didn't delete any of your stuff this time. I believe your post was sent to me only, not to the list. I am responding to the list.)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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> John E Clifford wrote: > > >Sigh! > > > > > > Why has the new proposal been met with > universal acceptance, even by the > esteemed Dr. Rosta? > > Why have you failed to offer an alternative > proposal lacking in the > perceived defects, or succeeded in defending > the previous system as it was?
i CAN'T EXPLAIN IT (BEYOND WHAT i HAVE SAID ABOUT
GD buttons!
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> John E Clifford wrote: > > >Sigh! > > > > > > Why has the new proposal been met with > universal acceptance, even by the > esteemed Dr. Rosta? > > Why have you failed to offer an alternative > proposal lacking in the > perceived defects, or succeeded in defending > the previous system as it was?
I can't explain it beyond what I have said about it being so obscure that its long term effects have remained hidden (Mr. Rabbit is new to the field officially). I have proposed alternatives: Lojban Formulae for one. And I am under the threat of being cut off from the list if I criticize xorlo beyond responding to particular points as they arise outside wiki.
xorxes: > > xorxes: > > > The (present?) material world is not especially favoured by the > > > _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, although it is a very > > > frequent obvious choice in many contexts. > > > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous > > claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of > > doctorhood in the world in which I need them. > > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the > property of being a doctor".
I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? So that is not synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a neutral question.)
> > In other words, > > that one can go out into the world in which my needing occurs, > > and find & grab hold of these two individuals that are doctors. > > By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of things that we may > make reference to in a given discourse. In one context, {lo mikce} > may have a single referent in the universe of discourse, in other > contexts it may have more than one. In any context, > {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two of the referents of > {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the universe of discourse) > are such that I need them. In that discourse, I don't need any > of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from all the referents > in the universe of discourse).
I understand this — the universe of discourse can simultaneously contain something that is a needer in World X but not necessarily in World Y, and something that is a doctor in World Y but not necessarily in World X.
But what I'm asking is how to say "something is such that in one and the same world, I need it and it is a doctor".
> > For clarity, a second example: There is an ambiguity in "I drew > > two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate two unicorns". How > > can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted to do so? > > Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is like "I took > a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew two unicorns" > that is like "I made two unicorns out of clay"? maybe we can > distinguish them with different predicates: > > mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna > I picture-created two unicorns. > > mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna > I picture-copy-made two unicorns. > > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't > eat them into existence, so that would be the difference > between those predicates.
That's not really the distinction I mean. Our local mythology may contain unicorns that already exist in that mythology. I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, say) without thereby bringing them into existence. But "I photographed two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", entails that the photographees exists in the same world as the one in which I took the photo.
> > > I think that unless the grammar is to impose an ontology, > > > that distinction can't be made with gadri. One way to make > > > it is through prediacates: "is a subkind of", "is an instance > > > of" > > > > I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance of lo mikce" > > would not guarantee that we are referring to actual instances; > > we could be referring to imaginable instances. That's why > > I can't see how to do it without involving gadri. (More > > precisely, I can't see how to do it without having a way > > to distinguish quantification over subkinds from quantification > > over instances.) > > Would that require fixing the universe of discourse > to the one set of referents we all agree are true material > indivisible objects in the real meterial world, irrespective > of context? I don't think that's desirable, but I'm not sure > it's even possible. For some broda we may all agree on what > counts as a true individual concrete real single broda for > any and all contexts, but for many broda we won't, it will > depend on context.
I opine that a proposition is claimed to be true of some particular world (-- and the universe of discourse can span many worlds). I further opine that it is desirable to have some way to indicate whether two propositions (such as "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true of the same world (since there seems to me to be a pretty patent distinction in meaning).
I was about to explain what I meant by "instances", in the light of what I have just said, but I'll take things slowly.
--And.
wrote:
> --- John E Clifford wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > > wrote: > > > Mentioning something immediately introduces > it > > > into the discourse. > > > > But, in order to mention it and thus bring it > > into the universe, it has to be somewhere > already > > (in some sense). > > Well, if it was somewhere already, we could > define that > somewhere as the one true universe of discourse > fixed > once and for all for every utterance in every > context. > I don't think there is such a somewhere.
Fair enough. This is mainly just terminological, universes of discourse are normally given in advance and then references are assigned within them. If you want to build the uiniverse along with the reference, I think that will work out OK. But it does have one off-putting consequence: The person who answers "What's in the box?" with "Nothing" has given on xorxes' view the right answer, there is nothing in the universe of discourse in the box (I'm assuming that air molecules have not been talked aobut recently, since that would usually cue the answerer to use them in the answer). Thus, the response pointing to the air molecules in the box (we do agree that they were there all the time don't we?) is not an acceptable correction (and by the way bringing something from the universe into the light) but a piece of Gricean dirty pool, changing the game in mid stream. Not a move we ought to be recommending. > > In particular, suppose I say > > "some cows" or "there are cows that," what > cows > > have introduced? the ones that satisfy the > rest > > of the sentence? > > No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some cows" > "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces cows. > {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo bakni} > and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni} to > have referents in the universe of discourse. > The quantifiers just quantify over those > referents, > they don't introduce them.
Were the cows there before or not? If not then the use of the expression must introduce them, if they were there already, where are the limits? I pass over our differences about what "refers" means.
> > But the rest of the sentence > > comes after the introduction — the cows have > to > > be there in order to go on. And what if I am > > wrong? I have introduced cows apparently but > none > > of them have the properties involved. So, > maybe > > by mentioning cows I introduce the lot of > them. > > But then, what is excluded — I mentioned > > physical objects too, so are all of them in > or is > > it specific? > > {lo dacti} in principle could have a single > referent, "Mr Object".
Not really. Or rather this won't work with Mr. Object (in old Lojban {lo dacti} in a particular context does have a single referent — the group of dacti under consideration — but that doesn't seem to be what "Mr. Object" means — it has been rejected at least twice in the last few years). So, if Mr Object is something that does all the things it is supposed to do, it doesn't exist and thus is no help at all.
> > I suspect this is all terminological, that > > "universe of discourse" here means something > more > > restricted than usual (what has actually been > > mentioned and perhaps what is going to be > > mentioned in the foreseeable future, > abstracted > > from the broader notion of, say, the range of > > quantifiers or the like). A smidge of > > clarification might be handy here — and > maybe > > some new terminology as well. > > You're welcome to suggest other terminology, > but I think "universe of discourse" is fairly > standard.
It is standard, just not with this meaning, which is why I had some trouble with it when you first used it (and probably still do, since your meaning is not very clear).
> > > >or , > > > > if so, what is excluded?) > > > > > > There is no general answer. When I say that > > > there > > > is nothing in the box, air molecules are > > > normally > > > excluded from the universe of discourse, > but > > > once > > > I mention them, we have to admit that there > is > > > something in the box after all. > > > > I didn't ask for a general answer in the > sense of > > a list of allthe things that are always in > the > > universe of discourse, only criteria for > deciding > > whjat is in and what is not. Obviously > > everything tha has been mentioned explicitly > is > > in. Almost as obviously, some other things, > > implicit in what has been said or about to be > > mentioned, are also in, but what are the > limits > > — by rule, not by list > > I don't know the rule. Relevance will probably > be > the most significant factor.
Not very useful, since "relevance" is surely as obscure as this is. We only know what is relevant when we see what comes up (possibly including what comes up metaconversationally). But by that time, you can look back at all the things mentioned and say "That's the universe." The task is to say something useful about it in medias res.
> > > In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of > > > discourse > > > contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for > those > > > who don't mind that picture. If you can't > > > picture > > > doctors as just doctors, and you > necessarily > > > must > > > picture them as an aggregate of many > individual > > > > > > doctors, each considered separately, then > you > > > must > > > take another course, for example (mi nitcu > lo > > > nu > > > da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats > me" > > > or > > > something like that. Here you are picturing > all > > > > > > {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr > > > Someone-Treats-Me" > > > that you need, but some people mind doing > this > > > abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" > > > > abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to > > > abstract > > > than people. > > > > Ah, the history of Philosophy: those who > ignore > > it are doomed to repeat it. This is the kind > of > > metaphysical argle-bargle created by not > paying > > attenmtion to logic (or being to lazy to use > it). > > There is no Mr. Doctor (shouldn't that be > "Dr. > > Doctor"?) and if there were, he would be of > no > > help in satisfying a person's needs. Only a > real > > concrete doctor will do that, and further one > who > > is in the appropriate relation to the needer > -- > > treating him, say. > > Mr Doctor (or Dr. Doctor if you prefer) is of > course > real and concrete. Just like an event of a > doctor > curing me has to be real and concrete in order > to be > any use to me. I have no need for an event of a > doctor > curing me if the event is not real and > concrete.
This is the old cyclic dodge — not very convincing. We have in Lojban that events exist even if they do not occur (this is not my favorite way of doing things, but it works and solves the problems). So, what I need is for the event to occur, meaning tht we should change the definition of {nitcu} or — as we have always done — sinmply take that as a give. The problem is that if Dr. Doctor occurs, we still have the problem To do what you want him to do, he has to be abstract at least and so of no use at all. On the other hand, if what you mean is that a manifestation of Dr. Dr occurs, then we need to change the definition of {nitcu} even more, since that has not been what we have been doing causually up til now. Further we have the same problem: there is no manifestation that I need -- another one would always do, so on this reading the claim is always false. And of course, the doctor being real is not enough; we still need the appropriate event, without which my need cannot be met. So why not just say so straight off — or at least recognize that this is generally what is meant even when not said and make the corresponding caveats in the text (just as we do in English).
> > The fact that we cannot
> > identify beforehand who that doctor is,
> indeed
> > that the need is indifferent to that issue,
> does
> > not mean that there is an indifferent doctor
> who
> > is needed or an unidentified one. It only
> means
> > that the quantifier involved is within the
> scope
> > of the needing.
> > As for Mr. abstractions just being a variant
> of
> > event abstractions (and sometimes property or
> > truth function or... abstractions), the
> Lojban
> > answer is simply NO. The event, property,
> and so
> > on abstractions are inherent in Lojban; the
> Mr.
> > abstractions — assuming that it could be
> given
> > some meaningful interpretation (and all
> serious
> > attempts at this have failed so far) — is a
> new
> > thing, not already provided for. That it is
> > being used to hi-jack an existing
> construction,
> > which had a perfectly good but different
> meaning,
>
=
> xorxes: > > > xorxes: > > > > The (present?) material world is not > especially favoured by the > > > > _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, > although it is a very > > > > frequent obvious choice in many contexts. > > > > > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able > to make unambiguous > > > claims to the effect that exactly two > things have the property of > > > doctorhood in the world in which I need > them. > > > > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two > things have the > > property of being a doctor". > > I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? > So that is not > synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a > neutral question.) > > > > In other words, > > > that one can go out into the world in which > my needing occurs, > > > and find & grab hold of these two > individuals that are doctors. > > > > By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of > things that we may > > make reference to in a given discourse. In > one context, {lo mikce} > > may have a single referent in the universe of > discourse, in other > > contexts it may have more than one. In any > context, > > {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two > of the referents of > > {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the > universe of discourse) > > are such that I need them. In that discourse, > I don't need any > > of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from > all the referents > > in the universe of discourse). > > I understand this — the universe of discourse > can simultaneously > contain something that is a needer in World X > but not necessarily > in World Y, and something that is a doctor in > World Y but not > necessarily in World X. > > But what I'm asking is how to say "something is > such that in > one and the same world, I need it and it is a > doctor".
I can't really speak for Dr.Dr. but I suppose we can do it with a prenexed quantified expression, i.e., outside the **** (I won't say the dreaded words out of kindness to weak sensibilities) and probably also using token reflexive devices that drag things out of those places: "that doctor right over there," "my neighbor Dr. Brown", etc.
> > > For clarity, a second example: There is an > ambiguity in "I drew > > > two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate > two unicorns". How > > > can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted > to do so? > > > > Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is > like "I took > > a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew > two unicorns" > > that is like "I made two unicorns out of > clay"? maybe we can > > distinguish them with different predicates: > > > > mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna > > I picture-created two unicorns. > > > > mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna > > I picture-copy-made two unicorns. > > > > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but > you can't > > eat them into existence, so that would be the > difference > > between those predicates. > > That's not really the distinction I mean. Our > local mythology > may contain unicorns that already exist in that > mythology. > I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, > say) without > thereby bringing them into existence. But "I > photographed > two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", > entails that > the photographees exists in the same world as > the one in > which I took the photo. i.e. the one in which the things photographed exist (cf. eating unicorns and other kinds of physical interactions — being run down by one say). *** is coming up again.
