Talk:BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 17 of Aug., 2004 16:10 GMT posts: 2388 These are clearer than the realis: the attached sentence is believed not to be true and its truth is somehow the object of an attitude. Score: 0.00 Vote: 1 2 3 4 5 top of page Reply
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Mon 08 of Nov., 2004 23:18 GMT posts: 2388 Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone — whether authoritatively or not — to match the other forms in the neighborhood?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by xorxes on Mon 08 of Nov., 2004 23:18 GMT posts: 1912
pc: > Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone — whether authoritatively or > not — to match the other forms in the neighborhood?
I think it reduces to that in the case where the second person is the agent: {ei do klama}, "it ought to be the case that you go", i.e. "you ought to go", but I think {ei} is more general, as it works even for non-agentive situations. For example:
eipei zo ei tutci lo nu te bilga da de Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Mon 08 of Nov., 2004 23:18 GMT posts: 2388 Nice example! I think that is most of what I meant by nonauthoritative laying on, now that I look at it.
Jorge Llambías wrote: pc: > Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone — whether authoritatively or > not — to match the other forms in the neighborhood?
I think it reduces to that in the case where the second person is the agent: {ei do klama}, "it ought to be the case that you go", i.e. "you ought to go", but I think {ei} is more general, as it works even for non-agentive situations. For example:
eipei zo ei tutci lo nu te bilga da de Oughtn't {ei} be for laying an ob on someone?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Wed 12 of Jan., 2005 00:05 GMT Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals These are clearer than the realis: the attached sentence is believed not to be true and its truth is somehow the object of an attitude.
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Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Sat 06 of Aug., 2005 21:09 GMT posts: 953 From the section:
> .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
> ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness.
This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal.
-arj
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:33 GMT > > .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) > > > ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. > > This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal. > > -arj
What about compositionality?
rejection/refusal is the opposite of acceptance/accession/consent, not the opposite of intent/purpose/design.
Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is used for rejection/refusal?
>From what I can see, it has been used to show lack of intent: "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" which really means "I have the intention of not doing X." In some cases, this could constitute refusal, if it comes after a request or suggestion or command that I do X, but in such cases {vi'o nai} would be more appropriate.
Do you think this is an inappropriate use of {ainai}:
.ai nai do pu se xrani I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
If so, what do you take the Lojban to mean, and how would you express the English in Lojban?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:34 GMT posts: 2388
> > > .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express > unintentionality / accidentality / > unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) > > > > > ai nai changed from rejection / refusal > (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / > accidentality / unplannedness. > > > > This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo > list, and usage. You should change it back to > rejection/refusal. > > > > -arj > > What about compositionality?
Vastly overrated — when it makes for useless definitions. In this case, however, once we get past (I am not sure I have) the idea that one can
express* intentionality or its absence, this would seem to be a natural (and rejection, which clearly can be expressed, is covered).
> rejection/refusal is the opposite of > acceptance/accession/consent, not the > opposite of intent/purpose/design. > > Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is > used for rejection/refusal? > > >From what I can see, it has been used to show > lack of intent: > "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" > which really means "I have > the intention of not doing X." In some cases, > this could constitute refusal, > if it comes after a request or suggestion or > command that I do X, but in > such cases {vi'o nai} would be more > appropriate. > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of > {ainai}: > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
Probably, since the English *states* my non-intention, not *express* it (and, again, can it really be expressed?) > If so, what do you take the Lojban to mean, and > how would you express > the English in Lojban?
Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" though this contains a number of other things as well -- acceptance of some responsibility and an apology, at least — but very weakly.
{mi na purpla lo nu do se xrani}, though I am not wild about {purpla} and miss again the "x does y intending to do z" of Philosophy (several philosophically interesting terms got cut out early in the vocabulary building process and reasonable replacements, though promised, have never actually appeared).
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:35 GMT posts: 2388
> > > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of > > {ainai}: > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > Probably, since the English *states* my > non-intention, not *express* it (and, again, > can > it really be expressed?) > > If so, what do you take the Lojban to mean, > and > > how would you express > > the English in Lojban? > > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" though > this contains a number of other things as well > -- > acceptance of some responsibility and an > apology, > at least — but very weakly. > > {mi na purpla lo nu do se xrani}, though I am > not > wild about {purpla} and miss again the "x does > y > intending to do z" of Philosophy (several > philosophically interesting terms got cut out > early in the vocabulary building process and > reasonable replacements, though promised, have > never actually appeared). {mi se snuti lo nu do se xrani} is not much better and works not at all for more detailed work.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:36 GMT On 8/7/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of > > {ainai}: > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > Probably, since the English *states* my > non-intention, not *express* it
The English probably both states and expresses it. It is difficult to disentangle statements about oneself from expressions, and in English we often express something by stating something about ourselves. Saying "I'm sorry", for example is a common way of expressing that one is sorry, even if it also makes the statement that one is sorry. Stating that something is the case is not incompatible with expressing something in the same act.
> (and, again, can > it really be expressed?)
Why not? As you show below even more clearly, saying "oops" is often a way to express unintentionality, this time without making the corresponding statement.
> Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?"
Or "Oops, you got hurt!".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:37 GMT posts: 953 On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>>> .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) >> >>> ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. >> >> This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal. >> >> -arj > > What about compositionality? > > rejection/refusal is the opposite of acceptance/accession/consent, not the > opposite of intent/purpose/design.
Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?
> Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is used for rejection/refusal?
Yes, from the IRC corpus:
Examples that support my interpretation: 17:01 .ainai mi na gunka ca le pavdei 17:01 .ui 17:01 sa 17:01 .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei
21 Jun 2004 18:23:28 .i .ainai curmi lonu citka lo titnanba .i slari nanba po'o
25 Dec 2004 11:33:28 ainai mi bebna
06 May 2005 17:39:13 ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti
Examples that support your definition: None found.
Uncertain examples: 06:46 la kolas: .i .ainai.o'o mi na bazi cliva .i do pu xlagalfi le sidbo pe le sodva .i do pu zbasu le dukse xlali selckasu le sakta selpinxe poi ro le prenu cu zmanei ke'a .i xu do djuno le du'u lo bloti xukmrkafin cu vindu
22 May 2004 14:04:21 iaru'e do pu xusra le du'u zo do'e tolplixau 22 May 2004 14:04:34 i e'o ko skicu le mukti 22 May 2004 14:05:54 .ainai na go'i 22 May 2004 14:06:29 mi xusra le du'u lo jbopre cu jai to'e dukse fai le nu pilno zo do'e
>> From what I can see, it has been used to show lack of intent:
> "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" which really means "I have
> the intention of not doing X."
Totally agreed. But that is not a possible reading of your current proposal, as far as I can tell.
> In some cases, this could constitute refusal, > if it comes after a request or suggestion or command that I do X, but in > such cases {vi'o nai} would be more appropriate. > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of {ainai}: > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
Yes, I think it's about as strange as using "ei" in a past tense sentence. If you removed the "pu" I would translate it as "I'll see to it that you don't get hurt."
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ NEI! IKKE GI MEG LINK! TENK FOR MEG!
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:38 GMT On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can > think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something?
Intention.
> > Do you have examples of usage where {ainai} is used for rejection/refusal? > > Yes, from the IRC corpus: > > Examples that support my interpretation: > 17:01 .ainai mi na gunka ca le pavdei > 17:01 .ui > 17:01 sa > 17:01 .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei
That's a refusal/rejection only if in response to someone suggesting or asking or ordering that he work today, but then vi'onai would be better. Without more context, I would say it was meant as just {ai mi na gunka ca le pavdei}.
> 21 Jun 2004 18:23:28 .i .ainai curmi lonu citka lo titnanba .i slari nanba po'o
Same here.
> 25 Dec 2004 11:33:28 ainai mi bebna
Was that meant as "I reject the implication that I'm silly" or something like that? If so, then this should have been {ienai}. It could also mean "I'm not trying to be silly", but I suppose you didn't mean it like that, or it would support my definition.
> 06 May 2005 17:39:13 ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti > > Examples that support your definition: > None found.
OK, but no examples clearly support rejection/refusal either.
> Uncertain examples: > 06:46 la kolas: .i .ainai.o'o mi na bazi cliva .i do pu > xlagalfi le sidbo pe le sodva .i do pu zbasu le dukse xlali selckasu le > sakta selpinxe poi ro le prenu cu zmanei ke'a .i xu do djuno le du'u lo > bloti xukmrkafin cu vindu > > 22 May 2004 14:04:21 iaru'e do pu xusra le du'u zo do'e tolplixau > 22 May 2004 14:04:34 i e'o ko skicu le mukti > 22 May 2004 14:05:54 .ainai na go'i > 22 May 2004 14:06:29 mi xusra le du'u lo jbopre cu jai to'e dukse fai le nu pilno zo do'e
Some confusion with the double negatives, probably.
> >> From what I can see, it has been used to show lack of intent: > > "ainai X" = "I have no intention of doing X" which really means "I have > > the intention of not doing X." > > Totally agreed. But that is not a possible reading of your current > proposal, as far as I can tell.
True, the wording applies better as being about things in the past than about something that may or may not happen in the future. My point was that people have not been using {ainai} for rejection/refusal, at least not consistently. Most often they have used it as {ai nai broda} = {ai na broda}.
> > In some cases, this could constitute refusal, > > if it comes after a request or suggestion or command that I do X, but in > > such cases {vi'o nai} would be more appropriate. > > > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use of {ainai}: > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > Yes, I think it's about as strange as using "ei" in a past tense sentence.
I don't see any problem in using {ei} with a past tense. {ei} is used to express how the speaker feels things ought to be now, in the future or have been in the past:
ei do pu dunda le cukta la djan You ought to have given the book to John.
ei le cmavo smuni pu xagmau se skicu cmavo meanings ougth to have been better described.
> If you removed the "pu" I would translate it as "I'll see to it that you > don't get hurt."
Which is not about rejection/refusal, it's about intention:
ai do na ba se xrani
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:39 GMT posts: 953 On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >> >> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can >> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something? > > Intention.
Well, yes, but we need to have something a bit more specific, to separate it from {ai}.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Etter revolusjonen har jeg ordnet meg slik at jeg fr meg statue. Har avtalt dette med nkkelpersoner p venstresiden. Som takk for min innsats. Det blir en 150m hy statue i havnebassenget. skal du ha restaurant i hodet?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:40 GMT On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote: > > On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > >> > >> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can > >> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something? > > > > Intention. > > Well, yes, but we need to have something a bit more specific, to separate > it from {ai}.
What I propose is to use {ai} to express either the intention of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama} if I intend to go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go, and leave {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no intentions about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is something in between: I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I intend to go.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:41 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/7/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > > Do you think this is an inappropriate use
> of
> > > {ainai}:
> > >
> > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> >
> > Probably, since the English *states* my
> > non-intention, not *express* it
>
> The English probably both states and expresses
> it.
> It is difficult to disentangle statements about
> oneself
> from expressions, and in English we often
> express
> something by stating something about ourselves.
> Saying "I'm sorry", for example is a common
> way of expressing that one is sorry, even if it
> also
> makes the statement that one is sorry. Stating
> that
> something is the case is not incompatible with
> expressing something in the same act.
>
> > (and, again, can
> > it really be expressed?)
The point is that {ainai} and its kin NEVER state, they only express. That is, an {ainai} expression is not false if I really did intend the involved event; it is merely misleading or some other negative judgment on it. The "state and express" rule seems only to work with things that can/do already state: "Oy, he's coming" is false only if he is not coming, not if he is but I am happy about it. It may be that "I did not intend" can be expressed in English, if at all, only using stating language, but it seems to me at least as likely that it cannot be exprtessed at all and that the "expressive" aspects of usage are implications (if you claim it was not intentional then you are aware that it was damaging and are trying to reduce responsibility while making a weak apology, and so on). It is hard to figure out — in language appropriate for emotions or attitudes — what is being expressed here.
> > Why not? As you show below even more clearly, > saying > "oops" is often a way to express > unintentionality, this time > without making the corresponding statement. > > > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" > > Or "Oops, you got hurt!". The problem with "oops!" is that it says so much more than unintentionality and extends to situations where intentionality does not even seem to apply (or, at least, would not normally be thought to: obvious accidents, for example).
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:42 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen
> wrote:
> > On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > > On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen
> wrote:
> > >>
> > >> Rejection/refusal may not be the best
> keywords, but it's the best I can
> > >> think of. What would you call the
> intention of not doing something?
> > >
> > > Intention.
> >
> > Well, yes, but we need to have something a
> bit more specific, to separate
> > it from {ai}.
>
> What I propose is to use {ai} to express either
> the intention
> of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama}
> if I intend to
> go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go,
> and leave
> {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no
> intentions
> about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is
> something in between:
> I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I
> intend to go.
>
It is nice to get {ainai} and {ai na} separated,
since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be equated
in these attitudinals (and even more so in BAI).
The {ainai} {aicu'i} distinction seems to me to
be less clear and less useful. If I have not yet
formulated an intention about something then I
have no intention about it. The most that can be
said as an intermeidate position is that for some
things about which I have so far no intention, I
intend to formulate an intention — and for
others I don't. But using either {nai} or {cu'i}
for these second order intentions does not seem
to me to have any justification other than a
remote preactical one — and it violates
compositionality, of course. One would normally
assume (except for this use of {nai}) that the
things like {cu'i} had to do with the strength of
one's resolve — maybe something along the likes
of thevarious old "shall"-"will" distinctions
(which no one can now — nor ever, so far as I
can tell — remember consistently).
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:43 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > The point is that {ainai} and its kin NEVER > state, they only express.
All UIs are used to express or indicate something, never to state. Only bridi can be used to state. bridi can also be used for other things than stating. UIs can accompany a bridi. This bridi accompanied by a UI may but need not be used to state.
> > > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" > > > > Or "Oops, you got hurt!". > The problem with "oops!" is that it says so much > more than unintentionality and extends to > situations where intentionality does not even > seem to apply (or, at least, would not normally > be thought to: obvious accidents, for example).
"Oops" is indeed much less well defined than Lojban attitudinals, which generally have much more restricted senses. "Oops" is certainly not a perfect match for {ainai} always and everywhere. Hardly any English interjection (probably none) is a perfect match for a Lojban UI.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:44 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > It is nice to get {ainai} and {ai na} separated, > since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be equated > in these attitudinals
{e'u nai} is the only one I can find where that seems to be the case. Which one(s) did you have in mind?
>(and even more so in BAI).
With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai ko'a} is equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case did you have in mind?
> The {ainai} {aicu'i} distinction seems to me to
> be less clear and less useful. If I have not yet
> formulated an intention about something then I
> have no intention about it. The most that can be
> said as an intermeidate position is that for some
> things about which I have so far no intention, I
> intend to formulate an intention — and for
> others I don't.
Not everybody is as decisive as you though. I often find myself wavering in a state where I have an intention and at the same time I don't.
> But using either {nai} or {cu'i} > for these second order intentions does not seem > to me to have any justification other than a > remote preactical one — and it violates > compositionality, of course. One would normally > assume (except for this use of {nai}) that the > things like {cu'i} had to do with the strength of > one's resolve — maybe something along the likes > of thevarious old "shall"-"will" distinctions > (which no one can now — nor ever, so far as I > can tell — remember consistently).
But strength is handled by {ru'e} (weak), {sai} (strong} and {cai} (stronger).
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:45 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> >
> > The point is that {ainai} and its kin NEVER
> > state, they only express.
>
> All UIs are used to express or indicate
> something, never
> to state. Only bridi can be used to state.
> bridi can also be used for other things than
> stating.
> UIs can accompany a bridi. This bridi
> accompanied by a
> UI may but need not be used to state.
I just wanted to reiterate this point, which has been lost from time to time in the past. UI do have the power — in some cases — to interfere with, not merely accompany, the assertions of bridi. And the irrealis cases are particularly so inclined (though others are as well). Assuming intentions can be expressed, this would be such a case.
> > > > Approximately "Oops, did that hurt you?" > > > > > > Or "Oops, you got hurt!". > > The problem with "oops!" is that it says so > much > > more than unintentionality and extends to > > situations where intentionality does not even > > seem to apply (or, at least, would not > normally > > be thought to: obvious accidents, for > example). > > "Oops" is indeed much less well defined than > Lojban > attitudinals, which generally have much more > restricted > senses. "Oops" is certainly not a perfect match > for {ainai} > always and everywhere. Hardly any English > interjection > (probably none) is a perfect match for a Lojban > UI. Some surely come close than "oops" and {ainai}.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:46 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > > Hardly any English > > interjection > > (probably none) is a perfect match for a Lojban > > UI. > Some surely come close than "oops" and {ainai}.
No doubt. Indeed I had already used "oops" for another attitudinal:
.o'a nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express shame / abashment / embarrassment / humiliation / mortification (cf. ckeji)
.o'a nai mi mrilu le notci lo srera noigri Oops, I posted the message to the wrong newsgroup.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:47 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > It is nice to get {ainai} and {ai na} > separated, > > since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be > equated > > in these attitudinals > > {e'u nai} is the only one I can find where that > seems to be > the case. Which one(s) did you have in mind?
{e'u} seems odd in several ways, though not particularly in this one, but then it is a little hard to see the difference between urging someone not to do something and the polar opposite of urging them to do it and that, once the distinction is made is hard to distinguish from taking no action pro or con something (which is what one would expect {e'u cu'i} to be rather than giving up a previous suggestion. It may be that similar problems (whether because these notions are rather vague to begin with or are merely described rather vaguely) lead to the uncertainty of just what the negative — and now and even moreso the neutral — are meant to mean.
> >(and even more so in BAI). > > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai > ko'a} is > equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case did > you > have in mind? > I am glad to hear that has been straightened out as well. At one point (about the last time I looked in, I suppose) the line between {BAInai} and {BAI na} was fluctuating all over the place and at least some people were equating them in most cases (this tended to be associated with an overly literal and formulaic reading of the connection between BAI and the "corresponding" predicates).
> > The {ainai} {aicu'i} distinction seems to me > to > > be less clear and less useful. If I have not > yet > > formulated an intention about something then > I > > have no intention about it. The most that > can be > > said as an intermeidate position is that for > some > > things about which I have so far no > intention, I > > intend to formulate an intention — and for > > others I don't. > > Not everybody is as decisive as you though. I > often > find myself wavering in a state where I have an > > intention and at the same time I don't.
I am not terribly decisive but I don't live in contradictions either, as the situation of having and not having an intention about some one thing would be. I may fluctuate back and forth very rapidly but that just means that I have no fixed intention (which might be equated with not really having an intention at all — yet). Is this fluctuating state what {aicu'i} is expressing? That is not what "neutral" suggests — but then, it is not clear what the opposite of "intention" is in attitudinal terms so it is hard to say what lies in between. > > > But using either {nai} or {cu'i} > > for these second order intentions does not > seem > > to me to have any justification other than a > > remote preactical one — and it violates > > compositionality, of course. One would > normally > > assume (except for this use of {nai}) that > the > > things like {cu'i} had to do with the > strength of > > one's resolve — maybe something along the > likes > > of thevarious old "shall"-"will" distinctions > > (which no one can now — nor ever, so far as > I > > can tell — remember consistently). > > But strength is handled by {ru'e} (weak), {sai} > (strong} > and {cai} (stronger). This whole "system" seems to be getting more and more muddled: {cu'i} is the midpoint on a seven- point scale of something or other (whether you call it strength or not) of which {ru'e}, {sai} and {cai} are the increasing stronger values, applied going off in the general areas x and {xnai}. As noted, since it is not clear what {ainai} means (except not {ai na}), it is not clear what the midpoint is like nor what strength is. The natural reading (in which {ai nai} is {ai na}) would have {ai cu'i} as completely uncommitted in the area, with tending toward and against running off through the "strength" markers. But if {ainai} is "uncommitted in the area," the polar opposite of "commiitted" ("intends"), the middle point comes out somewhere in the middle of {ai sai} or maybe {ai ru'e} on the basis of strength, and the position of fluctuating between pro and con doesn't really appear at all.
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:48 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > {e'u} seems odd in several ways, though not > particularly in this one, but then it is a little > hard to see the difference between urging someone > not to do something and the polar opposite of > urging them to do it and that, once the > distinction is made is hard to distinguish from > taking no action pro or con something (which is > what one would expect {e'u cu'i} to be rather > than giving up a previous suggestion.
I couldn't make much sense of "abandon suggestion" for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from the definitions.
> It may be > that similar problems (whether because these > notions are rather vague to begin with or are > merely described rather vaguely) lead to the > uncertainty of just what the negative — and now > and even moreso the neutral — are meant to mean.
So I take it that your "since {xnai} and {xna} seems often to be equated in these attitudinals" was mostly hyperbole.
> > >(and even more so in BAI). > > > > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai > > ko'a} is > > equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case did > > you > > have in mind? > > > I am glad to hear that has been straightened out > as well. At one point (about the last time I > looked in, I suppose) the line between {BAInai} > and {BAI na} was fluctuating all over the place
Nothing has changed since the last time you participated in the discussion, as far as I know.
> and at least some people were equating them in > most cases (this tended to be associated with an > overly literal and formulaic reading of the > connection between BAI and the "corresponding" > predicates).
For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = fi'o na broda.
Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda ko'a} is very different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o broda ko'a na ku}.
The {nai} in {bai nai} negates the underlying predicate, i.e. the inner meaning of {bai}, it does not negate the main selbri which gets an additional place with the {bai} tag.
Similarly, for UInai, {nai} often negates the inner meaning of the UI, it generally does not negate the bridi which the UI modifies.
> Is this
> fluctuating state what {aicu'i} is expressing?
> That is not what "neutral" suggests — but then,
> it is not clear what the opposite of "intention"
> is in attitudinal terms so it is hard to say what
> lies in between.
I agree there is no obvious meaning for {aicu'i}.
I think the opposites intentional - unintentional for {ai} {ainai} are fairly obvious, but maybe that's just me.
I also think that the "indecision" proposed in the ma'oste for {aicu'i} is at least reasonable and can be understood as an intermediate state between intent and unintentionality.
> This whole "system" seems to be getting more and
> more muddled: {cu'i} is the midpoint on a seven-
> point scale of something or other (whether you
> call it strength or not) of which {ru'e}, {sai}
> and {cai} are the increasing stronger values,
> applied going off in the general areas x and
> {xnai}. As noted, since it is not clear what
> {ainai} means (except not {ai na}), it is not
> clear what the midpoint is like nor what strength
> is. The natural reading (in which {ai nai} is
> {ai na})
And I thought you approved of {ainai} not being {ai na}!
So, do you have a suggestion, or is this just general complaining that things are not very clear?
would have {ai cu'i} as completely
> uncommitted in the area, with tending toward and
> against running off through the "strength"
> markers. But if {ainai} is "uncommitted in the
> area," the polar opposite of "commiitted"
> ("intends"), the middle point comes out somewhere
> in the middle of {ai sai} or maybe {ai ru'e} on
> the basis of strength, and the position of
> fluctuating between pro and con doesn't really
> appear at all.
Something like this:
ai cai - extermely determined to ai sai - very much intending to ai ru'e - somewhat intending to ai cu'i - undecided ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with
(The difference between {sai} and {cai} seems to be hardly ever significant, I think {sai} is the general intensifier and {cai} is mostly for effect.)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:49 GMT posts: 953 On Mon, 8 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >> On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote: >>> On 8/7/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >>>> >>>> Rejection/refusal may not be the best keywords, but it's the best I can >>>> think of. What would you call the intention of not doing something? >>> >>> Intention. >> >> Well, yes, but we need to have something a bit more specific, to separate >> it from {ai}. > > What I propose is to use {ai} to express either the intention > of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama} if I intend to > go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go, and leave > {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no intentions > about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is something in between: > I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I intend to go.
Yes, I understand what your proposal is. But you have to bring the section in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list says.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ - Hvorfor snakker man engelsk p Internet? - Har du hrt om minste felles nevner?
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:50 GMT On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > Yes, I understand what your proposal is. But you have to bring the section > in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list says.
Only if what they say makes sense to me as shepherd of the section.
I will not write definitions that are in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list say just because that's what they say. I try to follow them as much as possible, but when I consider those definitions flawed, I will write what I consider better definitions. I'm very willing to discuss and consider other positions, but a mere "the CLL and the cmavo list say it" just doesn't do anything for me.
I can certainly not impose my definitions on anyone, so if they are considered unsatisfactory by two or more people, and they don't convince me to change them, they will be voted down. In that case, I have no objection to stepping down as shepherd and let someone else take responsibility for whatever modifications they want to make. I will probably not vote for them, but I will not half-veto any definitions that the majority approves either.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:51 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > {e'u} seems odd in several ways, though not
> > particularly in this one, but then it is a
> little
> > hard to see the difference between urging
> someone
> > not to do something and the polar opposite of
> > urging them to do it and that, once the
> > distinction is made is hard to distinguish
> from
> > taking no action pro or con something (which
> is
> > what one would expect {e'u cu'i} to be rather
> > than giving up a previous suggestion.
>
> I couldn't make much sense of "abandon
> suggestion"
> for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from the
> definitions.
Leaving what? (I can't find your lists in any of the usual places, but my looking through wiki are often not successful).
> > > It may be > > that similar problems (whether because these > > notions are rather vague to begin with or are > > merely described rather vaguely) lead to the > > uncertainty of just what the negative — and > now > > and even moreso the neutral — are meant to > mean. > > So I take it that your "since {xnai} and {xna} > seems often > to be equated in these attitudinals" was > mostly hyperbole.
Only in the sense that I took cases which were unclear or apparently nonsense as cases of the identification, which did alwys make sense at least.
> > > >(and even more so in BAI). > > > > > > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai > nai > > > ko'a} is > > > equated with {bai ko'a naku}. Which case > did > > > you > > > have in mind?
I guess that I don't see the difference you are making here. The last time I checked I thought that {no broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} meant the same thing by you except when explicit quantifiers were involved (they do mean different things by me in any case where existence could be an issue as well).
> > I am glad to hear that has been straightened > out > > as well. At one point (about the last time I > > looked in, I suppose) the line between > {BAInai} > > and {BAI na} was fluctuating all over the > place > > Nothing has changed since the last time you > participated in the discussion, as far as I > know. > > > and at least some people were equating them > in > > most cases (this tended to be associated with > an > > overly literal and formulaic reading of the > > connection between BAI and the > "corresponding" > > predicates). > > For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = fi'o na > broda. > > Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda > ko'a} is very > different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o broda > ko'a na ku}.
As noted, I don't quite get the point here. Is it that in the first case the negativity is attached only to the buried predicate whereas in them latter case it leaks out to the (more) main predication? A look at the examples suggests that at least often this will work in the way intended apparently only if {nai} corresponds to {to'e}, so the "explanation" is not quite serviceable. Putting that in would eliminate the possible misinterpretation, but would also occasionally get the wrong thing (where only {na} is meant, even if not {naku}) or else something barely intelligible. I think — moving back from BAI — this stuff about {ai} falls into the last category as things now stand, but I also think that much of this results from the whole frame of discourse being unclear. Does {ai mu klama} implicate (maybe even mean) "I intend to come" or "I come intentionally" Tense condsiderations aside, these seem rather different, especially when mixed with some sort of negation. "I come accidentally," "I happen to come", "I come unintentionally" apply to the second with polar negation, though it is hard to see what contrary or contradictory negation is like here. For the first case, we seem to have only "I do not intend to come" as a negation and it is as uncertain as "not" usually is: it clearly means that I have not formulated an intention to come but it is not clear whether this means I have formulated an intention incompatible with coming (most easily an intention not to come) or simply have no intention in the area at all. The traditional list seems to take the strong position: {ainai} is "intend not," the negation goes into the main predication. (Note that this is different from {ienai}as stronger, volitional not merely factual, and so on.) In this case, the neutral position is just having no intention either way. If, on the other hand, we take the opposite of having an intention to come to be having no intention about coming (which would also be the opposite of intending not to come), that is decisive and indecisive, it is not clear what a neutral position can be (of course, there is no law that says there has to be one in every case).
> > The {nai} in {bai nai} negates the underlying > predicate, > i.e. the inner meaning of {bai}, it does not > negate the > main selbri which gets an additional place with > the > {bai} tag. > > Similarly, for UInai, {nai} often negates the > inner meaning > of the UI, it generally does not negate the > bridi which the > UI modifies.
Some emotions and attitudes clearly have negations of various sorts: contraries, contradictories or opposites; it is not clear that all of them (or even most of them) do while remaining in the realm of emotions and attitudes.
> > > Is this > > fluctuating state what {aicu'i} is > expressing? > > That is not what "neutral" suggests — but > then, > > it is not clear what the opposite of > "intention" > > is in attitudinal terms so it is hard to say > what > > lies in between. > > I agree there is no obvious meaning for > {aicu'i}. > > I think the opposites intentional - > unintentional for > {ai} {ainai} are fairly obvious, but maybe > that's just me.
In English that is the intentional — accidental pair, which is the one least likely to be a matter for expression, while the intend to -- intend to not pairs has clear expression (stress and the like in English — and the "shall"-"will" distinction if we knew how it went) and a meaningful neutral position.
> I also think that the "indecision" proposed in > the ma'oste > for {aicu'i} is at least reasonable and can be > understood > as an intermediate state between intent and > unintentionality.
Only when "unintend" means "intend not," otherwise "unintend" seems to be indecision already.
> > > This whole "system" seems to be getting more > and > > more muddled: {cu'i} is the midpoint on a > seven- > > point scale of something or other (whether > you > > call it strength or not) of which {ru'e}, > {sai} > > and {cai} are the increasing stronger values, > > applied going off in the general areas x and > > {xnai}. As noted, since it is not clear what > > {ainai} means (except not {ai na}), it is not > > clear what the midpoint is like nor what > strength > > is. The natural reading (in which {ai nai} > is > > {ai na}) > > And I thought you approved of {ainai} not being > {ai na}! > > So, do you have a suggestion, or is this just > general > complaining that things are not very clear? > Well, it is a complaint that things are not very clear and I have made that way too often before. In this case, it seems to me that the status quo ante was just fine and the move away from it accomplishes nothing but muddlification.
> would have {ai cu'i} as completely > > uncommitted in the area, with tending toward > and > > against running off through the "strength" > > markers. But if {ainai} is "uncommitted in > the > > area," the polar opposite of "commiitted" > > ("intends"), the middle point comes out > somewhere > > in the middle of {ai sai} or maybe {ai ru'e} > on > > the basis of strength, and the position of > > fluctuating between pro and con doesn't > really > > appear at all. > > Something like this: > > ai cai - extermely determined to > ai sai - very much intending to > ai ru'e - somewhat intending to > ai cu'i - undecided > ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating > ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with > ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with
Ahah! Now, "unconcerned with" introduces (or make clear what was obscure before) a new aspect to the whole discussion. We now have the x-xcu'i-xnai as "decided-undecided-indifferent," which fits together sensibly. But can it be what {ai} was meant to be? {ainai} as "Whatever!" does not seem to fit with "intend/tion" (which may be the problem to begin with, although it fit the old version just fine).
> (The difference between {sai} and {cai} seems > to be hardly > ever significant, I think {sai} is the general > intensifier and {cai} > is mostly for effect.)
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arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:52 GMT posts: 953 On Mon, 8 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >> Yes, I understand what your proposal is. But you have to bring the section >> in line with what the CLL and the cmavo list says. > > Only if what they say makes sense to me as shepherd > of the section. > > I will not write definitions that are in line with what the CLL > and the cmavo list say just because that's what they say. > I try to follow them as much as possible, but when I consider > those definitions flawed, I will write what I consider better > definitions.
The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to me, it only has what could be considered an unfortunate wording ("refusal"). That the one word for ainai seems wrong should be no reason to redefine the other points on the scale.
Or is there some other flaw that I have missed?
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Information wants to be anthropomorphized!
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:52 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > I couldn't make much sense of "abandon > > suggestion" > > for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from the > > definitions. > > Leaving what? (I can't find your lists in any of > the usual places, but my looking through wiki are > often not successful).
Not all {cu'i}'s have definitions. The page under discussion is:
> > > > >(and even more so in BAI). > > > > > > > > With BAIs, it is never the case that {bai nai > > > > ko'a} is equated with {bai ko'a naku}. > > I guess that I don't see the difference you are > making here. The last time I checked I thought > that {no broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} meant > the same thing by you except when explicit > quantifiers were involved (they do mean different > things by me in any case where existence could be > an issue as well).
{na broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} do mean the same thing by me, yes.
{bai nai broda} and {na bai broda} mean very different things.
The first one says that broda happens, just not under compulsion. The second one says that (broda under compulsion) does not happen. It doesn't say that broda happens.
> > For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = fi'o na > > broda. > > > > Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda > > ko'a} is very > > different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o broda > > ko'a na ku}. > > As noted, I don't quite get the point here. Is > it that in the first case the negativity is > attached only to the buried predicate whereas in > them latter case it leaks out to the (more) main > predication?
Indeed.
> A look at the examples suggests > that at least often this will work in the way > intended apparently only if {nai} corresponds to > {to'e}, so the "explanation" is not quite > serviceable.
For BAI = fi'o broda, we get to'e BAI = fi'o to'e broda, so no, it is in general not the same thing.
> Putting that in would eliminate the > possible misinterpretation, but would also > occasionally get the wrong thing (where only {na} > is meant, even if not {naku}) or else something > barely intelligible.
I don't know what you mean by that.
> I think — moving back from BAI — this stuff > about {ai} falls into the last category as things > now stand, but I also think that much of this > results from the whole frame of discourse being > unclear. > Does {ai mu klama} implicate (maybe even mean) "I > intend to come" or "I come intentionally" Tense > condsiderations aside, these seem rather > different, especially when mixed with some sort > of negation.
{ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come" {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally" {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on context.
> "I come accidentally," "I happen to > come", "I come unintentionally" apply to the > second with polar negation, though it is hard to > see what contrary or contradictory negation is > like here. For the first case, we seem to have > only "I do not intend to come" as a negation and > it is as uncertain as "not" usually is: it > clearly means that I have not formulated an > intention to come but it is not clear whether > this means I have formulated an intention > incompatible with coming (most easily an > intention not to come) or simply have no > intention in the area at all.
In English, "I have no intention of coming" usually means that I do have the intention of not coming, despite the surface form.
> The traditional > list seems to take the strong position: {ainai} > is "intend not," the negation goes into the main > predication.
Yes, even though the keywords are not really appropriate, because "intend not" is not necessarily a rejection or a refusal of something. Nobody need have asked.
> > So, do you have a suggestion, or is this just > > general > > complaining that things are not very clear? > > > Well, it is a complaint that things are not very > clear and I have made that way too often before.
Indeed.
> In this case, it seems to me that the status quo > ante was just fine and the move away from it > accomplishes nothing but muddlification.
Hm. So you are now in favour of {ainai} = {ai na}?
> > Something like this: > > > > ai cai - extermely determined to > > ai sai - very much intending to > > ai ru'e - somewhat intending to > > ai cu'i - undecided > > ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating > > ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with > > ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with > > Ahah!
I tremble at those "ahah!" of yours, as they usually mean you will come up with an interpretation that has little or nothing to do with what I intended.
>Now, "unconcerned with" introduces (or > make clear what was obscure before) a new aspect > to the whole discussion. We now have the > x-xcu'i-xnai as "decided-undecided-indifferent," > which fits together sensibly. But can it be what > {ai} was meant to be? {ainai} as "Whatever!" does > not seem to fit with "intend/tion" (which may be > the problem to begin with, although it fit the > old version just fine).
I meant "unconcerned" as "not-on-my-mind", not as "indifferent". Probably not the best choice of word. "Not contemplating" might be better.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:54 GMT On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to me, it only has what could be > considered an unfortunate wording ("refusal").
But that single word is all CLL has to say about {ai nai}. There is no further explanation or example, is there?
> That the one word for ainai > seems wrong should be no reason to redefine the other points on the scale.
I have left the two other points untouched, haven't I?
> Or is there some other flaw that I have missed?
No, just that one.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:55 GMT posts: 953 On Mon, 8 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >> The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to me, it only has what could be >> considered an unfortunate wording ("refusal"). > > But that single word is all CLL has to say about {ai nai}. There is no > further explanation or example, is there?
Correct. Hence I appeal to usage.
>> That the one word for ainai >> seems wrong should be no reason to redefine the other points on the scale. > > I have left the two other points untouched, haven't I?
To quote an earlier post:
> What I propose is to use {ai} to express either the intention > of doing or not doing something: {ai mi klama} if I intend to > go and {ai mi na klama} if I intend to not go,
This is where I misread. In both these examples, the intention is of the referent of the main bridi actually happening, and not the opposite. So there is no change.
> and leave > {ai nai mi klama} to express that I have no intentions > about the matter. {ai cu'i mi klama} is something in between: > I have not yet made up my mind whether or not I intend to go.
Having no intentions and having not made up one's mind seems to amount to the same thing.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Jeg er nok verdens sydligste sengevter. Forutsatt at ingen p basen p Sydpolen driver med slikt, da. --Erling Kagge: Alene til Sydpolen
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:55 GMT On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > Having no intentions and having not made up one's mind seems to amount to > the same thing.
If I hurt you unintentionally, I have no intention of hurting you. That's different from my not having made up my mind about hurting you (or from having a positive intention of not hurting you).
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 01:56 GMT posts: 953 On Sun, 7 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>>> .ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) >> >>> ai nai changed from rejection / refusal (which is i'a nai) to unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. >> >> This is at odds with both the CLL, the cmavo list, and usage. You should change it back to rejection/refusal. >> >> -arj > > rejection/refusal is the opposite of acceptance/accession/consent, not the > opposite of intent/purpose/design.
This is a wording I would be reasonably happy with:
.ai (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / avoidance / rejection / refusal (cf. fanta, rivbi)
As examples, one or both of these: .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei I'm not going to work on Monday.
.ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti I actively avoid adding words of my own devising.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Assumption is the mother of all screw-ups. (Wethern's Law)
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 02:00 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > --- Jorge Llambías
> wrote:
> > > I couldn't make much sense of "abandon
> > > suggestion"
> > > for {e'u cu'i} either, so I dropped it from
> the
> > > definitions.
> >
> > Leaving what? (I can't find your lists in any
> of
> > the usual places, but my looking through wiki
> are
> > often not successful).
>
> Not all {cu'i}'s have definitions. The page
> under discussion is:
>
Thanx
> > > > > >(and even more so in BAI). > > > > > > > > > > With BAIs, it is never the case that > {bai nai > > > > > ko'a} is equated with {bai ko'a naku}. > > > > I guess that I don't see the difference you > are > > making here. The last time I checked I > thought > > that {no broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} > meant > > the same thing by you except when explicit > > quantifiers were involved (they do mean > different > > things by me in any case where existence > could be > > an issue as well). > > {na broda ko'a} and {broda ko'a naku} do mean > the same > thing by me, yes. > > {bai nai broda} and {na bai broda} mean very > different things.
Is this the issue? This is somewhat clearer than the earlier discussion, though I think to the same point.
> The first one says that broda happens, just not > under compulsion. > The second one says that (broda under > compulsion) does not > happen. It doesn't say that broda happens. > > > > For BAI = fi'o broda, we have BAI nai = > fi'o na > > > broda. > > > > > > Notice that {bai nai ko'a} = {fi'o na broda > > > ko'a} is very > > > different from {bai ko'a na ku} = {fi'o > broda > > > ko'a na ku}. > > > > As noted, I don't quite get the point here. > Is > > it that in the first case the negativity is > > attached only to the buried predicate whereas > in > > them latter case it leaks out to the (more) > main > > predication? > > Indeed. > > > A look at the examples suggests > > that at least often this will work in the way > > intended apparently only if {nai} corresponds > to > > {to'e}, so the "explanation" is not quite > > serviceable. > > For BAI = fi'o broda, we get to'e BAI = fi'o > to'e broda, > so no, it is in general not the same thing. My point was that, as you are setting things up, {x nai} seems to be a polar opposite not just a contrary or contradictory negation, so {to'e} without ever using the word.
> > Putting that in would eliminate the > > possible misinterpretation, but would also > > occasionally get the wrong thing (where only > {na} > > is meant, even if not {naku}) or else > something > > barely intelligible. > > I don't know what you mean by that.
Just say that {x nai}is related to {to'e} not {na} (or, rather, since {to'e} is related to {na}, that it is related directly to {to'e}). I am not sure this always works, but that would make it even more important to note the cases where it does.
> > I think — moving back from BAI — this stuff > > about {ai} falls into the last category as > things > > now stand, but I also think that much of this > > results from the whole frame of discourse > being > > unclear. > > Does {ai mu klama} implicate (maybe even > mean) "I > > intend to come" or "I come intentionally" > Tense > > condsiderations aside, these seem rather > > different, especially when mixed with some > sort > > of negation. > > {ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come" > {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally" > {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on > context.
This looks like amphiboly to me; {ai} changes meanings — and indeed semantic categories -- from expression an intention to making a claim about the way I come.
> > "I come accidentally," "I happen to > > come", "I come unintentionally" apply to the > > second with polar negation, though it is hard > to > > see what contrary or contradictory negation > is > > like here. For the first case, we seem to > have > > only "I do not intend to come" as a negation > and > > it is as uncertain as "not" usually is: it > > clearly means that I have not formulated an > > intention to come but it is not clear whether > > this means I have formulated an intention > > incompatible with coming (most easily an > > intention not to come) or simply have no > > intention in the area at all. > > In English, "I have no intention of coming" > usually means > that I do have the intention of not coming, > despite the surface > form.
I think that that is correct and it fits in with {ai nai} as "intend not to" rather than either "accidentally" or "I don't give a damn." At this point I confess I have forgotten what the proposal was and who's on what side, but the matter still (indeed more so) seems muddled.
> > The traditional > > list seems to take the strong position: > {ainai} > > is "intend not," the negation goes into the > main > > predication. > > Yes, even though the keywords are not really > appropriate, > because "intend not" is not necessarily a > rejection or a refusal > of something. Nobody need have asked.
We can reject an activity even if nobody has asked us about it, surely. I suppose that we have to at least have proposed it to ourselves then. But I don't think we can reject nor intend not to do something that we have never considered.
> > > So, do you have a suggestion, or is this
> just
> > > general
> > > complaining that things are not very clear?
> > >
> > Well, it is a complaint that things are not
> very
> > clear and I have made that way too often
> before.
>
> Indeed.
>
> > In this case, it seems to me that the status
> quo
> > ante was just fine and the move away from it
> > accomplishes nothing but muddlification.
>
> Hm. So you are now in favour of {ainai} = {ai
> na}?
>
> > > Something like this:
> > >
> > > ai cai - extermely determined to
> > > ai sai - very much intending to
> > > ai ru'e - somewhat intending to
> > > ai cu'i - undecided
> > > ai nai ru'e - not really contemplating
> > > ai nai sai - quite unconcerned with
> > > ai nai cai - completely unconcerned with
> >
> > Ahah!
>
> I tremble at those "ahah!" of yours, as they
> usually mean you
> will come up with an interpretation that has
> little or nothing to do
> with what I intended.
>
> >Now, "unconcerned with" introduces (or
> > make clear what was obscure before) a new
> aspect
> > to the whole discussion. We now have the
> > x-xcu'i-xnai as
> "decided-undecided-indifferent,"
> > which fits together sensibly. But can it be
> what
> > {ai} was meant to be? {ainai} as "Whatever!"
> does
> > not seem to fit with "intend/tion" (which may
> > be the problem to begin with, although it
fit > >the old version just fine).