> > > > I think that unless the grammar is to > impose an ontology, > > > > that distinction can't be made with > gadri. One way to make > > > > it is through prediacates: "is a subkind > of", "is an instance > > > > of" > > > > > > I understand your reasoning, but "lo > instance of lo mikce" > > > would not guarantee that we are referring > to actual instances; > > > we could be referring to imaginable > instances. That's why > > > I can't see how to do it without involving > gadri. (More > > > precisely, I can't see how to do it without > having a way > > > to distinguish quantification over subkinds > from quantification > > > over instances.)
I look forward to seein how this turns out to be relevant. I don't see it now, unless you want to sorta save Dr. Dr. by saying that what is meant is Dr. A-Certain-Kind-of-Doctor. But that helpeth not.
> > Would that require fixing the universe of > discourse > > to the one set of referents we all agree are > true material > > indivisible objects in the real meterial > world, irrespective > > of context? I don't think that's desirable, > but I'm not sure > > it's even possible. For some broda we may all > agree on what > > counts as a true individual concrete real > single broda for > > any and all contexts, but for many broda we > won't, it will > > depend on context. > > I opine that a proposition is claimed to be > true of some > particular world (-- and the universe of > discourse can > span many worlds). I further opine that it is > desirable to > have some way to indicate whether two > propositions (such as > "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true > of the same > world (since there seems to me to be a pretty > patent > distinction in meaning). > > I was about to explain what I meant by > "instances", in the > light of what I have just said, but I'll take > things slowly. > > --And. > > >
I see that my last attempt to send on the original messages has not yet worked so here they are again:
wrote:
> > xorxes: > > > The (present?) material world is not > especially favoured by the > > > _grammar_ as the universe of discourse, > although it is a very > > > frequent obvious choice in many contexts. > > > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able > to make unambiguous > > claims to the effect that exactly two things > have the property of > > doctorhood in the world in which I need them. > X-ecartis-version: Ecartis v1.0.0 > Sender: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org > Errors-to: wikidiscuss-bounce@lojban.org > X-original-sender: jjllambias2000@yahoo.com.ar > Precedence: bulk > Reply-to: wikidiscuss-list@lojban.org > X-list: wikidiscuss > > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two > things have the > property of being a doctor". > > > In other words, > > that one can go out into the world in which > my needing occurs, > > and find & grab hold of these two individuals > that are doctors. > > By "universe of discourse" I mean the set of > things that we may > make reference to in a given discourse. In one > context, {lo mikce} > may have a single referent in the universe of > discourse, in other > contexts it may have more than one. In any > context, > {mi nitcu re lo mikce} says that exactly two of > the referents of > {lo mikce} (from all the referents of the > universe of discourse) > are such that I need them. In that discourse, I > don't need any > of the other referents of {lo mikce} (from all > the referents > in the universe of discourse).
This notion of "universe of discourse" is fraught with practical difficulties e.g., are things in the physical environment in the universe or not and, if not, how can I then introduce them, or , if so, what is excluded?) but it also does not solve the {mi nitcu lo mikce} problem, which is about scope, not range: {mi nitcu lo mikce} does not generally even entail (let alone be equivalent to) {lo mikce zo'u mi nitcu my}, since whatever doctor(s) we pick is not needed for another would do as well.
> > For clarity, a second example: There is an > ambiguity in "I drew > > two unicorns" that doesn't exist in "I ate > two unicorns". How > > can one remove the ambiguity, if one wanted > to do so? > > Do you mean the "I drew two unicorns" that is > like "I took > a photograph of two unicorns" vs. the "I drew > two unicorns" > that is like "I made two unicorns out of clay"? > maybe we can > distinguish them with different predicates: > > mi pirfi'i lo re pavyseljirna > I picture-created two unicorns. > > mi pirfukygau lo re pavyseljirna > I picture-copy-made two unicorns. > > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but > you can't > eat them into existence, so that would be the > difference > between those predicates.
Category mistake. Pictures of unicorns aren't unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) — see the fronting problem again if nothing else. Presumably eating a unicorn requires a unicorn, not just a representation of one (to speak loosely). This is usually just fussbudgetry, of course, but it does sometimes make a difference and, as a logical language (well, trying to be one where possible), Lojban sould make the necessary distinctions at the basic grammatical level (where inferences are meant to be transparent).
> > > I think that unless the grammar is to > impose an ontology, > > > that distinction can't be made with gadri. > One way to make > > > it is through prediacates: "is a subkind > of", "is an instance > > > of" > > > > I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance > of lo mikce" > > would not guarantee that we are referring to > actual instances; > > we could be referring to imaginable > instances. That's why > > I can't see how to do it without involving > gadri. (More > > precisely, I can't see how to do it without > having a way > > to distinguish quantification over subkinds > from quantification > > over instances.)
And I can't see exactly what subkinds will do to help the matter at all, unless {nitcu} is like {sisku} in taking properties; but we usually say it takes events.
> Would that require fixing the universe of > discourse > to the one set of referents we all agree are > true material > indivisible objects in the real meterial world, > irrespective > of context? I don't think that's desirable, but > I'm not sure > it's even possible. For some broda we may all > agree on what > counts as a true individual concrete real > single broda for > any and all contexts, but for many broda we > won't, it will > depend on context.
I have to agree with xorxes here (as often), but I don't see how this helps matters at all.
wrote:
> > --- John E Clifford wrote: > > This notion of "universe of discourse" is > fraught > > with practical difficulties e.g., are things > in > > the physical environment in the universe or > not > > In some contexts they are, in other contexts > they > are not. > > > and, if not, how can I then introduce them, > > Mentioning something immediately introduces it > into the discourse.
But, in order to mention it and thus bring it into the universe, it has to be somewhere already (in some sense). In particular, suppose I say "some cows" or "there are cows that," what cows have introduced? the ones that satisfy the rest of the sentence? But the rest of the sentence comes after the introduction — the cows have to be there in order to go on. And what if I am wrong? I have introduced cows apparently but none of them have the properties involved. So, maybe by mentioning cows I introduce the lot of them. But then, what is excluded — I mentioned physical objects too, so are all of them in or is it specific? I suspect this is all terminological, that "universe of discourse" here means something more restricted than usual (what has actually been mentioned and perhaps what is going to be mentioned in the foreseeable future, abstracted from the broader notion of, say, the range of quantifiers or the like). A smidge of clarification might be handy here — and maybe some new terminology as well.
> >or , > > if so, what is excluded?) > > There is no general answer. When I say that > there > is nothing in the box, air molecules are > normally > excluded from the universe of discourse, but > once > I mention them, we have to admit that there is > something in the box after all.
I didn't ask for a general answer in the sense of a list of allthe things that are always in the universe of discourse, only criteria for deciding whjat is in and what is not. Obviously everything tha has been mentioned explicitly is in. Almost as obviously, some other things, implicit in what has been said or about to be mentioned, are also in, but what are the limits -- by rule, not by list .. > > but it also does not > > solve the {mi nitcu lo mikce} problem, which > is > > about scope, not range: {mi nitcu lo mikce} > does > > not generally even entail (let alone be > > equivalent to) {lo mikce zo'u mi nitcu my}, > since > > whatever doctor(s) we pick is not needed for > > another would do as well. > > In {mi nitcu lo mikce}, the universe of > discourse > contains a single doctor, "Mr Doctor" for those > who don't mind that picture. If you can't > picture > doctors as just doctors, and you necessarily > must > picture them as an aggregate of many individual > > doctors, each considered separately, then you > must > take another course, for example (mi nitcu lo > nu > da mikce mi}, "I need that someone treats me" > or > something like that. Here you are picturing all > > {lo nu da mikce mi} as one "Mr > Someone-Treats-Me" > that you need, but some people mind doing this > abstraction less than doing the "Mr Doctor" > abstraction. Events are somewhat easier to > abstract > than people.
Ah, the history of Philosophy: those who ignore it are doomed to repeat it. This is the kind of metaphysical argle-bargle created by not paying attenmtion to logic (or being to lazy to use it). There is no Mr. Doctor (shouldn't that be "Dr. Doctor"?) and if there were, he would be of no help in satisfying a person's needs. Only a real concrete doctor will do that, and further one who is in the appropriate relation to the needer -- treating him, say. The fact that we cannot identify beforehand who that doctor is, indeed that the need is indifferent to that issue, does not mean that there is an indifferent doctor who is needed or an unidentified one. It only means that the quantifier involved is within the scope of the needing. As for Mr. abstractions just being a variant of event abstractions (and sometimes property or truth function or... abstractions), the Lojban answer is simply NO. The event, property, and so on abstractions are inherent in Lojban; the Mr. abstractions — assuming that it could be given some meaningful interpretation (and all serious attempts at this have failed so far) — is a new thing, not already provided for. That it is being used to hi-jack an existing construction, which had a perfectly good but different meaning, does not mean that it was laready in Lojban. It is a foreign import and needs to be marked as such.
> > > You can draw two unicorns into existence, > but > > > you can't > > > eat them into existence, so that would be > the > > > difference > > > between those predicates. > > > > Category mistake. Pictures of unicorns > aren't > > unicorns (in the {lo pavyseljirna} sense) -- > see > > the fronting problem again if nothing else. > > That seems like an ontology issue. Are > teddy-bears bears? > CLL says they are, if I recall corrrectly. I > say it depends > on the context (maybe that's what CLL says > too). The same > with pictures of unicorns. I don't think there > needs to be a > special gadri to sort teddy-bears from more > central bears, > or drawn unicorns from clay unicorns from > flesh-and-blood > unicorns.
I agree, this is not a gadri issue — unless you want to use the "what I am calling" aspect of {le} to deal with the eccentric cases. You might, of course, say it is a brivla issue: what exactly does a certain predicate mean (I take it that this is the solution proposed for teddy bears). So, if {pavyseljirna} refers simply to a shape (as Kung Sun Lung would have us believe) then painting a picture of a unicorn presents no problem: there is the unicorn I painted a picture of, namely the shape of the picture itself. This of course makes for some very strange aesthetics: it become hard to define realism, for example, or portraiture in particular. And it is rarely what we mean.
> John E Clifford wrote: > > >Sigh! > > > > > > Why has the new proposal been met with > universal acceptance, even by the > esteemed Dr. Rosta? > > Why have you failed to offer an alternative > proposal lacking in the > perceived defects, or succeeded in defending > the previous system as it was?
Incidentally, as a rule of rhetoric, I don't have to defend the status quo, the other side has to show good reasons for changing. They have not shown any reasons for changing so far as I can tell — largely because they have not explained what the changes are.
pc: > > > I understand your reasoning, but "lo instance > > of lo mikce" > > > would not guarantee that we are referring to > > actual instances; > > > we could be referring to imaginable > > instances. That's why > > > I can't see how to do it without involving > > gadri. (More > > > precisely, I can't see how to do it without > > having a way > > > to distinguish quantification over subkinds > > from quantification > > > over instances.) > > And I can't see exactly what subkinds will do to > help the matter at all, unless {nitcu} is like > {sisku} in taking properties; but we usually say > it takes events.
I'll issue a promissory note stating that if and only if it becomes helpful to do so, I'll explain what I meant.
In the meantime, though, I think my most helpful contribution is to limit myself to asking "How does one express such and such a meaning?".
--And.
And: > xorxes: > > And: > > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous > > > claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of > > > doctorhood in the world in which I need them. > > > > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the > > property of being a doctor". > > I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? So that is not > synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a neutral question.)
They are synonymous as far as I can tell. Also {re se nitcu be mi cu mikce}, although the focus is different in all three.
I think I misunderstood what you meant by "in the world in which I need them". {da} can take any value from the universe of discourse, not just those things that exist in the world. To restrict to those, we would need something like {da poi zasti le munje}. There is no gadri that automatically imposes the restriction {poi zasti le munje}.
.... > I understand this — the universe of discourse can simultaneously > contain something that is a needer in World X but not necessarily > in World Y, and something that is a doctor in World Y but not > necessarily in World X. > > But what I'm asking is how to say "something is such that in > one and the same world, I need it and it is a doctor".
How about: {mi nitcu lo mikce ku noi zasti mi}? But that's the abnormal claim. In general it will be the case that: {mi nitcu lo mikce poi zasti mi ku}, because a doctor that doesn't exist where I exist would not be much use. The {poi zasti mi} clause need not be explicited because it is usually obvious.
> > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't > > eat them into existence, so that would be the difference > > between those predicates. > > That's not really the distinction I mean. Our local mythology > may contain unicorns that already exist in that mythology. > I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, say) without > thereby bringing them into existence. But "I photographed > two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", entails that > the photographees exists in the same world as the one in > which I took the photo.
I don't think that distinction is made with gadri. {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in our world".
> I opine that a proposition is claimed to be true of some > particular world (-- and the universe of discourse can > span many worlds). I further opine that it is desirable to > have some way to indicate whether two propositions (such as > "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true of the same > world (since there seems to me to be a pretty patent > distinction in meaning).