>I meant "unconcerned" as "not-on-my-mind", not as >"indifferent". >Probably not the best choice of word. "Not >contemplating" might >be better.
Understood: "determined - waffling - unexamined," maybe. And this really does seem to be expressible. Further, {nai} is pretty clearly not {to'e} in this case, that is closer to waffling than unexamined, but even that is contrary, not opposite.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 02:04 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen
> wrote:
> > The CLL's definition doesn't look flawed to
> me, it only has what could be
> > considered an unfortunate wording
> ("refusal").
>
> But that single word is all CLL has to say
> about {ai nai}. There is no
> further explanation or example, is there?
>
> > That the one word for ainai
> > seems wrong should be no reason to redefine
> the other points on the scale.
>
> I have left the two other points untouched,
> haven't I?
Not really; {ai} now expresses any intention to do or not do, while the latter was what {ainai} (apparently) used to mean.
> > Or is there some other flaw that I have > missed? > > No, just that one. > > mu'o mi'e xorxes > > > >
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 14:09 GMT On 8/8/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > This is a wording I would be reasonably happy with: > > .ai (UI1) > Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / avoidance / rejection / > refusal (cf. fanta, rivbi)
I have no problem with "non-intent", which is basically what I'm suggesting.
I think "refusal" is clearly {vi'o nai} and "rejection" {i'a nai}. "Avoidance" is used for {a'a nai}. That doesn't mean necessarily they couldn't be used again, but I don't think they are the same as non-intent.
> As examples, one or both of these: > .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei > I'm not going to work on Monday.
OK. It's not that I refuse to, it's just that I have no plans to do it.
> .ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti > I actively avoid adding words of my own devising.
I reject the sense of "actively avoid" in {ainai}. Simply "I don't mean to add words of my own devising" (i.e. if I happen to add one, it is because I didn't realize it was me who coined it.)
For actively avoid I would say: .ai mi na jmina lo valsi poi mi finti
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 14:38 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > {ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come" > > {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally" > > {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on > > context. > > This looks like amphiboly to me; {ai} changes > meanings — and indeed semantic categories -- > from expression an intention to making a claim > about the way I come.
OK, change the second one to: "I intend to be coming" i.e. whether or not it is the case that I am actually coming, my intention is that I am. In general, if I am coming I would know it, but in some special cases I might not be certain.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 14:41 GMT posts: 2388 Let's see if I understand the issues here. There are like three ideas about what {ai - ai cu'i - ai nai} should mean.
The original (as near as we can make out) was intend to — waffling — intend not to. All of these are clearly expressible in some way.
xorxes' proposal is have an intention about — am undecided about -- have not considered. Again, all expressible in some way.
Another reading of xorxes (or another xorxes' proposal) intentionally (no clear neutral ground) unintentionally (accidentally) These are not so obviously expressible and do not fit well into the pattern of {aV}, which seem to be mainly (though not exclusively without a lot of work) future-oriented irrealis attitudinals (hope, fear that, desire and the like), whereas this one is past (including the present) oriented and realis, indeed affirming. I think this last case then drops out of consideration, leaving the other two. Of them — assuming that there is not a heavy load of usage for the old version -- xorxes' seems the most useful, extending the system to cover a real situation that is not otherwise dealt with. On these grounds I wnder if a similar move might not be called for in the case of {i'e}, which patterns like the original {ai} or is disapproval stronger than approving the negation (yes, it is) and non-approval broad enough to cover the case where we haven't thought about the matter as well as the case where we haven't made up our mind (probably). OK, so skip that suggestion. I suppose that {ie} can't be rewritten in this way, since, once the proposal is made, we can't claim not to have thought about it, only that we have not yet decided, {iecu'i}.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 14:43 GMT On 8/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > I have left the two other points untouched, > > haven't I? > > Not really; {ai} now expresses any intention to > do or not do,
{ai} has always been usable for that, hasn't it? That hasn't changed. Does anyone object to {ai mi na klama} meaning "I intend not to come"?
> while the latter was what {ainai} > (apparently) used to mean.
Apparently {ai nai} was taken to mean {ai na}, yes, but I don't think there was any doubt about {ai na} itself.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 14:46 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/8/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > > {ai mi ba klama} is "I intend to come"
> > > {ai mi ca klama} is "I come intentionally"
> > > {ai mi klama} could be either, depending on
> > > context.
> >
> > This looks like amphiboly to me; {ai} changes
> > meanings — and indeed semantic categories --
> > from expression an intention to making a
> claim
> > about the way I come.
>
> OK, change the second one to:
> "I intend to be coming" i.e. whether or not it
> is the
> case that I am actually coming, my intention is
> that
> I am. In general, if I am coming I would know
> it, but
> in some special cases I might not be certain.
I don't think "I intend to be coming" in English can be used when I am actually in the process of coming — and know I am — unless there is some doubt about my completing the process. And it certainly can't be used once I have arrived (which is the point of your second case, I think).
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 14:53 GMT On 8/9/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > I don't think "I intend to be coming" in English > can be used when I am actually in the process of > coming — and know I am — unless there is some > doubt about my completing the process. And it > certainly can't be used once I have arrived > (which is the point of your second case, I think).
OK, but that's a pecularity of English that we need not import into Lojban. In Lojban {ai} would only indicate my intentions, independently of their degree of completion or realization (which can be indicated by other means).
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 15:18 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/9/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> >
> > I don't think "I intend to be coming" in
> English
> > can be used when I am actually in the process
> of
> > coming — and know I am — unless there is
> some
> > doubt about my completing the process. And
> it
> > certainly can't be used once I have arrived
> > (which is the point of your second case, I
> think).
>
> OK, but that's a pecularity of English that we
> need
> not import into Lojban. In Lojban {ai} would
> only
> indicate my intentions, independently of
> their degree of completion or realization
> (which
> can be indicated by other means).
Well, I think I disagree. I think that in fact one can only intend something which has not occurred (is not known to have occurred, at least, or — even better — whose opportunity for occurring is not known to be closed). Thus, to say I am doing something intentionally is to report on a past situation (and so not be appropriate for UI) when I had that intention, which I am now fulfilling. It make no sense to intend to do something already known done, any more than it makes sense to hope for something already known to be decided. The nearest thing to intending to do something one is doing is to do it deliberately, which is not a plausible UI either.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 17:29 GMT posts: 953 On Tue, 9 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>> As examples, one or both of these: >> .ainai mi gunka ca le pavdei >> I'm not going to work on Monday. > > OK. It's not that I refuse to, it's just that I have no plans > to do it.
Rather, that I have plans of not doing it.
>> .ainai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti >> I actively avoid adding words of my own devising. > > I reject the sense of "actively avoid" in {ainai}. > Simply "I don't mean to add words of my own devising" > (i.e. if I happen to add one, it is because I didn't realize > it was me who coined it.)
I'll have to think about that, as I suspect it to be non-baseline-compliant.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Public Notice as Required by Law: Any Use of This Product, in Any Manner Whatsoever, Will Increase the Amount of Disorder in the Universe. Although No Liability Is Implied Herein, the Consumer Is Warned That This Process Will Ultimately Lead to the Heat Death of the Universe. --Susan Hewitt and Edward Subitzky
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Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Tue 09 of Aug., 2005 23:00 GMT posts: 953 From the section:
>.ai nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti)
This is not only noncompliant with the baseline, but it is also confusing. Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have anything to do with it.
Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some.
-arj
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 17:35 GMT > >.ai nai (UI*1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) > > This is not only noncompliant with the baseline, but it is also confusing. Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have anything to do with it.
Nothing to do with what? They are all close synonyms. >From dictionary.com definitions:
accidental: Without intent. unplanned: Not intended; unintentional. intend: To have in mind; plan unintended: Not deliberate or intentional; unplanned
What you may mean is that they don't correspond with "intent not to", but we are and have always been in agreement about that.
> Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some.
In this section, the keywords are basically all the words that appear in the definitions. Is it worth listing them again? If I left out some I might add them to the definition itself, or you are welcome to suggest others if they won't fit well in the definition. Were you thinking of any words in particular?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 18:37 GMT posts: 2388
> > >.ai nai (UI*1) > > > > > Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent > / unintentionality / accidentality / > unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) > > > > This is not only noncompliant with the > baseline, but it is also confusing. > Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have > anything to do with it. > > Nothing to do with what? They are all close > synonyms. > >From dictionary.com definitions: > > accidental: Without intent. > unplanned: Not intended; unintentional. > intend: To have in mind; plan > unintended: Not deliberate or intentional; > unplanned > > What you may mean is that they don't correspond > > with "intent not to", but we are and have > always been > in agreement about that. > > > > Also, if you need help with the keywords, I > suppose I could do some. > > In this section, the keywords are basically all > the words > that appear in the definitions. Is it worth > listing them again? > If I left out some I might add them to the > definition itself, > or you are welcome to suggest others if they > won't fit well > in the definition. Were you thinking of any > words in particular?
Now I am confused a bit. I thought that the spread you had prpared was: determined (intend to or not to/to not)-- undecided (thought about but not yet formulated an intention) — not yet thought about even. All of these formulated as irrealis attitudes, like the title of the page says. Now, unless the words are more misleading than even arj notes, we seem to have to have, first of all, a factual claim, not an attitude (something about an occurred or occurring event, not about a possibility whose time is not yet -- or only just — come). And secondly (and as a consequent?) the negative is only the contradictory negation of the simplest form of the psoitive, not the strong opposite. That is, it included the neutral case as well the (as I understood it) negative case and even the external negation of the original system. that is, it seems to combine the worst possible features of all the (apparent) proposals. if we take out the factual elements (which don't belong, as noted), especially "accidentality," it is possible to stretch the ordinary understanding of the remaining (insofar as these odd words have ordinary understandings) to bring them almost back into line with what I took to be the proposal before: reading "non-intent" as having no consideration of intention at all and similarly for "unintentionality" and "unplannedness." But then the keywords — or the definition — needs a footnote warning the the meaings have stretched in a particular way.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 19:17 GMT posts: 953 On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>>> .ai nai (UI*1) >> >>> Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) >> >> This is not only noncompliant with the baseline, but it is also confusing. Accidentality and unplannedness doesn't have anything to do with it. > > Nothing to do with what? They are all close synonyms. >> From dictionary.com definitions: > > accidental: Without intent. > unplanned: Not intended; unintentional. > intend: To have in mind; plan > unintended: Not deliberate or intentional; unplanned > > What you may mean is that they don't correspond > with "intent not to", but we are and have always been > in agreement about that.
That is what I meant by non-intent, and the other synonyms which you removed from the definition suggestion. I want to have a definition that is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to you.
>> Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some. > > In this section, the keywords are basically all the words > that appear in the definitions.
Including "used", to", and so on?
> Is it worth listing them again?
Yes, to take the burden off those who are going to put the results of the section into the dictionary. It is important that they are not seen as making decisions of their own.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Etter revolusjonen har jeg ordnet meg slik at jeg fr meg statue. Har avtalt dette med nkkelpersoner p venstresiden. Som takk for min innsats. Det blir en 150m hy statue i havnebassenget. skal du ha restaurant i hodet?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 20:20 GMT On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote: > > What you may mean is that they don't correspond > > with "intent not to", but we are and have always been > > in agreement about that. > > That is what I meant by non-intent, and the other synonyms which you > removed from the definition suggestion.
Arrghh, this is getting silly.
"Non-intent" is not a standard word, so it is not in most dictionaries and I can't point you to a standard definition, but it is plainly not synonymous with "rejection/refusal". Here is an example of usage of "nonintent":
"This statute is thus different from one that simply outlawed any public burning or mutilation of the flag, regardless of the expressive intent or 459 U.S. 949 , 955 nonintent of the actor."
Taken from:
Where hopefully you will agree that nonintent = lack of intent.
In any case, it is also very clear to me that you don't want {ai nai} used to indicate lack of intent.
> I want to have a definition that > is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to you.
I know. And I gave you my reasons why I reject that definition.
BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai nai} = "intent not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} = "request not to"?
And if those were adopted, to be systematic we should also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e nai} = "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command not to", {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = "ought not", {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope that not".
I don't see why {ai} should be the only one following that pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed as "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste?
> >> Also, if you need help with the keywords, I suppose I could do some. > > > > In this section, the keywords are basically all the words > > that appear in the definitions. > > Including "used", to", and so on?
Heh.
> > Is it worth listing them again? > > Yes, to take the burden off those who are going to put the results of the > section into the dictionary. It is important that they are not seen as > making decisions of their own.
If we were writing things in a machine readable format, that would make sense. Otherwise, I don't see what kind of decision you mean. Sorting out "used to express" from the actual content?
The danger of duplicating the lists is that a word is left out of one of them and then people start making interpretations about why this or that word is in the definition but not used as a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only makes sense if it adds something that is not there in the definition.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 21:20 GMT posts: 953 On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >> On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote: >>> What you may mean is that they don't correspond >>> with "intent not to", but we are and have always been >>> in agreement about that. >> >> That is what I meant by non-intent, and the other synonyms which you >> removed from the definition suggestion.
> "Non-intent" is not a standard word, so it is not in most > dictionaries and I can't point you to a standard definition, > but it is plainly not synonymous with "rejection/refusal". > Here is an example of usage of "nonintent": > > "This statute is thus different from one that simply outlawed > any public burning or mutilation of the flag, regardless of the > expressive intent or 459 U.S. 949 , 955 nonintent of the > actor." > > Taken from: > > > Where hopefully you will agree that nonintent = lack of intent. > > In any case, it is also very clear to me that you don't > want {ai nai} used to indicate lack of intent.
Okay. I agree that that is misleading. How about simply removing "non-intent" so that we get:
Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / avoidance / rejection / refusal (cf. fanta, rivbi)
?
>> I want to have a definition that >> is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to you. > > I know. And I gave you my reasons why I reject that > definition.
Yes, but a poorly worded definition surely can't be a reason good enough to throw out the intent of the old definition and create a wholly new one.
> BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai nai} = "intent > not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} = "request > not to"?
Actually, I'd completely overlooked that. Thanks for pointing it out!
Suggested new definition:
.e'o (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to make a negative request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u)
Suggested new examples:
.e'onai ri zmadu lemi se cpadji Don't give me more than I want.
Artificial example: .e'onai do stapa le mlatu Don't step on the cat!
> And if those were adopted, to be systematic we should > also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e nai} = > "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command not to", > {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = "ought not", > {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope that not".
I disagree both that that is more systematic, and that systematicity is more important than compliance with the baseline and usage.
>>> Is it worth listing them again? >> >> Yes, to take the burden off those who are going to put the results of the >> section into the dictionary. It is important that they are not seen as >> making decisions of their own. > > If we were writing things in a machine readable format, > that would make sense. Otherwise, I don't see what kind > of decision you mean. Sorting out "used to express" > from the actual content? > > The danger of duplicating the lists is that a word is left out > of one of them and then people start making interpretations > about why this or that word is in the definition but not used as > a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only makes sense if it > adds something that is not there in the definition.
That *is* a good point. I think we should let it stand that way, at least for now.
On second thought, maybe there could be interjections or adverbs that are more useful for reverse lookup than "intent", "prohibit", and so on. I see that you have already used "whoa" as a translation of ".e'e nai" in an example.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Learn languages! The more languages you know, the more incomprehensible you can get.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 21:50 GMT On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai nai} = "intent > > not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} = "request > > not to"? > > Actually, I'd completely overlooked that. Thanks for pointing it out!
You're welcome. :-)
> Suggested new definition: > > .e'o (UI1) > Attitudinal. Used to make a negative request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u) > > Suggested new examples: > > .e'onai ri zmadu lemi se cpadji > Don't give me more than I want. > > Artificial example: > .e'onai do stapa le mlatu > Don't step on the cat!
I'm not changing it, but keep them in case my proposal is rejected and you or someone else takes over as shepherd for the section.
> > And if those were adopted, to be systematic we should > > also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e nai} = > > "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command not to", > > {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = "ought not", > > {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope that not". > > I disagree both that that is more systematic,
Would you care to ellucidate? I think {UI nai broda} = {UI na broda} would be pretty systematic, even though against what I take the spirit of {nai} to be.
>and that systematicity is > more important than compliance with the baseline and usage.
This, I think, is the issue. We probably both value systematicity, compliance with ma'oste/CLL and usage, (and I would add usability and usefulness) but we weigh them differently.
> > The danger of duplicating the lists is that a word is left out > > of one of them and then people start making interpretations > > about why this or that word is in the definition but not used as > > a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only makes sense if it > > adds something that is not there in the definition. > > That *is* a good point. I think we should let it stand that way, at least > for now. > > On second thought, maybe there could be interjections or adverbs that are > more useful for reverse lookup than "intent", "prohibit", and so on. I see > that you have already used "whoa" as a translation of ".e'e nai" in an > example.
Yes, that's the kind of thing I had in mind for a keyword that "adds something that is not there in the definition". I should point out to you that my definitions of {e'e} and {e'i} *may* also not agree with ma'oste/CLL. It's just that in these cases it's harder to interpret what exactly the ma'oste/CLL definitions are.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 21:53 GMT posts: 2388 Personally, I think that trying to find one word -- or a cluster of single words — to explain how an expressive word is used is probably oftengoing to lead to misunderstandings. A scenario would make more sense: "this word is appropriate when ...." I expect the problems with {ai} can be repeated mutatis mutandis throughout UI.
> On 8/10/05, Arnt Richard Johansen
> wrote:
> > On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambías wrote:
> > > What you may mean is that they don't
> correspond
> > > with "intent not to", but we are and have
> always been
> > > in agreement about that.
> >
> > That is what I meant by non-intent, and the
> other synonyms which you
> > removed from the definition suggestion.
>
> Arrghh, this is getting silly.
>
> "Non-intent" is not a standard word, so it is
> not in most
> dictionaries and I can't point you to a
> standard definition,
> but it is plainly not synonymous with
> "rejection/refusal".
> Here is an example of usage of "nonintent":
>
> "This statute is thus different from one that
> simply outlawed
> any public burning or mutilation of the flag,
> regardless of the
> expressive intent or 459 U.S. 949 , 955
> nonintent of the
> actor."
>
> Taken from:
>
> > Where hopefully you will agree that nonintent = > lack of intent.
The problem remains that "lack of intent" is too vague for your present purpose: it can occur in at least four different situations: intent not to, intent to not, indecision, and lack of considering the situation at all. Arj wants either the first or second, presumably the first; I took xorxes as wanting the fourth. But they are all non-intent to do x.
> In any case, it is also very clear to me that > you don't > want {ai nai} used to indicate lack of intent. > > > I want to have a definition that > > is baseline-compliant, and I suggested one to > you. > > I know. And I gave you my reasons why I reject > that > definition. > > BTW, if you insist so much on retaining {ai > nai} = "intent > not to", shouldn't you argue also for {e'o nai} > = "request > not to"? > > And if those were adopted, to be systematic we > should > also have {e'a nai} = "permission not to", {e'e > nai} = > "encouragement not to", {e'i nai} = "command > not to", > {e'u nai} = "suggestion not to", {ei nai} = > "ought not", > {au nai} = "whish that not", {a'o nai} = "hope > that not".
The pattern argument is an iffy approach. There are clear cases among UI of opposites, clear cases (to me) of either {xnai} as "x to not" or "x not to," cases where the relation to negation is unclear, and cases of meanings at right angles to any obvious axis (more or less what the "never considered" version of {ainai} is). I am not sure where the preponderance lies, but there is no unanimity for any one pattern.
> I don't see why {ai} should be the only one > following that > pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed as > "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste?
Well, there is also the fact that it seems to have been used that way by the majority of people who used it at all.
> > >> Also, if you need help with the keywords, > I suppose I could do some. > > > > > > In this section, the keywords are basically > all the words > > > that appear in the definitions. > > > > Including "used", to", and so on? > > Heh. > > > > Is it worth listing them again? > > > > Yes, to take the burden off those who are > going to put the results of the > > section into the dictionary. It is important > that they are not seen as > > making decisions of their own. > > If we were writing things in a machine readable > format, > that would make sense. Otherwise, I don't see > what kind > of decision you mean. Sorting out "used to > express" > from the actual content? > > The danger of duplicating the lists is that a > word is left out > of one of them and then people start making > interpretations > about why this or that word is in the > definition but not used as > a keyword or viceversa. A keyword list only > makes sense if it > adds something that is not there in the > definition.
See above.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 22:36 GMT On 8/10/05, John E Clifford wrote: > Personally, I think that trying to find one word > — or a cluster of single words — to explain how > an expressive word is used is probably oftengoing > to lead to misunderstandings. A scenario would > make more sense: "this word is appropriate when > ...." I expect the problems with {ai} can be > repeated mutatis mutandis throughout UI.
Yes, that's why I think the examples are the most important part of the definitions.
> The problem remains that "lack of intent" is too > vague for your present purpose: it can occur in > at least four different situations: intent not > to, intent to not,
(I'm not sure my English is up to telling those two appart, what's the difference? Googling for "I intend not to" and "I intend to not", all I can figure out is a difference in register, formal/informal, but I can't really find a difference in meaning.)
In any case, those two seem to express intent to me. "Negative intent" if you want, but not a lack of it.
> indecision, and lack of > considering the situation at all.
The indecision position is admittedly somewhat artificial, I only included it because it was already there in the ma'oste/CLL and I can make some sense of it as a middle ground. It can be seen as a lack of fully formed intent, but it's surely not am absolute lack of intent.
> Arj wants > either the first or second, presumably the first; > I took xorxes as wanting the fourth. But they > are all non-intent to do x.
Well, yes, intent to not do x requires non-intent to do x, but it requires more than that.
> The pattern argument is an iffy approach. There > are clear cases among UI of opposites, clear > cases (to me) of either {xnai} as "x to not" or > "x not to," cases where the relation to negation > is unclear, and cases of meanings at right angles > to any obvious axis (more or less what the "never > considered" version of {ainai} is). I am not > sure where the preponderance lies, but there is > no unanimity for any one pattern.
Let's list them then, and compare. The more relevant ones for this are all in the "irrealis" section, and I have only 11 there (some may want to argue for removing or adding some, for example you mentioned "fear that..." recently, which is not there.)
> > I don't see why {ai} should be the only one > > following that > > pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed as > > "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste? > > Well, there is also the fact that it seems to > have been used that way by the majority of people > who used it at all.
Yes, usage is one of the factors to take into considaration. (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to have been very significant, but not surprizingly it did tend to follow the keywords. I think I even used it in the Alice translation.)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Wed 10 of Aug., 2005 22:57 GMT posts: 953 On Wed, 10 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
>> Suggested new definition: >> >> .e'o (UI1) >> Attitudinal. Used to make a negative request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u) >> >> Suggested new examples: >> >> .e'onai ri zmadu lemi se cpadji >> Don't give me more than I want. >> >> Artificial example: >> .e'onai do stapa le mlatu >> Don't step on the cat! > > I'm not changing it, but keep them in case my proposal is > rejected and you or someone else takes over as shepherd for > the section.
Can't you at least point out some parts of the proposal, so that I can write one that is more acceptable? I'd hate to see you step down as shepherd for this section, seeing as you have done a fine job with most/all of the others.
>> and that systematicity is >> more important than compliance with the baseline and usage. > > This, I think, is the issue. We probably both value systematicity, > compliance with ma'oste/CLL and usage, (and I would add > usability and usefulness) but we weigh them differently.
Right.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ If you connect yourself across a 2000V supply, the very best you can hope for is something like a serious heart attack with severe burns thrown in for good measure. IT'S MUCH MORE LIKELY THAT YOU'LL BE DEAD. -- John Nelson: Power Supplies & Control Units, in The VHF/UHF DX Book
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 02:43 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/10/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > Personally, I think that trying to find one
> word
> > — or a cluster of single words — to explain
> how
> > an expressive word is used is probably
> oftengoing
> > to lead to misunderstandings. A scenario
> would
> > make more sense: "this word is appropriate
> when
> > ...." I expect the problems with {ai} can be
> > repeated mutatis mutandis throughout UI.
>
> Yes, that's why I think the examples are the
> most important
> part of the definitions.
They would be if we knew more about them. As it stands they are open to almost any available interpretation.
> > The problem remains that "lack of intent" is > too > > vague for your present purpose: it can occur > in > > at least four different situations: intent > not > > to, intent to not, > > (I'm not sure my English is up to telling those > two appart, > what's the difference? Googling for "I intend > not to" and > "I intend to not", all I can figure out is a > difference in > register, formal/informal, but I can't really > find a difference > in meaning.) I am being a logician here so it is a scoping thing. "I intend to not do x" means that that is my intention without any further specification -- I will resist doing x." "I intend to do not x" means that I intend to do something other than (and incompatible with) x at the time of opportunity for x. Both of these (and the others as well) fall into the case "I do not intend to do x," i.e., "I intend to do x" is false (These are of course descriptions of appropriate times to say thing with {ai} and {nai} and {na} and so on, not actual cases of saying these or rather translations of such).
> In any case, those two seem to express intent > to me. "Negative > intent" if you want, but not a lack of it.
They do indeed and negative intent only in the sense that what is intended is described negatively. The problem with "non-intent" is that it has no real use (the law and related topics are really real, after all) And most of the others when used with a mention of what is not intended, are of the broad sort noted above. This is why spelling out the conditions — or at least stating flat out that non-intent to do x, means having no intent with regard to x, even to the extent of being not yet determined between yea and nay. (The example with non-intending symbolic speech or some such does not clearly give your menaing but is at least as likely just "whether or not they intended symbolic speech" or whatever, that is the whole range of "not intend.")
> > indecision, and lack of > > considering the situation at all. > > The indecision position is admittedly somewhat > artificial, I only > included it because it was already there in the > ma'oste/CLL and > I can make some sense of it as a middle ground. > It can be seen > as a lack of fully formed intent, but it's > surely not am absolute > lack of intent.
You see, it quite literally is just that lack of intent, because you have not yet formed an intention to do one or the other (which gives another of the plausible readings of {ainai}). You can't intend to do something unless you have formed that intention (I'm sure there is a philosopher somewhere who would argue endlessly against this point, but the broad outline of it seems correct enough for present purposes). Intention is a conscious act of will, in other words, and so until you have made that effort you don't have an intention.
> > Arj wants
> > either the first or second, presumably the
> first;
> > I took xorxes as wanting the fourth. But
> they
> > are all non-intent to do x.
>
> Well, yes, intent to not do x requires
> non-intent to do x,
> but it requires more than that.
Yes, it is one particular place within the complement of intending to do x, as is intending to do something (which happens to be)incompatible with x and, of course, not having thought about x at all.
> > The pattern argument is an iffy approach. > There > > are clear cases among UI of opposites, clear > > cases (to me) of either {xnai} as "x to not" > or > > "x not to," cases where the relation to > negation > > is unclear, and cases of meanings at right > angles > > to any obvious axis (more or less what the > "never > > considered" version of {ainai} is). I am not > > sure where the preponderance lies, but there > is > > no unanimity for any one pattern. > > Let's list them then, and compare. The more > relevant > ones for this are all in the "irrealis" > section, and I have > only 11 there (some may want to argue for > removing > or adding some, for example you mentioned "fear > that..." > recently, which is not there.)
I assumed you had alreeady made such a list as part of preparing these sections (I guess you are not doing all the VV's, but at least for your sets). It may well be that — since I just looked at some cases without thinking about what sort of UI they were — the patterns are different for different different classes (if so that is wortha note somewhere as well). As for "fear," the relevant one ("fear that") seems to be just the negative (in the photo sense) version of "despair": if I despair of x, I fear that not x. If you think these critters need a closer look than you have given them, I'll elaborate on that point a bit in the survey.
> > > I don't see why {ai} should be the only one > > > following that > > > pattern. Just because it was oddly glossed > as > > > "rejection/refusal" in the ma'oste? > > > > Well, there is also the fact that it seems to > > have been used that way by the majority of > people > > who used it at all. > > Yes, usage is one of the factors to take into > considaration. > (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to have > been very > significant, but not surprizingly it did tend > to follow the > keywords. I think I even used it in the Alice > translation.)
So there you have arj's argument in a nutshell, except for the relatively higher value he places on tradition.
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 13:16 GMT On 8/10/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > On 8/10/05, John E Clifford > > wrote: > > > The problem remains that "lack of intent" is > > too > > > vague for your present purpose: it can occur > > in > > > at least four different situations: intent > > not > > > to, intent to not, > > > > (I'm not sure my English is up to telling those > > two appart, > > what's the difference? Googling for "I intend > > not to" and > > "I intend to not", all I can figure out is a > > difference in > > register, formal/informal, but I can't really > > find a difference > > in meaning.) > I am being a logician here so it is a scoping > thing. "I intend to not do x" means that that is > my intention without any further specification -- > I will resist doing x." "I intend to do not x" > means that I intend to do something other than > (and incompatible with) x at the time of > opportunity for x.
That I understand, yes, but you did not address the issue, you introduced a third form:
1) Intend not to do X 2) Intend to not do X 3) Intend to do not X
(3) is clearly different from (1) and (2), which is what you explain, but the only difference I can see between (1) and (2) is one of register.
> The problem with "non-intent" is
> that it has no real use (the law and related
> topics are really real, after all)
Did you mean "are not really real"? Otherwise, I don't follow.
...
> I assumed you had alreeady made such a list as
> part of preparing these sections (I guess you are
> not doing all the VV's, but at least for your
> sets).
I am doing all the VV's, yes. You can find the rest here:
> It may well be that — since I just > looked at some cases without thinking about what > sort of UI they were — the patterns are > different for different different classes (if so > that is wortha note somewhere as well).
I will write some kind of summary of the irrealis later today. In the end, anyone who is really interested in finding patterns will have to do the work of looking for them by themselves, because the classes are not always obvious and clearcut.
> As for > "fear," the relevant one ("fear that") seems to > be just the negative (in the photo sense) version > of "despair": if I despair of x, I fear that not > x. If you think these critters need a closer look > than you have given them, I'll elaborate on that > point a bit in the survey.
All I'm saying is that "fear that..." is nowhere to be found on the list of UIs. You are welcome to elaborate on English expressions, but it would be more useful if you somehow relate them to the Lojban system (if it can be called that), since that's what we are defining here.
> > Yes, usage is one of the factors to take into > > considaration. > > (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to have > > been very > > significant, but not surprizingly it did tend > > to follow the > > keywords. I think I even used it in the Alice > > translation.) > > So there you have arj's argument in a nutshell, > except for the relatively higher value he places > on tradition.
Indeed. His point was crystal clear from the beginning.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 15:41 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/10/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > On 8/10/05, John E Clifford > > > wrote: > > > > The problem remains that "lack of intent" > is > > > too > > > > vague for your present purpose: it can > occur > > > in > > > > at least four different situations: > intent > > > not > > > > to, intent to not, > > > > > > (I'm not sure my English is up to telling > those > > > two appart, > > > what's the difference? Googling for "I > intend > > > not to" and > > > "I intend to not", all I can figure out is > a > > > difference in > > > register, formal/informal, but I can't > really > > > find a difference > > > in meaning.) > > I am being a logician here so it is a > scoping > > thing. "I intend to not do x" means that > that is > > my intention without any further > specification -- > > I will resist doing x." "I intend to do not > x" > > means that I intend to do something other > than > > (and incompatible with) x at the time of > > opportunity for x. > > That I understand, yes, but you did not address > the issue, > you introduced a third form: > > 1) Intend not to do X > 2) Intend to not do X > 3) Intend to do not X > > (3) is clearly different from (1) and (2), > which is what you > explain, but the only difference I can see > between (1) and > (2) is one of register.
A problem in using short forms like "intend not to" and "intend to not," instead of the fuller forms. I agree that my "intend not to" might be either 1 or 2 (as usual, someone could problably find differences, but I don't see them for the moment — tone aside). "intend to not" was meant to be your 3. > > > The problem with "non-intent" is > > that it has no real use (the law and related > > topics are really real, after all) > > Did you mean "are not really real"?
Yes.
Otherwise, > I don't follow. > > > ... > > I assumed you had already made such a list > as > > part of preparing these sections (I guess you > are > > not doing all the VV's, but at least for your > > sets). > > I am doing all the VV's, yes. You can find the > rest here: >
> > > It may well be that — since I just > > looked at some cases without thinking about > what > > sort of UI they were — the patterns are > > different for different different classes (if > so > > that is worth a note somewhere as well). > > I will write some kind of summary of the > irrealis later > today. In the end, anyone who is really > interested in > finding patterns will have to do the work of > looking > for them by themselves, because the classes are > not > always obvious and clearcut. > > > As for > > "fear," the relevant one ("fear that") seems > to > > be just the negative (in the photo sense) > version > > of "despair": if I despair of x, I fear that > not > > x. If you think these critters need a closer > look > > than you have given them, I'll elaborate on > that > > point a bit in the survey. > > All I'm saying is that "fear that..." is > nowhere to be > found on the list of UIs. You are welcome to > elaborate > on English expressions, but it would be more > useful > if you somehow relate them to the Lojban system > (if it > can be called that), since that's what we are > defining > here.
As far as I can figure out, "hope that x" is appropriate for cases where 1) x is a living possibility (in the speaker's mind, at least) 2) the speaker has a positive attitude toward x (maybe even desires that it occur, more than just approving of it) 3) its coming to be or not is outside his control (in his opinion again) 4) it is not clearly the most likely possibility for the occasion in question (in his opinion yet again). "despair" agrees with "hope" in 2 and 3 at least (addingg perhaps in 2 that the speaker has a negative attitude — even fear of — toward x not occurring or at least some particular -- and likely — alternative), but in place of 4 we have that x is the least likely of viable possibilities or maybe not even viable at all anymore (so 1 may go as well). "fear that x" agrees with "hope" on 1 and 3 but has a negative attitude (even desires not) for 2 and has it the most likely possibility in 4. So the interrelations here are more complex than can be dealt with simply by negating some chunk the surface formula: "despair" is the extreme form of "hope" in that x need be not only less than most likely (and this is the least certain part of "hope") but actually the least likely, even not viable. It may also have the stronger element in the speaker's attitude) "fear" seems to be more than "hope that not x" for a number of reasons: not-x being most likely does not follow from x being less than most likely nor conversely, indeed not-x is too indeterminate to be of much use here, where the fear is of a prrticular thing (hope that x as fear that not-x works a bit better but still misses the part about positive attitudes: negative toward x does not gurantee positive toward not-x). And of course, "not hope that", "noot despair of" and "not feart that" don't get us anywhere at all toward any of the other, though "hope" and "fear" as polar opposites is not too bad (within the context of viable alternatives outside one's control). I do think it is the case that if a despairs of x then a fears that not-x, except that range of not-x is usually more specific. So what does this say about {a'o}? On the basis of {nai} giving the opposite, {ao'nai} should be "fear that" propbably, but none of this does much about the affective aspects of these attitudes, which are quite different and not obviously related in any way that could be called negation. Ineed, it is mainly the affect tht separates hope from despair, probably what coverts — in the speaker's mind — from "not most likely to "least likely": once you get, gloomy it spreads. So, as affects, the two are opposite and it could be argued that affects are what attitudinals are all about.
> > > Yes, usage is one of the factors to take
> into
> > > considaration.
> > > (I don't consider the usage of {ai nai} to
> have
> > > been very
> > > significant, but not surprizingly it did
> tend
> > > to follow the
> > > keywords. I think I even used it in the
> Alice
> > > translation.)
> >
> > So there you have arj's argument in a
> nutshell,
> > except for the relatively higher value he
> places
> > on tradition.
>
> Indeed. His point was crystal clear from the
> beginning.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 18:52 GMT We can sort the "irrealis" attitudinals broadly into three classes:
a-series: ai, au, a'o, ei ("ei" is an honorary member here) e-series: e'a, e'e, e'i ,e'o, e'u i-series: ia, ie
The a-series is used to express the attitude of the speaker towards a certain situation.
The e-series is used to express the attitude of the speaker towards a certain situation to be brought about by the audience or, eventually, by a third party.
The i-series is used to indicate how the speaker evaluates a proposition in regards to its correspondence with reality.
{au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation that the speaker would find desirable. The difference is that with {au} the speaker judges the situation to be impossible (i.e. incompatible with how things really are) or at least extremely unlikely, whereas with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and even likely (i.e. compatible with how things really are, and the speaker is optimistic), but still uncertain, for if the speaker knew that the world agreed with their desideratum they would express hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather than hope.
{aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a situation that the speaker would find undesirable. The difference is that with {aunai} the speaker judges the situation to be relatively unlikely, or at least avoidable, whereas with {a'onai} it is judged to be quite likely (i.e. the speaker is pessimistic), but still uncertain, for if the speaker knew for sure that the world agreed with the undesirable situation they would express unhappiness (uinai) or complaint (oi) rather than despair.
{aucu'i} (and eventually {a'ocu'i}) indicates a situation that the speaker finds neither desirable nor undesirable. Since the speaker is apathetic to the situation, the relative likelihood loses relevance and perhaps that's why {a'ocu'i} is not even glossed, but still {aucu'i} could be used for something considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for something more likely. When the world agrees with the indifferent situation the indifference could be expressed as (uicu'i) or (oicu'i) (neither has been glossed).
{ei} indicates that the speaker judges the situation as described to be how the world "ought to be". There is no indication as to whether the speaker considers the world to actually be that way or not, most often the world will not be as it ought to, or there would be no need to point out the discrepancy, but it's also possible to say "this is how it is, and that's just how it ought to be too"; and there is no indication about what criteria are used to make the judjement (moral, spiritual, social, physical, etc. this can probably be indicated with a modifier.)
{einai} indicates that the speaker does not take the situation as described to be how the world "ought to be". There is no indication as to whether the speaker considers the world to actually be thus or not, most often however the world *will* be that way, or there would be no need to point out that there is no obligation for it to be that way, but it's also possible to say "this is not how it is, and there's no need for it to be that way either".
{ai} indicates a situation that the speakers takes to be the goal or purpose of their actions. As with {ei}, the situation may or may not coincide with actuality: it's a target which may be hit or missed.
{ainai} indicates a situation that the speakers takes not to be the goal or purpose of their actions. The situation may or may not coincide with actuality: it is just not a target. In many cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or at least appear to, or there would be no reason to bring it up.
{aicu'i} indicates a situation that the speaker contemplates as a goal or purpose of their actions. The situation may or may not coincide with actuality: it's just not clear to the speaker whether it is the target or not.
With the e-series, the speaker makes a transfer of some
kind to the audience:
e'a: the speaker grants permission to the audience e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the audience e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the audience e'o: the speaker poses a request to the audience e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the audience
The transference language may be metaphorical but I think it shows that the speaker is placing the onus for bringing the situation about on the audience (or eventually a third party). These can all be accompanied with {ko}, or rather, using {ko} by itself could replace any of these, losing the specific attitude of the speaker with respect to the action.
e'anai: the speaker imposes a prohibition to the audience e'enai: the speaker throws discouragement to the audience e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the audience e'onai: the speaker grants a favor to the audience e'unai: the speaker proffers a warning to the audience
{e'a} and {e'i} can be seen as duals, in the same way that "may" and "must" are duals. The difference between {e'a} (permission) and {e'inai} (unconstrain) is the difference between "may" and "need not".
{ia} and {ie} are used to indicate that the speaker judges
the situation described to correspond with reality. The
difference between them is that with {ia} the speaker brings
up the situation in question themselves, whereas with {ie}
the speaker is judging a situation brough up by someone
else.
{ianai} and {ienai} are used to indicate that the speaker judges the situation described to not correspond with reality.
{iacu'i} and {iecu'i} are used to indicate that the speaker cannot or will not make a definite judgement as to whether the situation described corresponds with reality or not.
Notice that {ia} and {ie} could be taken to constitute assertions, because the speaker is indicating that the proposition in question does properly describe reality according to them, but I would say that the proposition is not really asserted in those cases, it is just the attitude of the speaker towards the proposition that is expressed.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 19:16 GMT On 8/11/05, John E Clifford wrote: ... > other, though "hope" and "fear" as polar > opposites is not too bad (within the context of > viable alternatives outside one's control).
I have added "used to express fear that the situation ensues" for {a'onai}. I always took the keyword "despair" in the sense of "despair that..." rather than "despair of...", which is what you describe. "Despair that..." fits with "fear that..." in that both refer to situations that the speaker finds undesirable.
> So what does this say > about {a'o}? On the basis of {nai} giving the > opposite, {ao'nai} should be "fear that" > propbably,
Yes, I agree.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 19:58 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/11/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > ... > > other, though "hope" and "fear" as polar > > opposites is not too bad (within the context > of > > viable alternatives outside one's control). > > I have added "used to express fear that the > situation > ensues" for {a'onai}. I always took the keyword > "despair" > in the sense of "despair that..." rather than > "despair of...", > which is what you describe. "Despair that..." > fits with > "fear that..." in that both refer to situations > that the > speaker finds undesirable.
I don't think I have "despair that" in my idiolect. I was worried about the different form from "hope that" and "fear that" but had nothing to move to in that direction with "despair." And it seems I am not alone in this, the OED has only a couple of citations for "despair that" and they are old (pre18th century). As for despair in any case referring to an event that the the speaker finds undesireable, the event mentioned is always (I may have missed a case, though the OED does not give a definition to fit) a desirable one and despair is the loss of hope that it will occur. That is "despair that/of x" means that x is desired, among other things. Whereas, in "fear that x" x is undesirable. The bad thing in despair is that what is mentioned won't happen, in fear it is that it will.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 20:16 GMT On 8/11/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > I don't think I have "despair that" in my > idiolect. I was worried about the different form > from "hope that" and "fear that" but had nothing > to move to in that direction with "despair." > And it seems I am not alone in this, the OED has > only a couple of citations for "despair that" and > they are old (pre18th century).
These might be more current (from the first page of "I despair that" by Google):
Today, I despair that too many of us have already decided to surrender.
I despair that I feel like a stranger in my own land -- as though I don't belong — because the values I hold dear are so marginalized.
I despair that I had to queue five hours for my ticket; I despair that a large proportion of the fans who were there couldn't be bothered to cheer on the...
Sometimes I despair that I'm fighting on a false front.
I despair that very few members of the American community will follow suit.
I despair that this stupid Western trend is becoming popular in Japan.
At times I despair that misery truly is the human condition, and we immortals are certainly not spared our immortal share of it.
I despair that things will never change.
> As for despair
> in any case referring to an event that the the
> speaker finds undesireable, the event mentioned
> is always (I may have missed a case, though the
> OED does not give a definition to fit) a
> desirable one and despair is the loss of hope
> that it will occur.
That doesn't seem to agree with current usage.
> That is "despair that/of x" > means that x is desired, among other things. > Whereas, in "fear that x" x is undesirable. The > bad thing in despair is that what is mentioned > won't happen, in fear it is that it will.
In the examples above the x of "I despair that x" is undesirable for the speaker.
I did find one where x was desirable:
"I despair that I shall ever win to the far end of that love, there are so many plies in it."
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 20:49 GMT posts: 2388
> We can sort the "irrealis" attitudinals broadly
> into three
> classes:
>
> a-series: ai, au, a'o, ei ("ei" is an honorary
> member here)
> e-series: e'a, e'e, e'i ,e'o, e'u
> i-series: ia, ie
>
> The a-series is used to express the attitude of
> the speaker
> towards a certain situation.
I am not even sure what this means, but maybe its very unclarity helps for the purpose of tying up one bundle. But it doesn't seem to me to do a good job even then. Of course, part of the problem is that strange "attitude" which means God knows what, if anything.