I don't know if Lojban is equipped to handle different worlds in such detail. Other than {mu'ei} (that serves to quantify over worlds but not to refer to a particular world) we don't have a lot of world machinery.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''__ Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - You care about security. So do we. http://promotions.yahoo.com/new_mail
> OK. But it does have one off-putting > consequence: The person who answers "What's in > the box?" with "Nothing" has given on xorxes' > view the right answer, there is nothing in the > universe of discourse in the box (I'm assuming > that air molecules have not been talked aobut > recently, since that would usually cue the > answerer to use them in the answer).
Right.
> Thus, the > response pointing to the air molecules in the box > (we do agree that they were there all the time > don't we?) is not an acceptable correction
Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, many people rejoice in making such corrections. It is not a nice correction (unless for some reason it was important to consider air as a thing), but once made, we have to deal with it. "There is nothing in the box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!", "Well, yes, but I meant that there's nothing but air in the box".
> (and > by the way bringing something from the universe > into the light) but a piece of Gricean dirty > pool, changing the game in mid stream. Not a > move we ought to be recommending.
It's a move that happens all the time. In what sense we ought not recommend it?
> > No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some cows" > > "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces cows. > > {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo bakni} > > and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni} to > > have referents in the universe of discourse. > > The quantifiers just quantify over those > > referents, > > they don't introduce them. > > Were the cows there before or not?
I have no idea, what's the context? If we are in a cow farm the cows will probably be there from the start. In this discussion, there were no cows until we started talking about them.
> If not then > the use of the expression must introduce them, if > they were there already, where are the limits? I > pass over our differences about what "refers" > means.
I'm not sure what kind of limits you are talking about.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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wrote:
> > And: > > xorxes: > > > And: > > > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be > able to make unambiguous > > > > claims to the effect that exactly two > things have the property of > > > > doctorhood in the world in which I need > them. > > > > > > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two > things have the > > > property of being a doctor". > > > > I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? > So that is not > > synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's > a neutral question.) > > They are synonymous as far as I can tell. > Also {re se nitcu be mi cu mikce}, although the > focus is > different in all three.
That is, they are all pretty certainly false, unless there are exactly two people (in the universe of discourse)who collaboratively can handle the problem I have. But that changes the meaning of at least {mi nitcu re mikce} as it appears to have been intended (as an adequate translation of "I need two doctors."
> I think I misunderstood what you meant by "in > the world in which > I need them". {da} can take any value from the > universe of discourse, > not just those things that exist in the world. > To restrict to those, > we would need something like {da poi zasti le > munje}. There is no > gadri that automatically imposes the > restriction {poi zasti le munje}. I assume that the quantifiers also do not impose that restriction (a common one for quantifiers, but not essential — though having a quantifier that does this is usually handy)
> > I understand this — the universe of > discourse can simultaneously > > contain something that is a needer in World X > but not necessarily > > in World Y, and something that is a doctor in > World Y but not > > necessarily in World X. > > > > But what I'm asking is how to say "something > is such that in > > one and the same world, I need it and it is a > doctor". > > How about: {mi nitcu lo mikce ku noi zasti mi}? > But that's the abnormal claim. In general it > will be the case > that: {mi nitcu lo mikce poi zasti mi ku}, > because a doctor > that doesn't exist where I exist would not be > much use. The > {poi zasti mi} clause need not be explicited > because it > is usually obvious.
But now the problem comes around again that this claim is usually false, even though the corresponding one in English might well be true. There is no doctor in the relevant world that the speaker needs — another one would do as well.
> > > You can draw two unicorns into existence,
> but you can't
> > > eat them into existence, so that would be
> the difference
> > > between those predicates.
> >
> > That's not really the distinction I mean. Our
> local mythology
> > may contain unicorns that already exist in
> that mythology.
> > I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer,
> say) without
> > thereby bringing them into existence. But "I
> photographed
> > two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns",
> entails that
> > the photographees exists in the same world as
> the one in
> > which I took the photo.
>
> I don't think that distinction is made with
> gadri.
> {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu}
> "that's a picture
> of two unicorns which are mythological animals"
> and
> {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le
> ma'a munje}
> "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually
> exist in
> our world".
Aside from saying that pictures of unicorns are unicorns — as you seem to do sometimes — I agree with this: it is not a gadri issue.
> > I opine that a proposition is claimed to be > true of some > > particular world (-- and the universe of > discourse can > > span many worlds). I further opine that it is > desirable to > > have some way to indicate whether two > propositions (such as > > "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed > true of the same > > world (since there seems to me to be a pretty > patent > > distinction in meaning). > > I don't know if Lojban is equipped to handle > different worlds > in such detail. Other than {mu'ei} (that serves > to quantify > over worlds but not to refer to a particular > world) we don't > have a lot of world machinery.
We can build it fairly easily with {munje} and the like but I don't see the point here. Quantifiers in *** may be over different worlds than covered in the rest of a sentence. And that is all that is needed for everything that has turned up so far.
wrote:
> > --- John E Clifford wrote: > > OK. But it does have one off-putting > > consequence: The person who answers "What's > in > > the box?" with "Nothing" has given on xorxes' > > view the right answer, there is nothing in > the > > universe of discourse in the box (I'm > assuming > > that air molecules have not been talked aobut > > recently, since that would usually cue the > > answerer to use them in the answer). > > Right. > > > Thus, the > > response pointing to the air molecules in the > box > > (we do agree that they were there all the > time > > don't we?) is not an acceptable correction > > Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, many > people rejoice > in making such corrections. It is not a nice > correction (unless > for some reason it was important to consider > air as a thing), > but once made, we have to deal with it. "There > is nothing in the > box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!", > "Well, yes, but > I meant that there's nothing but air in the > box".
But on your view there was nothing at all in the box, the air wasn't available to be there until it was mentioned. Unless something not mentioned can be in the universe, in which case, where the limits? Why not allow the usual sort of universe, since it is easier to deal with?
> > (and
> > by the way bringing something from the
> universe
> > into the light) but a piece of Gricean dirty
> > pool, changing the game in mid stream. Not a
> > move we ought to be recommending.
>
> It's a move that happens all the time. In what
> sense we
> ought not recommend it?
The fact that it happens all the time — that is that that verbal exchange occurs — is evidence that what is happening is not what you claim, i.e. that the universe does not contain something until it is mentioned. It is only under that rubric that his action is condemned, so, since we do not condemn it but even favor it, I take it that your position is incorrect.
> > > No, quantifiers don't refer. Saying "some
> cows"
> > > "all cows" or "no cows" just introduces
> cows.
> > > {ro lo bakni}, {su'o lo bakni}, {no lo
> bakni}
> > > and {lo bakni} will all require {lo bakni}
> to
> > > have referents in the universe of
> discourse.
> > > The quantifiers just quantify over those
> > > referents,
> > > they don't introduce them.
> >
> > Were the cows there before or not?
>
> I have no idea, what's the context? If we are
> in a cow farm
> the cows will probably be there from the start.
> In this
> discussion, there were no cows until we started
> talking
> about them.
How were they there on the cow farm if not yet mentioned at the beginning of the conversation? I see that you are allowing that somethings other than what are mentioned are in the universe, so mentioning the first time them is sometimes not introducing them. But now why then do we ever need to introduce something at all — it may be there alreeady and we just did not notice — as the cows were on the farm, say.
> > If not then > > the use of the expression must introduce > them, if > > they were there already, where are the > limits? I > > pass over our differences about what "refers" > > means. > > I'm not sure what kind of limits you are > talking about. > If the universe contains some things that are not mentioned in the conversation, how does this differ from a universe given at the beginning with only the referential relations being filled in as the conversation proceeds?
> > > Thus, the > > > response pointing to the air molecules in the > > box > > > (we do agree that they were there all the > > time > > > don't we?) is not an acceptable correction > > > > Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, many > > people rejoice > > in making such corrections. It is not a nice > > correction (unless > > for some reason it was important to consider > > air as a thing), > > but once made, we have to deal with it. "There > > is nothing in the > > box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!", > > "Well, yes, but > > I meant that there's nothing but air in the > > box". > > But on your view there was nothing at all in the > box, the air wasn't available to be there until > it was mentioned. Unless something not mentioned > can be in the universe, in which case, where the > limits? Why not allow the usual sort of universe, > since it is easier to deal with?
I'm lost as to what your objection is here. You seem to be identifying the universe of discourse (a mathematical set) with the physical universe (nothing like a mathematical set). The air will always be in the physical universe whether we talk about it or not, or even whether we have ever identified it or given it a name.
> The fact that it happens all the time — that is > that that verbal exchange occurs — is evidence > that what is happening is not what you claim, > i.e. that the universe does not contain something > until it is mentioned.
I hope I never claimed such a thing about the universe! But also not even about the universe of discourse. All I said was that if you mention it, then it is in the universe of discourse, not that if you don't mention it then it is not.
> How were they there on the cow farm if not yet > mentioned at the beginning of the conversation? > I see that you are allowing that somethings other > than what are mentioned are in the universe, so > mentioning the first time them is sometimes not > introducing them. But now why then do we ever > need to introduce something at all — it may be > there alreeady and we just did not notice — as > the cows were on the farm, say.
Yes, so what's the point? I certainly don't have an algorithm to list the things that are in the universe of discourse for any discourse. Figuring that out is a hard job of interpretation. If you get the context wrong, you may completely misunderstand a conversation, there is nothing new about that.
> > > If not then > > > the use of the expression must introduce > > them, if > > > they were there already, where are the > > limits? I > > > pass over our differences about what "refers" > > > means. > > > > I'm not sure what kind of limits you are > > talking about. > > > If the universe contains some things that are not > mentioned in the conversation, how does this > differ from a universe given at the beginning > with only the referential relations being filled > in as the conversation proceeds?
One difference that occurs to me is that some things may be incompatible to share a universe of discourse. But maybe not, maybe that can be sorted out with appropriate sets of referential relations.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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I have been raising this as a gadri issue only because in an ancestral version of xorlo it was treated as such and because that was the only solution I was ever satisfied was satisfactory. But I'm not trying to argue that xorlo needs to be altered.
xorxes: > And: > > xorxes: > > > And: > > > > Okay, but one would like to somehow be able to make unambiguous > > > > claims to the effect that exactly two things have the property of > > > > doctorhood in the world in which I need them. > > > > > > That would be {re da mikce}, "exactly two things have the > > > property of being a doctor". > > > > I.e. {re da zo'u ge da mikce gi mi nitcu da}? So that is not > > synonymous with {mi nitcu re mikce}? (That's a neutral question.) > > They are synonymous as far as I can tell. > Also {re se nitcu be mi cu mikce}, although the focus is > different in all three. > > I think I misunderstood what you meant by "in the world in which > I need them". {da} can take any value from the universe of discourse, > not just those things that exist in the world. To restrict to those, > we would need something like {da poi zasti le munje}. There is no > gadri that automatically imposes the restriction {poi zasti le munje}.
Yes, you'd misunderstood me.
> > I understand this — the universe of discourse can simultaneously > > contain something that is a needer in World X but not necessarily > > in World Y, and something that is a doctor in World Y but not > > necessarily in World X. > > > > But what I'm asking is how to say "something is such that in > > one and the same world, I need it and it is a doctor". > > How about: {mi nitcu lo mikce ku noi zasti mi}? > But that's the abnormal claim. In general it will be the case > that: {mi nitcu lo mikce poi zasti mi ku}, because a doctor > that doesn't exist where I exist would not be much use. The > {poi zasti mi} clause need not be explicited because it > is usually obvious.
I think this might work, except that there remains an ambiguity. Suppose there are two statues of unicorns in front of me, and I draw them, and say "ta pixra re pavyseljirna ku noi zasti ta": that would be true, because the two drawees do exist in the same world as ta, even though in ta's world they aren't unicorns (-- they're statues). So we'd also want a way to express whether the drawees are unicorns in ta's world.
> > > > You can draw two unicorns into existence, but you can't > > > eat them into existence, so that would be the difference > > > between those predicates. > > > > That's not really the distinction I mean. Our local mythology > > may contain unicorns that already exist in that mythology. > > I might draw two of them (Dasher and Prancer, say) without > > thereby bringing them into existence. But "I photographed > > two unicorns", unlike "I drew two unicorns", entails that > > the photographees exists in the same world as the one in > > which I took the photo. > > I don't think that distinction is made with gadri. > {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture > of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and > {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} > "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in > our world".
The first seems okay, but the second doesn't, for two reasons. Firstly, one can have imaginary things that are defined as existing in the real world: "lo ca'a zasti le ma'a munje" needn't refer to something that exists in the real world; it might refer to "Mr Exister in the RW". Secondly, what matters (with regard to disambiguation) is whether the depictee exists in the same world as the depicter (and whether the depictee has the property of being depicted in the same world as it has the property of unicornhood).