> The e-series is used to express the attitude of > the speaker > towards a certain situation to be brought about > by the > audience or, eventually, by a third party. > > The i-series is used to indicate how the > speaker evaluates > a proposition in regards to its correspondence > with reality.
These others are better so I take your remarks on a as being an attempt to cover the garbage category. > {au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation that > the speaker would > find desirable. The difference is that with > {au} the speaker > judges the situation to be impossible (i.e. > incompatible with > how things really are) or at least extremely > unlikely, Why so? Can't he desire something without also judging that it is hard to get. He may very well (and often does) desire something without (before) considering whether he can get it. I don't see how this is going to help with {aunai} as "reluctance" (not a very meaningful word off hand anyhow). To be sure, I am not clear how this is something that can be expressed, but that is by now a generic worry in this list.
whereas > with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and even > likely (i.e. > compatible with how things really are, and the > speaker is > optimistic), but still uncertain, for if the > speaker knew that > the world agreed with their desideratum they > would express > hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather than > hope.
Well, surely not hope then, but maybe not joy yet either, waiting for it to come to pass before he throws the party.
> {aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a situation > that the speaker > would find undesirable.
Well, the sentence with the {a'onai} actually mentions (if "despair" is the right word) a desirable event — what is undesirable is that it is very unlikely to occur.
The difference is that > with {aunai} the > speaker judges the situation to be relatively > unlikely, or at > least avoidable,
I don't see this (indeed, I don't see likelihood in {au} at all, but then I still can't deal with "reluctance," whichseems to be about will not about desire.
whereas with {a'onai} it is > judged to be quite > likely (i.e. the speaker is pessimistic), but > still uncertain, for if > the speaker knew for sure that the world agreed > with the > undesirable situation they would express > unhappiness (uinai) > or complaint (oi) rather than despair.
See above.
> {aucu'i} (and eventually {a'ocu'i}) indicates a > situation that the > speaker finds neither desirable nor > undesirable. Since the > speaker is apathetic to the situation, the > relative likelihood > loses relevance if it every had any
and perhaps that's why > {a'ocu'i} is not even > glossed, but still {aucu'i} could be used for > something > considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for > something more > likely.
This might, I suppose, be right for {a'o}, since the difference (assuming "despair" is right) is just likelihood, but then the {cu'i} form would have to be about things just balance — as likely as not.
When the world agrees with the > indifferent situation > the indifference could be expressed as (uicu'i) > or (oicu'i) > (neither has been glossed). > > {ei} indicates that the speaker judges the > situation as described > to be how the world "ought to be". There is no > indication as > to whether the speaker considers the world to > actually be > that way or not, most often the world will not > be as it ought to, > or there would be no need to point out the > discrepancy, but > it's also possible to say "this is how it is, > and that's just how > it ought to be too"; and there is no indication > about what criteria > are used to make the judjement (moral, > spiritual, social, > physical, etc. this can probably be indicated > with a modifier.)
Nice. I was taking it as laying down an ob -- along the lines of {e'a} — which got me into trouble precisely with {e'a}
> {einai} indicates that the speaker does not > take the situation > as described to be how the world "ought to be". > There is no > indication as to whether the speaker considers > the world > to actually be thus or not, most often however > the world *will* > be that way, or there would be no need to point > out that there > is no obligation for it to be that way, but > it's also possible to > say "this is not how it is, and there's no need > for it to be that > way either".
Again, "freedom" sounds like something to do with the will rather than judgment. I am not sure what to make of this as a judgment; is what you are doing making {einai} be for things that are not covered by whatever the person is judging from? Rather than just things which are in the area but not given any particular force.
> {ai} indicates a situation that the speakers > takes to be the > goal or purpose of their actions. As with {ei}, > the situation > may or may not coincide with actuality: it's a > target which > may be hit or missed.
Here attitude is pretty hopeless. This seems pretty clearly about will and {ai x} indicates the intention to bring about x. It can only be used when x is not the case (so far as the speaker knows, etc.)
> {ainai} indicates a situation that the speakers > takes not to be > the goal or purpose of their actions. The > situation may or > may not coincide with actuality: it is just not > a target. In many > cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or at > least appear to, > or there would be no reason to bring it up.
I liked "has not considered" better — clearer anyhow, even if you decide it misses the exact place. I get no very clear idea of what this means — in particular hwo it differs from deciding to go for not-x.
> {aicu'i} indicates a situation that the speaker > contemplates > as a goal or purpose of their actions.
But has not yet decided whether to go for it or not.
The > situation > may or may not coincide with actuality: it's > just not clear > to the speaker whether it is the target or not.
It only makes sense if the event is not present (so far as the speaker believes) > ---- > > With the e-series, the speaker makes a transfer > of some > kind to the audience: > > e'a: the speaker grants permission to the > audience > e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the > audience > e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the > audience > e'o: the speaker poses a request to the > audience > e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the > audience
This makes for a pretty nice packet, laying out the common directive uses of language. While th interactions among them may be interesting, we don't need them here. However, most of these, while, they make a lot more sense, are not obviously what the standard list gives. Admittedly, the standard list in virtually unintelligible here and the moves seem to be in the right direction, but I can see a lot of people — if anyone has ever used any of these confidently — being up in arms about the changes.
> The transference language may be metaphorical > but I think it shows that the speaker is > placing the > onus for bringing the situation about on the > audience > (or eventually a third party). These can all be > > accompanied with {ko}, or rather, using {ko} by > itself > could replace any of these, losing the specific > attitude > of the speaker with respect to the action. > > e'anai: the speaker imposes a prohibition to > the audience > e'enai: the speaker throws discouragement to > the audience > e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the > audience
This one I don't understand. Releases from a command or some other form of ob? How is it different from a permission?
> e'onai: the speaker grants a favor to the > audience Nice opposition! Certainly better than "negative request"
> e'unai: the speaker proffers a warning to the > audience
Is a warning different from a suggestion that not. Probably, but it isn the opposite of a suggestion either.
> {e'a} and {e'i} can be seen as duals, in the > same way > that "may" and "must" are duals. The difference > between > {e'a} (permission) and {e'inai} (unconstrain) > is the difference > between "may" and "need not".
I am not sure what that difference is: "may x" and "may not-x"? ---- > > {ia} and {ie} are used to indicate that the > speaker judges > the situation described to correspond with > reality. The > difference between them is that with {ia} the > speaker brings > up the situation in question themselves, > whereas with {ie} > the speaker is judging a situation brough up by > someone > else.
I would take {ie} to be a performative not a judgment. But then I tend to think of agreement and disagreement as about proposals, not about claims, responses to some {e'V} or other. {ia} on the other hand is about facts and works as well if someone else makes the claim as if I do. {ie} on the other hand has nothing to do with reality but will intentions or so.
<<{ianai} and {ienai} are used to indicate that the speaker judges the situation described to not correspond with reality.
{iacu'i} and {iecu'i} are used to indicate that the speaker cannot or will not make a definite judgement as to whether the situation described corresponds with reality or not.
Notice that {ia} and {ie} could be taken to constitute assertions, because the speaker is indicating that the proposition in question does properly describe reality according to them, but I would say that the proposition is not really asserted in those cases, it is just the attitude of the speaker towards the proposition that is expressed.
I would agree for {ie} but not for {ia}, since {ia} is often used as an intensive, to point to external factors making the claim in need of stressing.
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 11 of Aug., 2005 21:43 GMT On 8/11/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > {au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation that > > the speaker would > > find desirable. The difference is that with > > {au} the speaker > > judges the situation to be impossible (i.e. > > incompatible with > > how things really are) or at least extremely > > unlikely, > > Why so?
That's simply how I'm defining it. Similar to the "Oh that x were the case" in English.
> Can't he desire something without also > judging that it is hard to get.
That would be {a'o}.
> He may very well > (and often does) desire something without > (before) considering whether he can get it.
For example? (I hope by "something" here you don't mean an object but rather that a situation obtain.
> > whereas > > with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and even > > likely (i.e. > > compatible with how things really are, and the > > speaker is > > optimistic), but still uncertain, for if the > > speaker knew that > > the world agreed with their desideratum they > > would express > > hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather than > > hope. > > Well, surely not hope then, but maybe not joy yet > either, waiting for it to come to pass before he > throws the party.
For example? I have no problem with something like:
ui la djan ba vitke ca le bavlamdei Yipee! John will visit tomorrow!
> > {aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a situation > > that the speaker > > would find undesirable. > > Well, the sentence with the {a'onai} actually > mentions (if "despair" is the right word) a > desirable event — what is undesirable is that it > is very unlikely to occur.
Which sentence? The one I have is:
.a'o nai ro da ca se cirko Everything will be lost now.
which mentions an undesirable event.
> > but still {aucu'i} could be used for
> > something
> > considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for
> > something more
> > likely.
>
> This might, I suppose, be right for {a'o}, since
> the difference (assuming "despair" is right) is
> just likelihood, but then the {cu'i} form would
> have to be about things just balance — as likely
> as not.
{a'o} is the more likely: {a'o} desirable/ {a'onai} undesirable {au} is the more unlikely: {au} desirable / {aunai} undesirable
{cu'i} is neither desirable nor undesirable in both cases..
> I am not sure
> what to make of this as a judgment; is what you
> are doing making {einai} be for things that are
> not covered by whatever the person is judging
> from? Rather than just things which are in the
> area but not given any particular force.
I don't understand the question. I'm proposing that {einai} indicates that the situation is not (perhaps against appearances) how things need to be. The example is:
.ei nai do tolnurcni You don't have to feel threatened.
i.e. there is no (moral, physical, social, whatever) law that says that you ought to feel threatened.
> > {ainai} indicates a situation that the speakers > > takes not to be > > the goal or purpose of their actions. The > > situation may or > > may not coincide with actuality: it is just not > > a target. In many > > cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or at > > least appear to, > > or there would be no reason to bring it up. > > I liked "has not considered" better — clearer > anyhow, even if you decide it misses the exact > place. I get no very clear idea of what this > means — in particular hwo it differs from > deciding to go for not-x.
One example is:
.ai nai do pu se xrani I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
Your getting hurt was not the target of my actions, but that doesn't mean that I ever decided to go for you not getting hurt.
> > e'a: the speaker grants permission to the
> > audience
> > e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the
> > audience
> > e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the
> > audience
> > e'o: the speaker poses a request to the
> > audience
> > e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the
> > audience
>
> This makes for a pretty nice packet, laying out
> the common directive uses of language. While th
> interactions among them may be interesting, we
> don't need them here. However, most of these,
> while, they make a lot more sense, are not
> obviously what the standard list gives.
{e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not really so'e but it is so'o, yes.
> Admittedly, the standard list in virtually > unintelligible here and the moves seem to be in > the right direction, but I can see a lot of > people — if anyone has ever used any of these > confidently — being up in arms about the > changes.
Indeed.
> > e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the
> > audience
>
> This one I don't understand. Releases from a
> command or some other form of ob? How is it
> different from a permission?
It's a subtle difference. As I say below, similar to the difference between "you may" and "you need not".
> I am not sure what that difference is: "may x" > and "may not-x"? ----
Yes.
> I would take {ie} to be a performative not a
> judgment.
Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie go'i} "I agree with that", as far as I can tell.
> But then I tend to think of agreement > and disagreement as about proposals, not about > claims, responses to some {e'V} or other.
That would probably fit {vi'o}.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 14:25 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/11/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > I don't think I have "despair that" in my > > idiolect. I was worried about the different > form > > from "hope that" and "fear that" but had > nothing > > to move to in that direction with "despair." > > And it seems I am not alone in this, the OED > has > > only a couple of citations for "despair that" > and > > they are old (pre18th century). > > These might be more current (from the first > page > of "I despair that" by Google): > > Today, I despair that too many of us have > already > decided to surrender. > > I despair that I feel like a stranger in my own > land -- > as though I don't belong — because the values > I hold > dear are so marginalized. > > I despair that I had to queue five hours for my > ticket; > I despair that a large proportion of the fans > who were > there couldn't be bothered to cheer on the... > > Sometimes I despair that I'm fighting on a > false front. > > I despair that very few members of the American > > community will follow suit. > > I despair that this stupid Western trend is > becoming > popular in Japan. > > At times I despair that misery truly is the > human > condition, and we immortals are certainly not > spared > our immortal share of it. > > I despair that things will never change.
Well, this is a new usage (and I dread to think how it came about — it is related to the old in a peculiar way: despair that x = despair of not-x). It has not made it into any dictionary I could find. But, yes, it does offer just the sort of thing you want: undesirable event likely to occur (maybe not so strongly as fear that -- or maybe more so insofar as the hope lost carries over from the older form, which is, happily, still current). Given that the creators of the original word list often use what I (and the dictionaries) think of as nonstandard (indeed, substandard) usage ("disinterest" elsewhere in the list, the inability to distinguish between "Don" and "dawn" and so on) I suppose this is what they ahd in mind — though a usage that is over twenty years old must have made it into some dictionary or other (but my newest dictionary is from the mid 90s). In any case, I suppose that the affect and physiology of "despair that" is like that of "despair of" and hence that "fear that" (with a different affect and physiology) is not an exact substitute. I suggest "dread" for the key word — it is also wroing affectively (and physiologically) but it is right logically (actually better than "fear" since it has the relevant future orientation) and does not interfere with other sets. > > > As for despair > > in any case referring to an event that the > the > > speaker finds undesireable, the event > mentioned > > is always (I may have missed a case, though > the > > OED does not give a definition to fit) a > > desirable one and despair is the loss of hope > > that it will occur. > > That doesn't seem to agree with current usage. Well, I see no evidece that the old usage has disappeared or event decreased in frequency. The new seems merely added on. (And, I suspect, there are some mixed cases, with "despair that" being used for "despair of".) Hmmm, "despair that" is roughly the dual of "hope that," affect and physiology aside.
> > That is "despair that/of x" > > means that x is desired, among other things. > > Whereas, in "fear that x" x is undesirable. > The > > bad thing in despair is that what is > mentioned > > won't happen, in fear it is that it will. > > In the examples above the x of "I despair that > x" > is undesirable for the speaker. > > I did find one where x was desirable: > > "I despair that I shall ever win to the far end > of that > love, there are so many plies in it."
Ahah, a mixed case as predicted.
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 15:48 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/11/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > > > {au} and {a'o} both indicate a situation > that > > > the speaker would > > > find desirable. The difference is that with > > > {au} the speaker > > > judges the situation to be impossible (i.e. > > > incompatible with > > > how things really are) or at least > extremely > > > unlikely, > > > > Why so? > > That's simply how I'm defining it. Similar to > the > "Oh that x were the case" in English.
OK, but I don't see that that is particularly what is wanted here. I mean, the old list and usage must count for something and this does not seem to be what those pointed to. On the other hand, we do need something like that and nothing else seems to do it efficiently.
> > Can't he desire something without also > > judging that it is hard to get. > > That would be {a'o}.
Hope is very different from desire logically and affectively. One can desire something quite independently of any judgment about how (or whether) it can be obtained.
> > He may very well > > (and often does) desire something without > > (before) considering whether he can get it. > > For example? (I hope by "something" here you > don't > mean an object but rather that a situation > obtain.
In this context, yes (I would argue that we always want a state of affairs, but that is contentious). I want the next President to be a Democrat but I have no idea what the likelihood of that is — it being three years until the election and all. Also — against "hope" — it is not yet essentially out of my control — I can at least make some contribution toward it.
> > > whereas > > > with {a'o} it is judged to be possible and > even > > > likely (i.e. > > > compatible with how things really are, and > the > > > speaker is > > > optimistic), but still uncertain, for if > the > > > speaker knew that > > > the world agreed with their desideratum > they > > > would express > > > hapiness (ui) or pleasure (oinai) rather > than > > > hope. > > > > Well, surely not hope then, but maybe not joy > yet > > either, waiting for it to come to pass before > he > > throws the party. > > For example? I have no problem with something > like: > > ui la djan ba vitke ca le bavlamdei > Yipee! John will visit tomorrow!
But that is joy in the expectation, not in the event. Still, I don't expect that Lojban will make the distinction, so I'll let that one pass.
> > > {aunai} and {a'onai} both indicate a > situation > > > that the speaker > > > would find undesirable. > > > > Well, the sentence with the {a'onai} actually > > mentions (if "despair" is the right word) a > > desirable event — what is undesirable is > that it > > is very unlikely to occur. > > Which sentence? The one I have is: > > .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko > Everything will be lost now. > > which mentions an undesirable event.
This is the ambiguity of unextended "desire;" I am reading it in the usual sense "despair of", you in the rising one "despair that" and it gives exactly opposite results with respect to the framing sentence.
> > > but still {aucu'i} could be used for > > > something > > > considered more unlikely and {a'ocu'i} for > > > something more > > > likely. > > > > This might, I suppose, be right for {a'o}, > since > > the difference (assuming "despair" is right) > is > > just likelihood, but then the {cu'i} form > would > > have to be about things just balance — as > likely > > as not. > > {a'o} is the more likely: {a'o} desirable/ > {a'onai} undesirable > {au} is the more unlikely: {au} desirable / > {aunai} undesirable > > {cu'i} is neither desirable nor undesirable in > both cases..
Surely the likelihood is a noncentral part of the notion, if it plays a role in {au} at all (it is definitely secondary in "hope" and "dread" -- though less in the latter than the former).
> > > I am not sure > > what to make of this as a judgment; is what > you > > are doing making {einai} be for things that > are > > not covered by whatever the person is judging > > from? Rather than just things which are in > the > > area but not given any particular force. > > I don't understand the question.
In most cases (moral, legal, etc.) there are things that fall outside the scope of the rules (the law and which fork to use, for example) and there are also matters inside the scope that are not decided (cell phones while driving was until about a year ago, and still is in most jurisdictions — including Missouri, alas). So, is {einai} about the first (outside the scope of the rules) or the second (not fixed within the rules)?
I'm proposing > that > {einai} indicates that the situation is not > (perhaps > against appearances) how things need to be. The > example is: > > .ei nai do tolnurcni > You don't have to feel threatened. > > i.e. there is no (moral, physical, social, > whatever) law > that says that you ought to feel threatened.
This is ambiguous in the way mentioned above. It is also rather strange, since I can't imagine what sort of law (in this sense) would require that. At best I would imagine this comes under a psychological "law" (in that other sense) and then there very likely is such a law: that in a certain situation (like this one) a person (perhaps further specified) feels threatened. Of course, that doesn't usually generate an "ought," though it might, as might further facts about the situation (that someone is threatening you, for example). I suppose the situation is such that no one is threatening you nor in a position to actually do you harm even though they might be expected to want to do so. Of course, if this is literally feeling threatened (a form of fear) none of this is really very meaningful. Still, it is reassuring, if not very literally accurate. The main question is whether it can be taken as a reasonable reading of "freedom" (in this context, as you have developed it, obviously the wrong word). I suppose it means free of necessity in either direction, stressing the most helpful one in each case (there is presumably no need not to feel threatened either, but that doesn't help here, where reassurance is called for). While it is unclear what the original meant, this is pretty clearly a change, even if a needed one.
> > > {ainai} indicates a situation that the > speakers > > > takes not to be > > > the goal or purpose of their actions. The > > > situation may or > > > may not coincide with actuality: it is just > not > > > a target. In many > > > cases it *will* coincide with actuality, or > at > > > least appear to, > > > or there would be no reason to bring it up. > > > > I liked "has not considered" better -- > clearer > > anyhow, even if you decide it misses the > exact > > place. I get no very clear idea of what this > > means — in particular hwo it differs from > > deciding to go for not-x. > > One example is: > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > Your getting hurt was not the target of my > actions, but > that doesn't mean that I ever decided to go for > you not > getting hurt.
As I have said of this example before, it does not fit the pattern here at all, being factual rather than attitudinal. If these are irrealis, then they presumably don't deal with fait accompli even negatively. This is clearly a report of a past intention, not an expression of a present one. It may be some sort of UI, but not this one — if the patterns mean anything at all (which there is some evidence they don't, of course). > > > > e'a: the speaker grants permission to the > > > audience > > > e'e: the speaker gives encouragement to the > > > audience > > > e'i: the speaker imposes a command to the > > > audience > > > e'o: the speaker poses a request to the > > > audience > > > e'u: the speaker offers a suggestion to the > > > audience > > > > This makes for a pretty nice packet, laying > out > > the common directive uses of language. While > th > > interactions among them may be interesting, > we > > don't need them here. However, most of > these, > > while they make a lot more sense, are not > > obviously what the standard list gives. > > {e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not > really so'e > but it is so'o, yes.
Huh?! what do most and several have to do with these items on either reading? The pair mentioned are the most obviously deviant (they may not be at all, given the incomprehensibity of the originals, but they sure look different at first glance).
> > Admittedly, the standard list in virtually > > unintelligible here and the moves seem to be > in > > the right direction, but I can see a lot of > > people — if anyone has ever used any of > these > > confidently — being up in arms about the > > changes. > message truncated <
> > e'inai: the speaker gives freedom to the
> > audience
>
> This one I don't understand. Releases from a
> command or some other form of ob? How is it
> different from a permission?
It's a subtle difference. As I say below, similar to the difference between "you may" and "you need not".>>
"You need not do x" amounts to "you may do not-x" (oddly, I admit), but that doesn't seem to be the difference involved here.
<<> I am not sure what that difference is: "may x" > and "may not-x"? ----
Yes.>> I need to see some example where this works itself out; at present it does not look to be what you are saying.
<<> I would take {ie} to be a performative not a > judgment.
Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie go'i} "I agree with that", as far as I can tell.>> This hardly helps if what is {go'i}d is {e'u x} example. Otherwise, how does {i'e go'i} differ from {ia go'i}, which seems also to occur?
<<> But then I tend to think of agreement > and disagreement as about proposals, not about > claims, responses to some {e'V} or other.
That would probably fit {vi'o}.>>
Well, at most in the case where what is given is a command; when negotiation is a possibility (which it is even with some command forms) then agreement is different from compliance (logically and affectively)
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 16:10 GMT On 8/12/05, John E Clifford wrote: > Well, this is a new usage (and I dread to think > how it came about — it is related to the old in > a peculiar way: despair that x = despair of > not-x).
It's not an unnatural change though, I think this kind of polarity shifts is not all that rare with words that have a negative sense in them. It's interesting that none of the examples is the least bit ambiguous. I suspect this might be related to the loss of the subjunctive in English. "I despair that x" with a desirable (and unlikely, uncertain) x requires x to be in the subjunctive, whereas with an undesirable (and likely or certain) x the indicative will do just fine. Almost all the examples with desirable x's that I find contain "ever" as a subjunctive marker:
I despair that there ever will be an end to it all.
I despair that Microsoft will ever again play the part they so badly need to play in our industry:
Sometimes I despair that I shall ever read the books I want to read
> It has not made it into any dictionary I
> could find. But, yes, it does offer just the
> sort of thing you want: undesirable event likely
> to occur (maybe not so strongly as fear that --
> or maybe more so insofar as the hope lost carries
> over from the older form, which is, happily,
> still current). Given that the creators of the
> original word list often use what I (and the
> dictionaries) think of as nonstandard (indeed,
> substandard) usage ("disinterest" elsewhere in
> the list, the inability to distinguish between
> "Don" and "dawn" and so on) I suppose this is
> what they ahd in mind
I don't know. I think what they had in mind is that {a'o} and {a'onai} were to express hope and despair and that was that, not that the accompanying bridi would describe the hoped for or dreaded situation.
-- though a usage that is > over twenty years old must have made it into some > dictionary or other (but my newest dictionary is > from the mid 90s).
I don't know if dictionaries are that quick to pick up such usages. If I had to guess, I would say this use of "despair that" must be much older than twenty years, but I can't really justify my hunch. It is certainly the overwhelmingly prevalent one as found by Google.
> In any case, I suppose that > the affect and physiology of "despair that" is
How do you figure out the physiology of a usage?
> like that of "despair of" and hence that "fear > that" (with a different affect and physiology) > is not an exact substitute.
Nature abhors exact synonyms anyway.
> I suggest "dread" > for the key word --
I will add it, yes.
> Well, I see no evidece that the old usage has > disappeared or event decreased in frequency. The > new seems merely added on.
In the "I dispair that x" form as found with Google, the undesirable x case is clearly prevalent, although there are cases of desirable x, almost always containing the word "ever".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 17:03 GMT On 8/12/05, John E Clifford wrote:
> > .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko > > Everything will be lost now. > > > > which mentions an undesirable event. > > This is the ambiguity of unextended "desire;" I > am reading it in the usual sense "despair of", > you in the rising one "despair that" and it gives > exactly opposite results with respect to the > framing sentence.
Ouch! How do you get "everything is lost" as a desirable thing?
> In most cases (moral, legal, etc.) there are
> things that fall outside the scope of the rules
> (the law and which fork to use, for example) and
> there are also matters inside the scope that are
> not decided (cell phones while driving was until
> about a year ago, and still is in most
> jurisdictions — including Missouri, alas). So,
> is {einai} about the first (outside the scope of
> the rules) or the second (not fixed within the
> rules)?
I'd say it could be either. We're not talking of any fixed and clear set of laws anyway. If the distinction is relevant, {ei cu'i} could be used for the "undecided" case.
> > .ei nai do tolnurcni > > You don't have to feel threatened. > > > The main question is whether it can be taken as a > reasonable reading of "freedom" (in this context, > as you have developed it, obviously the wrong > word).
Yes. As is "obligation" for "how things ought to be". The idea is:
ei: "I feel/consider things ought to be this way:" einai: "I feel/consider things need not be this way:"
> While it > is unclear what the original meant, this is > pretty clearly a change, even if a needed one.
Yes, in the case of {ei} a very old one, at least in my usage.
> If these are irrealis, > then they presumably don't deal with fait > accompli even negatively.
I didn't choose the title of the page. I don't think these words are, in general, irrealis markers. But in most cases (perhaps all) they are compatible with an irrealis marker and tend to be non-assertions.
> > > However, most of these, > > > while they make a lot more sense, are not > > > obviously what the standard list gives. > > > > {e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not > > really so'e > > but it is so'o, yes. > > Huh?! what do most and several have to do with > these items on either reading?
There were five items in the list, two of which are not obviously what the standard list gives. The other three, {e'a}, {e'o} and {e'u} are kept in perfect accordance with the standard list, so I was just objecting to your use of "most" there.
> <<> I would take {ie} to be a performative not a > > judgment. > > Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie go'i} > "I agree with that", as far as I can tell.>> > This hardly helps if what is {go'i}d is {e'u x} > example.
I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as response to an assertion. That's probably the most common use of {ie}.
> Otherwise, how does {i'e go'i} differ > from {ia go'i}, which seems also to occur?
I can't find any instances of {ia go'i}, but I would use it instead of {ie go'i} if the previous speaker was asking a question rather than making an assertion.
> <<> But then I tend to think of agreement > > and disagreement as about proposals, not about > > claims, responses to some {e'V} or other. > > That would probably fit {vi'o}.>> > > Well, at most in the case where what is given is > a command;
I've used and seen it used mostly as a response to a request. That's probably because in irc chat people don't usually go ordering each other about, but requests do happen.
> when negotiation is a possibility > (which it is even with some command forms) then > agreement is different from compliance (logically > and affectively)
Yes, but {ie} does not seem to be used that way. At least not in the great majority of cases.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 19:09 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > Well, this is a new usage (and I dread to
> think
> > how it came about — it is related to the old
> in
> > a peculiar way: despair that x = despair of
> > not-x).
>
> It's not an unnatural change though, I think
> this kind
> of polarity shifts is not all that rare with
> words that
> have a negative sense in them. It's interesting
> that
> none of the examples is the least bit
> ambiguous.
> I suspect this might be related to the loss of
> the
> subjunctive in English. "I despair that x" with
> a
> desirable (and unlikely, uncertain) x requires
> x to be
> in the subjunctive, whereas with an undesirable
>
> (and likely or certain) x the indicative will
> do just fine.
> Almost all the examples with desirable x's that
> I
> find contain "ever" as a subjunctive marker:
>
> I despair that there ever will be an end to it
> all.
>
> I despair that Microsoft will ever again play
> the
> part they so badly need to play in our
> industry:
>
> Sometimes I despair that I shall ever read the
> books I want to read
I now find the "despair that" with desired object bizarre, but easier to explain (the pattern from "hope"). In any event, the usage is too new to be affected by the loss of the subjunctive, which was long before the usage arose. Nor is "ever" particularly a mark of subjunctiveness. It is a mark of subordination (including to negation) like "any", say, in that it rarely (if ever) occurs in main clauses. And, in many languages -- but not in English even when subjunctives were more vigorous — subordinate clauses are often subjunctive, often regardless of meaning (English subjunctives seem to usually have been more meaning-driven). > > > It has not made it into any dictionary I > > could find. But, yes, it does offer just > the > > sort of thing you want: undesirable event > likely > > to occur (maybe not so strongly as fear that > -- > > or maybe more so insofar as the hope lost > carries > > over from the older form, which is, happily, > > still current). Given that the creators of > the > > original word list often use what I (and the > > dictionaries) think of as nonstandard > (indeed, > > substandard) usage ("disinterest" elsewhere > in > > the list, the inability to distinguish > between > > "Don" and "dawn" and so on) I suppose this is > > what they ahd in mind > > I don't know. I think what they had in mind is > that > {a'o} and {a'onai} were to express hope and > despair > and that was that, not that the accompanying > bridi > would describe the hoped for or dreaded > situation.
Well, the examples — what few there are — and the classification — as a propositional attitude (illegitimately so called from the original context for the phrase)-- and the warning not to confuse {a'o x} with {mi pacna le nu x} (and isn't the definition of {pacna} a disaster waiting to happen!) all suggest that the accompanying sentence is meant to be the object of the hope or whatever.
> — though a usage that is > > over twenty years old must have made it into > some > > dictionary or other (but my newest dictionary > is > > from the mid 90s). > > I don't know if dictionaries are that quick to > pick up > such usages. If I had to guess, I would say > this use > of "despair that" must be much older than > twenty years, > but I can't really justify my hunch. It is > certainly the > overwhelmingly prevalent one as found by > Google.
Nowadays, published dictionaries are only about five years out of date and online ones even less. By the way, the online dictionaries I could find all lack either usage, indeed, "despair that" altogether.
> > In any case, I suppose that
> > the affect and physiology of "despair that"
> is
>
> How do you figure out the physiology of a
> usage?
Well, it is meant to express an emotion (actually in ths case, amazingly) and that emotion has a certain affect and a corresponding physiological pattern (which nowadays largely "explains" the affect). Hope is an upper and a dose of seratonin; despair is a downer and a dose of whatever it is (GBA?) that counteracts seratonin. Fear (and dread?) are slightly down but more preparation for activity in terms of adrenalin and glucose.
> > like that of "despair of" and hence that > "fear > > that" (with a different affect and > physiology) > > is not an exact substitute. > > Nature abhors exact synonyms anyway. > > > I suggest "dread" > > for the key word -- > > I will add it, yes. > > > Well, I see no evidece that the old usage has > > disappeared or event decreased in frequency. > The > > new seems merely added on. > > In the "I dispair that x" form as found with > Google, the > undesirable x case is clearly prevalent, > although there > are cases of desirable x, almost always > containing the > word "ever".
But "despair that" is the new usage in question. Are there no longer any "despair of" cases to be had?
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 20:10 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko > > > Everything will be lost now. > > > > > > which mentions an undesirable event. > > > > This is the ambiguity of unextended "desire;" > I > > am reading it in the usual sense "despair > of", > > you in the rising one "despair that" and it > gives > > exactly opposite results with respect to the > > framing sentence. > > Ouch! How do you get "everything is lost" as a > desirable > thing?
Oops! That should be "despair", not "desire." Does that answer your question (which I otherwise don't understand, having lost the discussion that led up to the line cited).
> > > In most cases (moral, legal, etc.) there are > > things that fall outside the scope of the > rules > > (the law and which fork to use, for example) > and > > there are also matters inside the scope that > are > > not decided (cell phones while driving was > until > > about a year ago, and still is in most > > jurisdictions — including Missouri, alas). > So, > > is {einai} about the first (outside the scope > of > > the rules) or the second (not fixed within > the > > rules)? > > I'd say it could be either. We're not talking > of any > fixed and clear set of laws anyway. If the > distinction > is relevant, {ei cu'i} could be used for the > "undecided" > case.
So, the pattern you introduced for {ai} is being carried through more or less consistently.
> > > .ei nai do tolnurcni > > > You don't have to feel threatened. > > > > > The main question is whether it can be taken > as a > > reasonable reading of "freedom" (in this > context, > > as you have developed it, obviously the wrong > > word). > > Yes. As is "obligation" for "how things ought > to be". > The idea is: > > ei: "I feel/consider things ought to be this > way:" > einai: "I feel/consider things need not be this > way:"
OK, just checking (though both "obligation" and "freedom" are lousy word here — misleading at best). The book examples are pretty useless for deciding, since they are all first-person and so could be either my judgement or my obliging myself. The other words in the same series (unreliable as that is as a guideline) suggest that this is will and action oriented; that it is trying to put someone under an ob (in second and third person) to do something about the matter. Of course, it could be argued that this is inherent in judgments as well, so it may be that there is no real difference here.
> > While it > > is unclear what the original meant, this is > > pretty clearly a change, even if a needed > one. > > Yes, in the case of {ei} a very old one, at > least in my > usage. > > > If these are irrealis, > > then they presumably don't deal with fait > > accompli even negatively. > > I didn't choose the title of the page. I don't > think these > words are, in general, irrealis markers. But in > most cases > (perhaps all) they are compatible with an > irrealis marker > and tend to be non-assertions.
But, of course, "I didn't mean to hurt you" is, if not an assertion, then an apology and start of a defense, which again is very different from an intention. As noted, intentions (whatever is the case for the others — but it seems pretty much to carry through if we ignore a few things that problably shouldn't be on the list) are irrealis. You can't intend what is already the case and thus you cannot express an intention with regard to it. You can only report a previous intention -- which is what the English does. The Lojban is merely unintelligible.
> > > > However, most of these, > > > > while they make a lot more sense, are not > > > > obviously what the standard list gives. > > > > > > {e'e} and {e'i} in particular, which is not > > > really so'e > > > but it is so'o, yes. > > > > Huh?! what do most and several have to do > with > > these items on either reading? > > There were five items in the list, two of which > are not > obviously what the standard list gives. The > other three, > {e'a}, {e'o} and {e'u} are kept in perfect > accordance > with the standard list, so I was just objecting > to your > use of "most" there.
Ah. Well, I think your {ie} is a change as well, but that still does not make "most." I get impressed by the magnitude of the deviation and don't notice how it is distributed.
> > <<> I would take {ie} to be a performative > not a > > > judgment. > > > > Well, usage has consistently been as in {ie > go'i} > > "I agree with that", as far as I can tell.>> > > This hardly helps if what is {go'i}d is {e'u > x} > > example. > > I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as response > to an > assertion. That's probably the most common use > of {ie}.
I wonder why not {ia}. I also wonder how to accept a proposal.
> > Otherwise, how does {i'e go'i} differ > > from {ia go'i}, which seems also to occur? > > I can't find any instances of {ia go'i}, but I > would use > it instead of {ie go'i} if the previous speaker > was > asking a question rather than making an > assertion. > > > <<> But then I tend to think of agreement > > > and disagreement as about proposals, not > about > > > claims, responses to some {e'V} or other. > > > > That would probably fit {vi'o}.>> > > > > Well, at most in the case where what is given > is > > a command; > > I've used and seen it used mostly as a response > to > a request. That's probably because in irc chat > people > don't usually go ordering each other about, but > requests > do happen.
The issue (since commands and requests and petitions are all the same linguistically in Lojban) is what works with suggestions and other less direct directives.
> > when negotiation is a possibility > > (which it is even with some command forms) > then > > agreement is different from compliance > (logically > > and affectively) > > Yes, but {ie} does not seem to be used that > way. > At least not in the great majority of cases.
OK. Even the example in CLL can be read in your way, though it seems wasteful of space when there are so many items that were left out. The question of agreeing to a proposal remains as one of these. Compliance seems the wrong line altogether, if for not other reason that proposals need not take the form of getting the speaker to do something.
By the way. How does one promise in Lojban? Or sentence? Or proclaim (promulgate)? These ought all fit in here somewhere but don't obviously have a place in your system — or in the CLL version, come to that.
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 20:18 GMT On 8/12/05, John E Clifford wrote: > (and > isn't the definition of {pacna} a disaster > waiting to happen!)
Waiting to happen? It happened already:
> > How do you figure out the physiology of a > > usage? > > Well, it is meant to express an emotion (actually > in ths case, amazingly) and that emotion has a > certain affect and a corresponding physiological > pattern (which nowadays largely "explains" the > affect). Hope is an upper and a dose of > seratonin; despair is a downer and a dose of > whatever it is (GBA?) that counteracts seratonin. > Fear (and dread?) are slightly down but more > preparation for activity in terms of adrenalin > and glucose.
Thank god that was not in vogue twenty years ago or the place structure of {pacna} would have probably been: "x1 hopes/despairs/fears/dreads that x2, with serotonin level x3, adrenalin level x4 and glucose level x5". Phew!
> > In the "I dispair that x" form as found with > > Google, the > > undesirable x case is clearly prevalent, > > although there > > are cases of desirable x, almost always > > containing the > > word "ever". > > But "despair that" is the new usage in question. > Are there no longer any "despair of" cases to be had?
Oh, yes, plenty more than "despair that", but that one was never an issue.
In many cases it's despair of a thing or a person though, which doesn't really qualify as desirable or undesirable (although if pressed I would have to say they fall on the undesirable side: "I despair of the current state of radio") But when it's dispair *of an event happening*, it's always a desirable one, as far as I can tell.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 20:48 GMT On 8/12/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > I don't > > think these > > words are, in general, irrealis markers. But in > > most cases > > (perhaps all) they are compatible with an > > irrealis marker > > and tend to be non-assertions. > > But, of course, "I didn't mean to hurt you" is, > if not an assertion, then an apology and start of > a defense, which again is very different from an > intention.
Yes, it's different from an intention. {ainai} is meant to show lack of intention, not intention.
> As noted, intentions (whatever is the > case for the others — but it seems pretty much > to carry through if we ignore a few things that > problably shouldn't be on the list) are irrealis. > You can't intend what is already the case and > thus you cannot express an intention with regard > to it. You can only report a previous intention > — which is what the English does. The Lojban is > merely unintelligible.
I don't really see what is gained by imposing the irrealis condition, so prefer not to do it.
> > I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as response
> > to an
> > assertion. That's probably the most common use
> > of {ie}.
>
> I wonder why not {ia}.
Maybe because {ia} may carry religious overtones? Just guessing, I don't know. What I do know is that in my experience {ie} is used very frequently, and {ia} very rarely.
> I also wonder how to > accept a proposal.
{.i'a} probably.
> By the way. How does one promise in Lojban?
{nu'e}
> Or sentence?
As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.
> Or proclaim (promulgate)?
Same?
>These ought > all fit in here somewhere but don't obviously > have a place in your system — or in the CLL > version, come to that.
Most COIs should be in UI, as I often say.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 21:00 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > (and > > isn't the definition of {pacna} a disaster > > waiting to happen!) > > Waiting to happen? It happened already: >
Nice. Pacna still mixes hopes and desires, whihc, while "hope" implies desire, are very different in other respects. Hope has affect and physiological correlates, desire does not or very different ones, but there are other differences as well. Desire is unrelated to expectations, for example. And what ever happened to {djica} in all of this?
> > > How do you figure out the physiology of a
> > > usage?
> >
> > Well, it is meant to express an emotion
> (actually
> > in ths case, amazingly) and that emotion has
> a
> > certain affect and a corresponding
> physiological
> > pattern (which nowadays largely "explains"
> the
> > affect). Hope is an upper and a dose of
> > seratonin; despair is a downer and a dose of
> > whatever it is (GBA?) that counteracts
> seratonin.
> > Fear (and dread?) are slightly down but more
> > preparation for activity in terms of
> adrenalin
> > and glucose.
>
> Thank god that was not in vogue twenty years
> ago
> or the place structure of {pacna} would have
> probably
> been: "x1 hopes/despairs/fears/dreads that x2,
> with
> serotonin level x3, adrenalin level x4 and
> glucose
> level x5". Phew!
This stuff was around 20 years ago (indeed, 40, though not in as much detail) but happily it was not out in the popular literature yet (I had a course in loosely bio-epistemology in grad school to get what was to be had in the mid 60s). Otherwise, I fear that you would have been right. The numbers that there are on {pacna} — and {kanpe}are suspect enough. In any case this would not affect the UI; it was just a point about how emotions are more tricky than their logic would allow: "fear that" works logically but not really (and I don't know what is the norm in actual experience here or if both dread and despair are possible).
> > > In the "I dispair that x" form as found > with > > > Google, the > > > undesirable x case is clearly prevalent, > > > although there > > > are cases of desirable x, almost always > > > containing the > > > word "ever". > > > > But "despair that" is the new usage in > question. > > Are there no longer any "despair of" cases to > be had? > > Oh, yes, plenty more than "despair that", but > that one > was never an issue.
The point is that you can't just say that {ainai} means "despair" and expect folks to get to the right meaning since the two are so nearly opposite, with only the affect carrying over.
> In many cases it's despair of a thing or a > person though, > which doesn't really qualify as desirable or > undesirable > (although if pressed I would have to say they > fall on the > undesirable side: "I despair of the current > state of radio") > But when it's dispair *of an event happening*, > it's always > a desirable one, as far as I can tell.
On my general principle about desires and the like always being about events, I would take the the "despair of" and "despair for" with things as object as being shorthand for appropriate expressions about events involving those things, though I would hate to have to claim any particular expansion was correct.
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 21:19 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > I don't > > > think these > > > words are, in general, irrealis markers. > But in > > > most cases > > > (perhaps all) they are compatible with an > > > irrealis marker > > > and tend to be non-assertions. > > > > But, of course, "I didn't mean to hurt you" > is, > > if not an assertion, then an apology and > start of > > a defense, which again is very different from > an > > intention. > > Yes, it's different from an intention. {ainai} > is meant to > show lack of intention, not intention.
Presumably indicating lack of intention is only appropriate where indicating intention would be appropriate, It isn't for acknowledged past events.
> > As noted, intentions (whatever is the > > case for the others — but it seems pretty > much > > to carry through if we ignore a few things > that > > problably shouldn't be on the list) are > irrealis. > > You can't intend what is already the case and > > thus you cannot express an intention with > regard > > to it. You can only report a previous > intention > > — which is what the English does. The > Lojban is > > merely unintelligible. > > I don't really see what is gained by imposing > the > irrealis condition, so prefer not to do it.
It is not an imposition; it is the nature of intentions. Now, you may say that {ai} is about something other than intentions but then we will have to find something else to do for intentions and come up with something else for {ai} that can be fit plausibly around the given definitions for {ai}.
> > > > I mean {ie go'i}, or a simple {ie}, as > response > > > to an > > > assertion. That's probably the most common > use > > > of {ie}. > > > > I wonder why not {ia}. > > Maybe because {ia} may carry religious > overtones? > Just guessing, I don't know. What I do know is > that > in my experience {ie} is used very frequently, > and {ia} > very rarely. > > > I also wonder how to > > accept a proposal. > > {.i'a} probably.
Wrong kind of acceptance if "blame" is vaguely right for the negative form (want "rejection" or some such).