> > I opine that a proposition is claimed to be true of some > > particular world (-- and the universe of discourse can > > span many worlds). I further opine that it is desirable to > > have some way to indicate whether two propositions (such as > > "mi nitcu da" and "da mikce") are claimed true of the same > > world (since there seems to me to be a pretty patent > > distinction in meaning). > > I don't know if Lojban is equipped to handle different worlds > in such detail. Other than {mu'ei} (that serves to quantify > over worlds but not to refer to a particular world) we don't > have a lot of world machinery.
I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this overtly in terms of different worlds. I am talking about different worlds only as a means of explicating the different readings we get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm suggesting that Lojbanists might want a robust way to express the readings distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?
--And.
> I have been raising this as a gadri issue only because > in an ancestral version of xorlo it was treated as such > and because that was the only solution I was ever > satisfied was satisfactory. But I'm not trying to > argue that xorlo needs to be altered.
The way I understand it, xorlo hasn't changed much in the aspect we are discussing (but it's possible I'm still missing something). The only significant change from the old version has been the interpretation of the inner quantifier with respect to the outer one: in the old version the inner quantifier was the numerosity of each value that the quantified variable takes, in the current version it is the total number of values the quantified variable takes.
For example, {mi nitcu lo mikce} and {mi nitcu no lo mikce} are not compatible in either version.
> Suppose there are two statues of unicorns in front of me, and I > draw them, and say "ta pixra re pavyseljirna ku noi zasti ta": > that would be true, because the two drawees do exist in the > same world as ta, even though in ta's world they aren't > unicorns (-- they're statues). So we'd also want a way to > express whether the drawees are unicorns in ta's world.
But that issue only arises if {ta pavyseljirna} has two different readings. If we can say of the statue that it is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue is a picture of a unicorn. If we can't say that the statue is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue is not a picture of a unicorn.
CLL says:
(The notion of a ``really existing, objectively defined bear raises certain difficulties. Is a panda bear a ``real bear? How about a teddy bear? In general, the answer is ``yes. Lojban gismu are defined as broadly as possible, allowing tanru and lujvo to narrow down the definition. There probably are no necessary and sufficient conditions for defining what is and what is not a bear that can be pinned down with complete precision: the real world is fuzzy. In borderline cases, ``le may communicate better than ``lo.)
I would add that in different contexts the boundaries can be different. Once we decide whether in the given context a statue of a unicorn counts as a unicorn, we know whether the picture of the statue counts as a picture of a unicorn.
> > {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture > > of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and > > {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} > > "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in > > our world". > > The first seems okay, but the second doesn't, for two > reasons. Firstly, one can have imaginary things that are defined > as existing in the real world: "lo ca'a zasti le ma'a munje" > needn't refer to something that exists in the real world;
This part I'm not sure I understand. Wouldn't an imaginary (or fictional) thing be non-existent by definition?
> it might refer to "Mr Exister in the RW".
Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all it needs to do.
> Secondly, what > matters (with regard to disambiguation) is whether the > depictee exists in the same world as the depicter (and > whether the depictee has the property of being depicted > in the same world as it has the property of unicornhood).
That would seem to require the marking of statements for world of application, rather than the marking of sumti.
> I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this overtly in > terms of different worlds. I am talking about different worlds > only as a means of explicating the different readings we > get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm suggesting that > Lojbanists might want a robust way to express the readings > distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?
How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version according to you?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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wrote:
> > --- John E Clifford wrote: > > > > Thus, the > > > > response pointing to the air molecules in > the > > > box > > > > (we do agree that they were there all the > > > time > > > > don't we?) is not an acceptable > correction > > > > > > Well, in some cases it might be. In fact, > many > > > people rejoice > > > in making such corrections. It is not a > nice > > > correction (unless > > > for some reason it was important to > consider > > > air as a thing), > > > but once made, we have to deal with it. > "There > > > is nothing in the > > > box!", "yes there is, there's air in it!", > > > "Well, yes, but > > > I meant that there's nothing but air in the > > > box". > > > > But on your view there was nothing at all in > the > > box, the air wasn't available to be there > until > > it was mentioned. Unless something not > mentioned > > can be in the universe, in which case, where > the > > limits? Why not allow the usual sort of > universe, > > since it is easier to deal with? > > I'm lost as to what your objection is here. You > seem > to be identifying the universe of discourse (a > mathematical > set) with the physical universe (nothing like a > mathematical > set). The air will always be in the physical > universe > whether we talk about it or not, or even > whether we have > ever identified it or given it a name.
The objection is (to repeat myself) that on your view (things aren't in the universe until mentioned) there was nothing in the box until the air molecules were mentioned — nothing that can be brought up in the conversation, nothing in the universe of discourse. Far from confusing the physical universe with the u/d, I am insisting on the distinction and taking the u/d in your sense, rather than some more common one.
> > The fact that it happens all the time — that > is > > that that verbal exchange occurs — is > evidence > > that what is happening is not what you claim, > > i.e. that the universe does not contain > something > > until it is mentioned. > > I hope I never claimed such a thing about the > universe! > But also not even about the universe of > discourse. All I > said was that if you mention it, then it is in > the > universe of discourse, not that if you don't > mention it > then it is not.
You actually said that mentioning it the first time *introduced* it into the universe of discourse, whence I infer it was not there before. You may have *meant* something like "if I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not previously obvious that it was" or some such, but it is hard to take your words in that sense. On the other hand, I am glad to see that your sense of u/d is not hopelessly diffderent from a normal pone, for all that its operations are put rather strangely.To be sure, what is in the u/d varies with context, but it takes a fairly clearly specialized context to leave out gross physical objects, even when most of them go unmentioned.
> > How were they there on the cow farm if not > yet > > mentioned at the beginning of the > conversation? > > I see that you are allowing that somethings > other > > than what are mentioned are in the universe, > so > > mentioning the first time them is sometimes > not > > introducing them. But now why then do we > ever > > need to introduce something at all — it may > be > > there alreeady and we just did not notice -- > as > > the cows were on the farm, say. > > Yes, so what's the point? I certainly don't > have an > algorithm to list the things that are in the > universe > of discourse for any discourse. Figuring that > out > is a hard job of interpretation. If you get the > context wrong, you may completely misunderstand > a > conversation, there is nothing new about that.
Well, the Gricean line is that the u/d must be decided by the interaction of the interlocutors. If one of the participants wants it to be crucially different from the (loosely defined, to be sure) standard set (roughly gross physical objects and — for Lojban — all abstracta) then he must make that difference overt at the beginning. Failing to do so is an offence in the language game. The air molecule guy is probably at most weakly in violation, but maybe in violation none the less — even on the standrd notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you (only, apparently) seem to have been presenting.
> > > > If not then > > > > the use of the expression must introduce > > > them, if > > > > they were there already, where are the > > > limits? I > > > > pass over our differences about what > "refers" > > > > means. > > > > > > I'm not sure what kind of limits you are > > > talking about. > > > > > If the universe contains some things that are > not > > mentioned in the conversation, how does this > > differ from a universe given at the beginning > > with only the referential relations being > filled > > in as the conversation proceeds? > > One difference that occurs to me is that some > things may be > incompatible to share a universe of discourse. > But maybe not, > maybe that can be sorted out with appropriate > sets of > referential relations.
Huh? There are some things that cannot both be in a u/d. This, assuming some moderate sense of coherence is surely true (the irresistable force and the immovable object are classic casses). But a u/d need not be coherent in this sense, so that does not seem to be a real problem — nor one that is relevant to the point at issue.
& says: > I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this > overtly in > terms of different worlds. I am talking about > different worlds > only as a means of explicating the different > readings we > get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm > suggesting that > Lojbanists might want a robust way to express > the readings > distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable?
I gather that the distinction is something like this: "I drew a picture of a unicorn" might mean that a) there is a unicorn — in the same world as the one in which "I" refers to me and in which I did this action of drawing a picture of it or b) I drew a picture in this world which represented the salient visible properties ascribed to unicorns and either 1) in some other world there is a unicorn that this is an accurate depiction of (or would be if it were in that world) or 2) whether this is a depiction of some real or not unicorn is irrelevant so long as this does indeed display the relevant visual prperties. The first seems to be covered by "There is a unicorn and I painted a picture of it," if we identify the u/d with a world, rather than insisting on a physical restriction. The third is in Lojban the standard dodge "I drew a picture of the event/property/some relevant abstraction of something being a unicorn" ("drew a picture of" will need a careful definition in Lojban of course). The middle case is harder, since presumably we want a quantifier of unicorns that is clearly not in the world of the picture and the picturer and most of the easy moves with worlds (or without for that matter) don't distinguish out the base world (the real is possible). Calling the unicorn mythical doesn't do it since it is not in the world where it exists. Maybe the best move is to add the "which exists in some situation other than this one" or the like. How do we make it clear that the doctor we need is one in Chelm?
John E Clifford wrote:
>--- Jorge Llambas >wrote: > >
>>I hope I never claimed such a thing about the >>universe! >>But also not even about the universe of >>discourse. All I >>said was that if you mention it, then it is in >>the >>universe of discourse, not that if you don't >>mention it >>then it is not. >> >> > >You actually said that mentioning it the first >time *introduced* it into the universe of >discourse, whence I infer it was not there >before. You may have *meant* something like "if >I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not >previously obvious that it was" or some such, but >it is hard to take your words in that sense. > >
The only 'difference' between the two interpretations is the difference between the item being newly introduced into the universe of discourse at its first mention, and the item always having been in the universe of discourse. But the interval in dispute starts at the beginning of the discussion and ends at the item's first mention. Since the item is never mentioned in the interval, this 'difference' is meaningless.
-- "The more you tighten your grip, Tarkin, the more star systems will slip through your fingers."
> The objection is (to repeat myself) that on your > view (things aren't in the universe until > mentioned)
Not my view at all.
> You actually said that mentioning it the first > time *introduced* it into the universe of > discourse, whence I infer it was not there > before.
If I recall correctly, you asked how things that were not in the universe of discourse could be introduced into it and I said one obvious way of doing that was to mention them. If my recollection is inaccurate, that's what I meant so hopefully we are now clear.
> You may have *meant* something like "if > I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not > previously obvious that it was" or some such, but > it is hard to take your words in that sense.
That's indeed what I meant.
> On the other hand, I am glad to see that your > sense of u/d is not hopelessly diffderent from a > normal pone, for all that its operations are put > rather strangely.To be sure, what is in the u/d > varies with context, but it takes a fairly > clearly specialized context to leave out gross > physical objects, even when most of them go > unmentioned.
Really? I would think in most contexts most gross physical objects are left out.
This is what dictionary.com has for "universe of discourse":
universe of discourse n. Logic A class containing all the entities referred to in a discourse or an argument. Also called universe.
universe of discourse n : everything stated or assumed in a given discussion [syn: universe syn: universe]
Most things in the physical universe are not referred to in most discourses or arguments, nor stated or assumed in most discussions.
> Well, the Gricean line is that the u/d must be > decided by the interaction of the interlocutors. > If one of the participants wants it to be > crucially different from the (loosely defined, to > be sure) standard set (roughly gross physical > objects and — for Lojban — all abstracta) then > he must make that difference overt at the > beginning.
The standard set? There is a standard set of things that Lojbanists are required to talk about?
> Failing to do so is an offence in the > language game. The air molecule guy is probably > at most weakly in violation, but maybe in > violation none the less — even on the standrd > notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you > (only, apparently) seem to have been presenting.
Which guy is in violation according to you, the one that says the box doesn't contain anything or the one that points out that it contains air? It seems to be a normal negotiation of the universe of discourse.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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xorxes: > --- And Rosta wrote: > > I have been raising this as a gadri issue only because > > in an ancestral version of xorlo it was treated as such > > and because that was the only solution I was ever > > satisfied was satisfactory. But I'm not trying to > > argue that xorlo needs to be altered. > > The way I understand it, xorlo hasn't changed much in the > aspect we are discussing (but it's possible I'm still > missing something). The only significant change from > the old version has been the interpretation of the inner > quantifier with respect to the outer one: in the old > version the inner quantifier was the numerosity of each > value that the quantified variable takes, in the current > version it is the total number of values the quantified > variable takes.
The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the distinction, and (iii) there needed to be some way to make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this just in order to jog your memory & explain where I'm coming from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and undermine xorlo.
> > Suppose there are two statues of unicorns in front of me, and I > > draw them, and say "ta pixra re pavyseljirna ku noi zasti ta": > > that would be true, because the two drawees do exist in the > > same world as ta, even though in ta's world they aren't > > unicorns (-- they're statues). So we'd also want a way to > > express whether the drawees are unicorns in ta's world. > > But that issue only arises if {ta pavyseljirna} has > two different readings. If we can say of the statue > that it is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue > is a picture of a unicorn. If we can't say that the > statue is a unicorn, then the picture of the statue > is not a picture of a unicorn. > > CLL says: > > (The notion of a ``really existing, objectively defined bear raises certain > difficulties. Is a panda bear a ``real bear? How about a teddy bear? In > general, the answer is ``yes. Lojban gismu are defined as broadly as > possible, allowing tanru and lujvo to narrow down the definition. There > probably are no necessary and sufficient conditions for defining what is and > what is not a bear that can be pinned down with complete precision: the real > world is fuzzy. In borderline cases, ``le may communicate better than > ``lo.) > > I would add that in different contexts the boundaries can > be different. Once we decide whether in the given context > a statue of a unicorn counts as a unicorn, we know whether > the picture of the statue counts as a picture of a unicorn.