> > By the way. How does one promise in Lojban? > > {nu'e}
How strange that that is in COI while so many
related notions are in UI. I wonder how that
works.
> > Or sentence? > > As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.
Certainly not if "I define" is at all aaccurate
(though I have to admit I have trouble seeing
this as useful for anyone but a logician most of
the time). Sentencing — and promulgating to go
to the next case — involve a web of rights and
duties that go far beyond anything that
defintions can ever involve.
> > Or proclaim (promulgate)?
>
> Same?
Maybe, but not {ca'e}.
> >These ought > > all fit in here somewhere but don't obviously > > have a place in your system — or in the CLL > > version, come to that. > > Most COIs should be in UI, as I often say.
Well, {nu'e} pretty clearly is and, of course, an irrealis one at that.
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 21:21 GMT On 8/12/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > Otherwise, I fear that you would have been right.
Hmm... I wonder how we would say that in Lojban? Perhaps something like:
a'o nai va'o nai ku da'i do drani
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 12 of Aug., 2005 21:30 GMT On 8/12/05, John E Clifford wrote:
> > > I also wonder how to > > > accept a proposal. > > > > {.i'a} probably. > > Wrong kind of acceptance if "blame" is vaguely > right for the negative form (want "rejection" or > some such).
Yes, I pushed "blame" out of first place anyway:
.i'a (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express acceptance / acknowledgement / admission / assent / consent / acquiescence / conformity / satisfaction (cf. selmansa, nalpro, no'epro, nalzugjdi, fi'i) .i'a ta banzu Okay, that will do.
.i'a nai (UI*1)
Attitudinal. Used to express refusal / rejection / eschewal /
resistance / dissatisfaction / blame / incrimination / inculpation
(cf. tolselmansa, fi'i nai)
.i'a nai ta mi za'o na mansa
No, that still doesn't satisfy me.
> > > Or sentence?
> >
> > As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}.
>
> Certainly not if "I define" is at all aaccurate
It isn't very. Here is Arnt's proposed expanded definition:
ca'e (UI2) Evidential. Used to mark a performative/speech act, that is, an utterance that is true because the speaker says so. See also the preface.
Not that I would call it an evidential, but anyway it's better than "I define".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Sat 13 of Aug., 2005 00:35 GMT posts: 2388
> On 8/12/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > > I also wonder how to > > > > accept a proposal. > > > > > > {.i'a} probably. > > > > Wrong kind of acceptance if "blame" is > vaguely > > right for the negative form (want "rejection" > or > > some such). > > Yes, I pushed "blame" out of first place > anyway: > > .i'a (UI1) > Attitudinal. Used to express acceptance / > acknowledgement / admission > / assent / consent / acquiescence / conformity > / satisfaction (cf. > selmansa, nalpro, no'epro, nalzugjdi, fi'i) > .i'a ta banzu > Okay, that will do. > > > .i'a nai (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to express refusal / > rejection / eschewal / > resistance / dissatisfaction / blame / > incrimination / inculpation > (cf. tolselmansa, fi'i nai) > .i'a nai ta mi za'o na mansa > No, that still doesn't satisfy me. > These look to be a pretty mixed bag of things some of which maybe go together though still different, others of which don't fit in at all (different logics as well as different affects or whatever). But that is a prima facie judgment; I'll give it some time and thought. > > > > Or sentence? > > > > > > As in "I hearby declare"? {ca'e}. > > > > Certainly not if "I define" is at all > aaccurate > > It isn't very. Here is Arnt's proposed expanded > definition: > > ca'e (UI2) > Evidential. Used to mark a performative/speech > act, > that is, an utterance that is true because the > speaker > says so. See also the preface. > > Not that I would call it an evidential, but > anyway it's > better than "I define"
I suppose evidential in the slightly scewed sense its used here, but it does seem to cry out for another category: "performstive speech acts" springs to mind (and drags {nu'e}in and probably some others. Still, "I believe it is true because I say so" makes somewhat the same kind of sense as "I believe it true because I saw it/heard it from Bertel Isaac/deduced it from other stuff" and is often actually used by people who are actually in a position to do world-creating acts, mainly parents (and sargeants).
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Posted by Anonymous on Sat 13 of Aug., 2005 19:11 GMT ai, au, a'o ... and a'i
Let's consider three features that ai, au and a'o might be taken to indicate: desirable (D+) / undesirable (D-), under-control (C+) / not-under-control (C-), and likely (L+) / unlikely (L-).
Let's then define:
ai: D+ C+ L+ ainai: D- C+ L+ a'o: D+ C- L+ a'onai: D- C- L+ au: D+ C- L- aunai: D- C- L-
What {nai} does is turn desirable into undesirable, leaving the control and likelihood features unchanged.
The two remaining combinations happen to fit {a'i} and {a'inai} pretty well, so I'm bringing those from the "realis" to the "irrealis" camp. (This is not really a big deal because CLL has them classified as "propositional attitudes" too.)
The two remaining combinations then are:
a'i: D+ C+ L- a'inai: D- C+ L-
The positive forms are thus all D+, and the nai-forms are all D-.
{ai} and {a'i} are the C+ forms, and {au and a'o} the C-. {ai} and {a'o} are the L+ forms and {au} and {a'i} the L- ones.
"Likely" and "unlikely" are not to be taken in an absolute sense, but relative to each other. "Unlikely" includes the impossible (incompatible with reality) case, and "likely" includes the certain or actual case.
There are still some issues though. I'm not too sure what aunai (D-C-L-) would amount to.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Sat 13 of Aug., 2005 20:28 GMT posts: 2388
> ai, au, a'o ... and a'i > > Let's consider three features that ai, au and > a'o might be taken > to indicate: desirable (D+) / undesirable (D-), > under-control (C+) / > not-under-control (C-), and likely (L+) / > unlikely (L-). > > Let's then define: > > ai: D+ C+ L+ ainai: D- C+ L+ > a'o: D+ C- L+ a'onai: D- C- L+ > au: D+ C- L- aunai: D- C- L- > > What {nai} does is turn desirable into > undesirable, leaving the > control and likelihood features unchanged.
As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all correct for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at all in its realization. We can desire the inevitable as well as the impossible and anything in between. It is probably also the case that control is not a part of the definition; indeed, one expect that, if "desire" is correct in both places {au} is simply D+. Of course, we might take the "-" to mean "irrelevant" or some such thing, but that doesn't fit the C of {a'o}, nor the L of {ai}, where the likelihood is again not important. And, of course, fits none of the D-s.
> The two remaining combinations happen to fit > {a'i} and {a'inai} pretty > well, so I'm bringing those from the "realis" > to the "irrealis" camp. > (This is not really a big deal because CLL has > them classified > as "propositional attitudes" too.) > > The two remaining combinations then are: > > a'i: D+ C+ L- a'inai: D- C+ L-
This is a change in {a'i nai}, since it is hard to see this combination as "repose" in any sense. Or is it? "Not going to make an effort" is, I suppose, one way of looking at it and could fit both slots ({a'inai} and "repose").
> The positive forms are thus all D+, and the > nai-forms are all D-. > > {ai} and {a'i} are the C+ forms, and {au and > a'o} the C-. > {ai} and {a'o} are the L+ forms and {au} and > {a'i} the L- ones. > > "Likely" and "unlikely" are not to be taken in > an absolute > sense, but relative to each other. "Unlikely" > includes the impossible > (incompatible with reality) case, and "likely" > includes the certain > or actual case. > > There are still some issues though. I'm not too > sure what aunai (D-C-L-) > would amount to.
The Ds work throughout (with some appropriate version of what {a'inai} means. The C in {au} doesn't belong unless "-" means "irrelevant" and likewise the L, which also irrelevant for at least {ai}.
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Posted by Anonymous on Sat 13 of Aug., 2005 21:55 GMT On 8/13/05, John E Clifford wrote: > As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all correct > for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at all in > its realization. We can desire the inevitable as > well as the impossible and anything in between. > It is probably also the case that control is not > a part of the definition; indeed, one expect > that, if "desire" is correct in both places {au} > is simply D+.
Right.
The difference between our approaches seems to be that you are concentrating on the English keyword and its nuances for each individual word on its own, whereas I'm trying to look at all the words together and use the English keywords as mere signposts that may not be all that accurate.
The detailed semantics of the word "desire" doesn't really interest me here. As I said, I'm taking {au} to indicate a wish, as in "oh that it were so". If "desire" is not the ideal keyword for that, that's too bad. Maybe what I'm proposing is not the optimum meaning for {au} either, but at least I'm trying to figure out how it all fits together.
> Of course, we might take the "-" > to mean "irrelevant" or some such thing, but that > doesn't fit the C of {a'o}, nor the L of {ai}, > where the likelihood is again not important.
Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. In both cases they indicate the goal of the actions of the speaker, suggested by "desirable, under-control". The difference is that with intention the speaker finds the achievement of the goal more certain or likely wheras with attempt/effort success is not taken for granted, and it is at least comparatively unlikely.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Tue 16 of Aug., 2005 15:16 GMT posts: 2388 Ok. So "desire" is the wrong word; I suggest "wish" (as in "wishful thinking") for the psoitive side. Nothing suggests itself for the negative: maybe "worry" in its most pejorative sense. On the whole, think the idea of fitting these notions into sstematic groujpings is a good idea. May this set be the harbinger and pattern of many more.
> On 8/13/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all
> correct
> > for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at
> all in
> > its realization. We can desire the
> inevitable as
> > well as the impossible and anything in
> between.
> > It is probably also the case that control is
> not
> > a part of the definition; indeed, one expect
> > that, if "desire" is correct in both places
> {au}
> > is simply D+.
>
> Right.
>
> The difference between our approaches seems to
> be that you
> are concentrating on the English keyword and
> its nuances
> for each individual word on its own, whereas
> I'm trying to look
> at all the words together and use the English
> keywords as mere
> signposts that may not be all that accurate.
>
> The detailed semantics of the word "desire"
> doesn't really
> interest me here. As I said, I'm taking {au} to
> indicate
> a wish, as in "oh that it were so". If "desire"
> is not the ideal
> keyword for that, that's too bad. Maybe what
> I'm proposing
> is not the optimum meaning for {au} either, but
> at least I'm
> trying to figure out how it all fits together.
>
> > Of course, we might take the "-"
> > to mean "irrelevant" or some such thing, but
> that
> > doesn't fit the C of {a'o}, nor the L of
> {ai},
> > where the likelihood is again not important.
>
> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at
> least) to be the
> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. In both
> cases they indicate
> the goal of the actions of the speaker,
> suggested by "desirable,
> under-control". The difference is that with
> intention the
> speaker finds the achievement of the goal more
> certain or
> likely wheras with attempt/effort success is
> not taken for
> granted, and it is at least comparatively
> unlikely.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>
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arj Posted by arj on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:07 GMT posts: 953 On Sat, 13 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/13/05, John E Clifford wrote: >> As noted earlier, if "desire" is at all correct >> for {au}, then likelihood plays no role at all in >> its realization. We can desire the inevitable as >> well as the impossible and anything in between. >> It is probably also the case that control is not >> a part of the definition; indeed, one expect >> that, if "desire" is correct in both places {au} >> is simply D+. > > Right. > > The difference between our approaches seems to be that you > are concentrating on the English keyword and its nuances > for each individual word on its own, whereas I'm trying to look > at all the words together and use the English keywords as mere > signposts that may not be all that accurate.
I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a few poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not seem to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look at it holistically.
> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the > distinction between {ai} and {a'i}.
This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302 ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Evan, a Quiz Bowl reject, nevertheless knows more than what's good for him. The son of deposed royalty from some obscure nation whose name is probably only known to himself, Evan is the life of the party when the party's over. — Leon Lin: Kissing the Buddha's Feet
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:07 GMT On 8/18/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a few > poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not seem > to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look at it > holistically.
If you can fathom their intentions from a holistic perspective, please do explain them.
> > Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the > > distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. > > This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302 > ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").
Why not? I added it as an example precisely because I thought it did. If it's hard for me to wake you up, it means that your waking up is relatively unlikely, not a given, despite mi intentions, doesn't it? In other words, I'll do my best but the result is not guaranteed.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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arj Posted by arj on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:08 GMT posts: 953 On Thu, 18 Aug 2005, Jorge Llambas wrote:
> On 8/18/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >> I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a few >> poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not seem >> to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look at it >> holistically. > > If you can fathom their intentions from a holistic perspective, > please do explain them.
Very well.
I believe that the attitudinal system was designed as a bag of loose senses with no interconnection, selected based on their perceived usefulness.
To quote the CLL, section 13.6, p 306:
> The Lojban attitudinal system was designed by starting with a long list > of English emotion words, far too many to fit into the 39 available > VV-form cmavo. To keep the number of cmavo limited, the emotion words in > the list were grouped together by common features: each group was then > assigned a separate cmavo. This was like making tanru in reverse, and > the result is a collection of indicators that can be combined, like > tanru, to express very complex emotions.
>>> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the >>> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. >> >> This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302 >> ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up"). > > Why not? I added it as an example precisely because > I thought it did. If it's hard for me to wake you up, it means > that your waking up is relatively unlikely, not a given, > despite mi intentions, doesn't it? In other words, I'll do my > best but the result is not guaranteed.
My interpretation was that your waking up is a given, but this fact is associated with a feeling of the excertion of effort.
But since the CLL groups it along with propositional indicators, and that the available usage could be interpreted either way, I'm willing to concede on this point.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Keyboard: The Ultimate Input Device
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:08 GMT On 8/23/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > To quote the CLL, section 13.6, p 306: > > > The Lojban attitudinal system was designed by starting with a long list > > of English emotion words, far too many to fit into the 39 available > > VV-form cmavo. To keep the number of cmavo limited, the emotion words in > > the list were grouped together by common features: each group was then > > assigned a separate cmavo.
It would be quite useful to see the original list. I wonder if anyone has it or remembers where it was taken from.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:08 GMT Jorge Llambías scripsit:
> It would be quite useful to see the original list. I wonder > if anyone has it or remembers where it was taken from.
If it's anywhere it's in the LeChevaliers' basement, probably in hard copy.
-- John Cowan jcowan@reutershealth.com www.reutershealth.com www.ccil.org/~cowan It's the old, old story. Droid meets droid. Droid becomes chameleon. Droid loses chameleon, chameleon becomes blob, droid gets blob back again. It's a classic tale. --Kryten, Red Dwarf
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Posted by pycyn on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:08 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> Jorge Llambías scripsit: > > > It would be quite useful to see the original > list. I wonder > > if anyone has it or remembers where it was > taken from. > > If it's anywhere it's in the LeChevaliers' > basement, probably in hard copy.
It might be recomstructable. My guess (recollection?)is that a large part of it came from a topical thesaurus (not a dictionary one) and the words listed under "Emotion" or "Feeling" or so. there may have been other sources, but I believe this was a main one.
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Posted by lojbab on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:09 GMT posts: 162 I spotted this in response to Robin's call for assistance, and am not sure of the context.
Jorge Llambas wrote: > On 8/23/05, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: >>To quote the CLL, section 13.6, p 306: >> >>>The Lojban attitudinal system was designed by starting with a long list >>>of English emotion words, far too many to fit into the 39 available >>>VV-form cmavo. To keep the number of cmavo limited, the emotion words in >>>the list were grouped together by common features: each group was then >>>assigned a separate cmavo. > > It would be quite useful to see the original list. I wonder > if anyone has it or remembers where it was taken from.
I dunno if it is useful, but a bit of digging uncovered the 2nd step in this process, which was the attempt to group attitudes together by properties, before we considered how to assign the VVs to those attitudes.
At this point, we had clearly decided on the use of two extremes and a middle/neutral position, and we had come up with the 5 (now 6) classifiers (social, physical, sexual) to simplify the list
The first step was a big long list of probably 200-odd emotion words written down as they came to mind over a week or two. As those words were put onto the 2nd step list, they were crossed off, and I have no particular reason to believe that we saved the list of entirely scribbled out words.
This second list is pretty scribbly too, though I can read it all. All squeezed into one sheet with 5-6 problem "attitudes" listed on the back that we had not decided were fully dealt with.
The work is undated, but there is a date clue in some transactions I needed to enter into the balance data base. Based on these, I'd guess this list was made in Sep 88 or Sept 89; I could determine which by looking up the transactions that were entered.
lojbab
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Posted by lojbab on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:09 GMT posts: 162 John E Clifford wrote: > --- "John.Cowan" > wrote: >>Jorge Llambas scripsit: >> >>>It would be quite useful to see the original >>list. I wonder >>>if anyone has it or remembers where it was >>taken from. >> >>If it's anywhere it's in the LeChevaliers' >>basement, probably in hard copy. > > > It might be recomstructable. My guess > (recollection?)is that a large part of it came > from a topical thesaurus (not a dictionary one) > and the words listed under "Emotion" or "Feeling" > or so. there may have been other sources, but I > believe this was a main one.
Actually, the original list was a group-grope by a half-dozen prospective Lojban students in New Jersey at Art Wieners's house. That was where the original idea of expanding and systematizing the attitudinals was suggested. Then Nora and I added to the list at home, possibly indeed by looking in a thesaurus among other places. I also went to the library once, and looked for books or articles on emotion, and I recall reading something in Psychology Today on someone else's attempt to classify emotions, that made me feel that we were doing something good. Actually attempting to systematize the list added to the list, as we tried to think of opposites and neutrals. If we came up with multiple scales, we selected one, and added the others to the list to be dealt with.
The concept of realis/irrealis had I think come up a bit before this, though not using those words. I believe that when I visited him in Oct 1986(?), PC explained a possible grouping of the old set of attitudinals in terms of "possible worlds", and I think I have some notes on that somewhere, possible in correspondence from PC (though I might be remembering conversations from that visit or from his appearances at LogFests). I know his classification informed our assignment of cmavo to some extent, though we found it difficult to match the new list with PC's formulation.
lojbab
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Posted by lojbab on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:09 GMT posts: 162 Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > I must agree with PC here. This does not seem so much as an issue of a > few poorly chosen signpost keywords, but a featural model that does not > seem to fit the intentions of the originators very well, even if we look > at it holistically. > >> Likelihood is what I'm taking (for now at least) to be the >> distinction between {ai} and {a'i}. > > This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302 > ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up").
I am intentionally NOT reading CLL and the byfy page before addressing this, since the question is the original intent of the originators (i.e. me). I am looking at the draft list, though ity doesn't exactly match the final cmavo list scales.
1. There is no particular relationship implied between ai and a'i just because they use the same letters. We had to squeeze the scales in, and couldn't be too picky.
2. The classic a'i might be used by a worker exerting themselves at a task. The extreme of a'inai is non-effort or an avoidance of effort. I have the word "laziness" down on the negative side along with repose, as the opposite of effort. Passivity might be the term used in a sexual context. No effort to interact in a social context (we always tried to look at these words using the 5 ro'V groupings in trying to interpret them. I hope that Jorge (or whoever) is considering the current 6 groupings in formalizing the definitions, because they are important in achieving the fullest expressive/definitional scope, even if people don't use them much these days.
3. Intent (ai) has nothing at all to do with whether one is making any significant effort to bring that which is intended about. I could use "ai" in a discussion about interplanetary exploration, even though there isn't much I could do to bring it about, effort-wise.
4. ai is distinguished from a'o in that a'o suggests to me a more personal emotional investment in the proposition. a'o is thus close to au - neither a'o nor au suggests in the slightest to me that the speaker necessarily would do anything about it. ai suggests that the speaker might do something to bring it about, but does not necessarily require any personal effort in that direction - a commander giving orders might use ai, but would not use a'i if the commander was not himself involved in bringing the result about.
The example above quoted from CLL seems not especially indicative of any of the attitudinals. > This interpretation does not seem to fit well with example 3.4, p 302 > ("It'll be hard for me to wake you up"). though that might be because the example has been distanced in time from any actual effort.
"Boy, are you hard to wake up" does suggest that the speaker has or is making some effort. "I've tried to wake you up, but you don't want to respond, and I've got to get ready for work myself" might be an a'icu'i. "Go set your alarm yourself if you want to get up; don't expect any help from me" is an a'inai response.
In the mental arena, a'iro'e is someone striving mightily to work out the problems on the examination. a'icu'iro'e is the expression s/he might uses when the problem is done as well as the speaker intends. a'inaicairo'e is used by someone who answers randomly on a multiple choice question without even reading the problem, or who skips the problem because even a random answer is too much effort. Social and sexual effort is understood in terms of activity/passivity. Physical effort should be self-explanatory. Emotional effort, I think of as a sort of angst.
One can expend considerable effort on a process without necessarily having a particular intent or desire for any particular outcome for that process.
a'oro'e I have confused the issue enough for one post.
lojbab
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 19:09 GMT On 9/6/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > > a'oro'e I have confused the issue enough for one post.
I don't have any major objections to what you say here.
The most contentious issue about these words was on the meaning of {ai nai}, in particular, whether it could be used to indicate "unintentionality", as in for example:
.ai nai do pu se xrani Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by lojbab on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 22:59 GMT posts: 162 Jorge Llambas wrote: > On 9/6/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: >>a'oro'e I have confused the issue enough for one post. > > I don't have any major objections to what you say here.
How rare! zo'o
> The most contentious issue about these words was > on the meaning of {ai nai}, in particular, whether it > could be used to indicate "unintentionality", as in > for example: > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...
The thing to remember is that attitudinals are immediate emotional expressions, and I think it is rare that they will be used in a past-tense expression, except when one is explicitly recalling (ba'anai) and even then the ba'a may render tense unnecessary (unless we've concocted some elaborate time-travel scenario).
I thus wouldn't expect that "pu" to be in there.
do se xrani .ainai You're hurt! I didn't mean it!
Now if you are trying to reconcile this with the keywords, then you still have to take into account that this is referring to a past tense event (being hurt). It doesn't make sense to refuse to perform something that you already did, and the keywords thus cannot apply as they are.
Now if you are trying to reassure a child about to ride a roller coaster, you might say
.ainai do (ba) se xrani I won't let you get hurt.
And that makes more sense in terms of the keyword of "refusal".
And if I was wearing my "original intent" hat and disagreeing with you, I might use ainai in "rejection" of a definition that you were proposing.
For the context of the byfy work, I would hope that all of the definitions are being expanded considerably from one word keywords, and I will not object just because this results in examples inconsistent with the keywords, provided that there is an expanded definition that is coherent, and consistent with the times when the keyword might in fact apply. English doesn't have a true set of attitudinals and there are no true keywords for many of them - they cover tone of voice, facial expression, and interjections that outside of the context are indistinguishable from others.
As Nora says, most of the attitudinals have as their best literal translation "Oh" or "Ah", with only punctuation used to make the minimal distinctions possible in print. (Nora did note that for a'i - effort the English expression would more likely be something like "Oof" - the sound one might make when making a sudden exertion %^)
But those would neither be definitional, or unique for purposes of LogFlash, and it is important to realize that the keywords were created for LogFlash, not to serve in lieu of a dictionary, though of course we've had 15 years where that is in fact what has happened.
lojbab
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 23:07 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 07:05:06PM -0400, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > >The most contentious issue about these words was on the meaning > >of {ai nai}, in particular, whether it could be used to indicate > >"unintentionality", as in for example: > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ...
The objection is that it conflicts with the ma'oste and CLL for no good reason.
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 23:34 GMT On 9/7/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > I don't have any major objections to what you say here. > > How rare! zo'o
I had lots of _minor_ objections that I started to write, but in the end decided they were not worth pursuing. :-)
> > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ... > > The thing to remember is that attitudinals are immediate emotional > expressions, and I think it is rare that they will be used in a > past-tense expression, except when one is explicitly recalling (ba'anai) > and even then the ba'a may render tense unnecessary (unless we've > concocted some elaborate time-travel scenario).
In this case, the hurting has already happened (if at all, it is not actually claimed, but the occasion for it happening was in the past). Doesn't the "Oops" suggest that the event is very recent and fresh in the speaker's mind?
> I thus wouldn't expect that "pu" to be in there. > > do se xrani .ainai > You're hurt! I didn't mean it!
That would work too, yes. Are you saying that it would be incorrect to use {pu} there? Can {ai nai} never accompany a past event, in your opinion?
> Now if you are trying to reconcile this with the keywords, then you
> still have to take into account that this is referring to a past tense
> event (being hurt). It doesn't make sense to refuse to perform
> something that you already did, and the keywords thus cannot apply as
> they are.
Right. That's why this one is controversial: I'm proposing to change the keywords.
> Now if you are trying to reassure a child about to ride a roller > coaster, you might say > > .ainai do (ba) se xrani > I won't let you get hurt. > > And that makes more sense in terms of the keyword of "refusal".
For that meaning you could say {ai do na (ba) se xrani}. The keywords do indeed suggest identifying {ai nai} with {ai na}, but I think that's not the normal pattern for attitudinals.
> And if I was wearing my "original intent" hat and disagreeing with you, > I might use ainai in "rejection" of a definition that you were proposing.
Wouldn't {.i'a nai} be better for that? The opposite of "acceptance"?
> For the context of the byfy work, I would hope that all of the > definitions are being expanded considerably from one word keywords, and > I will not object just because this results in examples inconsistent > with the keywords, provided that there is an expanded definition that is > coherent, and consistent with the times when the keyword might in fact > apply.
Have you had a chance to look at the expanded proposed definitions?
> As Nora says, most of the attitudinals have as their best literal > translation "Oh" or "Ah", with only punctuation used to make the minimal > distinctions possible in print.
Yes those are very vague, but there are others (somewhat) more specific, like "aha!", "whoa!", "yaaawn!", "yuck!", "yay!", "ouch!", "wow!", "snif", etc. which even if they are not a perfect fit for Lojban's they do approximate some of them.
> (Nora did note that for a'i - effort > the English expression would more likely be something like "Oof" - the > sound one might make when making a sudden exertion %^)
Right, but even according to the CLL example, {a'i} need not be about a _current_ effort. It simply indicates that the speaker has some sort of control over the event, that they attempt to bring it about, but that it is not at all a given that they succeed, precisely because an effort is involved.
> But those would neither be definitional, or unique for purposes of > LogFlash, and it is important to realize that the keywords were created > for LogFlash, not to serve in lieu of a dictionary, though of course > we've had 15 years where that is in fact what has happened.
Yes. Some of the keywords are very transparent, but others have given people headaches trying to figure out how they could possibly fit.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 23:43 GMT On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > > Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > > > I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ... > > The objection is that it conflicts with the ma'oste and CLL for no > good reason.
Or, depending on you point of view, for the very good reasons that:
{nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the bridi that the attitudinal modifies.
rejection/refusal is already handled much better by other words (i'anai/vi'onai)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 07 of Sep., 2005 23:49 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani Oops! I didn't mean for you to get > > > > hurt. > > > > > > I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. > > > But ... > > > > The objection is that it conflicts with the ma'oste and CLL for > > no good reason. > > Or, depending on you point of view, for the very good reasons > that: > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the bridi > that the attitudinal modifies.
This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your* definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old ones are not. I don't buy the snuti vs. to'e snuti thing; "intentional" is not the opposite of "accidental" to me. I don't think that Englaish has a word for the opposite of accidental, but it would be something like "intended and achieved successfully".
> * rejection/refusal is already handled much better by other words > (i'anai/vi'onai)
"blame" is very different from refusal to do something. vi'o nai is pretty close, though.
I don't call either of those reasons "very good"; I call them tinkering.
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 00:58 GMT On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the bridi > > that the attitudinal modifies. > > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your* > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old > ones are not.
I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.
> I don't buy the snuti vs. to'e snuti thing; > "intentional" is not the opposite of "accidental" to me. I don't > think that Englaish has a word for the opposite of accidental, but > it would be something like "intended and achieved successfully".
This page: gives "designed, intended, intentional, planned, premeditated" as antonyms of "accidental". Sounds right to me.
> > * rejection/refusal is already handled much better by other words > > (i'anai/vi'onai) > > "blame" is very different from refusal to do something.
Yes. I was thinking of "rejection" as the opposite of "acceptance" rather than of the keyword "blame".
> vi'o nai is pretty close, though.
Yes, I think {vi'o nai} is "refusal".
> I don't call either of those reasons "very good"; I call them > tinkering.
I know, that's why I said "depending on your point of view".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by lojbab on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 03:04 GMT posts: 162 Jorge Llambas wrote: > On 9/7/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: >>Jorge Llambas wrote: >>> .ai nai do pu se xrani >>> Oops! I didn't mean for you to get hurt. >> >>I don't have a problem with it from an attitudinal standpoint. But ... >> >>The thing to remember is that attitudinals are immediate emotional >>expressions, and I think it is rare that they will be used in a >>past-tense expression, except when one is explicitly recalling (ba'anai) >>and even then the ba'a may render tense unnecessary (unless we've >>concocted some elaborate time-travel scenario). > > In this case, the hurting has already happened (if at all, it is not > actually claimed, but the occasion for it happening was in the past). > Doesn't the "Oops" suggest that the event is very recent and fresh in the > speaker's mind? > >>I thus wouldn't expect that "pu" to be in there. >> >>do se xrani .ainai >>You're hurt! I didn't mean it! > > That would work too, yes. Are you saying that it would be incorrect to use > {pu} there? Can {ai nai} never accompany a past event, in your opinion?
I could never say never, but I think that *I* would be unlikely to use a one. To me, the essence of attitudinals are immediate and present tense, and the sorts of things I would express a reactive attitudinal about would be as observative-like as possible in expression.
I guess one can have a tensed observative, but a place where I would use one doesn't come to mind.
There are other attitudinals that are more reflective than reactive, and they might be used with tensed statements. There is no prescriptive force to a division between reactive and reflective attitudinal usages, but it is a distinction that comes to mind when I try to concoct examples, such that my mind resists using the kinds I consider reactive in a reflective context. I would be more likely to predicate my reaction in such sentences than to express it as an attitudinal.
>>Now if you are trying to reconcile this with the keywords, then you >>still have to take into account that this is referring to a past tense >>event (being hurt). It doesn't make sense to refuse to perform >>something that you already did, and the keywords thus cannot apply as >>they are. > > Right. That's why this one is controversial: I'm proposing to change > the keywords.
I'd prefer addition to change, but do what you have to do, and I personally will be more flexible on attitudinal keywords than other areas of the language, because I know that our first cut was very ad hoc. If there is no known contradictory usage, that would be more of a plus.
>>Now if you are trying to reassure a child about to ride a roller >>coaster, you might say >> >>.ainai do (ba) se xrani >>I won't let you get hurt. >> >>And that makes more sense in terms of the keyword of "refusal". > > For that meaning you could say {ai do na (ba) se xrani}. > The keywords do indeed suggest identifying {ai nai} with {ai na}, > but I think that's not the normal pattern for attitudinals.
There are several attitudinals where the nai could be replaced by an appropriate negation, with ianai and ienai being the classic examples. If you've managed to deal with those (I haven't looked), I suspect that ainai should be handled similarly.
>>And if I was wearing my "original intent" hat and disagreeing with you, >>I might use ainai in "rejection" of a definition that you were proposing. > > Wouldn't {.i'a nai} be better for that? The opposite of "acceptance"?
Hmm. The difference for me between acceptance and intent is a matter of degree, but moreover of willingness to act on my reaction. Saying .i'anai doesn't necessarily to me imply active refusal. I can see where others might use it though.
>>For the context of the byfy work, I would hope that all of the >>definitions are being expanded considerably from one word keywords, and >>I will not object just because this results in examples inconsistent >>with the keywords, provided that there is an expanded definition that is >>coherent, and consistent with the times when the keyword might in fact >>apply. > > Have you had a chance to look at the expanded proposed definitions?
I looked the beginning of the irrealis page and then I realized that I should answer your questions about "original intent" untainted by what has been written later, by you or by CLL.
My very-spotty contributions in this effort are not up to the sorts of careful analysis under time pressure that byfy is doing, so in the interest of keeping my stress level down, and also to keep from enraging Robin again, I am trying to stay out of the actual byfy process, except as needed to speak for original intent.
Nora is more willing to give opinions on such things, but has even less time to actually write them up.
>>(Nora did note that for a'i - effort >>the English expression would more likely be something like "Oof" - the >>sound one might make when making a sudden exertion %^) > > Right, but even according to the CLL example, {a'i} need not be about > a _current_ effort. It simply indicates that the speaker has some > sort of control over the event, that they attempt to bring it about, > but that it is not at all a given that they succeed, precisely because > an effort is involved.
That's a plausible argument, and one I would probably accept as an addition to a core definition that explicates the usage. But I don't think that is the core meaning, and thus it might mislead if there isn't a more normal usage first.
>>But those would neither be definitional, or unique for purposes of >>LogFlash, and it is important to realize that the keywords were created >>for LogFlash, not to serve in lieu of a dictionary, though of course >>we've had 15 years where that is in fact what has happened. > > Yes. Some of the keywords are very transparent, but others have given > people headaches trying to figure out how they could possibly fit.
Feel free to ask questions (you might want to ask me privately if I don't seem to be answering the thread - I tune out the byfy most of the time, since I remain overcommitted to other pursuits that I let slide for 17 years). I can't remember how thoroughly I reviewed Cowan's effort before CLL was published, so I can imagine that there are some areas of confusion. I can at least say what I intended, and in the case of attitudinals, may even be able to come up with examples (or Nora can).
lojbab
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 08:36 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > > > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies. > > > > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your* > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old > > ones are not. > > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}.
You keep saying that, but you keep supporting a definition that means exactly that, as far as I can tell. It's very confusing.
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 14:21 GMT On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > To me, the essence of attitudinals are immediate and present > tense, and the sorts of things I would express a reactive attitudinal > about would be as observative-like as possible in expression.
What do you think about things like:
ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei Whee! John will visit us tomorrow!
ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940 Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940!
It seems to me that one thing is the tense of the event one is reacting to, and a different thing is the attitude. I don't see a problem in showing attitudes towards past or future events, actual or potential.
> I guess one can have a tensed observative, but a place where I would use > one doesn't come to mind.
If by "observative" you mean something you are observing, it doesn't seem possible it could be tensed. It could be aspectual: {pu'o farlu} "It's about to fall!", or {ba'o porpi} "It's broken!", but it always has to be nau, the speaker's here & now.
If by "observative" you mean a bridi without an explicit x1, then of course it is possible to say things like {ba carvi ca le bavlamdei} "It will rain tomorrow", and there is no problem as far as I can tell in showing an attitude there: {oi ba carvi ca le bavlamdei}.
> > The keywords do indeed suggest identifying {ai nai} with {ai na},
> > but I think that's not the normal pattern for attitudinals.
>
> There are several attitudinals where the nai could be replaced by an
> appropriate negation, with ianai and ienai being the classic examples.
{ie nai broda} (disagreement that broda) is clearly different from {ie na broda} (agreement that not broda).
{ia nai broda} (disbelief that broda) is also different from {ia na broda} (belief that not broda).
> If you've managed to deal with those (I haven't looked), I suspect that > ainai should be handled similarly.
One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from "negative request" to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm not exactly sure what "negative request" means, but it would seem to be "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 14:39 GMT On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > > > > > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the > > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies. > > > > > > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your* > > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the old > > > ones are not. > > > > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}. > > You keep saying that, but you keep supporting a definition that > means exactly that, as far as I can tell. It's very confusing.
Which definition means exactly that? Certainly not the one I support.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 15:40 GMT posts: 2388 Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is closely related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type, then it ought to refer to expressions of attitudes toward events that are not yet determined (known to have occurred or not). In particular, they are not indications of claims about those events or about the speaker's attitude toward those events. Hence, they have no role in connection with events whose occurrence (or non-occurrence on the occasion for them to occur) is known; all that can be done about these is to report that one had such and such an attitude when the event was unknown and such reports are, of course, not expressed with attitudinals but with predicates, like any other report (including one about one's present attitudes). In this sense, of the listed forms in the old discussions, {ai}, {a'o} and {au}, intent, hope and desire are the most clearly irrealis attitudinals (you can't hope for, intend, or desire what is already the case). {a'i}, effort, if applied to a present project is iffy as irrealis — the task is under way and the effort is directed toward its present existence (it is hard). In that sense, the suggestion that the attitudinal reflects an assessment of the difficulty of achieving or even undertaking some future task makes more sense. Assuming, of course, that the segregation of attitudinals into realis and irrealis is more or less correct, which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and {a'u} attentive, alert, and interested take some work maybe more than we are capable of) to be made to fit. As for the negative forms (again assuming that these notions make *sense as attitudinals*), one part of the problem is the muddle between the neutral position on a scale and the negative extreme and the latter is caught up in the uncertainty about what type of negation is involved ({nai} doing duty for all of them on various occasions). Negating an attitude may be expressing the opposite attitude or it may be the neutral position: I may not intend something because I have never thought or it or don't give a damn just as readily (or more so) as because I intend the opposite. Indeed, if "intend" means something like "commit to bringing about" (the desirability of the event is assumable, its being in the speaker's scope of influence is inferable), we can stick the negation in in a couple of places and different sorts of negations. Non-commitment to do p may be simply having no commitments with regard to p one way or the other ("disinterested" in the traditional sense) or it may at least embrace the possibility that I have a commitment to not-p. The first of these seems to be a neutral commitment, the second more obviously negative. Similarly with bringing about as what one is committed to. Not bringing about p may mean doing nothing to affect the occurrence or not of p. Commitment to this is recusal in the legal sense. But it also can mean not doing anything to bring p about but not necessarily refraining from doing things to prevent it. And, of course, here there is the third possibility, actively working to prevent p. Putting these together we get "not intend p" may mean being indifferent whether p occurs or not or being committed to not-bringing- about p. And this latter may refraining from doing anything affecting the occurrence of p or doing nothing to bring p about but possibly doing something to prevent it or working to prevent entirely. I take it that either the first sense of "not-commit" or the first for "not-bring-about" points to the neutral position on the intention scale. The second sense of "not-bring-about" seems sorta wishy-washy, so the thrid seems to be the natural negative form. But there is not good word for this,largely because it is indistinguishable from "intend not-p." the situations are clearer with some of the others that are clearly irrealis in this series. The directive irrealis (most of eV) have negation problems (and neutral ones as well).
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 15:49 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier > wrote: > > To me, the essence of attitudinals are > immediate and present > > tense, and the sorts of things I would > express a reactive attitudinal > > about would be as observative-like as > possible in expression. > > What do you think about things like: > > ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei > Whee! John will visit us tomorrow! > > ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940 > Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940! > > It seems to me that one thing is the tense of > the event > one is reacting to, and a different thing is > the attitude. > I don't see a problem in showing attitudes > towards > past or future events, actual or potential.
Some attitudinals yes and some no. I take it
that the irrealis is a definitional part of
meanings of the irrealis attitudinals. It is not
a part of the "raw emotions" like your examples.
> > I guess one can have a tensed observative, > but a place where I would use > > one doesn't come to mind. > > If by "observative" you mean something you are > observing, > it doesn't seem possible it could be tensed. It > could > be aspectual: {pu'o farlu} "It's about to > fall!", or > {ba'o porpi} "It's broken!", but it always has > to be nau, > the speaker's here & now. > > If by "observative" you mean a bridi without an > explicit x1, > then of course it is possible to say things > like {ba carvi > ca le bavlamdei} "It will rain tomorrow", and > there is no > problem as far as I can tell in showing an > attitude > there: {oi ba carvi ca le bavlamdei}. > > > > > The keywords do indeed suggest identifying > {ai nai} with {ai na}, > > > but I think that's not the normal pattern > for attitudinals. > > > > There are several attitudinals where the nai > could be replaced by an > > appropriate negation, with ianai and ienai > being the classic examples. > > {ie nai broda} (disagreement that broda) is > clearly different > from {ie na broda} (agreement that not broda). > > {ia nai broda} (disbelief that broda) is also > different from > {ia na broda} (belief that not broda).
It is a bit hard to lay out the other position here without falling back on don't-give-a-damn-itude or simple suspension of willing to accept, but these really work here. The same happens with "intend" but there we take that middle case to be the neutral position, not the negative.
> > If you've managed to deal with those (I > haven't looked), I suspect that > > ainai should be handled similarly. > > One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from > "negative request" > to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm > not exactly sure > what "negative request" means, but it would > seem to be > "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.
Sensible choice from a practical point of view, but not clearly generalizable by rules of the sort we seem to want.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 15:52 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell > wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, > Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell > wrote: > > > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, > Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > > > > > > > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not > normally used to negate the > > > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies. > > > > > > > > This is a fundamental disagreement we > have: to me, *your* > > > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a > bridi negation, and the old > > > > ones are not. > > > > > > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}. > > > > You keep saying that, but you keep supporting > a definition that > > means exactly that, as far as I can tell. > It's very confusing. > > Which definition means exactly that? Certainly > not the one > I support.
As near as I can make out your scheme, {ainai} out to be "committed to preventing," which is indeed indistinguishable form "intending not." But, as is often the case, I am not sure just what your proposal is in concrete terms.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 15:56 GMT John E Clifford scripsit:
> Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is closely > related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon > of the all too usual type, then it ought to refer to expressions of > attitudes toward events that are not yet determined (known to have > occurred or not). In particular, they are not indications of claims > about those events or about the speaker's attitude toward those events.
a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for "attitudinal normally used in an irrealis way." It is possible to use the irrealis attitudinals in a realis fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. Such switcheroos are more likely for some attitudinals than for others.
b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal in an irrealis way? It means that the predication to which the attitudinal is attached is not claimed by the speaker as true.
-- John Cowan http://www.ccil.org/~cowan http://www.reutershealth.com Charles li reis, nostre emperesdre magnes, Set anz totz pleinz ad ested in Espagnes.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 16:04 GMT On 9/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis > attitudinals" is closely related to its apparent > meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon > of the all too usual type, then
I think it would be safer to assume it is some strange Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type. CLL calls them "propositional attitude indicators", not "irrealis".
The names "realis attitiudinals" and "irrealis attitudinals" I think were chosen by Nick when he created the BPFK sections, but he didn't do the actual sorting. I did the sorting when I started working on them based more or less on whether it seemed to me that the attitudinal interfered or not with the default assumption of assertion for an otherwise unmarked bridi. I also made a few changes back and forth as I was working on them, as can be seen from the history of the pages.
> Assuming, of > course, that the segregation of attitudinals into > realis and irrealis is more or less correct, > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and {a'u} > attentive, alert, and interested take some work > maybe more than we are capable of) to be made to > fit.
That's why I preferred to leave them with the "realis" bunch, despite CLL classifying them as propositional attitudes.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 16:25 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> John E Clifford scripsit: > > > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis > attitudinals" is closely > > related to its apparent meaning and is not > some strange Lojbanic jargon > > of the all too usual type, then it ought to > refer to expressions of > > attitudes toward events that are not yet > determined (known to have > > occurred or not). In particular, they are > not indications of claims > > about those events or about the speaker's > attitude toward those events. > > a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for > "attitudinal normally used in an > irrealis way." It is possible to use the > irrealis attitudinals in a realis > fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an > irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. > Such switcheroos are more likely for some > attitudinals than for others.
Well, I confess I can't find anything that could reasonably be taken to be a case of the switcheroo, but that is probably because I do not have any idea what such a switch would be like: How could I intend what is already (known to me to be) the case or hope for it or desire it or expect or ...? Using at least some realis cases in an irrealis way is pretty easy: xorxes' example of anticipatory pleasure (you can muck about with the psychology here, but the grammar/semantics is not a problem).
> b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal in > an irrealis way? It means that > the predication to which the attitudinal is > attached is not claimed by the > speaker as true.