I think this is a red-herring. Even if a statue of Abraham Lincoln is categorically not Abraham Lincoln, a picture of a statue of Lincoln can be a picture of Lincoln, whereas a photo of statue of Lincoln can't be a photo of Lincoln.
> > > {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ranmi danlu} "that's a picture > > > of two unicorns which are mythological animals" and > > > {ta pixra lo re pavyseljirna poi ca'a zasti le ma'a munje} > > > "that's a picture of two unicorns that actually exist in > > > our world". > > > > The first seems okay, but the second doesn't, for two > > reasons. Firstly, one can have imaginary things that are defined > > as existing in the real world: "lo ca'a zasti le ma'a munje" > > needn't refer to something that exists in the real world; > > This part I'm not sure I understand. Wouldn't an imaginary > (or fictional) thing be non-existent by definition?
Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway, my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not a dog in our local real world.
> > it might refer to "Mr Exister in the RW". > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all > it needs to do.
In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
> > Secondly, what > > matters (with regard to disambiguation) is whether the > > depictee exists in the same world as the depicter (and > > whether the depictee has the property of being depicted > > in the same world as it has the property of unicornhood). > > That would seem to require the marking of statements for > world of application, rather than the marking of sumti.
That'd be one solution, yes.
> > I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this overtly in > > terms of different worlds. I am talking about different worlds > > only as a means of explicating the different readings we > > get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm suggesting that > > Lojbanists might want a robust way to express the readings > > distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable? > > How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version > according to you?
{lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of {lo broda}. {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate decisions about how LAhE worked. For certain sorts of intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional readings, quantification would be over instances.
As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion to that scheme.
--And.
pc: > & says: > > I'm not saying that Lojban should handle this > > overtly in > > terms of different worlds. I am talking about > > different worlds > > only as a means of explicating the different > > readings we > > get with intensional sumti-places. And I'm > > suggesting that > > Lojbanists might want a robust way to express > > the readings > > distinctly on occasion. Is that reasonable? > > I gather that the distinction is something like > this: "I drew a picture of a unicorn" might mean > that a) there is a unicorn — in the same world > as the one in which "I" refers to me and in which > I did this action of drawing a picture of it or > b) I drew a picture in this world which > represented the salient visible properties > ascribed to unicorns and either 1) in some other > world there is a unicorn that this is an accurate > depiction of (or would be if it were in that > world) or 2) whether this is a depiction of some > real or not unicorn is irrelevant so long as this > does indeed display the relevant visual > prperties.
Yes!
> The first seems to be covered by "There is a > unicorn and I painted a picture of it," if we > identify the u/d with a world, rather than > insisting on a physical restriction.
Yes, but there's no guarantee that the u/d is identified with a world, so ideally there should be a way to mark that explicitly,
> The third > is in Lojban the standard dodge "I drew a > picture of > the event/property/some relevant abstraction of > something being a unicorn" ("drew a picture of" > will need a careful definition in Lojban of > course).
Assuming that event abstractions don't have to be events (i.e. don't have to fasnu). (That is indeed the traditional Lojban position. I was never very happy with it, but only because it seems, as you say, to be a dodge.)
> The middle case is harder, since > presumably we want a quantifier of unicorns that > is clearly not in the world of the picture and > the picturer and most of the easy moves with > worlds (or without for that matter) don't > distinguish out the base world (the real is > possible). Calling the unicorn mythical doesn't > do it since it is not in the world where it > exists. Maybe the best move is to add the "which > exists in some situation other than this one" or > the like. How do we make it clear that the > doctor we need is one in Chelm?
I concur with your statement of the problem.
--And.
> John E Clifford wrote: > > >--- Jorge Llambías > > >wrote: > > > > > > >>I hope I never claimed such a thing about the > >>universe! > >>But also not even about the universe of > >>discourse. All I > >>said was that if you mention it, then it is > in > >>the > >>universe of discourse, not that if you don't > >>mention it > >>then it is not. > >> > >> > > > >You actually said that mentioning it the first > >time *introduced* it into the universe of > >discourse, whence I infer it was not there > >before. You may have *meant* something like > "if > >I mention it then it is in the u/d even if not > >previously obvious that it was" or some such, > but > >it is hard to take your words in that sense. > > > > > > The only 'difference' between the two > interpretations is the difference > between the item being newly introduced into > the universe of discourse > at its first mention, and the item always > having been in the universe of > discourse. But the interval in dispute starts > at the beginning of the > discussion and ends at the item's first > mention. Since the item is never > mentioned in the interval, this 'difference' is > meaningless.
Not in the "Nothing" / "Air units" (they aren't molecules, after all) case — see the earlier discussion. I take it that xorxes meant things in a more usual sense and calls assigning as a reference "introduction" or something very like that.
> The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier > quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed > to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction > between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying > over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions > ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the > distinction,
Yes, and that remains so.
> and (iii) there needed to be some way to > make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this > just in order to jog your memory & explain where I'm coming > from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and > undermine xorlo.
I more or less remember it like that too. The BPFK has not voted on LAhE yet. I don't suppose any of the existing LAhEs could be recycled for this, but in principle new LAhEs with the meaning {lo klesi be} and {lo mupli be} (or brivla with the appropriate place structure) could be introduced.
Would you agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal to the intensional issue? We have the two readings for the instance case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind of doctor.
> Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but > they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway, > my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our > local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not > a dog in our local real world. > > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all > > it needs to do. > > In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X".
Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? You now seem to be giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances. I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where his time slices exist?
> > How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version > > according to you? > > {lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of > {lo broda}.
If that means {lo broda cu zasti le ma'a munje} was generally false, then that's not my understanding of what {lo broda} denoted. If brodakind generally exists in our world, then maybe we are just using different words to say the same thing.
> {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over > instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but > the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate > decisions about how LAhE worked.
That's my understanding of how it is for {PA lo broda}. LAhEs are still open for discussion.
> For certain sorts of > intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti > places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional > readings, quantification would be over instances.
I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to each instance separately.
> As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion > to that scheme.
I understand that. I agree there have been some changes with respect to the original scheme, but we disagree somewhat on what those changes have been.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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wrote:
> > --- John E Clifford wrote: > > The objection is (to repeat myself) that on > your > > view (things aren't in the universe until > > mentioned) > > Not my view at all. > > > You actually said that mentioning it the > first > > time *introduced* it into the universe of > > discourse, whence I infer it was not there > > before. > > If I recall correctly, you asked how things > that > were not in the universe of discourse could > be introduced into it and I said one obvious > way of doing that was to mention them. If my > recollection is inaccurate, that's what I meant > > so hopefully we are now clear. > > > You may have *meant* something like "if > > I mention it then it is in the u/d even if > not > > previously obvious that it was" or some such, > but > > it is hard to take your words in that sense. > > That's indeed what I meant. > > > On the other hand, I am glad to see that your > > sense of u/d is not hopelessly diffderent > from a > > normal pone, for all that its operations are > put > > rather strangely.To be sure, what is in the > u/d > > varies with context, but it takes a fairly > > clearly specialized context to leave out > gross > > physical objects, even when most of them go > > unmentioned. > > Really? I would think in most contexts most > gross > physical objects are left out.
This one really is a non-different case: if they are never mentioned, then it does not matter whether they are in the universe or not. For a variety of reasons — mainly that they might turn up though you had not thought of that possibility in advance — a fairly wide sweep is commonly used and the reference functions used assigned to cover the cases that are mentioned (the other cases dealt with in some arbitrary fashion -- within certain bounds, of course) > This is what dictionary.com has for "universe > of > discourse": > > universe of discourse > n. Logic > A class containing all the entities referred to > in a discourse or an argument. > Also called universe. > > universe of discourse > n : everything stated or assumed in a given > discussion [syn: universe syn: universe] > > Most things in the physical universe are not > referred to > in most discourses or arguments, nor stated or > assumed > in most discussions.
Well, that depends on what the quantifiers range over. Things that are never mentioned or referred to may still (have to) be in the universe to get the quantifiers working right in some cases. Maybe that is what "assumed" means here.
> > Well, the Gricean line is that the u/d must > be > > decided by the interaction of the > interlocutors. > > If one of the participants wants it to be > > crucially different from the (loosely > defined, to > > be sure) standard set (roughly gross physical > > objects and — for Lojban — all abstracta) > then > > he must make that difference overt at the > > beginning. > > The standard set? There is a standard set of > things > that Lojbanists are required to talk about?
I didn't say you were re > > Failing to do so is an offence in the > > language game. The air molecule guy is > probably > > at most weakly in violation, but maybe in > > violation none the less — even on the > standrd > > notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you > > (only, apparently) seem to have been > presenting. > > Which guy is in violation according to you, the > one that says the box doesn't contain anything > or > the one that points out that it contains air? > It seems to be a normal negotiation of the > universe of discourse. > > mu'o mi'e xorxes > > > > > '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''__ > Do you Yahoo!? > The all-new My Yahoo! - Get yours free! > http://my.yahoo.com > > > > >
Button! Does anyone know what the problem button is that seems to get hit at various points when I think I am doing normal stuff, like spacing or paragraphing?
wrote:
>
> The standard set? There is a standard set of
> things
> that Lojbanists are required to talk about?
I didn't say they were required to talk about them, only that the objects were always available if an occasion arose to mention them. I suppose that they are more precisely the objects in the shared knowledge and beliefs of the conversants, which presumably includes a large chunk of the real world, though not all of it. And may include quite a few other things as well.
> > Failing to do so is an offence in the > > language game. The air molecule guy is > probably > > at most weakly in violation, but maybe in > > violation none the less — even on the > standrd > > notion of u/d and certainly on the notion you > > (only, apparently) seem to have been > presenting. > > Which guy is in violation according to you, the > one that says the box doesn't contain anything > or > the one that points out that it contains air? > It seems to be a normal negotiation of the > universe of discourse. > As I understood your position originally, the one who "points out" that it contains air, since that constitutes changing the u/d in mid conversation. In that context, the one who says there is nothing in the box would be correct when he said it, according to the u/d then in place. In what I now gather is your actual view, the move is just a much less major shift, a pointing out of what is going to be taken as relevant in the conversation — a continually negotiated part of most conversations.
On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, John E Clifford wrote: > Button! Does anyone know what the problem button is that seems to > get hit at various points when I think I am doing normal stuff, > like spacing or paragraphing?
I assume that you've hit tab, which takes you to the next form element, i.e. out of the writing area.
-Robin
wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, John > E Clifford wrote: > > Button! Does anyone know what the problem > button is that seems to > > get hit at various points when I think I am > doing normal stuff, > > like spacing or paragraphing? > > I assume that you've hit tab, which takes you > to the next form > element, i.e. out of the writing area. > > -Robin
Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what happens here (indeed, in the reply segment it doesn't do anything). It certainly does not send the reply.
On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:17:49PM -0800, John E Clifford wrote: > > --- Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, John E Clifford wrote: > > > Button! Does anyone know what the problem button is that > > > seems to get hit at various points when I think I am doing > > > normal stuff, like spacing or paragraphing? > > > > I assume that you've hit tab, which takes you to the next form > > element, i.e. out of the writing area. > > Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what happens here (indeed, in > the reply segment it doesn't do anything). It certainly does not > send the reply.
No, but a tab followed by a return will.
In fact, a return by itself will probably do it.
-Robin
xorxes: > --- And: > > The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier > > quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed > > to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction > > between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying > > over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions > > ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the > > distinction, > > Yes, and that remains so.
Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or instances of a kind — the distinction, if relevant, to be glorked. Correct me if I err.)
> > and (iii) there needed to be some way to > > make the distinction, e.g. using LAhE. I'm saying this > > just in order to jog your memory & explain where I'm coming > > from; I'm not trying to resuscitate that old scheme and > > undermine xorlo. > > I more or less remember it like that too. The BPFK has not voted > on LAhE yet. I don't suppose any of the existing LAhEs could be > recycled for this, but in principle new LAhEs with the meaning > {lo klesi be} and {lo mupli be} (or brivla with the appropriate > place structure) could be introduced.
Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo} reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.
> Would you agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal > to the intensional issue?
Yes and no...
> We have the two readings for the instance > case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind > of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind > of doctor.
In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.
Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you & me (at least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification (when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal to pixra-type intensionals.
But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the subkind/instance contrast but is not intensional.
> > Pe'i imaginary things exist by virtue of being imaginable, but > > they don't exist in the same world as real things. But anyway, > > my point is that Mr Dog exists but is not a dog in our > > local world, and likewise Mr Real World Dog exists but is not > > a dog in our local real world. > > > > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all > > > it needs to do. > > > > In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X". > > Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view?
I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization, but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic singularization.
> You now seem to be > giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances. > I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is > his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where > his time slices exist?
Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.
In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else to swallow it.
> > > How was the distinction handled in the ancestral version > > > according to you? > > > > {lo broda} denoted brodakind. Actual broda were instances of > > {lo broda}. > > If that means {lo broda cu zasti le ma'a munje} was generally > false, then that's not my understanding of what {lo broda} > denoted. If brodakind generally exists in our world, then maybe > we are just using different words to say the same thing.
On my understanding, a brodakind, if it has instances that exist in our world, itself exists in our world, in the sense of being manifest in our world. But it also exists outside of our world, too, in the noosphere along with the kinds (e.g. unicornkind) that don't have instances that exist in our world.
> > {PA lo broda} was neutral between quantifying over > > instances of brodakind and over subkinds of brodakind, but > > the distinction could be made e.g. by LAhE, pending appropriate > > decisions about how LAhE worked. > > That's my understanding of how it is for {PA lo broda}. LAhEs > are still open for discussion.
Surely in xorlo {PA1 lo (PA2) broda} involves quantifying over the (PA2) referents of {lo (PA2) broda}.
If xorlo followed XS, then the inner PA in xorlo would make no sense. In XS, {pa lo re xirma} would be "two instances of Mr Horse Pair" or "two subkinds of Mr Horse Pair" — which admittedly made lVi redundant. But if xorlo {pa lo xirma} can mean "two instances/subkinds of Mr Horse", what on earth can xorlo {pa lo re xirma} mean? There is only one Mr Horse.
So no, I think xorlo is pretty different from XS.
> > For certain sorts of > > intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti > > places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional > > readings, quantification would be over instances. > > I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing > with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to > each instance separately.
Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.
> > As I have said, though, I don't intend to suggest a reversion > > to that scheme. > > I understand that. I agree there have been some changes with respect > to the original scheme, but we disagree somewhat on what those changes > have been.
Indeed!
--And.
> xorxes: > > --- And: > > > The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier > > > quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed > > > to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction > > > between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying > > > over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions > > > ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the > > > distinction, > > > > Yes, and that remains so. > > Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification > over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that > in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or > instances of a kind — the distinction, if relevant, to be > glorked. Correct me if I err.)
That's correct. So in effect {PA lo broda} has the same uses either way.
> Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent > to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo} > reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate.
I think {lo klesi be} disambiguates one way (or eventually it shows there is a possible third reading, and then an infinite series).
> > We have the two readings for the instance > > case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind > > of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind > > of doctor. > > In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo > mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}.
Yes, and now {su'o klesi be lo mikce} versus {lo klesi be lo mikce}.
> Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal > to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you & me (at > least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification > (when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal > to pixra-type intensionals.
I think the same possibilities exist for pixra: a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith) b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular) c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist) d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)
> But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the subkind/instance > contrast but is not intensional.
Yes, this is a better example to separate the two issues.
> > > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all > > > > it needs to do. > > > > > > In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X". > > > > Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? > > I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization, > but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic > singularization.
OK. Where we disagree is that I don't want manifestation in the world as a grammatical category. We can say of {lo broda} that it mafifests itself in the world, or that it doesn't, or say nothing about that point (it may be irrelevant).
> > You now seem to be > > giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances. > > I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is > > his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where > > his time slices exist? > > Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has > no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's > manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say.
"Exists" as in "can be included in the universe of discourse", "is a possible value for a variable", yes. "Exists" in the sense "is manifest in the physical world", not necessarily (it may or may not be). So I don't think we disagree on that.
> In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else > to swallow it.
I enjoy ruminating different ontologies. 
> > > For certain sorts of > > > intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti > > > places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional > > > readings, quantification would be over instances. > > > > I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing > > with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to > > each instance separately. > > Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.
All I meant is that you can make reference to Mr Broda without making reference to its eventual instances of manifestation.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:17:49PM -0800, John > E Clifford wrote: > > > > --- Robin Lee Powell > wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, > John E Clifford wrote: > > > > Button! Does anyone know what the > problem button is that > > > > seems to get hit at various points when I > think I am doing > > > > normal stuff, like spacing or > paragraphing? > > > > > > I assume that you've hit tab, which takes > you to the next form > > > element, i.e. out of the writing area. > > > > Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what > happens here (indeed, in > > the reply segment it doesn't do anything). > It certainly does not > > send the reply. > > No, but a tab followed by a return will. > > In fact, a return by itself will probably do > it. > > -Robin > > >
wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:17:49PM -0800, John > E Clifford wrote: > > > > --- Robin Lee Powell > wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Jan 13, 2005 at 03:07:54PM -0800, > John E Clifford wrote: > > > > Button! Does anyone know what the > problem button is that > > > > seems to get hit at various points when I > think I am doing > > > > normal stuff, like spacing or > paragraphing? > > > > > > I assume that you've hit tab, which takes > you to the next form > > > element, i.e. out of the writing area. > > > > Tab doesn't seem to do anything like what > happens here (indeed, in > > the reply segment it doesn't do anything). > It certainly does not > > send the reply. > > No, but a tab followed by a return will. > > In fact, a return by itself will probably do > it.
Thgank you; that does work — though I still don't quite see how I manage to do it. Return alone does not work.
I either happily never saw the subclass ideas about {Q lo broda} or blessedly have so completely forgotten them that even this discussion is not reviving any memories. It looks like a stage in the illconceived procession toward the xorlo reading of {Q1 lo Q2 broda) and should presumably be handled in the corresponding way: with {lo klesi be lo broda} like {lo Q2mei be lo broda}.
One vaguel encouraging thing in the discussion was xorxes comment that Dr. Dr. is just doctors. This begins to sound like bunches, which Lojban has always (though covertly) had. Metaphysical argle bargle aside, the only problem is that bunches will not solve the intensionality problem. That leaves either admitting that {mi nitcu lo mikce} is generally false — if {nitcu} is not a special predicate — or that {nitcu2} is an unmarked intensional context. The latter is of course a viable alternative (it works more or less well in English, for example) but seems less than optimal since Lojban has always had another solution that works better and marks intensions across the board. There is also the fact that {nitcu} 2 need not always be intensional, it need not be in {mi nitcu leti mikce} (with appropriate pointing if you insist)for example.
It is conceivable (though after how ever many years it has been, conceiving is getting very hard) that xorlo as it is now gradually emerging in the expositions on the proposal given actually solves some problem or presents some advantage for the language. I really would like to know what you think this might be. So far as the present evidence goes, it is a defective fix for a functioning system.
xorxes: > --- And: > > xorxes: > > > --- And: > > > > The relevant change concerns what the outer quantifier > > > > quantifies over; at the time that I tuned out, we seemed > > > > to be in agreement that (i) there was a significant distinction > > > > between quantifying over instances of a kind and quantifying > > > > over subkinds of a kind, (ii) PA + gadri constructions > > > > ought probably to be underspecified with regard to the > > > > distinction, > > > > > > Yes, and that remains so. > > > > Surely not, since PA + gadri in xorlo involves quantification > > over the referents of the gadri. (The similarity is that > > in xorlo the referents of the gadri may be subkinds or > > instances of a kind — the distinction, if relevant, to be > > glorked. Correct me if I err.) > > That's correct. So in effect {PA lo broda} has the same > uses either way.
Yes.
> > Jumping the gun, I note for the record that if LAhE are equivalent > > to {lo broda be} then they aren't a solution, since the {lo} > > reintroduces the ambiguity that the LAhE is supposed to eliminate. > > I think {lo klesi be} disambiguates one way (or eventually it > shows there is a possible third reading, and then an infinite > series). > > > > We have the two readings for the instance > > > case, and two readings for the subkind case: there is a certain kind > > > of doctor such that I need that kind of doctor vs. I need any kind > > > of doctor. > > > > In the scheme we called XS, that would have been {su'o -subkind lo > > mikce} versus {lo su'o -subkind lo mikce}. > > Yes, and now {su'o klesi be lo mikce} versus {lo klesi be lo mikce}.
OK.
> > Anyway, I agree that the subkind/instance distinction is orthogonal > > to "any" readings of intensional sumti-places, since you & me (at > > least) are of the view that "any" readings don't involve quantification > > (when not given a propositionalist paraphrase). But it's not orthogonal > > to pixra-type intensionals. > > I think the same possibilities exist for pixra: > a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith) > b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular) > c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist) > d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular)
Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture. I understand that the universe of discourse idea is supposed to do away with that ambiguity, by including individuals from different worlds in one and the same universe, and having quantification range over individuals in the UoD. But there are good practical reasons for wanting to be able to make the distinction if we choose to, since it — the distinction between real broda and imaginary broda — is one we often make.
> > But the ambiguity of "We ate the same meal" hinges on the subkind/instance > > contrast but is not intensional. > > Yes, this is a better example to separate the two issues. > > > > > > Mr Exister in the RW has to exist in the RW, that's in fact all > > > > > it needs to do. > > > > > > > > In that case, we must understand different things by "Mr X". > > > > > > Have you abandoned the myopic singularizer view? > > > > I don't think Mr X comes into existence through myopic singularization, > > but I do think that Mr X becomes manifest in the world through myopic > > singularization. > > OK. Where we disagree is that I don't want manifestation in the > world as a grammatical category. We can say of {lo broda} that > it mafifests itself in the world, or that it doesn't, or say > nothing about that point (it may be irrelevant).
I don't necessarily want manifestation to be a grammatical category. But I do want a way to determine truth-conditions, specifically in determining which world a proposition is claimed to be true of.
It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and the same world. That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa -detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the old-style meaning too.
> > > You now seem to be > > > giving Mr X a more independent existence from that of its instances. > > > I think Mr X is just its instances, in a similar way that John is > > > his time slices, for example. Does John not exist in the world where > > > his time slices exist? > > > > Yes, but Mr X exists (abstractly, in the noosphere) even when it has > > no instances. Mr Unicorn, Mr AIDS Cure, and so forth. Mr X's > > manifestation in the world is its instances, though, just as you say. > > "Exists" as in "can be included in the universe of discourse", > "is a possible value for a variable", yes. "Exists" in the sense > "is manifest in the physical world", not necessarily (it may > or may not be). So I don't think we disagree on that.
Right.
> > In my ontology, this is, of course. I'm not asking anybody else
> > to swallow it.
>
> I enjoy ruminating different ontologies.
>
> > > > For certain sorts of
> > > > intensional readings of quantified sumti in intensional sumti
> > > > places, quantification would be over subkinds. For extensional
> > > > readings, quantification would be over instances.
> > >
> > > I think the two issues are separate. The suggested way of dealing
> > > with intensional cases is by not forcing obligatory reference to
> > > each instance separately.
> >
> > Can you explain, with an example? I don't follow you.
>
> All I meant is that you can make reference to Mr Broda without
> making reference to its eventual instances of manifestation.
OK.
--And.
> xorxes: > > I think the same possibilities exist for pixra: > > a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith) > > b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular) > > c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist) > > d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular) > > Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according > to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture.
In that case, all four of them could be ambiguous that way. That's a third axis of distinctions.
> It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe > that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that > all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and > the same world.
I don't dispute there was a tendency (and maybe there still is) to do that, but surely it could never have been absolute because some predicates (like xanri) require their arguments to exist in different worlds.
> That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa > -detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even > when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a > literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an > ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I > do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the > old-style meaning too.
We don't impose any ontology on Lojban. Speakers are free to use the language in such a way that they only refer to non-fictional things if they so wish.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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xorxes: > --- And: > > xorxes: > > > I think the same possibilities exist for pixra: > > > a) A picture of a doctor (Dr Smith) > > > b) A picture of a doctor (no one in particular) > > > c) A picture of a doctor (a cardiologist) > > > d) A picture of a doctor (no speciality in particular) > > > > Yes, (a-d) are possibilities. But (a) has a further ambiguity according > > to whether the doctor exists in the same world as the picture. > > In that case, all four of them could be ambiguous that way. That's > a third axis of distinctions. > > > It may sound like I am introducing a wholly new idea, but I believe > > that the general lojbanological understanding was, implicitly, that > > all propositions in a clause were claimed to be true of one and > > the same world. > > I don't dispute there was a tendency (and maybe there still is) > to do that, but surely it could never have been absolute > because some predicates (like xanri) require their arguments to > exist in different worlds.
{da xanri mi} and {su'o crida xanri mi} are unproblematic, because {da xanri mi} and {da crida} are still true of the local real world (because the truthconditions of xanri and crida include "in a world other than the local real one"). ({su'o gerku cu xanri mi} would have fallen into the same problematic category as we are discussing here.)