I would have gone for the stronger: that using such a form implicates,that the speaker believes the claim not yet to be true (or rahter that he does not know /believe it to be true).
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 16:32 GMT John E Clifford scripsit:
> Well, I confess I can't find anything that could > reasonably be taken to be a case of the > switcheroo, but that is probably because I do not > have any idea what such a switch would be like: > How could I intend what is already (known to me > to be) the case or hope for it or desire it or > expect or ...?
Consider this two-line dialogue:
A: do catra le mi patfu B: .ai
A: You killed my father! B: That was the whole idea.
> > b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal in > > an irrealis way? It means that > > the predication to which the attitudinal is > > attached is not claimed by the > > speaker as true. > > I would have gone for the stronger: that using > such a form implicates,that the speaker believes > the claim not yet to be true (or rahter that he > does not know /believe it to be true).
I prefer the terminology "propositional attitude" to "irrealis" for reasons like this: it is clearer.
-- A rabbi whose congregation doesn't want John Cowan to drive him out of town isn't a rabbi, http://www.ccil.org/~cowan and a rabbi who lets them do it jcowan@reutershealth.com isn't a man. --Jewish saying http://www.reutershealth.com
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 16:36 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis > > attitudinals" is closely related to its > apparent > > meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic > jargon > > of the all too usual type, then > > I think it would be safer to assume it is some > strange > Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type. CLL > calls them > "propositional attitude indicators", not > "irrealis".
I suppose the jargon claim is probably true, but it does seem that you endeavored to give it some content not totally separate from the non-jargonic apparent meaning. "Propositional attitude" is, in this case, again a piece of jargon only dimly related to its use as a term of art in early to mid-20th century philosophy, so the shift in terminology is welcome (thoug admittedly some propositional attitudes in the extra-Lojbanic sense are included among those in the Lojbanic sense).
> The names "realis attitiudinals" and "irrealis > attitudinals" > I think were chosen by Nick when he created the > > BPFK sections, but he didn't do the actual > sorting. > I did the sorting when I started working on > them based > more or less on whether it seemed to me that > the > attitudinal interfered or not with the default > assumption > of assertion for an otherwise unmarked bridi. I > also > made a few changes back and forth as I was > working > on them, as can be seen from the history of the > pages.
That is, it does not make a claim of the sort the bridi looks to make — nor of course one about the speaker's attitude. It does not make a claim at all, in fact. But it still has an apprpriate context of use (in at least many cases)and these are often defining and often hinge on the truth of the embedded bridi or the speaker's belief about that truth. One does not direct a course of action (in any of the various ways provided) if that course of action is already under way or the opportunity for it is past (or believed to be in each case).
> > Assuming, of > > course, that the segregation of attitudinals > into > > realis and irrealis is more or less correct, > > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and > {a'u} > > attentive, alert, and interested take some > work > > maybe more than we are capable of) to be made > to > > fit. > > That's why I preferred to leave them with the > "realis" > bunch, despite CLL classifying them as > propositional > attitudes.
I think that was a good move (and I would throw in "effort" if Lojbab's interpretation is definitive).
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 16:47 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> John E Clifford scripsit: > > > Well, I confess I can't find anything that > could > > reasonably be taken to be a case of the > > switcheroo, but that is probably because I do > not > > have any idea what such a switch would be > like: > > How could I intend what is already (known to > me > > to be) the case or hope for it or desire it > or > > expect or ...? > > Consider this two-line dialogue: > > A: do catra le mi patfu > B: .ai > > A: You killed my father! > B: That was the whole idea.
Well, I guess I couldn't read it that way. That to me has to be some attitude other than intention (satisfaction, perhaps, or something more complex). Of course, there may be some rubric under which all these various things fit, discriminating exactly on the status of the event (subjunctive satisfaction, maybe, though that doesn't get the commitment part in). But actually I would take B's remark as improperly substituting for a claim that B intended to kill A's father.
> > > b) What is it, then, to use an attitudinal > in > > > an irrealis way? It means that > > > the predication to which the attitudinal is > > > attached is not claimed by the > > > speaker as true. > > > > I would have gone for the stronger: that > using > > such a form implicates,that the speaker > believes > > the claim not yet to be true (or rahter that > he > > does not know /believe it to be true). > > I prefer the terminology "propositional > attitude" to "irrealis" > for reasons like this: it is clearer.
Not hardly quite. "Irrealis" at least gives a clue, even if a bad one. Of course, I am blocked by the original meaninng of "propositional attitude" from the 1950s or so.
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 16:50 GMT On 9/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > > Assuming, of > > > course, that the segregation of attitudinals > > into > > > realis and irrealis is more or less correct, > > > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and > > {a'u} > > > attentive, alert, and interested take some > > work > > > maybe more than we are capable of) to be made > > to > > > fit. > > > > That's why I preferred to leave them with the > > "realis" > > bunch, despite CLL classifying them as > > propositional > > attitudes. > > I think that was a good move (and I would throw > in "effort" if Lojbab's interpretation is > definitive).
I had "effort" with the realis originally, but moved it with the irrealis because I think it forms part of a set wit ai, au and a'o. "Attempt" might be a better one-word gloss than "effort".
Effort in the sense of difficult exertion might be better expressed (or complemented) with {fu'inai}.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 18:13 GMT posts: 14214 On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 01:42:52AM -0700, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 10:04:59PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/7/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > On Wed, Sep 07, 2005 at 08:49:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > * {nai} on an attitudinal is not normally used to negate the > > > > bridi that the attitudinal modifies. > > > > > > This is a fundamental disagreement we have: to me, *your* > > > definitions of .ai and .ai nai are a bridi negation, and the > > > old ones are not. > > > > I oppose {ai nai nroda} = {ai na broda}. > > You keep saying that, but you keep supporting a definition that > means exactly that, as far as I can tell. It's very confusing.
Erm. I was smoking crack here. Sorry.
The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda} (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes proposal is not.
I'm really not sure how much I care about that, though.
xorxes: For how many other UI is this true, *before* you started tinkering with them?
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 18:24 GMT On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda} > (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes proposal > is not. > > I'm really not sure how much I care about that, though. > > xorxes: For how many other UI is this true, *before* you started > tinkering with them?
Besides {ai}, only {e'o} I think.
(Assuming "negative request" means "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 18:28 GMT Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda} > (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes proposal > is not.
Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is a four-way distinction:
intentional action (I intended to go to the store) intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store) unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to) unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)
The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na.
-- But you, Wormtongue, you have done what you could for your true master. Some reward you have earned at least. Yet Saruman is apt to overlook his bargains. I should advise you to go quickly and remind him, lest he forget your faithful service. --Gandalf John Cowan
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 18:32 GMT On 9/8/05, John.Cowan wrote: > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is a > four-way distinction: > > intentional action (I intended to go to the store) > intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store) > unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to) > unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention) > > The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na.
Exactly. That's what I'm proposing.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 18:44 GMT Jorge Llambías scripsit: > On 9/8/05, John.Cowan wrote: > > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is a > > four-way distinction: > > > > intentional action (I intended to go to the store) > > intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store) > > unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to) > > unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention) > > > > The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na. > > Exactly. That's what I'm proposing. >
However, my third and fourth examples are badly worded, as they sound realis:
3 should be: I have no intention of going to the store, and 4 should be: I have no intention of not going to the store.
-- When I wrote it I was more than a little John Cowan febrile with foodpoisoning from an antique carrot jcowan@reutershealth.com that I foolishly ate out of an illjudged faith www.ccil.org/~cowan in the benignancy of vegetables. --And Rosta www.reutershealth.com
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arj Posted by arj on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 18:48 GMT posts: 953 On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote:
> John E Clifford scripsit: > >> Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is closely >> related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon >> of the all too usual type, then it ought to refer to expressions of >> attitudes toward events that are not yet determined (known to have >> occurred or not). In particular, they are not indications of claims >> about those events or about the speaker's attitude toward those events. > > a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for "attitudinal normally used in an > irrealis way." It is possible to use the irrealis attitudinals in a realis > fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. > Such switcheroos are more likely for some attitudinals than for others.
I think you must be referring to the second paragraph on page 302.
IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that X" is bogus. If ".u'u" were used as a "propositional attitude indicator", it would be possible for X to be false, and "I regret that X" to still be true. I find that particularly counter-intuitive.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Information wants to be anthropomorphized!
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 19:03 GMT On 9/8/05, John.Cowan wrote: > > > intentional action (I intended to go to the store) > > > intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store) > > > unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to) > > > unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention) > However, my third and fourth examples are badly worded, as they sound realis: > > 3 should be: I have no intention of going to the store, and 4 should be: > I have no intention of not going to the store.
Yes, but the problem with that is that, in English, "I have no intention of going to the store" is more or less interchangeable with "I intend not to go to the store". What is wanted for 3 is "it may very well turn out that I do end up going to the store, but if that is so it won't be on purpose", which the wording "I have no intention..." sort of precludes, even if _logically_ it would apply. This English usage might have influenced the keyword choice for {ai nai}.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by JohnCowan on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 19:04 GMT posts: 149 Jorge Llamb?as scripsit:
> Yes, but the problem with that is that, in English, "I have > no intention of going to the store" is more or less > interchangeable with "I intend not to go to the store". > What is wanted for 3 is "it may very well turn out that I > do end up going to the store, but if that is so it won't be > on purpose", which the wording "I have no intention..." > sort of precludes, even if _logically_ it would apply. > This English usage might have influenced the keyword > choice for {ai nai}.
+1
-- May the hair on your toes never fall out! John Cowan --Thorin Oakenshield (to Bilbo) cowan@ccil.org
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 19:32 GMT posts: 14214 On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 02:34:38PM -0400, John.Cowan wrote: > Robin Lee Powell scripsit: > > > The current {.ai nai broda} is, in fact, equal to {.ai na broda} > > (assuming broda is a positive action, of course). xorxes > > proposal is not. > > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me that what we want is > a four-way distinction: > > intentional action (I intended to go to the store) > intentional inaction (I intended not to go to the store) > unintentional action (I went to the store not meaning to) > unintentional inaction (I failed to go to the store contrary to my intention)
I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all these things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't believe that it is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the store" using attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope outside the tenses. {pu ku .ai mi klama} == {.ai mi pu klama} == "I intend that in the past I went to the store". WTF that means, I have no idea, but "I intended to go to the store" it is not, I'm pretty sure.
So I'm going to ignore the past-tense-ness in the sentences above, beacuse it's confusing me.
> The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, and the 2nd and 4th > have na.
Well, that's the contention, isn't it?
.ai mi klama .ai mi na klama
So far, I'm good.
.ai nai mi klama
Under the current definition, that means "I refuse to go to the store". xorxes believes this to be equivalent of {.ai mi na klama}, and hence a waste of UI space. I believe he's right on both counts; the question is, is breaking past usage worth such a fiddly little problem?
-Robin
-- http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/ Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!" Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 19:37 GMT posts: 14214 On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 08:55:00PM +0200, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote: > > >John E Clifford scripsit: > > > >>Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis attitudinals" is > >>closely related to its apparent meaning and is not some strange > >>Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type, then it ought to > >>refer to expressions of attitudes toward events that are not yet > >>determined (known to have occurred or not). In particular, they > >>are not indications of claims about those events or about the > >>speaker's attitude toward those events. > > > >a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for "attitudinal normally > >used in an irrealis way." It is possible to use the irrealis > >attitudinals in a realis fashion, and the realis attitudinals in > >an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. Such switcheroos are more > >likely for some attitudinals than for others. > > I think you must be referring to the second paragraph on page 302.
AKA Chapter 13, section 3.
> IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that X" is bogus. If > ".u'u" were used as a "propositional attitude indicator", it would > be possible for X to be false, and "I regret that X" to still be > true. I find that particularly counter-intuitive.
+1 as stated. However, note the English gloss for .u'u in that usage would be "I would regret it if...". IMO, that's what da'i is for.
I'm with Arnt that the division between those UI that default to realis and those that default to irrealis should be as clear as humanly possible, and da'i and da'i nai should be used if you want the other.
-Robin
-- http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/ Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!" Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:12 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > Assuming, of > > > > course, that the segregation of > attitudinals > > > into > > > > realis and irrealis is more or less > correct, > > > > which is clearly iffy: {a'a}, {a'e}, and > > > {a'u} > > > > attentive, alert, and interested take > some > > > work > > > > maybe more than we are capable of) to be > made > > > to > > > > fit. > > > > > > That's why I preferred to leave them with > the > > > "realis" > > > bunch, despite CLL classifying them as > > > propositional > > > attitudes. > > > > I think that was a good move (and I would > throw > > in "effort" if Lojbab's interpretation is > > definitive). > > I had "effort" with the realis originally, but > moved it > with the irrealis because I think it forms part > of a > set wit ai, au and a'o. "Attempt" might be a > better > one-word gloss than "effort". > > Effort in the sense of difficult exertion might > be better > expressed (or complemented) with {fu'inai}.
Well just what attitudinal modifiers do or how they work is not crystalline, but presumably they modify other attitudinals and none suggests itself for the groan of hard labor (or the sigh of ease or the "om shanti shanti" of total nondoing.
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:17 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, John.Cowan > wrote: > > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to me > that what we want is a > > four-way distinction: > > > > intentional action (I intended to go > to the store) > > intentional inaction (I intended not > to go to the store) > > unintentional action (I went to the > store not meaning to) > > unintentional inaction (I failed to go > to the store contrary to my intention) > > > > The first two are ai, the last two are ainai, > and the 2nd and 4th have na. > > Exactly. That's what I'm proposing.
This seems to me to be a different sense of "intention" than the one apparently meant for {ai}. In fact, this is not an attitude at all, but a report of a way of doing something, deliberately or not. To make it {ai} is to confuse an expression of an attitude with a claim to have had that attitude in the past. Bow could you *express* lack of intention (or indeed, how have it as an *attitude* at all)?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:20 GMT On 9/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > Effort in the sense of difficult exertion might > > be better > > expressed (or complemented) with {fu'inai}. > > Well just what attitudinal modifiers do or how > they work is not crystalline, but presumably they > modify other attitudinals and none suggests > itself for the groan of hard labor (or the sigh > of ease or the "om shanti shanti" of total > nondoing.
o'u/o'unai ?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:20 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> Jorge Llambías scripsit: > > On 9/8/05, John.Cowan > wrote: > > > Sticking my toe in the water, it seems to > me that what we want is a > > > four-way distinction: > > > > > > intentional action (I intended to go > to the store) > > > intentional inaction (I intended not > to go to the store) > > > unintentional action (I went to the > store not meaning to) > > > unintentional inaction (I failed to > go to the store contrary to my intention) > > > > > > The first two are ai, the last two are > ainai, and the 2nd and 4th have na. > > > > Exactly. That's what I'm proposing. > > > > However, my third and fourth examples are badly > worded, as they sound realis: > > 3 should be: I have no intention of going to > the store, and 4 should be: > I have no intention of not going to the store.
Better, perhaps. I still have a problem with the attitude of non-intending in what appears to be the sense here.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:30 GMT posts: 2388
> On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote: > > > John E Clifford scripsit: > > > >> Taking as a working hypothesis that > "irrealis attitudinals" is closely > >> related to its apparent meaning and is not > some strange Lojbanic jargon > >> of the all too usual type, then it ought to > refer to expressions of > >> attitudes toward events that are not yet > determined (known to have > >> occurred or not). In particular, they are > not indications of claims > >> about those events or about the speaker's > attitude toward those events. > > > > a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for > "attitudinal normally used in an > > irrealis way." It is possible to use the > irrealis attitudinals in a realis > > fashion, and the realis attitudinals in an > irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. > > Such switcheroos are more likely for some > attitudinals than for others. > > I think you must be referring to the second > paragraph on page 302. > > IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that X" > is bogus. If ".u'u" were > used as a "propositional attitude indicator", > it would be possible for X > to be false, and "I regret that X" to still be > true. I find that > particularly counter-intuitive.
Thanks for the reference (it is not at all what I was expecting given Cowan's description of what it said). Of course, {u'u} is probably odd in various ways and what one might do with it does not obviously transfer to others. In particular for present purposes, {u'u} appears to be realis in the sense that it expresses an attitude (or whatever) that is only possible with an event that (the speaker believes) has actually occurred. So, {u'u X} is appropriate (not true or false, note) only if the speaker at least thinks x is true. Failing this, the expression of the emotion of regret (etc) is inept and possibly meant to mislead, and the claim to have that emtion is simply always false (I am not clear what "I regret that X" means but, since it is true or false independently of X, it cannot be {u'u X}.}
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:38 GMT Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all these > things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't believe that it > is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the store" using > attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope outside the tenses.
+1
-- John Cowan jcowan@reutershealth.com http://www.ccil.org/~cowan Does anybody want any flotsam? / I've gotsam. Does anybody want any jetsam? / I can getsam. --Ogden Nash, No Doctors Today, Thank You
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:40 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 08:55:00PM +0200, Arnt > Richard Johansen > wrote: > > On Thu, 8 Sep 2005, John.Cowan wrote: > > > > >John E Clifford scripsit: > > > > > >>Taking as a working hypothesis that > "irrealis attitudinals" is > > >>closely related to its apparent meaning and > is not some strange > > >>Lojbanic jargon of the all too usual type, > then it ought to > > >>refer to expressions of attitudes toward > events that are not yet > > >>determined (known to have occurred or not). > In particular, they > > >>are not indications of claims about those > events or about the > > >>speaker's attitude toward those events. > > > > > >a) "Irrealis attitudinal" is shorthand for > "attitudinal normally > > >used in an irrealis way." It is possible to > use the irrealis > > >attitudinals in a realis fashion, and the > realis attitudinals in > > >an irrealis fashion, as CLL points out. Such > switcheroos are more > > >likely for some attitudinals than for > others. > > > > I think you must be referring to the second > paragraph on page 302. > > AKA Chapter 13, section 3.
This says (over and over) that the division under various headings ("reealis" and irrealis: not among them) is arbitrary and porous in at least some cases. It does not say that semantic restrictions on a particular expression can be junked at will, which is what seems to be hap0pening in some of these cases. You can't intend or order or hope for or fear or.... an even you believe has occurred. That is built inot the meaning ("commit to bring about" and the like). Whatever is happening in the realis cases and is called intention is something else and might be worth looking at in its own right. But so far it looks to be sim0ply reports of past attitudes, not expressions of current one (note ONLY current attitudes can be expressed). > > IMO, the example of ".u'u" as "I regret that > X" is bogus. If > > ".u'u" were used as a "propositional attitude > indicator", it would > > be possible for X to be false, and "I regret > that X" to still be > > true. I find that particularly > counter-intuitive. > > +1 as stated. However, note the English gloss > for .u'u in that > usage would be "I would regret it if...". IMO, > that's what da'i is > for. > > I'm with Arnt that the division between those > UI that default to > realis and those that default to irrealis > should be as clear as > humanly possible, and da'i and da'i nai should > be used if you want > the other. > > -Robin > > — > http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** > http://www.lojban.org/ > Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their > Grate!" > Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - > http://singinst.org/ > > > >
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 20:54 GMT On 9/8/05, John.Cowan wrote: > Robin Lee Powell scripsit: > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all these > > things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't believe that it > > is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the store" using > > attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope outside the tenses. > > +1
Consider this two-line dialogue:
A: do pu catra le mi patfu B: .ai go'i
A: You killed my father! B: That was the whole idea.
I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 08 of Sep., 2005 23:03 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, John.Cowan > wrote: > > Robin Lee Powell scripsit: > > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be > able to emote all these > > > things, except that the tenses are wierd. > I don't believe that it > > > is *possible* to say "I intended to go to > the store" using > > > attitudinals, because the attitudinals > scope outside the tenses. > > > > +1 > > Consider this two-line dialogue: > > A: do pu catra le mi patfu > B: .ai go'i > > A: You killed my father! > B: That was the whole idea. > > I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.
Well, as noted an expression has to be of a present attitude and I can't think of a present attitude that refers to a past event and is like intention enough to use the same word. The English for B is pretty coearly a claim, object to truth condition rejection: "To Hell it was, you just lucked out."
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 00:15 GMT On 9/8/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > Consider this two-line dialogue: > > > > A: do pu catra le mi patfu > > B: .ai go'i > > > > A: You killed my father! > > B: That was the whole idea. > > > > I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue. > > Well, as noted an expression has to be of a > present attitude and I can't think of a present > attitude that refers to a past event and is like > intention enough to use the same word.
Well, if you really consider {ai go'i} meaningless/incomprehensible in that context I guess there isn't much more I can say. To me it is fairly obvious, so I won't object if someone uses expressions like that, and I probably will use them too (maybe I already have, I don't really remember.)
The > English for B is pretty coearly a claim, object > to truth condition rejection: "To Hell it was, > you just lucked out."
Yes, translations of attitudinals often have to be approximated in English as full claims because interjections in English tend to be much more vague and imprecise than Lojban attitudinals. Attitudinals can also be challenged in Lojban, of course, as can interjections in English: "Oops, did I hurt you?" "'Oops' my foot! You did that on purpose, you ...!"
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 00:18 GMT posts: 14214 On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 06:00:43PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/8/05, John.Cowan wrote: > > Robin Lee Powell scripsit: > > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to be able to emote all > > > these things, except that the tenses are wierd. I don't > > > believe that it is *possible* to say "I intended to go to the > > > store" using attitudinals, because the attitudinals scope > > > outside the tenses. > > > > +1 > > Consider this two-line dialogue: > > A: do pu catra le mi patfu > B: .ai go'i > > A: You killed my father! > B: That was the whole idea. > > I find nothing objectionable in that dialogue.
{.ai} by itself can mean pretty much anything, so sure, whatever.
But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I don't know what it means.
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 00:30 GMT On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I > don't know what it means.
OK, don't use then. :-) To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I don't think any direct English translation does justice to it, so I won't try.
BTW, I have made a transcript of the handwritten material Lojban sent us. I haven't examined it in detail yet but it seems very close to the final product, not a whole lot of reduction as the CLL quote seemed to suggest. Here is the list for those interested:
social intention scale physical emotional non-specific emotions mental/reasoning sexual
conformance/(obedience) agree/meek? disharmony/challenge/defiance (obligation/duty) (freedom/exemption) desire indiference reluctance pity/compassion rashness caution hope hopelessness request negative request suggestion abandon suggestion promise release from promise choice/decision/willing/voluntary lack of choice/mandatory against choice/rejection/unwilling indecision aggressive passive defensive belief unbelief/doubt disbelief attention/vigilance inattention/neglect avoidance/active neglect happy/cheerful/rejoice up! unhappy/dejected/sad/depressed down! comfort discomfort exaggeration acuracy understatement anticipation/future present/current past/memory effort/exertion relaxation repose/laziness self-orientation/privacy other orientation/conviviality interest/attraction disinterest repulsion/repugnance/avoidance confidence lack of confidence fear closeness/familiarity distance/alienation agree/concord/harmony disagree innocence guilt (attonement/repentance lack of regret impenitence) (pity/obligation/guilt) worship/sacredness sacrilege energy/excitement passive laziness/ennui certainty uncertainty impossibility dignity indignation/offense forgiveness/acceptance blame/rejection love/endearment/affection hate/disaffection relief irritation/aggravation forbearance/patience anger/rage/frustration permission/assent/consent agree/rank prohibition appreciation envy/jealousy approval non-approval disapproval/rejection/ridicule/derision truth falsity (sarcasm/irony/flattery) amusement/diversion boredom/weariness humor/jest dullness/matter of fact gravity/seriousness (pride) (humility) infamy) hauteur/rank meekness/lack of rank wonder expectation (friendship) success failure surprise deja vu boredom/passe discovery/find/gain confusion/absence/searching tension/stress/anxiety calm relaxation control lack of control opposed to control ease difficulty/futility competion incompleteness alertness exhaustion
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 00:32 GMT posts: 14214 On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 09:37:16PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I > > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, > > I don't know what it means. > > OK, don't use then. :-)
Don't use what, exactly?
> To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I don't think any direct > English translation does justice to it, so I won't try.
Oh, please? :-)
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 00:55 GMT On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 09:37:16PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I > > > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, > > > I don't know what it means. > > > > OK, don't use then. :-) > > Don't use what, exactly?
{ai} with a past tense bridi.
> > To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I don't think any direct > > English translation does justice to it, so I won't try. > > Oh, please? :-)
I think John Cowan's translation got the meaning quite well, even if it was not a literal one. It often happens that you can't translate literally from one language to another and some rewording is necessary to get the meaning across.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by lojbab on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 01:21 GMT posts: 162 Jorge Llambas wrote: > On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: >>To me, the essence of attitudinals are immediate and present >>tense, and the sorts of things I would express a reactive attitudinal >>about would be as observative-like as possible in expression. > > What do you think about things like: > ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei > Whee! John will visit us tomorrow!
There is an elliptical ba'a there, is there not?
> ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940 > Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940!
Likewise a ba'anai.
If one is anticipating or recalling, there is some degree of reflective consideration going on. If on the other hand you are reacting to a picture of the lady in 1940, I probably wouldn't think to use the pu, but merely try to qualify it as "in the picture".
But I think this is personal taste.
> It seems to me that one thing is the tense of the event > one is reacting to, and a different thing is the attitude. > I don't see a problem in showing attitudes towards > past or future events, actual or potential.
I'm not sure I see a problem with doing so, but rather that I would be inclined to mark with ba'a/ba'anai rather than pu/ba.
>>If you've managed to deal with those (I haven't looked), I suspect that >>ainai should be handled similarly. > > One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from "negative request" > to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm not exactly sure > what "negative request" means, but it would seem to be > "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}.
There are times when one attitudinally says "Please don't!" Usually something someone really expects the other person to do, but you don't want them to do; you could express this as "Please" with a negation, but I think that the negation is attitudinal rather than propositional. The relatively recent postfixed "Not!" in English slang has an attitudinal nature that could fit with ianai, ienai or e'onai depending on the context.
But I'm willing to consider your alternative, even though it is clearly a change, though I thought we had a COI vocative that conveyed an offer. Things are muddy in my mind at the moment, and I have no time to look things up.
lojbab
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by lojbab on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 01:36 GMT posts: 162 John E Clifford wrote: > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis > attitudinals" is closely related to its apparent > meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic jargon > of the all too usual type,
I've been interpreting irrealis as being a technical term for what you used to refer to as "possible worlds". If that is not correct (and maybe even if it is), I think a definition of the term as used in the classification of those particular attitudinals as "irrealis" should be right at the top of the section. I am presuming that there is no such definition or you would not need to be making a working hypothesis as to what the word means.
>you can't hope for,
> intend, or desire what is already the case).
You can, but only if you lack certainty that it is indeed the case. "a'o you (unlike me) have actually read Jorge's definitions" is an example. It probably is true, but my reaction is one of hope that it is indeed true.
> As for the negative forms (again assuming that > these notions make *sense as attitudinals*), one > part of the problem is the muddle between the > neutral position on a scale and the negative > extreme and the latter is caught up in the > uncertainty about what type of negation is > involved ({nai} doing duty for all of them on > various occasions). Negating an attitude may be > expressing the opposite attitude or it may be the > neutral position: I may not intend something > because I have never thought or it or don't give > a damn just as readily (or more so) as because I > intend the opposite.
The use of nai for scalar opposite in attitudinals was concocted long before the negation paper and our attempt to make negation rational. Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI. If it is required by perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a true negation in all contexts, then we need a different word a'onaicai (a perfect example, I think, and it just came out!)
lojbab
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 01:49 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > > > Consider this two-line dialogue: > > > > > > A: do pu catra le mi patfu > > > B: .ai go'i > > > > > > A: You killed my father! > > > B: That was the whole idea. > > > > > > I find nothing objectionable in that > dialogue. > > > > Well, as noted an expression has to be of a > > present attitude and I can't think of a > present > > attitude that refers to a past event and is > like > > intention enough to use the same word. > > Well, if you really consider {ai go'i} > meaningless/incomprehensible > in that context I guess there isn't much more I > can say. To me it > is fairly obvious, so I won't object if someone > uses expressions > like that, and I probably will use them too > (maybe I already have, > I don't really remember.)
I don't necessarily consider it meaningless or incomprehnsible; I just note that *it is not an expression of an attitude* in this case. Now, what it is here and how that is to be brought together with its official use as an expression of an attitude and how it is to avoid making a claim are matters that someone who wants to use things like {ai} in these cases has to figure out, formulate and justify. So far we have only the raw translations (ambiguous as you are about to note) without any explanation or justification, that is without fitting it in the Lojban context from which it arises. Maybe all that can be done, but I don't see any reason to accept these usages until it has been.
> The > > English for B is pretty coearly a claim, > object > > to truth condition rejection: "To Hell it > was, > > you just lucked out." > > Yes, translations of attitudinals often have to > be approximated in > English as full claims because interjections in > English tend to be > much more vague and imprecise than Lojban > attitudinals.
Well, since it can't be an interjection, I mean to say that B in Lojban either is a claim and thus improper for {ai} or that it is unintelligible in the present sense of {ai}. The bit about the translation is just to point out how it has to appear (the translation can't be of an expression of an attitude).
Attitudinals > can also be challenged in Lojban, of course, as > can interjections > in English: "Oops, did I hurt you?" "'Oops' my > foot! You did that > on purpose, you ...!"
Yes, we can challenge the sincerity of an attitudinal, even by challenging the implicit claims (note, not a claim about a present attitude — regret, say — but a past attitude).
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 01:50 GMT posts: 2388
wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 06:00:43PM -0300, Jorge > Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/8/05, John.Cowan > wrote: > > > Robin Lee Powell scripsit: > > > > I agree whole-heartedly that we want to > be able to emote all > > > > these things, except that the tenses are > wierd. I don't > > > > believe that it is *possible* to say "I > intended to go to the > > > > store" using attitudinals, because the > attitudinals scope > > > > outside the tenses. > > > > > > +1 > > > > Consider this two-line dialogue: > > > > A: do pu catra le mi patfu > > B: .ai go'i > > > > A: You killed my father! > > B: That was the whole idea. > > > > I find nothing objectionable in that > dialogue. > > {.ai} by itself can mean pretty much anything, > so sure, whatever. > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do > patfu}, which means "I > intend that in the past I killed your father" > which, as I said, I > don't know what it means.
Rather literally: "I am announcing my commitment to bringing it about that I have killed your father in the past," which is, I think, simply contradictory.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 01:54 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> wrote:
> > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > intend that in the past I killed your father"
> which, as I said, I
> > don't know what it means.
>
> OK, don't use then. :-)
> To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I
> don't think any direct
> English translation does justice to it, so I
> won't try.
The issue isn't about whether I use it or not, but about whether it makes any sense as part of the language regardless of its actually being used. The work needed to make the case that it does has not been done. As is often the case, you have an intuition about how something should wor, but haven't done the scut work to fit it into frame of the language. Since your intuitions usually eventually turn out to be pretty good, I don't see rejecting your usage out of hand. But I see NO reason for accepting it at the moment.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 01:58 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> wrote:
> > On Thu, Sep 08, 2005 at 09:37:16PM -0300,
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > On 9/8/05, Robin Lee Powell
> wrote:
> > > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > > > intend that in the past I killed your
> father" which, as I said,
> > > > I don't know what it means.
> > >
> > > OK, don't use then. :-)
> >
> > Don't use what, exactly?
>
> {ai} with a past tense bridi.
>
> > > To me it is fairly clear, as I said, but I
> don't think any direct
> > > English translation does justice to it, so
> I won't try.
> >
> > Oh, please? :-)
>
> I think John Cowan's translation got the
> meaning quite well, even
> if it was not a literal one. It often happens
> that you can't translate
> literally from one language to another and some
> rewording is
> necessary to get the meaning across.
So far as I can tell, the intended meaning has never been in doubt; the issue is how to squeeze that meaning out of the expression — which comes down to how to expand upon the meaning and use of attitudinals to cover these cases which are so different (not expressions of attitudes, apparently factual, and so on). That is your job, not finding a decent translation into English.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 02:07 GMT posts: 2388
> Jorge Llambías wrote: > > On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier > wrote: > >>To me, the essence of attitudinals are > immediate and present > >>tense, and the sorts of things I would > express a reactive attitudinal > >>about would be as observative-like as > possible in expression. > > > > What do you think about things like: > > ui la djan ba vitke mi'o ca le bavlamdei > > Whee! John will visit us tomorrow! > > There is an elliptical ba'a there, is there > not? > > > ua ko'a pu mutce melbi ca li 1940 > > Wow! She was really beautiful in 1940! > > Likewise a ba'anai. > > If one is anticipating or recalling, there is > some degree of reflective > consideration going on. If on the other hand > you are reacting to a > picture of the lady in 1940, I probably > wouldn't think to use the pu, > but merely try to qualify it as "in the > picture". > > But I think this is personal taste.
I think that this is probably psychologically correct, but I see no reason why it needs to be required linguistically or even implicated. I can be happy about a future event or admire a person from the past without any logical problem, but what works with those more or less realis cases doesn't work (yet, at least) for definitionally irrealis cases like intention.
> It seems to me that one thing is the tense of > the event > > one is reacting to, and a different thing is > the attitude. > > I don't see a problem in showing attitudes > towards > > past or future events, actual or potential. > > I'm not sure I see a problem with doing so, but > rather that I would be > inclined to mark with ba'a/ba'anai rather than > pu/ba.
It depends on the attitude, they each have a unique logic, for some of which, irrealis is an essential part. There are also some realis cases and some that either can g0o either way or are indifferent to the issue.
> >>If you've managed to deal with those (I > haven't looked), I suspect that > >>ainai should be handled similarly. > > > > One case I did change is {e'o nai}, from > "negative request" > > to "offer" as the opposite of "request". I'm > not exactly sure > > what "negative request" means, but it would > seem to be > > "request not to", i.e. {e'o na}. > > There are times when one attitudinally says > "Please don't!" Usually > something someone really expects the other > person to do, but you don't > want them to do; you could express this as > "Please" with a negation, but > I think that the negation is attitudinal rather > than propositional. The > relatively recent postfixed "Not!" in English > slang has an attitudinal > nature that could fit with ianai, ienai or > e'onai depending on the context. > > But I'm willing to consider your alternative, > even though it is clearly > a change, though I thought we had a COI > vocative that conveyed an offer. > Things are muddy in my mind at the moment, > and I have no time to look > things up. > > lojbab > > > > >
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 02:18 GMT posts: 2388
> John E Clifford wrote: > > Taking as a working hypothesis that "irrealis > > attitudinals" is closely related to its > apparent > > meaning and is not some strange Lojbanic > jargon > > of the all too usual type, > > I've been interpreting irrealis as being a > technical term for what you > used to refer to as "possible worlds". If that > is not correct (and > maybe even if it is), I think a definition of > the term as used in the > classification of those particular attitudinals > as "irrealis" should be > right at the top of the section. I am > presuming that there is no such > definition or you would not need to be making a > working hypothesis as to > what the word means.
Well, there isn't really yet a secrtion on irrealis attitudinals at all, so no such introduction yet. And, given the history of terminology in this racket, such an introduction does not guarantee that it is clear what it means or what it commits us to. The possible worlds involved here are nothing elaborate; just a recognition that some events have happened or are happening (realis) and other have not but still might yet (irrealis)
> > >you can't hope for, > > intend, or desire what is already the case). > > You can, but only if you lack certainty that it > is indeed the case. "a'o > you (unlike me) have actually read Jorge's > definitions" is an example. > It probably is true, but my reaction is one of > hope that it is indeed true.
Oops, I forgot the caveat I usually put in explicitly "what the speaker believes/knows" You don't bhave any confidence that I have read xorxes' definitions so you can still hope I have. Once you know I have not, you can hope I will. But the most you can do if you know I have is wish that I hadn't or hope that I will put my reading to good use (better than so far, anyhow).
> > As for the negative forms (again assuming > that > > these notions make *sense as attitudinals*), > one > > part of the problem is the muddle between the > > neutral position on a scale and the negative > > extreme and the latter is caught up in the > > uncertainty about what type of negation is > > involved ({nai} doing duty for all of them on > > various occasions). Negating an attitude may > be > > expressing the opposite attitude or it may be > the > > neutral position: I may not intend something > > because I have never thought or it or don't > give > > a damn just as readily (or more so) as > because I > > intend the opposite. > > The use of nai for scalar opposite in > attitudinals was concocted long > before the negation paper and our attempt to > make negation rational. > Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI. > If it is required by > perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a > true negation in all > contexts, then we need a different word > a'onaicai (a perfect example, I > think, and it just came out!)
Oddly, I think xorxes analysis of {a'o} and its congeners is pretty, much right. I would read {a'onaicai} as "I really dread that" in the expressive sense, "May God Almighty forfend that" if you want to get more overtly expressive.
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 03:03 GMT Robin Lee Powell scripsit:
> But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I > don't know what it means.
IOW, the intention began some time before the killing and is still ongoing even afterwards (as opposed to, say, I intended to kill him, did it, and then decided I shouldn't have done it after all).
-- John Cowan jcowan@reutershealth.com http://www.ccil.org/~cowan Does anybody want any flotsam? / I've gotsam. Does anybody want any jetsam? / I can getsam. --Ogden Nash, No Doctors Today, Thank You
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 10:45 GMT On Thursday 08 September 2005 20:25, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > {.ai} by itself can mean pretty much anything, so sure, whatever. > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do patfu}, which means "I > intend that in the past I killed your father" which, as I said, I > don't know what it means.
{.ai} doesn't have a tense. So the tense of "intend" is whatever makes sense: "I intended to kill your father".
phma
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 12:50 GMT On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > But I'm willing to consider your alternative, even though it is clearly > a change, though I thought we had a COI vocative that conveyed an offer. > Things are muddy in my mind at the moment, and I have no time to look > things up.
No, I don't see anything like offer. Here's the list of vovatives:
{fi'i} "hospitality" would be the only thing vaguely like it.
(Does it come from {friti} perchance?)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 12:55 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> Robin Lee Powell scripsit: > > > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do > patfu}, which means "I > > intend that in the past I killed your father" > which, as I said, I > > don't know what it means. > > IOW, the intention began some time before the > killing and is still > ongoing even afterwards (as opposed to, say, I > intended to kill him, > did it, and then decided I shouldn't have done > it after all).
As a matter of simple logic, whatever it is that occurs after the event, it can't be intention. It may be satisfaction, or lack of regret or agreement with the previous intention or whatever, but intent — as an attitude — ends with the event and so does its expression. Now, as noted elsewhere, if you want to continue using {ai} you are under the obligation to explain how it works and to find a way to fit it into the established system in Lojban. So far all we have seen is empty assertions that it is OK, without any attempt to show how to make it so.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 12:57 GMT posts: 2388 As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can only be of a present attitude. To make it work as representing a past attiude requires some as yet unworked out extension of the nature of words like {ai}.
> On Thursday 08 September 2005 20:25, Robin Lee
> Powell wrote:
> > {.ai} by itself can mean pretty much
> anything, so sure, whatever.
> >
> > But {.ai go'i} == {.ai mi pu catra le do
> patfu}, which means "I
> > intend that in the past I killed your father"
> which, as I said, I
> > don't know what it means.
>
> {.ai} doesn't have a tense. So the tense of
> "intend" is whatever makes sense:
> "I intended to kill your father".
>
> phma
>
>
>
>
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 13:04 GMT On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > The use of nai for scalar opposite in attitudinals was concocted long > before the negation paper and our attempt to make negation rational. > Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI. If it is required by > perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a true negation in all > contexts, then we need a different word a'onaicai (a perfect example, I > think, and it just came out!)
If I remember correctly back in '94 (I was just starting with Lojban then) you proposed to add {nei} as a companion of {nai} for one of the meanings, but there wasn't much support for it so you dropped it.
I don't really think a new word is needed though, {nai} by itself seems to work quite fine as long as it acts on the attitudinal it modifies and not on the bridi that the attitudinal relates to.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 16:00 GMT posts: 2388 Of course it works just fine if it modifies the attached bridi. It just sometimes gives different results. The issues are 1. which way does it work in each particular case and 2 what does the negation of a particular emotion amount to in detail — just saying it negates the attitude helps hardly at all. I take xorxes' {a'onai} as being a successful case, even though it goes against the old meaning.
> On 9/8/05, Robert LeChevalier
> wrote:
> > The use of nai for scalar opposite in
> attitudinals was concocted long
> > before the negation paper and our attempt to
> make negation rational.
> > Thus it isn't necessarily "negation" on a UI.
> If it is required by
> > perceived brokenness to make nai uniformly a
> true negation in all
> > contexts, then we need a different word
> a'onaicai (a perfect example, I
> > think, and it just came out!)
>
> If I remember correctly back in '94 (I was just
> starting with
> Lojban then) you proposed to add {nei} as a
> companion of
> {nai} for one of the meanings, but there wasn't
> much support
> for it so you dropped it.
>
> I don't really think a new word is needed
> though, {nai}
> by itself seems to work quite fine as long as
> it acts on
> the attitudinal it modifies and not on the
> bridi that the
> attitudinal relates to.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 17:56 GMT John E Clifford scripsit:
> As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can only be > of a present attitude. To make it work as > representing a past attiude requires some as yet > unworked out extension of the nature of words > like {ai}.
To summarize my position, then: I agree that attitudinals indicate current attitudes rather than past ones, but I believe the attitude tagged by "ai" can persist even after the intended act is consummated.
For example, I intended to eat breakfast today, and (having now eaten it), I continue to intend it. I could, however, decide that I now repent (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no longer intend it.
Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a non-intentional, accidental, act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.
-- Si hoc legere scis, nimium eruditionis habes.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 19:57 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> John E Clifford scripsit: > > > As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can > only be > > of a present attitude. To make it work as > > representing a past attiude requires some as > yet > > unworked out extension of the nature of words > > like {ai}. > > To summarize my position, then: I agree that > attitudinals indicate > current attitudes rather than past ones, but I > believe the attitude > tagged by "ai" can persist even after the > intended act is consummated. > > For example, I intended to eat breakfast today, > and (having now eaten it), > I continue to intend it. I could, however, > decide that I now repent > (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no > longer intend it. > > Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a > non-intentional, accidental, > act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it. > Well, Lojban's founders were cclose enough to H. Dumpty that using words any way one wants is a matter of group habit if not policy. But I think, in the interest of not hopelessly muddling people not used to the local ways, we should set at some limits. I think that calling an
attitude* toward a past event that one is expressing* "intention" is beyond those limits. It is — for the familiar use of the word "intent" contradictory and I am not convinced that there is any attitude or expression of one that comes close enough to expression an intention toward a potential act to justify using the same expression for it. I am willing to be convinced, since this is xorxes' intuition, but so far all I have seen is the malglico argument: the English expression corresponding to {ai} can occur in the past tense, therefore {ai} can occur in the past tense (or referring to past events), skipping over the difference in meaning of the English expression. (It occurs to me that you may rather mean something different by "attitude" or "expression," but that still requires a lot of explaining, since the old — more or less normal outside Lojbanistan — meanings seem to fit the forms so well as they were previously developed.)
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by lojbab on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 21:12 GMT posts: 162 John.Cowan wrote: > John E Clifford scripsit: >>As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can only be >>of a present attitude. To make it work as >>representing a past attiude requires some as yet >>unworked out extension of the nature of words >>like {ai}. > > To summarize my position, then: I agree that attitudinals indicate > current attitudes rather than past ones, but I believe the attitude > tagged by "ai" can persist even after the intended act is consummated. > > For example, I intended to eat breakfast today, and (having now eaten it), > I continue to intend it. I could, however, decide that I now repent > (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no longer intend it. > > Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a non-intentional, accidental, > act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.
I guess that makes sense. In a language that easily express superfective aspect, we now can also express inchoative and superfective emotions. And emotions indeed have a way of not shutting off after the event that triggers them - we usually change the name for the emotion after the fact - from "intent" or "effort" to "accomplishment" for example.
But documenting aspectual attitudes should be orthogonal to documenting their basic present-tense meaning, as associated with the 6 classifiers. With just inchoative, superfective, and present attitudes, 6 classifiers, and positive, negative and neutral scalar meanings, each of the attitudinals might need up to 54 examples to fully explicate its meaning.
Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
lojbab
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 23:44 GMT posts: 2388
> John.Cowan wrote:
> > John E Clifford scripsit:
> >>As an expression of an attitude, {ai} can
> only be
> >>of a present attitude. To make it work as
> >>representing a past attiude requires some as
> yet
> >>unworked out extension of the nature of words
> >>like {ai}.
> >
> > To summarize my position, then: I agree that
> attitudinals indicate
> > current attitudes rather than past ones, but
> I believe the attitude
> > tagged by "ai" can persist even after the
> intended act is consummated.
> >
> > For example, I intended to eat breakfast
> today, and (having now eaten it),
> > I continue to intend it. I could, however,
> decide that I now repent
> > (non-emotionally) of eating it, that I no
> longer intend it.
> >
> > Contrariwise, I could decide to treat a
> non-intentional, accidental,
> > act of mine as intentional, by "adopting" it.
>
> I guess that makes sense.
Bad guess; it doesn't.
In a language that > easily express > superfective aspect, we now can also express > inchoative and superfective > emotions. And emotions indeed have a way of > not shutting off after the > event that triggers them - we usually change > the name for the emotion > after the fact - from "intent" or "effort" to > "accomplishment" for example.
The change is what is essential here (assuming that there really is some kind of continuity in any useful sense). I can get a sort of sense of saying "I keep on intending to do what I did yesterday" — not meaning doing the same sort of thing again, but the particular event — but involves someone in a moderate phase of Alzheimer's. And notice that even that is not
expressing* that intention but reporting it. It may be that the same attitude persists but that it logically has to have a different name. This would be an easier case to make if the attitude were reliably connected with some physical signs -- expression or, better, heart rate and cchemical in the blood. Intention does not seem to be one of those and so I don't see any reason to say that sayisfaction or accomplishment or ... is "the same attitude" with a different name. It seems that the intention might just as well be "continued" in disappointment or some stronger form. The same applies to the hypothesized inchoative emotions. Intention arises more or less consciously and is not intention until it has arisen; there does not seem to be any other emotion that is a precursor (for that is what an inchoative expression of emotion would have to be -- the real expression of a precursor) that is reliably connected to intention.
> But documenting aspectual attitudes should be > orthogonal to documenting > their basic present-tense meaning, as > associated with the 6 classifiers. > With just inchoative, superfective, and > present attitudes, 6 > classifiers, and positive, negative and neutral > scalar meanings, each of > the attitudinals might need up to 54 examples > to fully explicate its > meaning. > > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^) > > lojbab > > > >
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Fri 09 of Sep., 2005 23:56 GMT On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people should stop philosophising, go and look at the definitions and examples and comment on those, and eventually propose improvements. {ai} is not the only one that needs checking either. And then vote.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Sat 10 of Sep., 2005 21:07 GMT posts: 14214 On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 08:51:20PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > > > > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^) > > Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people should stop > philosophising, go and look at the definitions and examples and > comment on those, and eventually propose improvements. {ai} is not > the only one that needs checking either. And then vote.
Erm. What's the point? It looks like you've got at least two "No" votes at this point.
-Robin
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Sun 11 of Sep., 2005 01:25 GMT On 9/10/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Fri, Sep 09, 2005 at 08:51:20PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier wrote: > > > > > > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^) > > > > Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people should stop > > philosophising, go and look at the definitions and examples and > > comment on those, and eventually propose improvements. {ai} is not > > the only one that needs checking either. And then vote. > > Erm. What's the point? It looks like you've got at least two "No" > votes at this point.
I see only one vote against (I suppose it's Arnt's) and one in favour (mine). But even if there were two or more against, it would still be necessary for people to say which definitions they oppose (is it just {ainai}? What about {e'onai}?, what about {e'e} and {e'i}?), so that whoever takes over as shepherd can change them. And it is necessary for as many people as possible to check all the definitions so that there are no inadvertent errors. The BPFK has something like 18 voting members, it would be great if at least a third of them actually voted.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 13 of Sep., 2005 19:37 GMT posts: 2388 Well, in addition to running discussions, here is a start.
> On 9/9/05, Robert LeChevalier
> wrote:
> >
> > Is Jorge having fun yet? %^)
>
> Lots, but my job is basically done. Now people
> should stop
> philosophising, go and look at the definitions
> and examples
> and comment on those, and eventually propose
> improvements.
> {ai} is not the only one that needs checking
> either. And then vote.
.a'i (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express effort / endeavor / exertion / labor / pains / strife / toil. (cf. troci, gunka, slunandu, selprogunka, fu'i nai) .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte I'm trying to hold it! .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo It'll be hard for me to wake you up. These seem to be two separate notions. The one is for a present effort, the other for a future one. I cannot now be experiencing (and so cant be expressing) the future effort. It may be, however, that I presently experiencing something like fear-that where the character of the predicted event is not that it is undesirable but that it is difficult, involves labor on my part. This is not common in English, though not unheard of (the comic strip version is Groan! e.g., I have to get him up tomorrow). That, in turn, might be extended to the present case (just as fear-that can become real fear), though with a change (as from {aonai} to {ii}), though what else might be used is not clear. From the surrounding forms, {aV}, {aI} seems to be about the future case. .a'i cu'i (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness / ease / facility / no special effort (cf. selfrili, fu'i) .a'i cu'i ti frili Ah, this is easy.
This, however, seems to be about the present case, rather than That will be a piece of cake, looking ahead.
.a'i nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express repose / inaction / inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness / indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla) .a'i nai cikre ta Nah, why bother fixing it.
And this is projective, apparently.
.ai (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express intent / intentionality / purpose / design (cf. zukte, platu) .ai mi ze'e ba jmive I intend to live forever. .ai le mi cukta do sidju gi'e pacnygau I intend for my book to give you help and hope. .ai cu'i (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express indecision / hesitation / vacillation / wavering. .ai cu'i mi ti ba te vecnu I don't know whether I'll purchase these or not.
This is having no intention either to do or refrain or do contrarily
.ai nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express non-intent / unintentionality / accidentality / unplannedness. (cf. selsnuti) .ai nai mi gunka ca le pavdei I'm not planning to work on Monday. .ai nai mi jmina lo valsi poi mi finti I don't mean to add words of my own devising. .ai nai do pu se xrani I didn't mean for you to get hurt. This is the puzzle. We can ignore the last example for now, since it is clearly up to something different from intention in the operating sense. It appears to be that {ainai p} means not intend p, but allows that I intend not-p. So it is more overtly committed than {aicuiI}, half the commitment process has been eliminated but still not necessarily decided. On a scale, this is not obviously the extreme, which would be intend not-p. The third example seems to be about some attitude inherited from a completed intention (more or less analogous to actual exertion fulfilling expected exertion in {ai}) . The problem is that there does not seem to be such an attitude, or, at least, that no one has pointed to a clear case of it nor explained how it is related to the future-looking case. .au (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express desire / wish / yearning / aspiration. (cf. djica) .au lo tricu cu krati lo ro se genja gi'e sfasa lo kusru be gy Would that the trees might speak on behalf of all things that have roots, and punish those that wrong them!
Here the componential analysis works: attitude toward a desireable event outside my control and not seen as likely.
.au cu'i (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express indifference / apathy / disinterest. (cf. nordji) .au cu'i makau jinga I don't really care who wins.
Attitude toward an event which is neither desirable or not, but rather toward which one is indifferent. The likelihood of occurrence seems to drop out as well. As far as I can tell, {kau} even if it covers all kinds of things other than indirect questions is still restricted to subordinate clauses, which, if true, makes (au cui) subordinating and, thus, presumably something more akin to asserting than one would expect for an attitudinal.
.au nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express reluctance / averseness / disinclination. (cf. toldji) .au nai mi cliva I'm reluctant to leave.
This seems to negate two factors. The event is undesirable and it is likely to occur ({cui} can be seen as similarly taking neutral positions on both factors). The example seems to suggest that my leaving is not significantly under my control.
.a'o (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express hope / longing. (cf. pacna) .a'o le nobli cu gidva lo se zukte be mi Oh, that the Lord would guide my ways.
It is not clear how this example differs from {au}, but presumably it is that the event is seen more as a lively option, i.e., as a less remote possibility (though probably not the most likely).
.a'o nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express despair / hopelessness / dread / fear that a situation ensues. (cf. tolpacna) .a'o nai ro da ca se cirko Everything will be lost now.
The key words here go in two directions directions: one dread that (as I take it to be) is the opposite of hope in the sense that it is an undesirable event mentioned (again a live option and not under my control). This comes very close to hope not except that perhaps the option is more likely than one merely hoped for. The other, despair, is a fullblown emotion (complete with affects and physiological markers). It need not even have a propositional object, though it can have one. In one sense it is not projective; the disaster is here. But it is typically reported (when propositional) in terms of potential things that will now not occur (despair of p, where p is desirable, is a locution at least as common as despair that p, (where p is undesirable) if not more so, but with totally different polarities) . It in both cases it is a denial of hope: not just not the case that I hope that p but not the case that I can hope that p (for the despair of version, the despair that needs appropriate adjustments. ). In the projective sense, despair that seems best for the extreme case (dread is slightly weaker). Here it seems likely that (aonai} can be used without a proposition for the global sense of despair and {ao} for the less obvious but detectable corresponding sense of hope (maybe hopeful).
.ei (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / how things ought to be. (cf. bilga) .ei mi cliva co'o Gotta go now, bye! .ei le jatna cu ckeji The president ought to be ashamed. .ei do djuno You ought to know. Here the various fields of attitudinals and the like has familiar play: we regularly distinguish between moral oughts and practical one and prudential ones and probably several others. In each the reference is to a possible world just like this one except that the appropriate rules are fa\ollowed. So here we say what would happen in that world in this case. And then, if need be, we flag for which rules we mean (including some pretty ad hoc one as in the first example as typically employed if I am to keep my sanity, say). The relation to {bilga} is some what tenuous: {bilga} seems to relate only the obligations laid on one by the appropriate ceremonial acts; not tose that come from, for example, ones simply being human. This is irrealis, of course (you never are told you ought to do what you are already doing or have done) but it functions more like the directive cases (eV) than like those that hinge on desirability , control, and likelihood: the last plays no role, desirability is implicit but not actually required, except the desirability of following the rules. And control is assumed. The have to reading suggests more likely meeting ones obligations than seems appropriate (if likelihood is involved at all, ought talk comes up when the odds are against). .ei nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express freedom / lack of obligation / how things need not be. (cf. zifre) .ei nai do tolnurcni You don't have to feel threatened.
Permission is the dual of obligation and seems to be a sort of neutral ground here. The idea for the negative end seems to be There are no rules in this area. The literal negation would seem to be something like You can obey all the rules and still not do this which does seem to allow that it is forbidden, though I dont think that was intended to be allowed. The short form is There are no rules covering this.
.e'a (UI1)
Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant
permission / authorization / consent / license.
(cf. curmi)
.e'a do tsebi'o
You may sit down.
Closely related to {ei} (its dual?) but apparently about making up rules rather than citing the preexistent (in the speakers mind, at least) ones. This seems to be more subjective and its utterance a world-creating speech act, whereas {ei} is more objective (in form) and the speech act closer to an assertion. But, on the other hand, {ei} might just as well also be a part of an obligation-making speech act, laying an ob on someone, where in a formal ceremony or not. These possibilities need to be clarified which is actually involved or if both how can we tell which is going on in a particular case>
.e'a nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to prohibit / forbid / deny permission / authorization / consent / license. (cf. tolcru) .e'a nai do ti stali You can't stay here.
Again, the subjectiver version of {ei na}
.e'e (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to exhort / incite / motivate / encourage / entreat / stimulate / challenge / dare / provoke / invite competition. (cf. talsa) .e'e ko jarco lo se kakne be do Show them what you can do! Go for it! .e'e mi do bajra jivna fe'e co'u le karce I'll race you to the car! Again a twoway split: a present and a projctive sense. The projective You can do it sense fits with other eVs as parts of getting others to do things by speech. The present sense, Good job! (calling it competent as the older list has it is not a very strong complement , if one at all), looks back to the split on {ai} to which it is related in an obvious way. .e'e nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to discourage / intimidate / demoralize / deprecate / dampen / bridle / avoid / dodge / elude / duck / evade / back off / withdraw. (cf. zunti, dicra) .e'e nai doi nelis Whoa, Nelly! .e'e nai mi bilga lo nu zukte lo drata Sorry, I have other things to do. The split continues here. The last example doesnt seem to fit (i.e., needs more explanation) since it seems more an apology (or excuse) rather than directly affecting someone elses behavior. .e'i (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to command / dictate / instruct / order / oblige / constrain / impose an obligation. (cf. minde, ri'urgau) .e'i ko ta mi dunda Give that to me!
The example raises the question (if it were not already in play) of what {ei} adds to or how it differs from simple imperatives. {eo} below has been taken to ameliorate the command form, getting glossed at one time as Please (and {eocai} as pretty please with sugar on it); does {ei} strenthen it to its most imperious form? It should be noted that {ei}, unlike the imperative forms, can be third person (and even first): the troops shall proceed to the intersection and the like. The last gloss suggests that this is what is to be used for laying on obs, leaving {ei} for noting them. These projective senses are at variance with the apparent present-feeling sense of the older lists, but that is a rather suspect case, for the most part.
.e'i nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to discharge / absolve / dismiss / exonerate / liberate / release / unbind / free of an obligation. (cf. zi'ergau) .e'i nai ko zukte lo se djica be do Do whatever you please!
This example looks like releasing from an ob, the converse of one reading of {ei}. Pragmatically, the two readings come to much the same thing. If one is in a position to command, then those you are addressing are already under an obligation to obey (what the command position amounts to) and this merely gives present content to that obligation. So this form releases from this particular but not from the general obligation.
.e'o (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to make a request. (cf. cpedu, pe'u) .e'o do dunda le silna mi Can you pass me the salt, please?
See {ei} for relation to {ko} forms. The notion of obligations and permissions dont really fit here except when asking permission to do something. Again, like {ei} this can third or first person.
.e'o nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer / make an offer. (cf. friti) .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla Here, have some candy.
This seems out of pattern. Taking it as norm would make {einai} a way to say Yessir. Conversely this should mean Nevermind withdrawing a request. On the other hand, this seems to be a useful notion to have and fits nicely with the notion of {nai} as opposite.
.e'u (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to suggest / persuade / advise. (cf. stidi) .e'u mi'o salci Let's party!
Weaker than any of the preceding, not definitely pointing to a course, merely putting one foreward, for others to accept or not. It does seem that it is not limited to actions; we can suggest factual possibilities (which we can order or request) as well as practical ones.
.e'u nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise. (cf. kajde, o'i) .e'u nai do kargau le moklu You better not open your mouth.
This looks very like {eu na}, it does not suggest for an alternative, merely against the stated proposition. Other possibilities are to use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for accepting one and so on.
ia (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi) ia lo cevni cu zasti Indeed God exists.
ia cu'i (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt / agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi) ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti Hmm ... God may or may not exist.
ia nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief / incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri) ia nai lo cevni cu zasti I don't believe God exists.
As you might expect with a notion close to truth, the negation seems to just negate the claim. You can arge that not believing p is different from believig not-p, but the alternative, of having no belief either way, is covered by the neutral form.
ie (UI1) Attitudinal. Used to express agreement / concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni) ie ta melbi Yes, that's beautiful.
This is a response to suggestions rather than to claims, possibly also to requests and commands (the example seems odd, but may be in response to something like Isnt it beautiful but {ia} still seems to be more apt. The relation of the two needs some working out).
ie nai (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement / dissent / contention / difference / argument. (cf. toltu'i) ie nai go'i I disagree with that.
Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a middle case for suspended judgment .
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Wed 14 of Sep., 2005 15:21 GMT posts: 2388 Is it just me or do we have trouble with gmail again?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 14 of Sep., 2005 17:54 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 14, 2005 at 08:21:37AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote: > Is it just me or do we have trouble with gmail again?
We never stopped. I haven't fixed the bug yet.
-Robin
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 14 of Sep., 2005 18:10 GMT posts: 14214 Replying to this just so people can see the decoded version.
-Robin
On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/13/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte > > I'm trying to hold it! > > .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo > > It'll be hard for me to wake you up. > > > > These seem to be two separate notions. The one > > is for a present effort, the other for a future > > one. > > Right, that's what the tense of the bridi indicates. The question > is, are the two notions so separate that they can't be covered > by the same word, or are they related enough that they > can? My take is the latter. There is in principle no impediment > for a UI to accompany a past, present or future bridi. There > is no requirement that the bridi be marked as present tense. > > > I cannot now be experiencing (and so can't > > be expressing) the future effort. > > I can't be experiencing a future effort (can I experience a present > one, or are efforts made rather than experienced?) But why not > express that I anticipate having to make one? Many attitudinals > are not for expressing what one is experiencing. Some are: {ui} > for example, I experience happiness, I express happiness. Others > aren't: {oi} is for expressing a complaint, but one does not experience > the complaint, and one can complain about things being experienced > now but also about things that were experienced in the past or > will be experienced in the future. > > > It may be, > > however, that I presently experiencing something > > like fear-that where the character of the > > predicted event is not that it is undesirable but > > that it is difficult, involves labor on my part. > > Right. > > > This is not common in English, though not unheard > > of (the comic strip version is "Groan!" ? e.g., > > "I have to get him up tomorrow"). That, in turn, > > might be extended to the present case (just as > > fear-that can become real fear), though with a > > change (as from {a'onai} to {ii}), though what > > else might be used is not clear. From the > > surrounding forms, {aV}, {a'I} seems to be about > > the future case. > > {a'onai} can also apply to the past or the present. > > > .a'i cu'i (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness / > > ease / facility / no special effort (cf. > > selfrili, fu'i) > > .a'i cu'i ti frili > > Ah, this is easy. > > > > This, however, seems to be about the present > > case, rather than "That will be a piece of cake," > > looking ahead. > > {a'i cu'i ti ca frili} "Ah, this is easy." > {a'i cu'i ti ba frili} "This will be a piece of cake." > > > .a'i nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express repose / inaction / > > inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness / > > indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla) > > .a'i nai cikre ta > > Nah, why bother fixing it. > > > > And this is projective, apparently. > > One could also say {a'i nai pu cikre ta}. > > > > .ei (UI1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / how > > things ought to be. > > > > This is > > irrealis, of course (you never are told you ought > > to do what you are already doing or have done) > > I think {ei} is not incompatible with an assertion: this > is how it is, and indeed how it ought to be as well. > So although often irrealis, it doesn't necessarily > impy that things are not how they ought to: > > A: oi mi ca'a klama le zarci > B: ei go'i > > A: Oy, I'm going to the store. > B: And so you should. > > > but it functions more like the directive cases > > (eV) than like those that hinge on desirability , > > control, and likelihood: the last plays no role, > > desirability is implicit ? but not actually > > required, except the desirability of following > > the rules. And control is assumed. > > Not sure about whose control we are talking about: > > ei lo xlali na se lifri lo xamgu prenu > Bad things ought not to happen to good people. > > God's? Fate's? > > > .e'a (UI1) > > Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant > > permission / authorization / consent / license. > > (cf. curmi) > > .e'a do tsebi'o > > You may sit down. > > > > Closely related to {ei} (its dual?) > > I think {e'a} is the dual of {e'i}, both assume that the speaker has > some kind of authority over the event in question. ({ei} does not.) > > > But, on the > > other hand, {ei} might just as well also be a > > part of an obligation-making speech act, laying > > an ob on someone, where in a formal ceremony or > > not. > > I'd say that's {e'i}. > > > .e'o nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer / > > make an offer. (cf. friti) > > .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla > > Here, have some candy. > > > > This seems out of pattern. Taking it as norm > > would make {e'inai} a way to say "Yessir." > > I think all the e'V are basically {ko} modifiers (even though > they work with third person too). "Yessir" wouldn't fit that > pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}. > > > > .e'u nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise. > > (cf. kajde, o'i) > > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu > > You better not open your mouth. > > > > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not > > suggest for an alternative, merely against the > > stated proposition. > > I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it should be > {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}. > > > Other possibilities are to > > use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for > > accepting one and so on. > > Neither seems very attractive to me, they seem too ad hoc. > > > ia (UI1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction > > / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi) > > ia lo cevni cu zasti > > Indeed God exists. > > > > ia cu'i (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt / > > agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi) > > ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti > > Hmm ... God may or may not exist. > > > > ia nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief / > > incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri) > > ia nai lo cevni cu zasti > > I don't believe God exists. > > > > As you might expect with a notion close to truth, > > the negation seems to just negate the claim. You > > can arge that not believing p is different from > > believig not-p, > > Yes, that's what I would argue. > > >but the alternative, of having no > > belief either way, is covered by the neutral > > form. > > I think doubt is different from absence of belief. It's similar to > the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack of intention. > > > > ie (UI1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express agreement / > > concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni) > > ie ta melbi > > Yes, that's beautiful. > > > > This is a response to suggestions rather than to > > claims, possibly also to requests and commands > > (the example seems odd, but may be in response to > > something like "Isn't it beautiful" but {ia} > > still seems to be more apt. The relation of the > > two needs some working out). > > {ie} has always been used as a response to claims, as far as > I can tell, and it is one of the most frequently used UIs. > > {ia} tags a belief of the speaker, {ie} tags a belief that the > speaker shares with their interlocutor. > > > ie nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement / > > dissent / contention / difference / argument. > > (cf. toltu'i) > > ie nai go'i > > I disagree with that. > > > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a > > middle case for suspended judgment . > > I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-) > > mu'o mi'e xorxes
-- http://www.digitalkingdom.org/~rlpowell/ *** http://www.lojban.org/ Reason #237 To Learn Lojban: "Homonyms: Their Grate!" Proud Supporter of the Singularity Institute - http://singinst.org/
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Wed 14 of Sep., 2005 22:46 GMT On 9/13/05, John E Clifford wrote: > .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte > I'm trying to hold it! > .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo > It'll be hard for me to wake you up. > > These seem to be two separate notions. The one > is for a present effort, the other for a future > one.
Right, that's what the tense of the bridi indicates. The question is, are the two notions so separate that they can't be covered by the same word, or are they related enough that they can? My take is the latter. There is in principle no impediment for a UI to accompany a past, present or future bridi. There is no requirement that the bridi be marked as present tense.
> I cannot now be experiencing (and so can't > be expressing) the future effort.
I can't be experiencing a future effort (can I experience a present one, or are efforts made rather than experienced?) But why not express that I anticipate having to make one? Many attitudinals are not for expressing what one is experiencing. Some are: {ui} for example, I experience happiness, I express happiness. Others aren't: {oi} is for expressing a complaint, but one does not experience the complaint, and one can complain about things being experienced now but also about things that were experienced in the past or will be experienced in the future.
> It may be, > however, that I presently experiencing something > like fear-that where the character of the > predicted event is not that it is undesirable but > that it is difficult, involves labor on my part.
Right.
> This is not common in English, though not unheard > of (the comic strip version is "Groan!" – e.g., > "I have to get him up tomorrow"). That, in turn, > might be extended to the present case (just as > fear-that can become real fear), though with a > change (as from {a'onai} to {ii}), though what > else might be used is not clear. From the > surrounding forms, {aV}, {a'I} seems to be about > the future case.
{a'onai} can also apply to the past or the present.
> .a'i cu'i (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness / > ease / facility / no special effort (cf. > selfrili, fu'i) > .a'i cu'i ti frili > Ah, this is easy. > > This, however, seems to be about the present > case, rather than "That will be a piece of cake," > looking ahead.
{a'i cu'i ti ca frili} "Ah, this is easy." {a'i cu'i ti ba frili} "This will be a piece of cake."
> .a'i nai (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to express repose / inaction / > inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness / > indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla) > .a'i nai cikre ta > Nah, why bother fixing it. > > And this is projective, apparently.
One could also say {a'i nai pu cikre ta}.
> .ei (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / how
> things ought to be.
>
> This is
> irrealis, of course (you never are told you ought
> to do what you are already doing or have done)
I think {ei} is not incompatible with an assertion: this is how it is, and indeed how it ought to be as well. So although often irrealis, it doesn't necessarily impy that things are not how they ought to:
A: oi mi ca'a klama le zarci B: ei go'i
A: Oy, I'm going to the store. B: And so you should.
> but it functions more like the directive cases > (eV) than like those that hinge on desirability , > control, and likelihood: the last plays no role, > desirability is implicit – but not actually > required, except the desirability of following > the rules. And control is assumed.
Not sure about whose control we are talking about:
ei lo xlali na se lifri lo xamgu prenu Bad things ought not to happen to good people.
God's? Fate's?
> .e'a (UI1) > Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant > permission / authorization / consent / license. > (cf. curmi) > .e'a do tsebi'o > You may sit down. > > Closely related to {ei} (its dual?)
I think {e'a} is the dual of {e'i}, both assume that the speaker has some kind of authority over the event in question. ({ei} does not.)
> But, on the > other hand, {ei} might just as well also be a > part of an obligation-making speech act, laying > an ob on someone, where in a formal ceremony or > not.
I'd say that's {e'i}.
> .e'o nai (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer / > make an offer. (cf. friti) > .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla > Here, have some candy. > > This seems out of pattern. Taking it as norm > would make {e'inai} a way to say "Yessir."
I think all the e'V are basically {ko} modifiers (even though they work with third person too). "Yessir" wouldn't fit that pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.
> .e'u nai (UI*1)
> Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise.
> (cf. kajde, o'i)
> .e'u nai do kargau le moklu
> You better not open your mouth.
>
> This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not
> suggest for an alternative, merely against the
> stated proposition.
I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it should be {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.
> Other possibilities are to > use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for > accepting one and so on.
Neither seems very attractive to me, they seem too ad hoc.
> ia (UI1) > Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction > / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi) > ia lo cevni cu zasti > Indeed God exists. > > ia cu'i (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt / > agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi) > ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti > Hmm ... God may or may not exist. > > ia nai (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief / > incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri) > ia nai lo cevni cu zasti > I don't believe God exists. > > As you might expect with a notion close to truth, > the negation seems to just negate the claim. You > can arge that not believing p is different from > believig not-p,
Yes, that's what I would argue.
>but the alternative, of having no > belief either way, is covered by the neutral > form.
I think doubt is different from absence of belief. It's similar to the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack of intention.
> ie (UI1)
> Attitudinal. Used to express agreement /
> concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni)
> ie ta melbi
> Yes, that's beautiful.
>
> This is a response to suggestions rather than to
> claims, possibly also to requests and commands
> (the example seems odd, but may be in response to
> something like "Isn't it beautiful" but {ia}
> still seems to be more apt. The relation of the
> two needs some working out).
{ie} has always been used as a response to claims, as far as I can tell, and it is one of the most frequently used UIs.
{ia} tags a belief of the speaker, {ie} tags a belief that the speaker shares with their interlocutor.
> ie nai (UI*1) > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement / > dissent / contention / difference / argument. > (cf. toltu'i) > ie nai go'i > I disagree with that. > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a > middle case for suspended judgment .
I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Wed 14 of Sep., 2005 23:49 GMT posts: 2388 > On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300, Jorge > Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/13/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > .a'i mi ze'a ba ralte > > > I'm trying to hold it! > > > .a'i mi ba gasnu lo nu do cikna binxo > > > It'll be hard for me to wake you up. > > > > > > These seem to be two separate notions. The > one > > > is for a present effort, the other for a > future > > > one. > > > > Right, that's what the tense of the bridi > indicates. The question > > is, are the two notions so separate that they > can't be covered > > by the same word, or are they related enough > that they > > can? My take is the latter. There is in > principle no impediment > > for a UI to accompany a past, present or > future bridi. There > > is no requirement that the bridi be marked as > present tense.
Well, I would say that the claim about UI depends very much on which UI is involved. But for {a'i} it seems pretty clear to me that the same state (perhaps in an attenuated form) may occur in remembering or anticipating an action as does when that action is being done. Since effort has affects and physiological markers, this is testable and passes. This is true for many other UI but certainly not for all and further there are UI which work with one combination of tenses (tenses is a bad category here since it is usually not the time of the event but whether it is known to have occurred that is decisive in many cases) but not with others. That is, every UI (l9ke every word) has its own logic and the doneness or not of an event is sometimes a relevant part of that logic.
> > > I cannot now be experiencing (and so can't > > > be expressing) the future effort. > > > > I can't be experiencing a future effort (can > I experience a present > > one, or are efforts made rather than > experienced?)
Well, we do say "make an effort" but doing so is experienced (and performed) in terms of stresses, physical and psychological, many of which are detectable even externally but certainly internally.
But why not > > express that I anticipate having to make one? > Many attitudinals > > are not for expressing what one is > experiencing. Some are: {ui} > > for example, I experience happiness, I > express happiness. Others > > aren't: {oi} is for expressing a complaint, > but one does not experience > > the complaint, and one can complain about > things being experienced > > now but also about things that were > experienced in the past or > > will be experienced in the future.
True enough, although I would generally take it taht a complaint is the expression of some underlying (perhaps liminal) feeling that is probably detectable. But it is clear that its object, like that of happiness, may be past, present or future, even in the psychological sense.
> > > > > It may be, > > > however, that I presently experiencing > something > > > like fear-that where the character of the > > > predicted event is not that it is > undesirable but > > > that it is difficult, involves labor on my > part. > > > > Right. > > > > > This is not common in English, though not > unheard > > > of (the comic strip version is "Groan!" ? > e.g., > > > "I have to get him up tomorrow"). That, in > turn, > > > might be extended to the present case (just > as > > > fear-that can become real fear), though > with a > > > change (as from {a'onai} to {ii}), though > what > > > else might be used is not clear. From the > > > surrounding forms, {aV}, {a'I} seems to be > about > > > the future case. > > > > {a'onai} can also apply to the past or the > present.
And {a'o} too, in one sense. On consideration, I take back the remark that such moves are uncommon; they seem actually (after tinking about it) fairly common indeed. The sense in which this applies to {a'o} and {a'o nai} however is not the propsoitional attitude "hope that" "fear that" "despair that" but the more global sense of hopefulness or despair, not tied to particular events as objects though perhaps recognized as causes. I don't see any problem with using the same mark for these even thoug they are phenomenologically and physiologically somewhat different.
> > > .a'i cu'i (UI*1)
> > > Attitudinal. Used to express effortlessness
> /
> > > ease / facility / no special effort (cf.
> > > selfrili, fu'i)
> > > .a'i cu'i ti frili
> > > Ah, this is easy.
> > >
> > > This, however, seems to be about the
> present
> > > case, rather than "That will be a piece of
> cake,"
> > > looking ahead.
> >
> > {a'i cu'i ti ca frili} "Ah, this is easy."
> > {a'i cu'i ti ba frili} "This will be a piece
> of cake."
Yeah, if effort can be anticipated or recalled, there doesn't seem to be any reason for leaving the others out.
> > > .a'i nai (UI*1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to express repose / > inaction / > > > inactivity / passivity / lackadaisicalness > / > > > indolence(cf. toltoi, cando, guksurla) > > > .a'i nai cikre ta > > > Nah, why bother fixing it. > > > > > > And this is projective, apparently. > > > > One could also say {a'i nai pu cikre ta}.
Yes for consistency's sake if nothing else (the markers are a lot less clear here).
> > > .ei (UI1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to express obligation / > how > > > things ought to be. > > > > > > This is > > > irrealis, of course (you never are told you > ought > > > to do what you are already doing or have > done) > > > > I think {ei} is not incompatible with an > assertion: this > > is how it is, and indeed how it ought to be > as well. > > So although often irrealis, it doesn't > necessarily > > impy that things are not how they ought to: > > > > A: oi mi ca'a klama le zarci > > B: ei go'i > > > > A: Oy, I'm going to the store. > > B: And so you should. > > > > > but it functions more like the directive > cases > > > (eV) than like those that hinge on > desirability , > > > control, and likelihood: the last plays no > role, > > > desirability is implicit ? but not actually > > > required, except the desirability of > following > > > the rules. And control is assumed. > > > > Not sure about whose control we are talking > about: > > > > ei lo xlali na se lifri lo xamgu prenu > > Bad things ought not to happen to good > people. > > > > God's? Fate's?
Yeah, I was taking these things in order and not thinking ahead, so I had only this for "ought." Since it is not laying on an ob, then it is compatible with any tense. By the way, the use of "obligation" here is misleading, since that word in modern English is mainly agent oriented: even though the word outght to be a certain way it is under no obligation (nor is it obliged) to be that way.
> > > .e'a (UI1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to permit / allow / grant > > > permission / authorization / consent / > license. > > > (cf. curmi) > > > .e'a do tsebi'o > > > You may sit down. > > > > > > Closely related to {ei} (its dual?) > > > > I think {e'a} is the dual of {e'i}, both > assume that the speaker has > > some kind of authority over the event in > question. ({ei} does not.)
Is there a form for noting that something is not required (or, more importantly, not forbidden)? {einai}? or {eicu'i}
> > > But, on the > > > other hand, {ei} might just as well also be > a > > > part of an obligation-making speech act, > laying > > > an ob on someone, where in a formal > ceremony or > > > not. > > > > I'd say that's {e'i}.
I would too once I got to it.
> > > .e'o nai (UI*1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to grant / cede / proffer > / > > > make an offer. (cf. friti) > > > .e'o nai ko lebna lo titla > > > Here, have some candy. > > > > > > This seems out of pattern. Taking it as > norm > > > would make {e'inai} a way to say "Yessir." > > > > I think all the e'V are basically {ko} > modifiers (even though
A point of view that needs expansion — how exactly do they modify (or supplant) {ko}? I think that this is very close to correct however (suggestion seems a bit too remote).
they work with third person too). "Yessir" wouldn't fit that > pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}.
This is patterning to match the {nai} form of "request" as "grant request":: {nai} form of command is "obey command." Since it is not that, the request form is anomolous. I don't think the command form should be changed to "Yessir."
> > .e'u nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / disadvise. > > (cf. kajde, o'i) > > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu > > You better not open your mouth. > > > > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not > > suggest for an alternative, merely against the > > stated proposition. > > I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it should be > {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}.
What then is the function of {nai}, i.e., how does this differ from {e'u do na kargau le moklu}?
> > Other possibilities are to > > use this for withdrawing a suggestion or for > > accepting one and so on. > > Neither seems very attractive to me, they seem too ad hoc.
Again, they are based on ealier {nai} foirms in this same block, which forms are pretty much a bag of unrelated bits. Maybe that is the way it is, but the appearance that these reading come by some rule of interpretation rather than ad hoc throughout needs a lot more evidence than is now available (which is not to say that I don't think these reading are probably the wisest choices).
> > ia (UI1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express belief / conviction > > / faith / certainty (cf. krici, birti, jinvi) > > ia lo cevni cu zasti > > Indeed God exists. > > > > ia cu'i (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express skepticism / doubt / > > agnosticism / uncertainty. (cf. senpi) > > ia cu'i lo cevni cu zasti > > Hmm ... God may or may not exist. > > > > ia nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express disbelief / > > incredulity / rejection (cf. tolkri) > > ia nai lo cevni cu zasti > > I don't believe God exists. > > > > As you might expect with a notion close to truth, > > the negation seems to just negate the claim. You > > can arge that not believing p is different from > > believing not-p, > > Yes, that's what I would argue.
Not believing that p covers a range of cases that are sometimes useful to separate: beliving that not-p, believing something more specific but contrary to p, being torn between p and not-p (or some specific alternative), having never considered the p issue at all. Where do you want the various forms available to fall? I would suppose that, for you at least, believing that not-p and believing something contrary to p are just forms of believing that (i.e., take bare {ia}).
> >but the alternative, of having no > > belief either way, is covered by the neutral > > form. > > I think doubt is different from absence of belief. It's similar to > the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack of intention.
So, you have the torn between p and not-p as {cu'i} and the "never considered" case as {nai}? But neither of these would normally be called disbelief, which is much closer to — even if not exactly the same as — belief that not-p. Doubt is something else again, perhaps closer to wavering. None of these seem to fit the example very well.
> > ie (UI1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express agreement / > > concordance / accord / concurrence. (cf. tugni) > > ie ta melbi > > Yes, that's beautiful. > > > > This is a response to suggestions rather than to > > claims, possibly also to requests and commands > > (the example seems odd, but may be in response to > > something like "Isn't it beautiful" but {ia} > > still seems to be more apt. The relation of the > > two needs some working out). > > {ie} has always been used as a response to claims, as far as > I can tell, and it is one of the most frequently used UIs. > > {ia} tags a belief of the speaker, {ie} tags a belief that the > speaker shares with their interlocutor. > > > ie nai (UI*1) > > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement / > > dissent / contention / difference / argument. > > (cf. toltu'i) > > ie nai go'i > > I disagree with that. > > > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that needs a > > middle case for suspended judgment . > > I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-)
Well, it does in fact look exacty like {ie na}, it just needs the middle case. Here of course we can get a fairly complex set of negations with first all the variations on believing and then at least a three-way separation on agreeing. I uniform way of handling middle cases (and negatives, come to that) would be nice but probably won't work out as meaningful, given the differences in the items being dealt with. BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 15 of Sep., 2005 15:47 GMT On 9/14/05, John E Clifford wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300, Jorge > > Llamb?as wrote: > > > I think all the e'V are basically {ko} > > modifiers (even though > > A point of view that needs expansion — how > exactly do they modify (or supplant) {ko}? I > think that this is very close to correct however > (suggestion seems a bit too remote).
e'a ko klama "Go (I give my permission)" e'e ko klama "Go (come on, you can do it)" e'i ko klama "Go (I command you to)" e'o ko klama "Go (please do)" e'u ko klama "Go (you won't regret it)"
In all cases the agent is the audience (eventually it could be a third party, but in any case not the speaker). The speaker's stake on the situation is indirect.
> they work with third person too). "Yessir" > wouldn't fit that > > pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}. > > This is patterning to match the {nai} form of > "request" as "grant request":: {nai} form of > command is "obey command." Since it is not that, > the request form is anomolous. I don't think the > command form should be changed to "Yessir."
But {e'onai} would be for making an offer as in "help yourself". The agent is still the audience.
> > > .e'u nai (UI*1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / > disadvise. > > > (cf. kajde, o'i) > > > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu > > > You better not open your mouth. > > > > > > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does not > > > suggest for an alternative, merely against > the > > > stated proposition. > > > > I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect it > should be > > {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}. > > What then is the function of {nai}, i.e., how > does this differ from {e'u do na kargau le > moklu}?
Let's see:
e'a nai do klama - your going, I don't give my permission, in fact I forbid it. e'e nai do klama - your going, I don't encourage it, in fact I discourage it. e'i nai do klama - your going, I don't impose it, in fact I'm allowing you not to go. e'o nai do klama - your going, it is not a request, it's an invitation. e'u nai do klama - your going, it is not a suggestion... but what the hell is it? :-)
...
> Not believing that p covers a range of cases that
> are sometimes useful to separate: beliving that
> not-p,
It is possible for someone to believe that p and also to believe that not-p. Illogical, maybe, but people are not required to follow logic in their beliefs. More difficult is to believe that p and not p, i.e. believe that the conjunction holds (it is easier to believe that p and believe that not p if you don't make the conection), but still possible. It is not an analytic truth that "believe p and q" is the same as "believe p and believe q".
> believing something more specific but > contrary to p,
This is even easier to believe together with believing p.
>being torn between p and not-p (or > some specific alternative), having never > considered the p issue at all. Where do you want > the various forms available to fall?
{ianai} indicates that something is not a belief I hold (perhaps because I never considered the issue, but I would have to give it at least a minimum of consideration in order to express that). {iacu'i} indicates doubt as to whether I hold the belief in question or not.
> I would > suppose that, for you at least, believing that > not-p and believing something contrary to p are > just forms of believing that (i.e., take bare > {ia}).
Correct.
> > >but the alternative, of having no > > > belief either way, is covered by the neutral > > > form. > > > > I think doubt is different from absence of > belief. It's similar to > > the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs. lack > of intention. > > So, you have the torn between p and not-p as > {cu'i} and the "never considered" case as {nai}?
I may believe neither p nor not-p, even after careful consideration.
> But neither of these would normally be called > disbelief, which is much closer to — even if not > exactly the same as — belief that not-p. Doubt > is something else again, perhaps closer to > wavering. None of these seem to fit the example > very well.
What would need changing?
> > > ie nai (UI*1) > > > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement / > > > dissent / contention / difference / argument. > > > (cf. toltu'i) > > > ie nai go'i > > > I disagree with that. > > > > > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that > needs a > > > middle case for suspended judgment . > > > > I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-) > > Well, it does in fact look exacty like {ie na}, > it just needs the middle case.
So are we agreeing or disagreeing?
A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u B1: ie na go'i B2: ie nai go'i
A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na". B1: I agree it is not. B2: I disagree that it is.
Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?
> BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Thu 15 of Sep., 2005 20:35 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/14/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2005 at 10:52:55PM -0300,
> Jorge
> > > Llamb?as wrote:
> > > > I think all the e'V are basically {ko}
> > > modifiers (even though
> >
> > A point of view that needs expansion — how
> > exactly do they modify (or supplant) {ko}? I
> > think that this is very close to correct
> however
> > (suggestion seems a bit too remote).
>
> e'a ko klama "Go (I give my permission)"
> e'e ko klama "Go (come on, you can do it)"
> e'i ko klama "Go (I command you to)"
> e'o ko klama "Go (please do)"
> e'u ko klama "Go (you won't regret it)"
>
> In all cases the agent is the audience
> (eventually
> it could be a third party, but in any case not
> the
> speaker). The speaker's stake on the situation
> is
> indirect.
Well, there are cases where the speaker is also the audience or even a third person in the process, but these are clearly derivative.
> > they work with third person too). "Yessir" > > wouldn't fit that > > > pattern. "Yessir" is {vi'o}. > > > > This is patterning to match the {nai} form of > > "request" as "grant request":: {nai} form of > > command is "obey command." Since it is not > that, > > the request form is anomolous. I don't think > the > > command form should be changed to "Yessir." > > But {e'onai} would be for making an offer as in > "help > yourself". The agent is still the audience.
Not obviously; the request need not be "may I do x" but equally (or more) likely "would you do x for me" (that is, it is not always a request for permission, it may be for commission). Then you have in both cases the pattern x asks y of z: y gives z to x. In any case, no pattern seems to carry through for your various {nai} forms, they are each either ad hoc or, at least, based on a separate logic or practical considerations. Or else there is some subtle pattern which needs to be made clear — it surely is not yet.