The same goes for (c): the claim that there is a kind of doctor (and I drew it) can be true of this world even if that kind is not manifest in this world; at least, that is so under my ontology... As for (b) & (d), they don't claim that something is a doctor or a kind of doctor, so they don't share (a)'s ambiguity. So I maintain that only (a) is significantly ambiguous.
Incidentally, in my interpretation of XS, the reading of (a) where Dr Smith is not necessarily a doctor in this world was not distinct from (c). So there were four readings, (a-d), but (a) (if expressed as {su'o mikce}) would unambiguously mean that the drawee is a doctor in this world.
However, I don't necessarily deny that the ambiguity of (a) operates on a different axis. Certainly that seems to be so under xorlo.
> > That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra pa > > -detective} can now describe a depiction of Sherlock Holmes, even > > when it is mutually manifest in the context that Holmes is a > > literary fiction. I think therefore that there has been an > > ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't object to it, but I > > do think there ought to be a way of expressing things with the > > old-style meaning too. > > We don't impose any ontology on Lojban.
That's debatable, since some ontology is hardwired into sny semantics. But be that as it may, the question I'm asking concerns how to express things in the old-style ontology.
> Speakers are free to use the language in such a way that they > only refer to non-fictional things if they so wish.
The issue doesn't have to do with referring to only nonfictional things; it has to do with making it clear what is and isn't claimed to be true of the local real world. Normal discourse, including fictional discourse (e.g. novels), makes a distinction between propositions that are claimed to be true of the local real world and propositions that aren't. So, for instances, the truthconditions of {da gerku}, given that gerku are by definition real (in the world in which they gerku), are such that one evaluates them by checking through the local real world to see if it contains something that has doghood.
Consider English "There is at least one cure for AIDS, and we discussed it". That entails or very very strongly implicates that one can go out into the world and find at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at least one cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure is necessarily real. So the two English sentences seem not to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents are synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We discussed at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how to render in Lojban the English "There is at least one AIDS cure, and we discussed it".
To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that xorlo happens not to provide it.
--And.
wrote:
> > --- And:
> > > It may sound like I am introducing a wholly > new idea, but I believe > > that the general lojbanological understanding > was, implicitly, that > > all propositions in a clause were claimed to > be true of one and > > the same world. > > I don't dispute there was a tendency (and maybe > there still is) > to do that, but surely it could never have been > absolute > because some predicates (like xanri) require > their arguments to > exist in different worlds.
This is one of the reasons for suggesting that
{xanri1} is intensional or (better) that the
preferred sumti is an abstractum. Of course,
this does not require that the referent is not in
the current world — the sentence may be false
after all or about someone, in (xanri2}, who
imagines something that is in fact real.
> > That is no longer the case, since {ti pixra > pa > > -detective} can now describe a depiction of > Sherlock Holmes, even > > when it is mutually manifest in the context > that Holmes is a > > literary fiction. I think therefore that > there has been an > > ontological shift in Lojban of late. I don't > object to it, but I > > do think there ought to be a way of > expressing things with the > > old-style meaning too. > > We don't impose any ontology on Lojban. > Speakers are free to use > the language in such a way that they only refer > to non-fictional > things if they so wish.
We don't impose an ontology on Lojban, but the facts of the case do have some relevance (impose an ontology — although that is not quite the right word, so we take it in the Lojban sense) and we should be prepared to deal with it. If we can get to a thing only by passing through someone's thought processes, it should be distinguished from something we can get to by walking around.
> Consider English "There is at least one cure > for AIDS, and > we discussed it". That entails or very very > strongly > implicates that one can go out into the world > and find > at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at > least one > cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure > is > necessarily real. So the two English sentences > seem not > to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents > are > synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We > discussed > at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how > to render > in Lojban the English "There is at least one > AIDS cure, > and we discussed it". > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else > reading this), I > am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to > provide a > way of translating "There is at least one AIDS > cure, > and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that > one would > like Lojban to have a way of translating it, > and that > xorlo happens not to provide it.
What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be a "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: {da [http://www.lojban.org/tiki/cure%20%E2%80%94%20seems%20nearly%20impossible%20to%20say%20for%20a%3Cbr%20/%3Ematerial%20rather%20than%20a%20doctor cure — seems nearly impossible to say for a material rather than a doctor] la aids ije mia casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo cure be la aids} (using the intensional object rather than the intensional place method.
wrote:
> > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else > > reading this), I > > am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* > to > > provide a > > way of translating "There is at least one > AIDS > > cure, > > and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that > > one would > > like Lojban to have a way of translating it, > > and that > > xorlo happens not to provide it. > > What I mean by saying that xorlo seems to be a > "fix" that destroys an unbroken system: > {da [http://www.lojban.org/tiki/cure%20%E2%80%94%20seems%20nearly%20impossible%20to%20say%20for%3Cbr%20/%3E%3E%20a%3Cbr%20/%3E%3E%20material%20rather%20than%20a%20doctor cure — seems nearly impossible to say for > a > material rather than a doctor] la aids ije mia > casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo cure be la > aids} (using the intensional object rather than > the intensional place method.
{ka'orbixri'a} (fech!) "(using) x1 causes one suffering from x2 to become healthy" "x1 is a cure for x2"
pc: > --- And Rosta .rosta@v21.me.uk la aids ije mia > casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo cure be la > aids} (using the intensional object rather than > the intensional place method.
But we discuss the cure, not the abstraction. And what would be the abstraction that tu'a abbreviates? Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the discussee does not necessarily exist (at least as a cure) in the same world as the discussion?
--And.
> pc: > > --- And Rosta .rosta@v21.me.uk la aids ije > mia > > casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo cure be la > > aids} (using the intensional object rather > than > > the intensional place method. > > But we discuss the cure, not the abstraction. > And > what would be the abstraction that tu'a > abbreviates? > Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the > discussee > does not necessarily exist (at least as a cure) > in > the same world as the discussion?
Yes, it is not immediately clear which abstraction to use. I am inclined to think it is usually events: What we discuss is either whether (or that) the cure exists or what it does or how it does it. Just discussing the cure tout court is a little like needing just a doctor, not a doctor doing something. But in any case, it does give a world creator to potentially distance the object.
pc: > --- And Rosta .rosta@v21.me.uk la aids ije > > mia > > > casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo cure be la > > > aids} (using the intensional object rather > > than > > > the intensional place method. > > > > But we discuss the cure, not the abstraction. > > And > > what would be the abstraction that tu'a > > abbreviates? > > Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the > > discussee > > does not necessarily exist (at least as a cure) > > in > > the same world as the discussion? > > Yes, it is not immediately clear which > abstraction to use. I am inclined to think it is > usually events: What we discuss is either > whether (or that) the cure exists or what it does > or how it does it. Just discussing the cure tout > court is a little like needing just a doctor, not > a doctor doing something. But in any case, it > does give a world creator to potentially distance > the object.
If this were so, it ought to be so also for cures that do exist, for I think existing and nonexisting cures can be discussed in the same way. So if tu'a is required for not-necessarily-existing cures, it should be required for necessarily-existing ones too.
Although I too at one time pushed for the sort of solution you're advocating, it no longer rings true for me (because the solution doesn't seem to fit the actual meaning). Two solutions I can see are: 1. Words (probably tcita) meaning "exists in local real world" and "doesn't necessarily exist in local real world". 2. Something like the XS gadri proposal, where there are two LAhE (or similar) such that PA LAhE1 lo broda quantifies over broda in the local real world and PA LAhE2 quantifies over broda regardless of whether they're in the local real world.
Solution (1) seems far less disruptive to xorlo and hence to the progress and consensus that the BPFK appears to have achieved.
--And.
> pc: > > --- And Rosta .rosta@v21.me.uk la aids > ije > > > mia > > > > casnu da} v. {mi'a casnu tu'a lo cure > be la > > > > aids} (using the intensional object > rather > > > than > > > > the intensional place method. > > > > > > But we discuss the cure, not the > abstraction. > > > And > > > what would be the abstraction that tu'a > > > abbreviates? > > > Or is {tu'a} just a marker showing that the > > > discussee > > > does not necessarily exist (at least as a > cure) > > > in > > > the same world as the discussion? > > > > Yes, it is not immediately clear which > > abstraction to use. I am inclined to think > it is > > usually events: What we discuss is either > > whether (or that) the cure exists or what it > does > > or how it does it. Just discussing the cure > tout > > court is a little like needing just a doctor, > not > > a doctor doing something. But in any case, > it > > does give a world creator to potentially > distance > > the object.
On further thought, it seems to me that the abstraction involved is a proposition, which provides all the advantages of events with the addition that they can be questions overtly, rather than covertly. And, of course, discussion is a linguistic activity.
> If this were so, it ought to be so also for
> cures
> that do exist, for I think existing and
> nonexisting
> cures can be discussed in the same way. So if
> tu'a
> is required for not-necessarily-existing cures,
> it should be required for necessarily-existing
> ones too.
While this is technically true, I don't see that it needs to influence the language that much. {mi nitcu loti mikce} is merely an idiom for the same with {tu'a} indicating that loti mikce exists in the same world as the speaker. (Some aspects of this talk about what world the object exists in seems to me to rest on a belief that because the doctor who would fill my need would have to be in the same world as I am the referent of {lo mikce} has to be in this world. But that is clearly wrong since the filling of the need is clearly subjunctive, that is I can have the need even though nothing in the world fills it.)
> Although I too at one time pushed for the sort > of > solution you're advocating, it no longer rings > true for me (because the solution doesn't seem > to > fit the actual meaning). Two solutions I can > see > are: > 1. Words (probably tcita) meaning "exists in > local > real world" and "doesn't necessarily exist in > local > real world". > 2. Something like the XS gadri proposal, where > there are two LAhE (or similar) such that PA > LAhE1 > lo broda quantifies over broda in the local > real > world and PA LAhE2 quantifies over broda > regardless > of whether they're in the local real world. > > Solution (1) seems far less disruptive to xorlo > and hence to the progress and consensus that > the > BPFK appears to have achieved.
Since I think that xorlo — even as it was presented officially, before the expanding explications — is a disaster, preserving it is hardly a considertation. The predicate for "exists in this world" ({zasti} + implications) and "exists in an unspecified world" ({zasti} + explcit comments) seems to me to put the work in the wrong place, as does the {LAhE} solution. They also complicates an already (in xorlo) complicated situation for what is ultimately a rather simple problem (several of them in fact), for which the use of intensional expressions provides a uniform solution within the present system. As I have noted, I have yet to see a convincing case which requires any of the mumbo-jumbo of xorlo or that would justify the complications that that system (well, some versions of it — I hope one will get settled on soon) entails.
> pc:
> > --- And Rosta .rosta@v21.me.ukOn Sun, 2005-01-16 at 17:48 -0800, John E Clifford wrote: > Even if you are correct (and there is some reason > to be doubtful about the discussion part of that) > that hardly makes it a Good Idea. Consider the > recent US election after all.
The recent US election was hardly unanimous.
> On Sun, 2005-01-16 at 17:48 -0800, John E > Clifford wrote: > > Even if you are correct (and there is some > reason > > to be doubtful about the discussion part of > that) > > that hardly makes it a Good Idea. Consider > the > > recent US election after all. > > The recent US election was hardly unanimous. > True, but it was not unaimously the other way either; as Lincoln said ...
> The issue doesn't have to do with referring to only > nonfictional things; it has to do with making it clear > what is and isn't claimed to be true of the local real > world. Normal discourse, including fictional discourse (e.g. > novels), makes a distinction between propositions that are > claimed to be true of the local real world and propositions > that aren't. So, for instances, the truthconditions of > {da gerku}, given that gerku are by definition real (in > the world in which they gerku), are such that one evaluates > them by checking through the local real world to see if > it contains something that has doghood.
The usual interpretation would be:
da (poi zasti le ma'a munje) cu gerku
> Consider English "There is at least one cure for AIDS, and > we discussed it". That entails or very very strongly > implicates that one can go out into the world and find > at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at least one > cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure is > necessarily real. So the two English sentences seem not > to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents are > synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We discussed > at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how to render > in Lojban the English "There is at least one AIDS cure, > and we discussed it".
I think somthing like {mi'o casnu su'o lo velmikce be fi abu be'o noi ca'a zasti}
> To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I > am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a > way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, > and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would > like Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that > xorlo happens not to provide it.