> > > > .e'u nai (UI*1) > > > > Attitudinal. Used to dissuade / warn / > > disadvise. > > > > (cf. kajde, o'i) > > > > .e'u nai do kargau le moklu > > > > You better not open your mouth. > > > > > > > > This looks very like {e'u na}, it does > not > > > > suggest for an alternative, merely > against > > the > > > > stated proposition. > > > > > > I'm not very happy with this one. I suspect > it > > should be > > > {e'u nai do na kargau le moklu}. > > > > What then is the function of {nai}, i.e., how > > does this differ from {e'u do na kargau le > > moklu}? > > Let's see: > > e'a nai do klama - your going, I don't give my > permission, in fact I forbid it. > e'e nai do klama - your going, I don't > encourage it, in fact I discourage it. > e'i nai do klama - your going, I don't impose > it, in fact I'm allowing > you not to go. > e'o nai do klama - your going, it is not a > request, it's an invitation. > e'u nai do klama - your going, it is not a > suggestion... but what the > hell is it? :-) > > > ... > > Not believing that p covers a range of cases > that > > are sometimes useful to separate: beliving > that > > not-p, > > It is possible for someone to believe that p > and also > to believe that not-p. Illogical, maybe, but > people are not > required to follow logic in their beliefs. More > difficult is > to believe that p and not p, i.e. believe that > the > conjunction holds (it is easier to believe that > p and > believe that not p if you don't make the > conection), > but still possible. It is not an analytic truth > that > "believe p and q" is the same as "believe p and > believe q".
Yes; and so? As noted, not believing p covers a number of cases. The fact that he can believe p and believe not-p doesn't mean that one way of not believing p can't be believing not-p. This may mean that one can both believe and not believe p, but one can — under the ususal condition "but not in the same respect, etc." When the conditions are held constant, the conflicting beliefs disappear (though finding the right conditions when confronted with a real case is not always an easy mtter). Another way of putting this is that bleief sets are always consistent but that one may hold more than one belief set. > > believing something more specific but > > contrary to p, > > This is even easier to believe together with > believing p.
Yes, because then it may be hard to notice the conflict. Again, what is the point here?
> >being torn between p and not-p (or > > some specific alternative), having never > > considered the p issue at all. Where do you > want > > the various forms available to fall? > > {ianai} indicates that something is not a > belief I hold > (perhaps because I never considered the issue, > but > I would have to give it at least a minimum of > consideration > in order to express that)
Or perhaps because I consciously believe its denial (though I may also unsciously believe it as well).
. {iacu'i} indicates > doubt as to > whether I hold the belief in question or not.
That is pulled both ways or just never considered the issue. So, how exactly is this different from {nai}; they seem to overlap at least.
> > I would
> > suppose that, for you at least, believing
> that
> > not-p and believing something contrary to p
> are
> > just forms of believing that (i.e., take bare
> > {ia}).
>
> Correct.
>
> > > >but the alternative, of having no
> > > > belief either way, is covered by the
> neutral
> > > > form.
> > >
> > > I think doubt is different from absence of
> > belief. It's similar to
> > > the aicu'i/ainai distinction, wavering vs.
> lack
> > of intention.
> >
> > So, you have the torn between p and not-p as
> > {cu'i} and the "never considered" case as
> {nai}?
>
> I may believe neither p nor not-p, even after
> careful consideration.
And how is this different from being torn between the two? Or at least undecided between the two. You may be content to stop there and not feel the urge to settle the matter, but it is still a balancing act.
> > But neither of these would normally be called > > disbelief, which is much closer to — even if > not > > exactly the same as — belief that not-p. > Doubt > > is something else again, perhaps closer to > > wavering. None of these seem to fit the > example > > very well. > > What would need changing?
I suspect that, as is so often the case, what is needed is more context; without context it is possible to imagine all manner of scenarios in which this line plays a role and understandfing what is meant requires mindreading you to get the case you are thinking of (see earlier on {e'o}, for example).
> > > > ie nai (UI*1) > > > > Attitudinal. Used to express disagreement > / > > > > dissent / contention / difference / > argument. > > > > (cf. toltu'i) > > > > ie nai go'i > > > > I disagree with that. > > > > > > > > Looks a lot like {ie na} but to make that > > needs a > > > > middle case for suspended judgment . > > > > > > I agree it doesn't look like {ie na}. :-) > > > > Well, it does in fact look exacty like {ie > na}, > > it just needs the middle case. > > So are we agreeing or disagreeing? > > A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u > B1: ie na go'i > B2: ie nai go'i > > A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na". > B1: I agree it is not. > B2: I disagree that it is. > > Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?
Yeah, the example shows just how screwed up this is. The purported agreement is in fact disagreeing and the purported disagreement seems actually to be agreeing. If B2 is disagreeing with A, then he is saying that A's claim is not the case. B1 is clearly saying that A's claim is not the case, but in so doing he is also diagreeing with A, so his expression of agreement is inept. So, both are claiming that A's claim is incorrect, which was the point I was making: that {ienai} amounts to {ie na}. To be sure, it is not marking an agreement, but then, they don't agree.
>
> > BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
> Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.
? Irrealis is different from false, presumably. To say that something is not the case is as realis as to say it is. But then, I clearly don't understand what in the world {ianai} and {ienai} mean (and have precious little reason to think you do either, even though they are your creations).
How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i} in meaning?
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Fri 16 of Sep., 2005 00:47 GMT On 9/15/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > But {e'onai} would be for making an offer as in > > "help > > yourself". The agent is still the audience. > > Not obviously; the request need not be "may I do > x" but equally (or more) likely "would you do x > for me" (that is, it is not always a request for > permission, it may be for commission).
You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is for replying to a request. That's not what I'm thinking.
... > As noted, not believing p covers a > number of cases. The fact that he can believe p > and believe not-p doesn't mean that one way of > not believing p can't be believing not-p.
I probably didn't understand what you meant by "cover". In some cases {ia nai} is appropriate and {ia na} is not, in some cases {ia na} is appropriate and {ia nai} is not. In some cases either can be appropriate. So there is no (full) covering of one by the other, but yes there is a possible overlap.
> . {iacu'i} indicates
> > doubt as to
> > whether I hold the belief in question or not.
>
> That is pulled both ways or just never considered
> the issue. So, how exactly is this different
> from {nai}; they seem to overlap at least.
They might ovelap, I suppose. I can't really think of a good example though.
> > What would need changing?
>
> I suspect that, as is so often the case, what is
> needed is more context; without context it is
> possible to imagine all manner of scenarios in
> which this line plays a role and understandfing
> what is meant requires mindreading you to get the
> case you are thinking of (see earlier on {e'o},
> for example).
If you want to suggest more clear examples, or how to add appropriate context, please do.
> > A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u
> > B1: ie na go'i
> > B2: ie nai go'i
> >
> > A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na".
> > B1: I agree it is not.
> > B2: I disagree that it is.
> >
> > Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike?
>
> Yeah, the example shows just how screwed up this
> is.
I think {ie na} and {ie nai} are perfectly clear and distinct, much more so than {ia na} and {ia nai}. I can't understand how agreeing that not p can ever be confused with disagreeing that p.
> The purported agreement is in fact > disagreeing and the purported disagreement seems > actually to be agreeing. If B2 is disagreeing > with A, then he is saying that A's claim is not > the case.
Of course.
> B1 is clearly saying that A's claim is > not the case, but in so doing he is also > diagreeing with A, so his expression of agreement > is inept.
Of course.
> So, both are claiming that A's claim > is incorrect, which was the point I was making: > that {ienai} amounts to {ie na}.
Not at all. {ie nai go'i} is a perfectly correct answer, while {ie na go'i} is a totally inept one.
> To be sure, it > is not marking an agreement, but then, they don't > agree.
Of course, they don't agree, that's why {ie nai} is appropriate and {ie na} inappropriate.
> > > BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis?
> > Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}.
>
> ? Irrealis is different from false, presumably.
When I say {ie nai go'i} I am not asserting anything, all I'm doing is showing my disagreement with my interlocutor. The state of affairs described by {go'i} is not claimed to hold.
> To say that something is not the case is as > realis as to say it is. But then, I clearly > don't understand what in the world {ianai} and > {ienai} mean (and have precious little reason to > think you do either, even though they are your > creations).
Not strictly my creations in this case.
> How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i} in meaning?
I suppose in much the same way in which belief differs from opinion in English.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 16 of Sep., 2005 02:51 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/15/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > > > But {e'onai} would be for making an offer > as in > > > "help > > > yourself". The agent is still the audience. > > > > Not obviously; the request need not be "may I > do > > x" but equally (or more) likely "would you do > x > > for me" (that is, it is not always a request > for > > permission, it may be for commission). > > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is for > replying > to a request. That's not what I'm thinking.
Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request" Now you seem to be saying — stressing another part of the range you offered — that you mean simply "offer" and this gives the pairing "X requests z from y" and "x offers z to y." The corresponding thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be "x commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do z for y," which doesn't seem right either — although it is clearer somewhat than the given {e'inai}.
> ... > > As noted, not believing p covers a > > number of cases. The fact that he can > believe p > > and believe not-p doesn't mean that one way > of > > not believing p can't be believing not-p. > > I probably didn't understand what you meant by > "cover". In some cases {ia nai} is appropriate > and > {ia na} is not, in some cases {ia na} is > appropriate and > {ia nai} is not. In some cases either can be > appropriate. > So there is no (full) covering of one by the > other, but > yes there is a possible overlap. > > > > . {iacu'i} indicates > > > doubt as to > > > whether I hold the belief in question or > not. > > > > That is pulled both ways or just never > considered > > the issue. So, how exactly is this different > > from {nai}; they seem to overlap at least. > > They might ovelap, I suppose. I can't really > think > of a good example though. > > > > > What would need changing? > > > > I suspect that, as is so often the case, what > is > > needed is more context; without context it is > > possible to imagine all manner of scenarios > in > > which this line plays a role and > understandfing > > what is meant requires mindreading you to get > the > > case you are thinking of (see earlier on > {e'o}, > > for example). > > If you want to suggest more clear examples, or > how > to add appropriate context, please do.
Not my job nor my forte (which is part of why it is not my job). I do think that one sentence examples in isolation are often misleading and at best only of limited use, but getting longer cases really requires some usage and most of tis stuff hasn't hardly been used at all. Where it has been — you say {ie} is fairly common, for example — then real cases with significant context should be used.
> > > A: lu ie nai li'u satci mintu lu ie na li'u > > > B1: ie na go'i > > > B2: ie nai go'i > > > > > > A: "ie nai" is just like "ie na". > > > B1: I agree it is not. > > > B2: I disagree that it is. > > > > > > Do B1 and B2 really look exactly alike? > > > > Yeah, the example shows just how screwed up > this > > is. > > I think {ie na} and {ie nai} are perfectly > clear and distinct, > much more so than {ia na} and {ia nai}. I can't > understand > how agreeing that not p can ever be confused > with > disagreeing that p.
To agree that not-p requires that the original be not-p, to disagree that p requires that the original be p and so is the same as asserting not-p, with some incidental stuff about agreement or the lack. That is why the examples are so screwed up — and this carries over to back to the theory. But both the misplaced agreement {ia na go'i} and the well-placed disagreement {ianai go'i} assert {na go'i}; only the frills are different, one inept and the other apt.
> > The purported agreement is in fact > > disagreeing and the purported disagreement > seems > > actually to be agreeing. If B2 is > disagreeing > > with A, then he is saying that A's claim is > not > > the case. > > Of course. > > > B1 is clearly saying that A's claim is > > not the case, but in so doing he is also > > diagreeing with A, so his expression of > agreement > > is inept. > > Of course. > > > So, both are claiming that A's claim > > is incorrect, which was the point I was > making: > > that {ienai} amounts to {ie na}. > > Not at all. {ie nai go'i} is a perfectly > correct answer, > while {ie na go'i} is a totally inept one.
But both say that {na go'i} which is all that really matters — the agreement bit is just a frill (and dubiously an attitude or whatever in any case) — these are just gussied up claims, with not significant additional use except rhetoric (and thus, as noted, barely distinguishable from {ia}, which functions in the same way).
> > To be sure, it > > is not marking an agreement, but then, they > don't > > agree. > > Of course, they don't agree, that's why {ie > nai} is appropriate > and {ie na} inappropriate. > > > > > > BTW why are {ia} and {ie} irrealis? > > > Because of {ia nai} and {ie nai}. > > > > ? Irrealis is different from false, > presumably. > > When I say {ie nai go'i} I am not asserting > anything, > all I'm doing is showing my disagreement with > my > interlocutor. The state of affairs described by > {go'i} > is not claimed to hold.
No, it is claimed not to hold — otherwise I would not be disagreeing.
> > To say that something is not the case is as > > realis as to say it is. But then, I clearly > > don't understand what in the world {ianai} > and > > {ienai} mean (and have precious little reason > to > > think you do either, even though they are > your > > creations). > > Not strictly my creations in this case. > > > How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i} > in meaning? > > I suppose in much the same way in which belief > differs > from opinion in English.
That is, the mean the same thing? The only difference that is clear that opinions are almost always expressed whereas a belief need not be.
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 16 of Sep., 2005 12:51 GMT On 9/15/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is for > > replying > > to a request. That's not what I'm thinking. > > Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request"
But I never wrote "Grant a request", did I? That's what you wrote.
> Now you > seem to be saying — stressing another part of > the range you offered — that you mean simply > "offer"
This is what I've been saying from the start, not just now.
>and this gives the pairing "X requests z > from y" and "x offers z to y." The corresponding > thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be "x > commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do z for > y," which doesn't seem right either — although > it is clearer somewhat than the given {e'inai}.
It's not right because the "offer" I mean is a "help yourself" kind of offer, not a "let me do it for you" kind of offer. The distinguishing feature of the e'V-series is that the agency is with the audience.
> To agree that not-p requires that the original be > not-p, to disagree that p requires that the > original be p
Indeed.
> and so is the same as asserting > not-p,
I disagree.
> with some incidental stuff about agreement > or the lack.
The agreement stuff is not incidental, it is the crux of {ie}.
> > > How, by the way, does {ia} differ from {pe'i}
> > in meaning?
> >
> > I suppose in much the same way in which belief
> > differs
> > from opinion in English.
>
> That is, the mean the same thing? The only
> difference that is clear that opinions are almost
> always expressed whereas a belief need not be.
I think {pe'i} is more specific in that it addresses your sources (in contrast with za'a/ti'e/ja'o etc) whereas {ia} does not raise the source issue. I guess people won't use {pe'i} for religious, faith-based beliefs, for example.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 16 of Sep., 2005 15:26 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/15/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > > > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is > for > > > replying > > > to a request. That's not what I'm thinking. > > > > Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request" > > But I never wrote "Grant a request", did I? > That's what > you wrote. > > > Now you > > seem to be saying — stressing another part > of > > the range you offered — that you mean simply > > "offer" > > This is what I've been saying from the start, > not just now. > > >and this gives the pairing "X requests z > > from y" and "x offers z to y." The > corresponding > > thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be > "x > > commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do z > for > > y," which doesn't seem right either -- > although > > it is clearer somewhat than the given > {e'inai}. > > It's not right because the "offer" I mean is a > "help > yourself" kind of offer, not a "let me do it > for you" > kind of offer. The distinguishing feature of > the > e'V-series is that the agency is with the > audience.
It is true that everything you have written is open toi the interpretation you give it here, so I concede that that is what you always meant. It is, however, open to a variety of other interpretations, which means that, to make the point you want, you need to do a considerable amount more work on the exposition here. The sense in which {e'o nai} is negatively related to {e'o} has also gotten further off course than before — though, admittedly, making the general point about {e'V} would make it somewhat more plausible. (I think something in this area is the right thing to have here; I just don't think it was arrived at — or can be justified — by appeal to general principles.)
> > To agree that not-p requires that the > original be > > not-p, to disagree that p requires that the > > original be p > > Indeed. > > > and so is the same as asserting > > not-p, > > I disagree. > > > with some incidental stuff about agreement > > or the lack. > > The agreement stuff is not incidental, it is > the crux of {ie}. That discussion was more than a litle murky, since we were talking at cross-purposes and neither of us being terribly consistent. To clarify: {ie(nai) p} either 1)asserts p and expresses that this (dis)agrees with the hearer's view or 2) expresses (dis)agreement on the subject that p. I was taking the first view, on the analogy with {ia} and the claim that {ie} was not agreement with suggestions, you are taking the second. But then the A B1 B2 case appears differently from what we said. On view 1, both B1 and B2 are inept: one says he agrees but asserts the opposite, the other says he disagrees but asserts the same thing, much like the perennial difficulty in answering negartive question apparently. On view 2, both are quite OK, though B1, for some rhetorical purpose perhaps, puts the subject of agreement in negative form. Assuming that the whole does not amount to an assertion directly, we can infer that B1 holds go'i although he gets there through na go'i (that is, he agrees that na go'i is wrong, even though A never actually said anything about na go'i). Similarly, B2 holds na go'i, that is, disagrees with go'i (which what he explicitly expresses). So, this convinces me (since I don't like to think that especially B2 has it wrong) this is a coherent set of meanings for the {ie} set ({iecu'i} for wavering or not having considered etc. as more or less usual?) And it seems not to be significantly different (except in eventual clarity) from what the original intention was.
> > > > > > How, by the way, does {ia} differ from > {pe'i} > > > in meaning? > > > > > > I suppose in much the same way in which > belief > > > differs > > > from opinion in English. > > > > That is, the mean the same thing? The only > > difference that is clear that opinions are > almost > > always expressed whereas a belief need not > be. > > I think {pe'i} is more specific in that it > addresses > your sources (in contrast with za'a/ti'e/ja'o > etc) > whereas {ia} does not raise the source issue. > I guess people won't use {pe'i} for religious, > faith-based beliefs, for example.
That seems to be another aspect of the belief-opinion divide — or several. Beliefs tend to be more stable and opinions more transitory (and "what I think" more passing still). On the other hand (as far as religious beliefs go); beliefs tend to be more factual and opinions more evaluative (in some very broad sense of both those words). {pe'i} — insofar as "I think" or "I opine" is a good guide — seems to be exactly a refusal (or an admission of inability) to give sources or dismiss sources as irrelevant. It is nearest thing to a neutral or noncommittal evidential, apparently, and thus seems to not differ practically from the bare claim or {ia} (or {ja'a}, come to that). I expect that some differentiations will come about eventually — or get worked out in advance — but I don't see any of them yet. (Is there much usage here? I couldn't find any.)
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Posted by pycyn on Sat 17 of Sep., 2005 15:39 GMT posts: 2388
wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > On 9/15/05, John E Clifford > > wrote: > > > --- Jorge Llambías > > wrote: > > > > > > > You seem to be thinking that {e'onai} is > > for > > > > replying > > > > to a request. That's not what I'm > thinking. > > > > > > Yes; that is how I read "Grant a request" > > > > But I never wrote "Grant a request", did I? > > That's what > > you wrote. > > > > > Now you > > > seem to be saying — stressing another part > > of > > > the range you offered — that you mean > simply > > > "offer" > > > > This is what I've been saying from the start, > > not just now. > > > > >and this gives the pairing "X requests z > > > from y" and "x offers z to y." The > > corresponding > > > thing for thing for {e'i} would seem to be > > "x > > > commands y to do z" and "x volunteers to do > z > > for > > > y," which doesn't seem right either -- > > although > > > it is clearer somewhat than the given > > {e'inai}. > > > > It's not right because the "offer" I mean is > a > > "help > > yourself" kind of offer, not a "let me do it > > for you" > > kind of offer. The distinguishing feature of > > the > > e'V-series is that the agency is with the > > audience. > > It is true that everything you have written is > open toi the interpretation you give it here, > so > I concede that that is what you always meant. > It > is, however, open to a variety of other > interpretations, which means that, to make the > point you want, you need to do a considerable > amount more work on the exposition here. The > sense in which {e'o nai} is negatively related > to > {e'o} has also gotten further off course than > before — though, admittedly, making the > general > point about {e'V} would make it somewhat more > plausible. (I think something in this area is > the right thing to have here; I just don't > think > it was arrived at — or can be justified — by > appeal to general principles.)
Part of my problem is that, far from being the opposite of a request, {e'onai}, as you present is just (certainly in form, though maybe not in psychology) just another request. At best, the difference is between "x asks y to give z" and "x asks y to take z." But the {e'o} forms are not restricted to requests for giving and so that difference disappears. Maybe it is between "x as y to do what x wants" and "x asks y to do what y wants," so that {e'onai} is always "Do what you will," perhaps with specified parameters: {e'onai citka} to restrict it to eating whatever you want and so on. I keep expecting the {nai} to give something different from a request, not merely a change in direction or core of the request. > > > > To agree that not-p requires that the > > original be > > > not-p, to disagree that p requires that the > > > original be p > > > > Indeed. > > > > > and so is the same as asserting > > > not-p, > > > > I disagree. > > > > > with some incidental stuff about agreement > > > or the lack. > > > > The agreement stuff is not incidental, it is > > the crux of {ie}. > That discussion was more than a litle murky, > since we were talking at cross-purposes and > neither of us being terribly consistent. To > clarify: {ie(nai) p} either 1)asserts p and > expresses that this (dis)agrees with the > hearer's > view or 2) expresses (dis)agreement on the > subject that p. I was taking the first view, > on > the analogy with {ia} and the claim that {ie} > was > not agreement with suggestions, you are taking > the second. But then the A B1 B2 case appears > differently from what we said. On view 1, both > B1 and B2 are inept: one says he agrees but > asserts the opposite, the other says he > disagrees > but asserts the same thing, much like the > perennial difficulty in answering negartive > question apparently. On view 2, both are quite > OK, though B1, for some rhetorical purpose > perhaps, puts the subject of agreement in > negative form. Assuming that the whole does > not > amount to an assertion directly, we can infer > that B1 holds go'i although he gets there > through > na go'i (that is, he agrees that na go'i is > wrong, even though A never actually said > anything > about na go'i). Similarly, B2 holds na go'i, > that is, disagrees with go'i (which what he > explicitly expresses). So, this convinces me > (since I don't like to think that especially B2 > has it wrong) this is a coherent set of > meanings > for the {ie} set ({iecu'i} for wavering or not > having considered etc. as more or less usual?) > And it seems not to be significantly different > (except in eventual clarity) from what the > original intention was.
There is another possibility for how {ie(nai) p} works, that might be read "I (dis)agree that p." But this comes very close to just asserting p and claiming agreement. In this case, B1's response is only inept if you insist that it is A he is agreeing with. Exchange B1 and B2 and the former B1 now presents no problems: he agrees with the former B2, who disagrees with A. Since the agreement — or lack of it — is on the face, mentioing it is just a flourish and {ienai} means the same as {ie na}.
Back to the original a minute. In the course of messing with {ie} I found a problem with {au}: there seem to be three possibilities that get intertwined. One is simply the "yummy-yuck" range, indicating one's immediate response to something as desirable or not (maybe "y-blah-y" to cover the middle case). The second is the expression of the affect of yearning, longing, attraction and the corresponding revulsion (etc)(and this may be two different scales in fact). The third is as a speech act marker for wishes and the (largely unnamed — forefending?) opposite. These have very different logics: anything any time can be desirable or not, but you can only wish for what you don't have and similarly you can be attracted to anything but can only yearn for what you don't have. The examples — and the various suggested words seem to cover all these bases. Which one is intended or is there some way to bring them all together (or some several of them).
In a similar sort of way, the discussion of {ai} seems to flit in and out among several meaning -- and indeed meanings derived from several different words based on "intend" and its various meaings. As I have noted, I tend to read "intend" in the "commit to bring about" sense. The nearly oldest public use of {ai} is in {ai mi betgo} (or was it {bedgo}; I don't have Troika handy), "I'm going to bed" which is just an announcement of a committal, not anything to do with planning or deliberation, just what is involved in the old presecriptions (which I nor hardly anyone else remembers correctly) about "shall" and "will." From there we get to "intentionally," which means something like "as part of a plan" or at least "something thought through," roughly "deliberately." Finally (well, I sometimes think I see yet other things but this will do for now), there is "intention," meaning something "goal, purpose." Again, these have different logics: the first is a speech act marker, the other two are only doubtfully attitudes at all. The first applies only to not-yet-had things, the other two can apply across the board. There are obvious connections among these but whether they can be spelled out in such a way as to make a coherent accoutn of all the suggested uses of {ai} remains to be seen.
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Posted by pycyn on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 16:00 GMT posts: 2388 .ai nai do pu se xrani I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly not OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As someone noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope of the intention marker (speech act?).
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 17:46 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 09:00:59AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote: > .ai nai do pu se xrani > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly not > OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As someone > noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope of the > intention marker (speech act?).
+1
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 18:27 GMT On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 09:00:59AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote: > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > > > Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly not > > OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As someone > > noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope of the > > intention marker (speech act?). > > +1 > > -Robin
-1 :-)
Perhaps it could be written as something like:
"Attitude expressed: unintentional on my part.
Event(uality) in question: You get hurt."
But that's not how one would say it in English. The English translations are meant to be in regular English, the overall sense is what matters, it is not a word-by-word gloss. So the fact that in English it is the verb "intend" that carries the tense and that in Lojban the indicator {ai} cannot carry tense is neither here nor there.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 18:40 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:28:27PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 09:00:59AM -0700, John E Clifford wrote: > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > > > > > Whatever else may be wrong here, the translation is clearly > > > not OK; it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." As > > > someone noted earlier, the tense marker comes inside the scope > > > of the intention marker (speech act?). > > > > +1 > > > > -Robin > > -1 :-)
Why?
> But that's not how one would say it in English. The English > translations are meant to be in regular English, the overall sense > is what matters, it is not a word-by-word gloss. So the fact that > in English it is the verb "intend" that carries the tense and that > in Lojban the indicator {ai} cannot carry tense is neither here > nor there.
I disagree strongly. The distinction is important, and must be conveyed in an official example. The non-intent is present tense. What's wrong with PC's gloss?
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 18:58 GMT On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote:
> > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > > > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > > > > > > > it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." > > What's wrong with PC's gloss?
It sounds like nonsense to me, whereas the Lojban does not.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 19:04 GMT posts: 14214 On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:59:02PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > > > > > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > > > > > > > > > it should be "I don't intend that you were hurt." > > > > What's wrong with PC's gloss? > > It sounds like nonsense to me, whereas the Lojban does not.
Whereas the Lojban mostly sounds like nonsense to me. Why would one ever express one's current intent about a past event?
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 19:14 GMT On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:59:02PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > > On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > > > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani > > > > > > > > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt. > > > > > > > Whereas the Lojban mostly sounds like nonsense to me. Why would one > ever express one's current intent about a past event?
One wouldn't, of course. That's why "I don't intend that you were hurt" is nonsense. But that's not what the Lojban says (in my view). The Lojban says that the speaker admits to being the agent/having some form of control in the event "do pu se xrani" but denies any intentionality on their part.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 22:20 GMT posts: 2388 You can't *express* an emotion, attitude, etc. that you are not now having; you can only report that you had it or predict having it eventually. Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or attitudes. Therefore, the are about current emotions or attitudes, not past (or future) ones. So — in so far as "I don't intend that" expresses and attitude and {ainai} does — my translation is perfectly correct. Now xorxes seems to have a view of the role of (ai} (at least {ainai}) which differs from that somehow, but from all the discussion so far, I can't see how it differs from the acknowledged mistake of taking {ai mi klama} as being true or false depending upon whether I do have such an intention. (I think that {ai mi klama} is not the sort of thing that can be true or false, but that is another issue; it is clear that which it is is not dependent on what my intentions are).
> On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell
> wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 21, 2005 at 03:59:02PM -0300,
> Jorge Llamb?as wrote:
> > > On 9/21/05, Robin Lee Powell
> wrote:
> > >
> > > > > > > .ai nai do pu se xrani
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I didn't mean for you to get hurt.
> > > > > > >
> > Whereas the Lojban mostly sounds like
> nonsense to me. Why would one
> > ever express one's current intent about a
> past event?
>
> One wouldn't, of course. That's why "I don't
> intend that
> you were hurt" is nonsense. But that's not what
> the Lojban
> says (in my view). The Lojban says that the
> speaker admits
> to being the agent/having some form of control
> in the event
> "do pu se xrani" but denies any intentionality
> on their part.
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>
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Posted by Anonymous on Wed 21 of Sep., 2005 22:59 GMT On 9/21/05, John E Clifford wrote: > You can't *express* an emotion, attitude, etc. > that you are not now having; you can only report > that you had it or predict having it eventually.
Right.
> Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or > attitudes. Therefore, the are about current > emotions or attitudes, not past (or future) ones.
Correct. But the attitudes can be about past, present, future events, actual or not.
> So — in so far as "I don't intend that" > expresses and attitude and {ainai} does — my > translation is perfectly correct.
If "I don't intend that" was a perfect match for {ainai}, it would be. But "I don't intend that" can only be about future events, eventually current ones, not about past events. There is no such restriction, in my view, for {ainai}.
> Now xorxes > seems to have a view of the role of (ai} (at > least {ainai}) which differs from that somehow,
Right. In my view, {ai} is used to express how the speaker sees their role in the event in question.
> but from all the discussion so far, I can't see > how it differs from the acknowledged mistake of > taking {ai mi klama} as being true or false > depending upon whether I do have such an > intention. (I think that {ai mi klama} is not > the sort of thing that can be true or false, but > that is another issue; it is clear that which it > is is not dependent on what my intentions are).
The most likely interpretation for {ai mi klama} is {ai mi ba klama}, the speaker indicates their intention of bringing about the (potential) future event described by {mi ba klama}, i.e. they see themselves as intentionally participating in that event.
If, however, context suggests an {ai mi pu klama} interpretation, then what the speaker indicates is that they see themselves as intentionally participating in that (potential) past event.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 22 of Sep., 2005 03:00 GMT posts: 2388 Unlike you I take both "expression" and "intend" seriously. An expression is contemporary with what is expressed (what presses it out of you to go back to the root). What I intend is what I commit to bringing about and must logically therefore be future, since I can't bring about what is or has been.
> On 9/21/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > You can't *express* an emotion, attitude,
> etc.
> > that you are not now having; you can only
> report
> > that you had it or predict having it
> eventually.
>
> Right.
>
> > Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or
> > attitudes. Therefore, the are about current
> > emotions or attitudes, not past (or future)
> ones.
>
> Correct. But the attitudes can be about past,
> present,
> future events, actual or not.
Not the one you are expressing. That is always now. Events about which attitudes arise may -- depending on the attitude involved — be any whichwhen;intention in the sense in which it can be expressed, is limited to future (technically "not know to have occurred or not) events.
> > So — in so far as "I don't intend that" > > expresses and attitude and {ainai} does — my > > translation is perfectly correct. > > If "I don't intend that" was a perfect match > for {ainai}, > it would be. But "I don't intend that" can only > be about > future events, eventually current ones, not > about past > events. There is no such restriction, in my > view, for > {ainai}.
I tend to take "intend" as being a reasonably accurate match for {ai}; I am less sure about what {ainai} might be so I have used the vaguest form. I do assume that {ainai} is of the same logical type as {ai} itself, that I can only {ainai} events I can {ai}. I also take the place in which it occurs in the word lists — and the classification as irrealis — seriously, which -- in spite of it being your classification you say -- you apparently do not. Admittedly, there are some cases in this list that do not fit so well, but I see no reason to think that {ai} is one of them (other, of course, than that solecism from Lojban 101).
> > Now xorxes
> > seems to have a view of the role of (ai} (at
> > least {ainai}) which differs from that
> somehow,
>
> Right. In my view, {ai} is used to express how
> the speaker sees their role in the event in
> question.
I can think of NO reason to think this, nor of a reason for legislating it in out of left field. {ai} is — and always has been — to declare intentions, sorta like promising only with only expectations rather than duties. This is not how the speaker sees his role but the speaker taking on a particular role, namely that of committing to bringing the stated event about. {ainai} is presumably about the speaker refusing that role in some way.
>> but from all the discussion so far, I can't > see > > how it differs from the acknowledged mistake > of > > taking {ai mi klama} as being true or false > > depending upon whether I do have such an > > intention. (I think that {ai mi klama} is > not > > the sort of thing that can be true or false, > but > > that is another issue; it is clear that which > it > > is is not dependent on what my intentions > are). > > The most likely interpretation for {ai mi > klama} > is {ai mi ba klama}, the speaker indicates > their intention of bringing about the > (potential) future > event described by {mi ba klama}, i.e. they see > themselves as intentionally participating in > that > event. > > If, however, context suggests an {ai mi pu > klama} > interpretation, then what the speaker indicates > is > that they see themselves as intentionally > participating > in that (potential) past event.
Fine. But that is not intention (and, I would say, not expressing a current attitude but reporting on a past one). Notice that you keep shifting around from "intend" to "intentional" and "intentionally," even thhough these are different notions (however related they may be). I do things intentionally that I never intended and so on through all the combinations: "intend" means "commit to," "intentional" means "deliberate, planned" and they do not have to run together.
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Posted by JohnCowan on Thu 22 of Sep., 2005 12:53 GMT posts: 149 John E Clifford scripsit:
> An expression is contemporary with > what is expressed (what presses it out of you to > go back to the root).
I agree.
> What I intend is what I > commit to bringing about and must logically > therefore be future, since I can't bring about > what is or has been.
I continue to think this is too restrictive. When Atlas holds up the Earth, he intends to keep it aloft all the while he is actually doing so. He could drop it either because his grip slips or because his intention falters.
-- John Cowan cowan@ccil.org www.reutershealth.com www.ccil.org/~cowan The known is finite, the unknown infinite; intellectually we stand on an islet in the midst of an illimitable ocean of inexplicability. Our business in every generation is to reclaim a little more land, to add something to the extent and the solidity of our possessions. --Thomas Henry Huxley
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 22 of Sep., 2005 15:27 GMT posts: 2388
> John E Clifford scripsit: > > > An expression is contemporary with > > what is expressed (what presses it out of you > to > > go back to the root). > > I agree. > > > What I intend is what I > > commit to bringing about and must logically > > therefore be future, since I can't bring > about > > what is or has been. > > I continue to think this is too restrictive. > When Atlas > holds up the Earth, he intends to keep it aloft > all the > while he is actually doing so. He could drop > it either because > his grip slips or because his intention > falters.
Yes he has to stick to his intention to get it done. But that does not mean he keeps on intending it even after he has done it-- or while he is doing it. Notice that Atlas's intention is still here to a future act — he is not now intending that he now hold the globe up on that he still do so in the next moment. I think that there is a confusion here between having a plan and carrying it out on the one hand and intending on the other. They do frequently run together but not necessarily so. I can intend something and do it without a plan and I suppose the other way is at least logically possible — testing a contingency plan. say.
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 22 of Sep., 2005 18:12 GMT On 9/22/05, John E Clifford wrote: > An expression is contemporary with > what is expressed (what presses it out of you to > go back to the root).
I would have said that the one doing the pressing (out of themselves) is the expressor, not what is expressed.
> > > Attitudinals are expressions of emotions or > > > attitudes. Therefore, the are about current > > > emotions or attitudes, not past (or future) > > ones. > > > > Correct. But the attitudes can be about past, > > present, future events, actual or not. > > Not the one you are expressing. That is always > now. Events about which attitudes arise may -- > depending on the attitude involved — be any > whichwhen;
Isn't that the same thing I said?
> Notice that you keep
> shifting around from "intend" to "intentional"
> and "intentionally," even thhough these are
> different notions (however related they may be).
> I do things intentionally that I never intended
For example what kind of things?
> and so on through all the combinations:
Examples?
> "intend" > means "commit to," "intentional" means > "deliberate, planned" and they do not have to run > together.
The question is, are they so unrelated that they can't be dealt with by the same word?
Definition A: {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the event described by broda (past, present, future, or whatever) is under the speaker's control and constitutes a goal of the speaker's actions.
Definition B: {ai broda} the speaker indicates that they intend to act so as to bring about the *future* event described by broda.
Definition A is broader than B, A covers B. I don't see any reason to settle for the more restricted B when the cases allowed by A and not allowed by B are useful things to cover. What is the danger of allowing the broader A?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Thu 22 of Sep., 2005 22:00 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/22/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > An expression is contemporary with > > what is expressed (what presses it out of you > to > > go back to the root). > > I would have said that the one doing the > pressing > (out of themselves) is the expressor, not what > is > expressed. > > > > > Attitudinals are expressions of emotions > or > > > > attitudes. Therefore, the are about > current > > > > emotions or attitudes, not past (or > future) > > > ones. > > > > > > Correct. But the attitudes can be about > past, > > > present, future events, actual or not. > > > > Not the one you are expressing. That is > always > > now. Events about which attitudes arise may > -- > > depending on the attitude involved — be any > > whichwhen; > > Isn't that the same thing I said? > Maybe, but I took you as talking about the example, that is, {ai}, where the event can only be past and the attitude only present.
> > Notice that you keep > > shifting around from "intend" to > "intentional" > > and "intentionally," even thhough these are > > different notions (however related they may > be). > > I do things intentionally that I never > intended > > For example what kind of things?
Back to the example: I did what I did — which constituted harming the hearer — intentionally (deliberately, according to -plan)but did not intend to harm the hearer. You can split hairs about that but it doesn't change the way it works.
> > and so on through all the combinations: > > Examples?
Well, I can intend (commit to bringing it about) and then have it come about as an unforeseen effect of something else I do.
> > "intend" > > means "commit to," "intentional" means > > "deliberate, planned" and they do not have to > run > > together. > > The question is, are they so unrelated that > they can't > be dealt with by the same word?
The basic problem is that only one of these fits in with the sort of things that go into UI, emotions, propositional attitudes, performative speech acts and the like. "I plan to do it" -- and even more "I planned to do it" are purely assertive acts reporting some mental activities on my part. They are not expressing anything and there relation to my committing to ssomething is -- at best and not necessarily — to report that it has occurred.
> Definition A: > {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the event > described > by broda (past, present, future, or whatever) > is under the > speaker's control and constitutes a goal of the > speaker's > actions.
Goals are always future, but aside from that this is not an expression of the sort of things required. It is merely a factual matter, generating none of the world web that intending (in the requisite sense) does.
> Definition B: > {ai broda} the speaker indicates that they > intend to act > so as to bring about the *future* event > described by broda.
Note that — assuming you really mean your first definition (you have a habit of presenting as definitions things you don't really mean apparently), then the stress on "future" is unnecessary, since only future events are involved in both cases. The difference is that in one case the speaker has made a commitment, in the other he has merely claimed that such and such is a goal.
> Definition A is broader than B, A covers B.
Neither, since they are two different sorts of things. > I > don't see any > reason to settle for the more restricted B when > the cases > allowed by A and not allowed by B are useful > things to > cover. What is the danger of allowing the > broader A?
We have the broader A covered just fine and logically properly with normal bridi "I have this under control and it is a goal of mine." That doesn't do the work of {ai}. Your A is close to laying down the conditions where B is appropriate, but that doesn't mean it is — or covers — B. By the way, your definition A does not obviously fit your example even (of course hurting the person is not now a purpose, you've already done it. Unless you are secretly planning to hurt him more).
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Posted by Anonymous on Thu 22 of Sep., 2005 22:57 GMT On 9/22/05, John E Clifford wrote:
> > > I do things intentionally that I never > > intended > > > > For example what kind of things? > > Back to the example: I did what I did — which > constituted harming the hearer — intentionally > (deliberately, according to -plan)but did not > intend to harm the hearer.
That doesn't make sense to me. If you did it intentionally, then you intended to do it. If you did not intend to do it then you did it unintentionally. Or maybe I just don't understand English, but that's how "intencionalmente" works in Spanish.
>You can split hairs > about that but it doesn't change the way it > works.
You say you can do something intentionally without intending to do it and I'm the one splitting hairs?
> > The question is, are they so unrelated that
> > they can't
> > be dealt with by the same word?
>
> The basic problem is that only one of these fits
> in with the sort of things that go into UI,
> emotions, propositional attitudes, performative
> speech acts and the like.
So you keep asserting. How do you say "oops!" in Lojban? This is the definition of "oops" from dictionary.com:
oops interj. Used to express acknowledgement of a minor accident, blunder, or mistake.
Compare with:
{ainai} Attitudinal. Used to express acknowledgement of a (past) accident or lack of intention to perform a (future) action.
> > Definition A: > > {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the event > > described > > by broda (past, present, future, or whatever) > > is under the > > speaker's control and constitutes a goal of the > > speaker's > > actions. > > By the way, your definition A does > not obviously fit your example even (of course > hurting the person is not now a purpose, you've > already done it. Unless you are secretly > planning to hurt him more).
That's a definition for {ai}, not for {ai nai}. {ai nai} indicates that the event is under the speaker's control, the speaker is the agent, but the event does not constitute a goal, it's not what the speaker wants.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 01:31 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/22/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > > > > I do things intentionally that I never > > > intended > > > > > > For example what kind of things? > > > > Back to the example: I did what I did -- > which > > constituted harming the hearer -- > intentionally > > (deliberately, according to -plan)but did not > > intend to harm the hearer. > > That doesn't make sense to me. If you did it > intentionally, > then you intended to do it. If you did not > intend to do it > then you did it unintentionally. Or maybe I > just don't > understand English, but that's how > "intencionalmente" > works in Spanish.
I thought your example for {ao nai} was one, but I must have misunderstood the situation you had in mind (though not in the example). the stock one nowadays is collateral damage: the US bombs Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and according to plan but that kills innocent civilians. That some civilians will be killed (indeed often how many)is part of that plan. But the US did not intend to kill those civilians (this is what morally separates the US from terrorists, who do intend to kill civilians).
> >You can split hairs
> > about that but it doesn't change the way it
> > works.
>
> You say you can do something intentionally
> without
> intending to do it and I'm the one splitting
> hairs?
The issue is whether If A did x intentionally and x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally. Philosophers run round and round on this one. I said that A did do y intentionally although A never intended it. I am not wedded to that, but it is the sort of thing you were asking for.
> > > The question is, are they so unrelated that > > > they can't > > > be dealt with by the same word? > > > > The basic problem is that only one of these > fits > > in with the sort of things that go into UI, > > emotions, propositional attitudes, > performative > > speech acts and the like. > > So you keep asserting. How do you say "oops!" > in Lojban? > This is the definition of "oops" from > dictionary.com: > oops > interj. > Used to express acknowledgement of a minor > accident, blunder, or mistake. > > Compare with: > > {ainai} Attitudinal. Used to express > acknowledgement of a (past) accident > or lack of intention to perform a (future) > action.
How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an interesting question, but I don't see any thing about it here. We are not in any case acknowledging a blunder, mistake or accident but rather that something happend that was objectionable and we are denying that it was part of our plan. I just don't see this as in any way on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is being expressed here? Put another way, I do not agree that acknowledging has the same logic as committing nor do I see an accident or a mistake as the same sort of thing as a bringing about or refusing to do so.
> > > Definition A: > > > {ai broda} the speaker indicates that the > event > > > described > > > by broda (past, present, future, or > whatever) > > > is under the > > > speaker's control and constitutes a goal of > the > > > speaker's > > > actions. > > > > By the way, your definition A does > > not obviously fit your example even (of > course > > hurting the person is not now a purpose, > you've > > already done it. Unless you are secretly > > planning to hurt him more). > > That's a definition for {ai}, not for {ai nai}.
Sorry; I thought that {ainai} was somehow (not sure exactly how, but it doesn't matter here) the negation of {ai}, so expressing non-commitment (or commitment to not bringing about or commitment to bringing about not and probably some other variations). In at least some of these senses, the fact that you cannot now bring something about is adequate grounds for denying that you are committing to do so. > {ai nai} indicates > that the event is under the speaker's control, > the speaker > is the agent, but the event does not constitute > a goal, it's not > what the speaker wants.
Again, since the event has occurred, it can't be a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that matter is it under his control, being over and done with. and, as usual, what attitude (etc.) is being ecxpressed here?