It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you can do it through predicates that require their arguments to be in the same world.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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xorxes: > --- And: > > The issue doesn't have to do with referring to only > > nonfictional things; it has to do with making it clear > > what is and isn't claimed to be true of the local real > > world. Normal discourse, including fictional discourse (e.g. > > novels), makes a distinction between propositions that are > > claimed to be true of the local real world and propositions > > that aren't. So, for instances, the truthconditions of > > {da gerku}, given that gerku are by definition real (in > > the world in which they gerku), are such that one evaluates > > them by checking through the local real world to see if > > it contains something that has doghood. > > The usual interpretation would be: > > da (poi zasti le ma'a munje) cu gerku > > > Consider English "There is at least one cure for AIDS, and > > we discussed it". That entails or very very strongly > > implicates that one can go out into the world and find > > at least one cure for AIDS. "We discussed at least one > > cure for AIDS" doesn't imply that the AIDS cure is > > necessarily real. So the two English sentences seem not > > to be synonymous. But the Lojban equivalents are > > synonymous, and are equivalent to English "We discussed > > at least one AIDS cure". So I want to know how to render > > in Lojban the English "There is at least one AIDS cure, > > and we discussed it". > > I think somthing like {mi'o casnu su'o lo velmikce be > fi abu be'o noi ca'a zasti}
OK, assuming an appropriate definition for {ca'a}. In which case, {lo ca'a velmikce} ought to be just as good.
> > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I > > am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a > > way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, > > and we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would > > like Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that > > xorlo happens not to provide it. > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, > but you can do it through predicates that require their > arguments to be in the same world.
Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
--And.
On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I am > > > not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a way of > > > translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and we discussed > > > it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like Lojban to have a > > > way of translating it, and that xorlo happens not to provide > > > it. > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you can > > do it through predicates that require their arguments to be in > > the same world. > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major > repercussions of xorlo on lojban.
Erm. This has probably been discussed, but is there something wrong with:
su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le go'i
-Robin
-- http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/ Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!" Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/
wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And > Rosta wrote: > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else > reading this), I am > > > > not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* > to provide a way of > > > > translating "There is at least one AIDS > cure, and we discussed > > > > it". Rather, I'm saying that one would > like Lojban to have a > > > > way of translating it, and that xorlo > happens not to provide > > > > it. > > > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it > through gadri, but you can > > > do it through predicates that require their > arguments to be in > > > the same world. > > > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as one > of the major > > repercussions of xorlo on lojban. > > Erm. This has probably been discussed, but is > there something wrong > with: > > su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a > mi'o pu casnu le > go'i > Well, {su'o pa} looks redundant and so does {ji'a} but that aside it seems to work, though I can see where xorxes might object and & as well (but I think they have crossed some wires).
Let's see. xorxes is right (of course) that Lojban (nor any language) does not per se (langage) favor one world over another. To be sure, Lojban favors one *kind* of world over another (I have done both Process philosophy and Theravada Buddhism in Lojban but it is a real strain — and it loses much of its spice since the basic concepts are so patently abstracted from the ordinary things that the philosophy purports to be constructing). But among the various possible object-abstraction-setworlds it does not choose.
The language in use (parole) however does favor one among the possible worlds. Language is a social activity which involves shared references among the conversants. And the world in which two conversant are (their "this world" as it were) is in the beginning the only guaranteed shared domain of reference. (This a tad optimistic since there may be more in one person's this world than in the other — consider a theist and an atheist talking for example [http://www.lojban.org/tiki/and%3Cbr%20/%3Enotice%20how%20often%20their%20conversation%20fails%20for%3Cbr%20/%3Ethis%20very%20reason and notice how often their conversation fails for this very reason]. But even they share a large overlapping mass of reality and, as long as they stick to that, they can converse quite effectively.) To move out of this given common world takes some indicator (not necessarily linguistic — sitting on a certain rock in a certain pose tells everyone that what you are saying is about Dreamtime, not here-and-now. Shifting without flags is at least to be at risk of being misunderstood and quite likely to be subject to sanctions — whatever may be appropriate ("Don't do that" to murder, say).
So the way to say that something exists in the real world is basically to to say it exists and make sure that no contrary flags are up.(Actually, when we are off in alternate worlds, we have explicit devices for getting back to *this* one — though I can't remember how that is lexed at the moment and some clever soul may have junked it as useless.) To say it exists in some other world to to make sure the flags are up and then say it exists. The same language works for both (as in the first point) but the context of use (the more explicit the better, generally) determines which world it refers to. So xorxes is right again at the end — it is not a gadri thing, since the gadri all work equally well in whatever world we are in (and, of course, the same is true of {ca'a} and the like).
Robin: > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I am > > > > not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a way of > > > > translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and we discussed > > > > it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like Lojban to have a > > > > way of translating it, and that xorlo happens not to provide > > > > it. > > > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you can > > > do it through predicates that require their arguments to be in > > > the same world. > > > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major > > repercussions of xorlo on lojban. > > Erm. This has probably been discussed, but is there something wrong > with: > > su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le > go'i
The major repercussion is not whether there is a way to say it (which is an independent issue that could perhaps be discussed in the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it is no longer the meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure". I don't have any objection to this, but I think it's important to recognize and record it.
--And.
On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 10:45:39PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > Robin: > > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I > > > > > am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a > > > > > way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and > > > > > we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like > > > > > Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that xorlo > > > > > happens not to provide it. > > > > > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you > > > > can do it through predicates that require their arguments to > > > > be in the same world. > > > > > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major > > > repercussions of xorlo on lojban. > > > > Erm. This has probably been discussed, but is there something > > wrong with: > > > > su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le > > go'i > > The major repercussion is not whether there is a way to say it > (which is an independent issue that could perhaps be discussed in > the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it is no longer the > meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure".
It's not?
su'o -cure- == su'o da poi -cure-; I'm not seeing a problem.
-Robin
> Robin: > > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And > Rosta wrote: > > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone > else reading this), I am > > > > > not saying that it is the job of > *xorlo* to provide a way of > > > > > translating "There is at least one AIDS > cure, and we discussed > > > > > it". Rather, I'm saying that one would > like Lojban to have a > > > > > way of translating it, and that xorlo > happens not to provide > > > > > it. > > > > > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it > through gadri, but you can > > > > do it through predicates that require > their arguments to be in > > > > the same world. > > > > > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as one > of the major > > > repercussions of xorlo on lojban. > > > > Erm. This has probably been discussed, but > is there something wrong > > with: > > > > su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i > ji'a mi'o pu casnu le > > go'i > > The major repercussion is not whether there is > a way to say it > (which is an independent issue that could > perhaps be discussed in > the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it > is no longer the > meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure". I don't > have any objection to > this, but I think it's important to recognize > and record it.
Well, we could argue about whether it ever was
the meaning of {mi'o casnu su'o cure-}. At
some intermediate time between CLL or rather the
gismu list that was then current and now, {mi'o
casnu su'o cure} would have been judged
unintelligible, since {casnu2} had to take some
kind of abstract, a topic (probably a proposition
but that was largely open). This was a
recognition that otherwise the opacity of
{casnu2} would go unmarked and that leads to
problems. Once that principle got promoted, the
codicil did occur that, if dubious cases were all
covered by abstractions, we could use the simple
form for the cases where the thing talked about
clearly existed here and now. But that did not
catch on . And even the fundamental point that
{casnu2} set up an opaque context which should be
marked fell into dissuetude. Now we have this
curious (incoherent in fact) mixed position: that
{casnu2} is not opaque but that we can use the
simple form without creating problems. I like
the intermediate position with abstracts but
simples for clearly existing things, but the
original is a possible as is the purely abstracts
strategy. The current proposal just doesn't
work.
Robin: > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 10:45:39PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > > Robin: > > > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > > > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of anyone else reading this), I > > > > > > am not saying that it is the job of *xorlo* to provide a > > > > > > way of translating "There is at least one AIDS cure, and > > > > > > we discussed it". Rather, I'm saying that one would like > > > > > > Lojban to have a way of translating it, and that xorlo > > > > > > happens not to provide it. > > > > > > > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it through gadri, but you > > > > > can do it through predicates that require their arguments to > > > > > be in the same world. > > > > > > > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as one of the major > > > > repercussions of xorlo on lojban. > > > > > > Erm. This has probably been discussed, but is there something > > > wrong with: > > > > > > su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le > > > go'i > > > > The major repercussion is not whether there is a way to say it > > (which is an independent issue that could perhaps be discussed in > > the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that it is no longer the > > meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure". > > It's not? > > su'o -cure- == su'o da poi -cure-; I'm not seeing a problem.
1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure" 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we discussed it"
These are not synonymous in English, because (2) but not (1) entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and "da ge -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) *. Now they mean the same as (1). So now, to say (2), one would have to say "ca'a cure" or something along those lines. (I don't consider this a change for the worse.)
* They used to be understood as meaning (2), and that used to be taken for granted. But this is not to say that a careful reading of CLL could not be made to show that technically they meant (1), without anyone having realized it.
--And.
On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 05:00:45PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > Robin: > 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure" > > 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we discussed it" > > These are not synonymous in English, because (2) but not (1) > entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and "da ge > -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) *. Now they > mean the same as (1).
The hell they do. su'o -cure- is su'o da poi -cure-, which absolutely means that a cure exists. If it doesn't, I'm inclined to think an error was made somewhere.
-Robin
Robin: > On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 05:00:45PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > > Robin: > > 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure" > > > > 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we discussed it" > > > > These are not synonymous in English, because (2) but not (1) > > entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and "da ge > > -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) *. Now they > > mean the same as (1). > > The hell they do. su'o -cure- is su'o da poi -cure-,
yes
> which absolutely means that a cure exists.
Not in the way that (2) means a cure exists. "su'o da poi -cure" says that there is at least one thing in the universe of discourse that in some world is a cure. But the world in which it is a cure is not necessarily the same world in which it is discussed; it could be a cure in an imaginary world but not in the real world in which it is discussed.
> If it doesn't, I'm inclined to think an error was made somewhere.
How so?
--And.
> Robin: > > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 10:45:39PM -0000, And > Rosta wrote: > > > Robin: > > > > On Wed, Jan 19, 2005 at 05:38:55PM -0000, > And Rosta wrote: > > > > > > > To reiterate (for the sake of > anyone else reading this), I > > > > > > > am not saying that it is the job of > *xorlo* to provide a > > > > > > > way of translating "There is at > least one AIDS cure, and > > > > > > > we discussed it". Rather, I'm > saying that one would like > > > > > > > Lojban to have a way of translating > it, and that xorlo > > > > > > > happens not to provide it. > > > > > > > > > > > > It doesn't provide a way of doing it > through gadri, but you > > > > > > can do it through predicates that > require their arguments to > > > > > > be in the same world. > > > > > > > > > > Fine, but it is as well to note this as > one of the major > > > > > repercussions of xorlo on lojban. > > > > > > > > Erm. This has probably been discussed, > but is there something > > > > wrong with: > > > > > > > > su'o pa lo -cure- be la .aids. cu zasti > .i ji'a mi'o pu casnu le > > > > go'i > > > > > > The major repercussion is not whether there > is a way to say it > > > (which is an independent issue that could > perhaps be discussed in > > > the context of CAhA tcita), but rather that > it is no longer the > > > meaning of "mi'o casnu su'o -cure". > > > > It's not? > > > > su'o -cure- == su'o da poi -cure-; I'm not > seeing a problem. > > 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure" > 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we > discussed it" > > These are not synonymous in English, because > (2) but not (1) entails > that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o -cure" and > "da ge -cure gi > se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same as (2) > *.
They still look like 2 to me, since the quantifier is overtly outside the intensional context.
Now they mean the > same as (1). So now, to say (2), one would have > to say "ca'a cure" > or something along those lines. (I don't > consider this a change > for the worse.)
{ca'a} does not help unless it is always going to the world of utterance, rather than the current world, as seems to be the case.
> * They used to be understood as meaning (2), > and that used to be > taken for granted. But this is not to say that > a careful reading > of CLL could not be made to show that > technically they meant (1), > without anyone having realized it. >
wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 05:00:45PM -0000, And > Rosta wrote: > > Robin: > > 1. "We discussed at least one AIDS cure" > > > > 2. "There is at least one AIDS cure and we > discussed it" > > > > These are not synonymous in English, because > (2) but not (1) > > entails that a cure exists. "mi'o casnu su'o > -cure" and "da ge > > -cure gi se casnu mi'o" used to mean the same > as (2) *. Now they > > mean the same as (1). > > The hell they do. su'o -cure- is su'o da poi > -cure-, which > absolutely means that a cure exists. If it > doesn't, I'm inclined to > think an error was made somewhere.
Did you miss the move that now makes opaque contexts unmarked, so that {mi nitcu lo mikce} no longer means that there is a doctor that I need and similarly for {casnu2} and the like (it is a part of xorlo). Or did you just not notice that {casnu2} is opaque?
On Thu, Jan 20, 2005 at 10:45:17PM -0000, And Rosta wrote: > Not in the way that (2) means a cure exists. "su'o da poi -cure" > says that there is at least one thing in the universe of discourse > that in some world is a cure. But the world in which it is a cure > is not necessarily the same world in which it is discussed; it > could be a cure in an imaginary world but not in the real world in > which it is discussed.
Oh, *that*.
We've been dealing with that since ca'a was invented; I don't see how xorlo make it any different.
-Robin