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 14:06 GMT On 9/22/05, John E Clifford wrote: > the US bombs > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and according > to plan but that kills innocent civilians. That > some civilians will be killed (indeed often how > many)is part of that plan. But the US did not > intend to kill those civilians
So, would you say that the US kills innocent civilians intentionally, but does not intend to kill them? I don't think you would.
> The issue is whether If A did x intentionally and > x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally.
I don't think that's the issue, because in considering {ai broda} or {ai nai broda} there is only x, no y.
> Philosophers run round and round on this one. I > said that A did do y intentionally although A > never intended it. I am not wedded to that, but > it is the sort of thing you were asking for.
I would prefer an example you really were wedded to. You said you sometimes do things intentionally that you never intended to do. To me that sounds very odd. I can believe philosophers do say that sort of thing, but it doesn't sound at all like ordinary language.
> How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an > interesting question, but I don't see any thing > about it here.
I say {ai nai}.
> We are not in any case > acknowledging a blunder, mistake or accident but > rather that something happend that was > objectionable and we are denying that it was part > of our plan.
Isn't that the same as an accident?
> I just don't see this as in any way > on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is being > expressed here?
That I acknowledge my control of or responsability for the event in question but deny that it was done on purpose, i.e. I indicate lack of intent on my part.
> Put another way, I do not agree > that acknowledging has the same logic as > committing nor do I see an accident or a mistake > as the same sort of thing as a bringing about or > refusing to do so.
Perhaps "assume responsibility for" can cover both acknowledgement for being the agent in a past event, and commitment to being the agent in a future one?
> > {ai nai} indicates > > that the event is under the speaker's control, > > the speaker > > is the agent, but the event does not constitute > > a goal, it's not > > what the speaker wants. > > Again, since the event has occurred, it can't be > a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that > matter is it under his control, being over and > done with. and, as usual, what attitude (etc.) is > being ecxpressed here?
Just lack of intent, as in "oops".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 16:56 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/22/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > the US bombs > > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and > according > > to plan but that kills innocent civilians. > That > > some civilians will be killed (indeed often > how > > many)is part of that plan. But the US did > not > > intend to kill those civilians > > So, would you say that the US kills innocent > civilians > intentionally, but does not intend to kill > them? I don't > think you would.
What I would say is beside the point here: the US does indeed say something very like this -- admitting responsibility for the deaths, for example (though not that it is blameworthy, which is an even trickier move to make).
> > The issue is whether If A did x intentionally > and > > x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally. > > I don't think that's the issue, because in > considering > {ai broda} or {ai nai broda} there is only x, > no y.
I would have said there is only y; we don't know what the person did that resulted in the hearer being hurt (the problem of insufficeint context again), but I would assume it was something the speaker did deliberately for present purposes.
> > Philosophers run round and round on this one. > I > > said that A did do y intentionally although A > > never intended it. I am not wedded to that, > but > > it is the sort of thing you were asking for. > > I would prefer an example you really were > wedded to. You said you sometimes do things > intentionally that you never intended to do. To > me > that sounds very odd. I can believe > philosophers > do say that sort of thing, but it doesn't sound > at > all like ordinary language.
Well, ordinary language is a good guideline for conceptual questions only when used with great care and precision. In this case, I don't think it helps a lot, since, as noted, there are cases where people really do — in very official ways -- say these apparently extraordinary things. It is a datum to be dealt with and suggests that exclusionary definitions are at least not certain, even if eventually defensible. It is certainly the norm that, if you do what you intend to, you do it intentionally (though there are exceptions as noted) and if you do something intentionally, you intended to do it (again with at least prima facie exceptions, as above). The parenthetical exceptions show that this normal cooccurrence is not semantically necessitated nor even czusally reliable. But even if there were a reliable connection, this would not help your case (inso far as I can make sense of it) since doing something intentionally is not doing it with a certain attitude or feeling or whatever that can be expressed in the relevant way; it is doing it according plan, carefully an consciously, deliberately, in short. That is acting intentionally is a way of acting not a feeling about about acting. Intending is a feeling (in some sense, of course-- there is no good general word for the range of possibilities) about the action — even before it is undertaken (you can only do an action intentionally when you are doing it — or maybe have done it).
> > How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an
> > interesting question, but I don't see any
> thing
> > about it here.
>
> I say {ai nai}.
I know you would but you have not given any
evidence that this is correct, even by the
definitions you have given — quoted for "oops",
invented (but you have not really given one yet)
for {ainai}.
> > We are not in any case > > acknowledging a blunder, mistake or accident > but > > rather that something happend that was > > objectionable and we are denying that it was > part > > of our plan. > > Isn't that the same as an accident?
Not obviously. To be sure, accidents are not parts of plans but not everything that happens outside some plan is an accident. For that matter, outside of Islam and like-minded theists, everything is outside some plan, but is not therefore an accident (well, there are those who would go so far as to say they are, but that is also an extreme position, not quite normal). > > I just don't see this as in any way > > on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is being > > expressed here? > > That I acknowledge my control of or > responsability for > the event in question but deny that it was done > on purpose, > i.e. I indicate lack of intent on my part. > > > Put another way, I do not agree > > that acknowledging has the same logic as > > committing nor do I see an accident or a > mistake > > as the same sort of thing as a bringing about > or > > refusing to do so. > > Perhaps "assume responsibility for" can cover > both > acknowledgement for being the agent in a past > event, > and commitment to being the agent in a future > one?
Now, that is about as close to a reasonable suggestion as I have seen so far. To be sure, responsibility goes with intentional action, not with intended action (see the Iraqi case again), but it does do one thing you want, namely get something that applies as well after an action as before it. And it gets very close to an attitude (etc.): we have a sense of responsibility and feel responsible for something — and, more to the point, take responsibility for something. It does not seem to work for {ai} (nor, so I would hope, for {ainai}) in the simplest cases, the old {ai mi betgo} from Troika, for example. There is no sense of responsibility here at all; talking about responsibility would be taken as simple nonsense in the context (girl announces this to two others who are clearly going to go on talking for a while). It is simply a stated intention, perhaps an act of committal.
> > > {ai nai} indicates > > > that the event is under the speaker's > control, > > > the speaker > > > is the agent, but the event does not > constitute > > > a goal, it's not > > > what the speaker wants. > > > > Again, since the event has occurred, it can't > be > > a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that > > matter is it under his control, being over > and > > done with. and, as usual, what attitude > (etc.) is > > being ecxpressed here? > > Just lack of intent, as in "oops".
But lack of intent (i.e., not doing something intentionally) is not an attitude or whatever, it is just a fact about the way you did something, making {ainai} malglico again.
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 18:18 GMT posts: 14214
Just FYI, I'm stepping out of this discussion now, for the most part. I simply don't have the energy.
I'll try to make time to review the sections. I expect I'll vote no on the .ai one; I'll defer to jcowan and Broca to let me know when I should consider changing that vote, since I'm not really going to be paying attention.
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 18:30 GMT On 9/23/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > Just FYI, I'm stepping out of this discussion now, for the most > part. I simply don't have the energy. > > I'll try to make time to review the sections. I expect I'll vote no > on the .ai one; I'll defer to jcowan and Broca to let me know when I > should consider changing that vote, since I'm not really going to be > paying attention.
Perhaps you should set a deadline for votes, since we've been mostly going in circles in the discussion for a while now, and it seems unlikely that anyone will be changing their mind on this issue. Once the votes are cast, and since it looks like the irrealis section at least won't be approved, I will be happy to step down as shepherd and let someone else do whatever adjustments they feel are necessary.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 18:32 GMT posts: 14214 On Fri, Sep 23, 2005 at 03:30:56PM -0300, Jorge Llamb?as wrote: > On 9/23/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > > > > Just FYI, I'm stepping out of this discussion now, for the most > > part. I simply don't have the energy. > > > > I'll try to make time to review the sections. I expect I'll > > vote no on the .ai one; I'll defer to jcowan and Broca to let me > > know when I should consider changing that vote, since I'm not > > really going to be paying attention. > > Perhaps you should set a deadline for votes,
Probably. I'd like to see the last section get finished, of course.
> since we've been mostly going in circles in the discussion for a > while now, and it seems unlikely that anyone will be changing > their mind on this issue. Once the votes are cast, and since it > looks like the irrealis section at least won't be approved, I will > be happy to step down as shepherd and let someone else do whatever > adjustments they feel are necessary.
I don't see that you stepping down is necessary or even desirable. It sets a precedent I don't like; that people get punished in some sense for having a point of view. Is there a problem with you making the changes yourself? It's not like you don't know what people want.
-Robin
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 18:46 GMT On 9/23/05, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > I don't see that you stepping down is necessary or even desirable. > It sets a precedent I don't like; that people get punished in some > sense for having a point of view.
I assure you I won't feel it as punishment! It seems like the right procedure.
> Is there a problem with you > making the changes yourself? It's not like you don't know what > people want.
I don't know that there is agreement on what others want.
Also, there should be a way to cancel one's yes vote without having to vote no (or vice versa), a way to explicitly abstain, because we are making changes to the pages after votes have been cast. I won't be voting in favour of ainai = rejection/refusal, but I won't be vetoing either if that's what most people want as the official definition.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 20:39 GMT posts: 2388
wrote:
> --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > On 9/22/05, John E Clifford > > wrote: > > > the US bombs > > > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and > > according > > > to plan but that kills innocent civilians. > > That > > > some civilians will be killed (indeed often > > how > > > many)is part of that plan. But the US did > > not > > > intend to kill those civilians > > > > So, would you say that the US kills innocent > > civilians > > intentionally, but does not intend to kill > > them? I don't > > think you would. > > What I would say is beside the point here: the > US > does indeed say something very like this -- > admitting responsibility for the deaths, for > example (though not that it is blameworthy, > which > is an even trickier move to make). > > > > The issue is whether If A did x > intentionally > > and > > > x amounted to y, did A do y intentionally. > > > > I don't think that's the issue, because in > > considering > > {ai broda} or {ai nai broda} there is only x, > > no y. > > I would have said there is only y; we don't > know > what the person did that resulted in the hearer > being hurt (the problem of insufficeint context > again), but I would assume it was something the > speaker did deliberately for present purposes. > > > > Philosophers run round and round on this > one. > > I > > > said that A did do y intentionally although > A > > > never intended it. I am not wedded to that, > > but > > > it is the sort of thing you were asking > for. > > > > I would prefer an example you really were > > wedded to. You said you sometimes do things > > intentionally that you never intended to do. > To > > me > > that sounds very odd. I can believe > > philosophers > > do say that sort of thing, but it doesn't > sound > > at > > all like ordinary language. > > Well, ordinary language is a good guideline for > conceptual questions only when used with great > care and precision. In this case, I don't > think > it helps a lot, since, as noted, there are > cases > where people really do — in very official ways > — say these apparently extraordinary things. > It > is a datum to be dealt with and suggests that > exclusionary definitions are at least not > certain, even if eventually defensible. It is > certainly the norm that, if you do what you > intend to, you do it intentionally (though > there > are exceptions as noted) and if you do > something > intentionally, you intended to do it (again > with > at least prima facie exceptions, as above). > The > parenthetical exceptions show that this normal > cooccurrence is not semantically necessitated > nor > even czusally reliable. But even if there were > a > reliable connection, this would not help your > case (inso far as I can make sense of it) since > doing something intentionally is not doing it > with a certain attitude or feeling or whatever > that can be expressed in the relevant way; it > is > doing it according plan, carefully an > consciously, deliberately, in short. That is > acting intentionally is a way of acting not a > feeling about about acting. Intending is a > feeling (in some sense, of course-- there is no > good general word for the range of > possibilities) > about the action — even before it is > undertaken > (you can only do an action intentionally when > you > are doing it — or maybe have done it). > > > > > How you say that "oops" in Lojban is an > > > interesting question, but I don't see any > > thing > > > about it here. > > > > I say {ai nai}. > > > I know you would but you have not given any > evidence that this is correct, even by the > definitions you have given — quoted for > "oops", > invented (but you have not really given one > yet) > for {ainai}. > > > > We are not in any case > > > acknowledging a blunder, mistake or > accident > > but > > > rather that something happend that was > > > objectionable and we are denying that it > was > > part > > > of our plan. > > > > Isn't that the same as an accident? > > Not obviously. To be sure, accidents are not > parts of plans but not everything that happens > outside some plan is an accident. For that > matter, outside of Islam and like-minded > theists, > everything is outside some plan, but is not > therefore an accident (well, there are those > who > would go so far as to say they are, but that is > also an extreme position, not quite normal). > > > I just don't see this as in any way > > > on a linguistic par with {ai}; what is > being > > > expressed here? > > > > That I acknowledge my control of or > > responsability for > > the event in question but deny that it was > done > > on purpose, > > i.e. I indicate lack of intent on my part. > > > > > Put another way, I do not agree > > > that acknowledging has the same logic as > > > committing nor do I see an accident or a > > mistake > > > as the same sort of thing as a bringing > about > > or > > > refusing to do so. > > > > Perhaps "assume responsibility for" can cover > > both > > acknowledgement for being the agent in a past > > event, > > and commitment to being the agent in a future > > one? > > Now, that is about as close to a reasonable > suggestion as I have seen so far. To be sure, > responsibility goes with intentional action, > not > with intended action (see the Iraqi case > again), > but it does do one thing you want, namely get > something that applies as well after an action > as > before it. And it gets very close to an > attitude > (etc.): we have a sense of responsibility and > feel responsible for something — and, more to > the point, take responsibility for something. > It > does not seem to work for {ai} (nor, so I would > hope, for {ainai}) in the simplest cases, the > old > {ai mi betgo} from Troika, for example. There > is no sense of responsibility here at all; <about responsibility would be taken as simple nonsense in the context (girl announces this to two others who are clearly going to go on talking for a while). It is simply a stated intention, perhaps an act of committal. >>
Botice also that, given this, {ainai} even more does not acknowledge and accident or whatever, but go directly to "it's not my fault," moving into the blame game directly — where intentions do not go.
<<> > > {ai nai} indicates > > > that the event is under the speaker's > control, > > > the speaker > > > is the agent, but the event does not > constitute > > > a goal, it's not > > > what the speaker wants. > > > > Again, since the event has occurred, it can't > be > > a purpose the speaker has now — nor for that > > matter is it under his control, being over > and > > done with. and, as usual, what attitude > (etc.) is > > being ecxpressed here? > > Just lack of intent, as in "oops".
But lack of intent (i.e., not doing something intentionally) is not an attitude or whatever, it is just a fact about the way you did something, making {ainai} malglico again.>>
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Posted by Anonymous on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 21:04 GMT John E Clifford scripsit:
> I thought your example for {ao nai} was one, but I must have > misunderstood the situation you had in mind (though not in the > example). the stock one nowadays is collateral damage: the US bombs > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and according to plan but that > kills innocent civilians. That some civilians will be killed (indeed > often how many)is part of that plan. But the US did not intend to kill > those civilians (this is what morally separates the US from terrorists, > who do intend to kill civilians).
The criminal law, at least, will not allow A to claim that he aimed at B but hit C, and therefore his killing of C was unintentional. ?It is (the other requirements being met) murder. This is an example of how the law treats intention as an objective fact, not a state of mind.
(FWIW, I don't think there's any moral distinction either. To intentionally undertake an action in full knowledge that it will kill people, whether specific people or nonspecific ones, is intentional killing. It can be justified, if at all, only by the (IMHO specious) argument of *raison d'etat*.)
-- They tried to pierce your heart John Cowan with a Morgul-knife that remains in the http://www.ccil.org/~cowan wound. If they had succeeded, you would http://www.reutershealth.com become a wraith under the domination of the Dark Lord. --Gandalf
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Posted by pycyn on Fri 23 of Sep., 2005 21:37 GMT posts: 2388 wrote:
> John E Clifford scripsit: > > > I thought your example for {ao nai} was one, > but I must have > > misunderstood the situation you had in mind > (though not in the > > example). the stock one nowadays is > collateral damage: the US bombs > > Iraq intentionally, deliberately, and > according to plan but that > > kills innocent civilians. That some > civilians will be killed (indeed > > often how many)is part of that plan. But the > US did not intend to kill > > those civilians (this is what morally > separates the US from terrorists, > > who do intend to kill civilians). > > The criminal law, at least, will not allow A to > claim that he aimed at > B but hit C, and therefore his killing of C was > unintentional. ?It is > (the other requirements being met) murder. > This is an example of how > the law treats intention as an objective fact, > not a state of mind.
The other requirements play a significant role here. For example, a policeman shooting at B in the line of duty but hitting C typically is not charged with murder, even when it is clear that he was aware of the possibility of hitting C. He is liable to internal sanctions, of course, and may get some criminal action (negligent homicide or the like) if there was some obvious alternative action to shooting at B to achieve appropriate goals. And, in general, if the shooting of B was a lawful act, then the charge will almost certainly be less than Murder One and may end up only as a civil wrongful death suit (an extreme but not all that uncommon event). To be sure, if the shooting of B would already be unlawful, then that intention is no out. This is all, of course, about acting intentionally or not and says nothing about intending in the relevant sense. Intentionally committing a crime but failing at it and in the process unintentionally committing a different crime does not excuse one from the other crime (though it might work if you were failing at a lawful activity). If this can be made to stick in general, it undercuts the US position (but the cop cases suggest it does not work for governments and, of course, a government can always argue that their original intentional acts were not criminal or immoral or whatvver is at issue).
> (FWIW, I don't think there's any moral > distinction either. To intentionally > undertake an action in full knowledge that it > will kill people, whether > specific people or nonspecific ones, is > intentional killing. It can be > justified, if at all, only by the (IMHO > specious) argument of *raison d'etat*.)
The moral case is even murkier, since it tends (as in the legal case) to depend upon what the justification is for the original intentional act and, with governemnts, that is almost never clear (except, as you note, policy). The Schrecklichkeit of the Hiroshima (and, even more, Nagasaki) bombing are about as close to a clear case as you can get (US did intend to kill civilians and the more the better — as a matter of policy) but there is no consensus about even that after 50 years.
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Posted by Anonymous on Sat 24 of Sep., 2005 16:56 GMT Here's my attempt at a summary of {ai}. Let's consider first these four examples:
(1) ai mi ba catra le do patfu Aye, I will kill your father!" (at least that's the idea)
(2) ai nai mi ba catra le do patfu "It's not part of my plans to kill your father" (if I do happen to kill him it won't be because I set out to do it)
(3) ai mi pu catra le do patfu The idea was indeed to kill your father" (no assertion is made here one way or another as to whether or not the father was actually killed)
(4) ai nai mi pu catra le do patfu "Oops, I didn't mean to kill your father" (maybe I killed him, maybe I nearly killed him, but in any case it wasn't on purpose)
(Disclaimer: The English sentences are not meant as literal transcriptions of the Lojban, obviously. They are only meant to get at their sense.)
Now, I think there is no major disagreement about (1).
There is some disagreement about (2): some people want {ai nai} to indicate more than just an absence of intent. Based on the "rejection/ refusal" keywords they want {ai nai} to indicate intent to avoid, similar or the same as {ai mi na ba catra le do patfu}. I think this doesn't fit with the way {nai} works in general. In many cases the distinction is minor, in other cases it may be significant.
There is more disagreement about (3) and (4). It is argued that there is an insurmountable logical barrier between (1)/(2) and (3)/(4), that {ai} can only work in conjunction with a future event and that the Lojban in (3) and (4) is therefore meaningless and the English does not correspond to it.
Let me do a bit of imagery: the speaker is an archer holding a bow in their hands. An arrow represents the speaker's actions. In all four examples, the bridi {mi catra le do patfu} is a description of a target. In (1) and (2), the arrow is still in the bow, in (3) an (4) the arrow has been shot. We don't really know from the info given whether or not the arrow hits the target.
In the most restrictive interpretation {ai} is used to express that the speaker is holding the arrow in their hands, bow stretched and aiming at the target. {ainai} the same but *aiming to miss* the target.
In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate an aim to miss, but rather that the target is ignored. The aim is somewhere else, but if the target is in the way it may get hit after all. Also, in my interpretation {ai} is only used to indicate the target, it does not indicate that the arrow hasn't been shot yet, that's left to the tense.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Sun 25 of Sep., 2005 00:03 GMT posts: 2388 Good summary of your side of things, not so good on the other side(s).
> Here's my attempt at a summary of {ai}. Let's
> consider first these
> four examples:
>
> (1) ai mi ba catra le do patfu
> Aye, I will kill your father!" (at least
> that's the idea)
>
> (2) ai nai mi ba catra le do patfu
> "It's not part of my plans to kill your
> father" (if I do happen to kill
> him it won't be because I set out to do
> it)
This is a problem still, since the negative pzrt is still vague. The parentheses suggests that I am not committed to preventing his killing either, so this looks like the decision to have nothing to do with the killing either way: recusal. It is still a commitment but one to not take sides on the issue.
> (3) ai mi pu catra le do patfu > The idea was indeed to kill your father" > (no assertion is made here > one way or another as to whether or not > the father was actually killed)
The note makes it worse, since it now becomes (I haven't seen any reason to think not) an assertion about what my intentions were, not an expression of anything: the very malglico we have been warned against so often over the last 50 years. The point of the disclaimer below seems to be that we should not take this as asserting anything when it does not assert somehting about killing Dad. The assumption is then that it expresses some attitude (etc.), but no such attitude has been offered and none is an obvious candidate. It is not, of course, intention, since that requires that the event intended not yet (be known to) have occurred and this is explicitly about an event in the past. Now, there is some wiggle room here: an event may be past but not yet known, so we can imagine (putting this into the context description — if it is what is meant — would help) the speaker has set a pretty fool-proof trap for Dad which was to have been sprung five minutes ago, but he has not yet heard whether it worked as planned. So, his intention can still be in force and even have a past object. But that is a very odd case and needs (as noted) quite a bit of context. The translation is terrible, since it suggests that the intention was in the past but not now "I intend that he was killed" reads oddly but is more accurate.
> (4) ai nai mi pu catra le do patfu > "Oops, I didn't mean to kill your father" > (maybe I killed him, maybe > I nearly killed him, but in any case it > wasn't on purpose)
Assuming that {ainai} is a recusal expression (whether that makes sense or not is another issue), that I have nothing to do one way or the other with intentionally killing Dad, tis again makes sense in the case that the news has not come through yet. It has nothing to do, note, with accidentally (almost) killing him; indeed, it doesn't really suggest that he has been in any danger (though disclaiming involvement usually means you think there was something to be involved in). Again some context is needed to make this plausible . And I don't really think that this is what xorxes has in mind.
> (Disclaimer: The English sentences are not > meant as literal transcriptions > of the Lojban, obviously. They are only meant > to get at their sense.) > > Now, I think there is no major disagreement > about (1). > > There is some disagreement about (2): some > people want {ai nai} to > indicate more than just an absence of intent. > Based on the "rejection/ > refusal" keywords they want {ai nai} to > indicate intent to avoid, similar > or the same as {ai mi na ba catra le do patfu}. > I think this doesn't > fit with the way {nai} works in general. In > many cases the distinction is > minor, in other cases it may be significant.
These hinted at rules are certainly not obvious. The old list seems in fact to assume something like the here derogated approach in many cases and the supposed other readings are often apparently ad hoc and create problems with the scalar notions (if the negation is whatever it happens to be in a given case, what is the neutral mid-point, which typically must be some sort of negation as well. Sorting out negation is hard enough, expressing them unambiguously is worse, and formulating a rule that identifies the various types of negations to be represented across the board for UI — or even "irrealis" cases — seems outside our range altogether. that said, it does seem that {ainai} might usefully be something other than {ai na} (or, at least, that some of the UI might be usefully treated in this way and so we might try it for {ainai}). The problem here has been to find something of the appropriate sort — like "intend" — to be expressed by the form. So far xorxes has not come up with a good case of something that can be expressed even, let alone fitting the pattern. There does not, in fact, seem to be a good English word here (maybe "recuse" but that is mainly technical for what to be a normal event). This does not mean that we can't have a Lojban word for it (indeed, that might be a demonstrable advantage of Lojban), but we need to describe it very carefully before we can be said to have solved this problem. I think that what comes closest to xorxes various stories about this attitude is the following: {ai} affirms (makes or announces or renews) a commitment to bringing about the connected event, which may be positive or negative (that is {ai p} and {ai na p} are on the same end of the spectrum, committing to taking an active role in determining the reality pole of p). {ainai} then affirms a commitment to not take a role in determining p's pole. The mid ground is not committing to any position here --- because one cannot make up one's mind to go pro, con, or out of it or because one has not even considered the amtter. This does fit xorxes' emerging pattern fairly well, I think and gives a nice attitude (in this case a performative speech act) to be expressed.
> There is more disagreement about (3) and (4). > It is argued that there is > an insurmountable logical barrier between > (1)/(2) and (3)/(4), that {ai} can > only work in conjunction with a future event > and that the Lojban in (3) and > (4) is therefore meaningless and the English > does not correspond to it.
Technically, not a future event but ones whose reality pole is not known to the speaker. So one where the determination is known (actually, believed is enough) to have taken place but whose determination is not known, can be intended in a past tense sentence — as in the discussion above.
> Let me do a bit of imagery: the speaker is an > archer holding a bow in their > hands. An arrow represents the speaker's > actions. In all four examples, > the bridi {mi catra le do patfu} is a > description of a target. In (1) and (2), > the arrow is still in the bow, in (3) and (4) > the arrow has been shot. We don't > really know from the info given whether or not > the arrow hits the target.
This allegory does not shed as much light as one might hope. The target is the (un)intended event, as laid out in the connected sentence. It is not clear what the arrow in the speaker's bow is doing: it is said to be the speaker's action, but nothing sbout {ai} — and certainly nothing about {ainai} — requires any action at all (I suppose if you did nothing toward p long enough, someone might question your intending it, but they could not prove their point conclusively). Indeed, what the bow is is hard to make out. But I suppose that intending to do something is like aiming an arrow at a target somehow. So {ai} is like aiming at the target, the old version (as far as anyone can tell) is like aiming away from the target (it would be useful generally to have an alternate target to aim at, although the "anything but that" approach is also to be dealt with somewhere, I suppose). So the arrow once released is the course of events that follows, which either comes to hitting the target or not, regardless of which way one was aiming. But certainly, once the target is hit or missed (and indeed long before that, even for archers who use body English) the aiming has ceased, that is, intending certainly ends when the event is determined (the fact aiming ends sooner is just a minor flaw in the allegory setup). So, the separation between 1&2 and 3&4 remains.
> In the most restrictive interpretation {ai} is > used to express that the speaker > is holding the arrow in their hands, bow > stretched and aiming at the target. > {ainai} the same but *aiming to miss* the > target. > > In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate an > aim to miss, but rather that > the target is ignored.
I am inclined to take this as recusal, refusal to aim at the target or away from it but just f9iring off arrows at random. Or, better, refusing to take up the bow at all. but the allegory continues in a different way.
>The aim is somewhere > else, but if the target is in the > way it may get hit after all.
How is this different from aiming to miss the target, with the possibility that you might hit it anyhow, i.e., how is this different from old {ainai}?
>Also, in my > interpretation {ai} is only used > to indicate the target, it does not indicate > that the arrow hasn't been shot > yet, that's left to the tense.
Surely {ai} at least indicates that the target is being aimed at or not, not just that it is the target. But, it ceases to be the target *for this round* as soon as it is hit or missed. We may reuse it, but that is a different intention, that is we have to aim anew, even if the target is the same physical object. Pushing the allegory too hard gets to some problems, since I can intend p even after not-p comes about and I can maintain that it is the same intention as before, merely renewed in the face of failure. Whether that position can be sustained in the end needs to be worked out — and the target story does not help much, since aiming is so different from intending. I must admit that the allegory and its key do not make clear that aiming is to represent intending, but I don't see anything else that will serve. Maybe firing the arrow (but he says {ai} does not say whether the arrow is fired and it certainly say the intention occurs)? Barring some other association, it seems to me that this allegory makes the case against 3&4 fairly clearly and does nothing to resolve the issue of what {ainai} should mean.
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Posted by Anonymous on Sun 25 of Sep., 2005 12:48 GMT On Saturday 24 September 2005 12:56, Jorge Llambías wrote: > In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate an aim to miss, but rather > that the target is ignored. The aim is somewhere else, but if the target is > in the way it may get hit after all. Also, in my interpretation {ai} is > only used to indicate the target, it does not indicate that the arrow > hasn't been shot yet, that's left to the tense.
I think that ignoring the target should be {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should be {ainai}.
phma
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Posted by Anonymous on Sun 25 of Sep., 2005 14:31 GMT On 9/25/05, Pierre Abbat wrote: > > I think that ignoring the target should be {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should > be {ainai}.
For some reason that seems like a popular choice: {ai nai broda} = {ai na broda}, and it is also the one suggested by the "rejection/refusal" keywords. (If you use {ai cu'i} for ignoring the target you don't have anything for indecision/wavering though.)
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Sun 25 of Sep., 2005 14:40 GMT posts: 2388
> On Saturday 24 September 2005 12:56, Jorge > Llambías wrote: > > In my interpretation {nai} does not indicate > an aim to miss, but rather > > that the target is ignored. The aim is > somewhere else, but if the target is > > in the way it may get hit after all. Also, in > my interpretation {ai} is > > only used to indicate the target, it does not > indicate that the arrow > > hasn't been shot yet, that's left to the > tense. > > I think that ignoring the target should be > {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should > be {ainai}.
This is, of course, the old meaning (as far as we can figure), but xorxes has been working on a different pattern for the other words in this set, one where the negation of {nai} attaches not to the propositional part but to some aspect of the definition of the attitude (e.g., negating "hope" negates the desirability of the event but leaves other factors — likelihood, control -- untouched). The neutral place then usually comes to be either indecision or indifference or noninvolvement. In this latter sense, {aicu'i} might work but that would leave {ainai} being {ai na} and xorxes is pretty well committed to not allowing that (and with good reasons in at lest some cases).
The allegory gets less useful the more you think about it. My attempts to make sense of it were not very successful and led me to say some dumb things: mainly that I cease to have something as intended once I fail to get it (stop aiming once I have missed), which is nonsense. So, I am trying a new story: A kid is out in the woods with his bow and arrow and he see something that would make a target -- better, a couple of things close together. He has a range of responses: he may pick one as a target to shoot at, or the other, or (being realistic) pick to miss one or the other, or just not be able to decide which to pick even after deciding to shoot at something, or ignore both of them and go on his way without shooting, or decide to shoot without a target. These correspond in an obvious way to intending p, intending q (incompatible with p), intending not-p, being unable to decide between p and q (not-p) but feeling the need to do something in the area, not realizing there is an opportunity to do something, and realizing the opportunity but decidsing not to do anything about it. How to line these up on the scale is up for grabs. I think that the not realizing there is an opportunity is not there at all, since, if you don't see the opportunity, you can't do anything about committing to exploit it. But whether the others belong in or not and where to put them are almost open questions. Issues like whether we would ever use some of them (but that doesn't seem to be much of an issue) and whether they can properly be called attitudes to be expressed alos play a role.
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Posted by pycyn on Sun 25 of Sep., 2005 14:43 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/25/05, Pierre Abbat
> wrote:
> >
> > I think that ignoring the target should be
> {aicu'i} and aiming to miss should
> > be {ainai}.
>
> For some reason that seems like a popular
> choice: {ai nai broda} = {ai
> na broda},
> and it is also the one suggested by the
> "rejection/refusal" keywords.
> (If you use
> {ai cu'i} for ignoring the target you don't
> have anything for
> indecision/wavering
> though.)
Yup, assuming "ignoring" means "recognizing it as a potential target but refusing to shoot at it" or some such thing, not "not recognizing it as a target."
Now, about the tense issue ...
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Posted by Anonymous on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 16:46 GMT On 9/24/05, John E Clifford wrote: > Technically, not a future event but ones whose > reality pole is not known to the speaker. So one > where the determination is known (actually, > believed is enough) to have taken place but whose > determination is not known, can be intended in a > past tense sentence — as in the discussion > above.
I'm not convinced that that is a correct analysis of "I intend that". I think what you intend not only has to be in the future, but in the linguistic equivalent of the relativistic absolute future cone of causality, i.e. you have to be able (or rather believe that you are able) to affect it through your actions. If you intend that X, you can always stop intending X simply by changing your mind and your plans. If I have set a trap intending for someone to fall into, I can the next day hope that they fell into the trap or change my mind and hope that they didn't fall, but I cannot the next day be intending that they already fell into the trap (and much less intend that they didn't fall), even if I don't know whether they did or not, because there is nothing I can do about it. "Hope" works with what I know or don't know, but "intend" works with what I believe I can affect or not. I can't intend something, even in the future, that I don't believe that I have a chance of affecting.
Having said that, I'm not proposing that {ai} is an exact match for "I intend that". {ai} can also be used to indicate past intent (or its absence, as in "oops"). What {ai} does is indicate that my actions are, will be, or have been oriented towards a specified situation, and {ai nai} that they are not, will not or have not be so oriented. If the target situation in question is in the past, then obviously I can only be acknowledging past actions (as in "oops"), if the target is in the future, then my current and future actions are relevant.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 18:21 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/24/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > Technically, not a future event but ones > whose > > reality pole is not known to the speaker. So > one > > where the determination is known (actually, > > believed is enough) to have taken place but > whose > > determination is not known, can be intended > in a > > past tense sentence — as in the discussion > > above. > > I'm not convinced that that is a correct > analysis of > "I intend that". I think what you intend not > only has to > be in the future, but in the linguistic > equivalent of the > relativistic absolute future cone of causality, > i.e. you > have to be able (or rather believe that you are > able) to > affect it through your actions. If you intend > that X, you > can always stop intending X simply by changing > your > mind and your plans. If I have set a trap > intending for > someone to fall into, I can the next day hope > that they > fell into the trap or change my mind and hope > that they > didn't fall, but I cannot the next day be > intending that > they already fell into the trap (and much less > intend that > they didn't fall), even if I don't know whether > they did or > not, because there is nothing I can do about > it. "Hope" > works with what I know or don't know, but > "intend" works > with what I believe I can affect or not. I > can't intend > something, even in the future, that I don't > believe that > I have a chance of affecting.
I agree. I tried to find a way to make at least some sense of your position and this seemed the best of a thing lot. Since it doesn't work, I am surprised by the following.
> Having said that, I'm not proposing that {ai}
> is an exact
> match for "I intend that".
Pity! It has served that purpose for 50 years and I have yet to see a reason to replace it -- nor what attitude it is to be replaced with. If we do replace it, then we needs must find a new word for "I intend that," since this is clearly something that language needs. I doubt that thais will be true of whatever is proposed to replace it as meaning for {ai}.
> {ai} can also be > used to indicate > past intent (or its absence, as in "oops").
That is, something in this area but an attitude is being proposed to replace "intend" as the meaning for {ai} ({ai} as it stands cannot be used in this way, so the sentence is misleading). The nearest thing so far suggested this replacement is "take responsibility for," but that does not cover the old {ai} (I can intend things that I will not take responsibility for and, alas, conversely). Notice that "opops" is not about responsibility — nor about intentions either, though most things that call for an "oops" are unintended. So, {ainai} is not a good candidate for "oops," whatever it ends up meaning.
> What {ai} does > is indicate that my actions are, will be, or > have been oriented > towards a specified situation, and {ai nai} > that they are not, > will not or have not be so oriented.
But how is this an attitude — or any other expressive rather than informative act? What is expressed is present tense by definition and this seems to be about intentions at some other time, not about my current attitude. Or, at least, I have seen no reason to think it is and can't think of any myself.
> If the
> target situation in
> question is in the past, then obviously I can
> only be
> acknowledging past actions (as in "oops"), if
> the target is
> in the future, then my current and future
> actions are relevant.
Now, acknowledging might be a kind of attitude, but I do not see that in this case it is significantly different from taking responsibility. The primary use of {ai} is to make a commitment and then to acknowledge that it has been made (and so renew it). But the commitment ends with the occurrence of the target event. What then is the force of acknowledging that I once had that commitment — it cannot renew it after the fact and that even attenuated committing is what allows (ai) outside its original performative function. I wait for a serious proposal along these lines before I go on -- but I don't see much likelihood of one coming along.
Now, as to "oops" and {ainai}. No, the latter will not do for the former. "Oops" acknowledges a boo-boo has occurred, but says nothing about responsibility — certainly neither takes it on nor denies it (I can oops in third person and second as well as first, and in the first I still have to say "sorry."). {ainai} on the other hand does not claim that the event occurred (irrealis, remember) but denies responsibility for it if it did occur — in the xorxes version, that is. And extreme non-responsibility; I can't even claim that I was intending that the event not happen (incidentally, the event involved does not have to be undesirable, as it is for "oops"), rather my position is "Not my pidgin." The Lojban for "oops," like that for "tsk tsk" remains to be identified (or created).
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Posted by Anonymous on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 18:41 GMT On 9/26/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > Having said that, I'm not proposing that {ai} > > is an exact > > match for "I intend that". > > Pity! It has served that purpose for 50 years > and I have yet to see a reason to replace it -- > nor what attitude it is to be replaced with.
It is not being replaced, just expanded.
> The nearest thing so far suggested this > replacement is "take responsibility for," but > that does not cover the old {ai} (I can intend > things that I will not take responsibility for > and, alas, conversely).
You can intend things that you will not take responsibility for, yes, as long as you keep the intent to yourself, but by expressing it to others, i.e. by using {ai}, you can't help but assume responsibility.
> What then is the force of acknowledging > that I once had that commitment — it cannot > renew it after the fact and that even attenuated > committing is what allows (ai) outside its > original performative function.
The force of acknowledging past intent is the assumption of resposibility.
> I wait for a > serious proposal along these lines before I go on > — but I don't see much likelihood of one coming > along.
I wait for a serious rebuttal — but I don't see much likelihood of one coming along.
> (I can oops in third person and > second as well as first,
Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be made explicit in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by Anonymous on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 19:14 GMT On 9/26/05, John E Clifford wrote: > The Lojban for > "oops," like that for "tsk tsk" remains to be > identified (or created).
Isn't "tsk tsk" something like {.i'e nai}?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 19:42 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > > > Having said that, I'm not proposing that > {ai} > > > is an exact > > > match for "I intend that". > > > > Pity! It has served that purpose for 50 > years > > and I have yet to see a reason to replace it > -- > > nor what attitude it is to be replaced with. > > It is not being replaced, just expanded.
But from what I can make of the expansion being hinted at, the expansion destroys it for the usual purposes. If I am merely claiming to have an intention rather than committing to it or renewing it, then I need some way of doing these original things and there is not yet, I think, a converter (and, of course, claiming is just what this bit of UI is not supposed to do).
> > The nearest thing so far suggested this > > replacement is "take responsibility for," but > > that does not cover the old {ai} (I can > intend > > things that I will not take responsibility > for > > and, alas, conversely). > > You can intend things that you will not take > responsibility > for, yes, as long as you keep the intent to > yourself, but > by expressing it to others, i.e. by using {ai}, > you can't help > but assume responsibility.
Of course I can. I intend that George Bush die in office, say, but, if he does, it is unlikely that I will — or justifiably could — take responsibility for it. I would have to do something at least along useful lines before I could take responsibility (with any plausibility -- (I suppose I could claim responsibility for all sorts of things, thus making a case for my paranaoia). And, of course, I can, with good reason take responsibility for thing I did not intend — and did not even do (my daughter's court record, for example).
> > What then is the force of acknowledging > > that I once had that commitment — it cannot > > renew it after the fact and that even > attenuated > > committing is what allows (ai) outside its > > original performative function. > > The force of acknowledging past intent is the > assumption of resposibility.
As noted, they seem to be, if not totally different, different enough to make using the same word for both ill-advised. Acknowledging a past intention is merely admitting to having had it, that is it is making a claim and has no other performative status. Assuming responsibility is another act in the general area of promising: it makes one liable to an array of rights and duties, which would not be one's own unless that responsibility were either assumed or assigned. Intending (committing or renewing) only opens one up to expectations, not rights and duties, and, as noted elsewhere, these expectations are pretty weak (I can intend and never fulfill any of them). And, of course, even those expectations die with the occurrence of the event: I may keep on doing the same things but they can no longer be with the ntention of bringing about what in fact now is.
> > serious proposal along these lines before I > go on > > — but I don't see much likelihood of one > coming > > along.
>From this I gather that you think you have made a proposal. Would you please spell it out. What attitude does {ai} express which attitude is present even with repsect to events in the past? How is the normal current usage of {ai} accomodated within this attitude?
> I wait for a serious rebuttal — but I don't > see > much likelihood of one coming along.
I have pointed out in some detail why none of your suggestions so far work. Give me something solid and stable and I will try to do better (though I suspect I will just be repeating myself, there not having been much room for improvement in what I have seen so far).
> > (I can oops in third person and > > second as well as first, > > Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be made > explicit > in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.
? What the Hell is {dai} doing here? Since "oops" doesn't say anything about anyone's feelings, there would be no need to bring in empathy in dealing with another person's boo-boo. Of course, since {ainai} has nothing to do with "oops" (they are positive and negative to one another in most repsects), the question is probably misplaced. I suppose it would be more to the point to ask What does {ainaidai} mean? I empathize with so-and-so's recusal in this matter? I have my doubts about that being an attitude, though I suppose any empathizing would be to some extent. In that case though the mode of empathy would be the whole description of the other's state, not some complex attitude of mine.
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Posted by pycyn on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 19:46 GMT posts: 2388 Close enough for government work. So "oops" alone remains — though I think a little thought would come up with other unsettled cases. Still things are moving along toward full expressibility (for English speakers anyhow).
> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > The Lojban for
> > "oops," like that for "tsk tsk" remains to be
> > identified (or created).
>
> Isn't "tsk tsk" something like {.i'e nai}?
>
> mu'o mi'e xorxes
>
>
>
>
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Posted by Anonymous on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 20:37 GMT On 9/26/05, John E Clifford wrote: > If I am merely claiming to have > an intention rather than committing to it
But that's a strawman. With {ai ba broda} you are commiting to bringing about broda, in all the interpretations of {ai} under discussion.
> I intend that George Bush die > in office, say,
How can you possibly intend that? Wish, hope or expect I can understand, but intend? How could you possibly commit to bring that about?
> but, if he does, it is unlikely > that I will — or justifiably could — take > responsibility for it.
Then I don't see how you could commit to bring it about.
> And, of course, I can, with good > reason take responsibility for thing I did not > intend — and did not even do (my daughter's > court record, for example).
Yes. {ai} can only serve to take responsibility for one's own actions, not for anyone else's.
> Assuming responsibility is > another act in the general area of promising: it > makes one liable to an array of rights and > duties, which would not be one's own unless that > responsibility were either assumed or assigned. > Intending (committing or renewing) only opens one > up to expectations, not rights and duties,
{ai} is not about rights and duties either, it is much more informal. It is certainly not for formal admission of responsibility. It is just owning up to the actions that lead to the target event in question. Commiting to performing them or admitting to having performed them.
> and, > as noted elsewhere, these expectations are pretty > weak (I can intend and never fulfill any of > them).
Of course. If you have a better watered down expression for informal assumption of responsibility please suggest it. Even "commit" is much too strong for {ai}. I don't suppose the person saying {ai mi ckakla} would say anything like "I hereby commit to going to bed" in English. The next second they can change their mind and nobody would probably reproach them.
> And, of course, even those expectations > die with the occurrence of the event: I may keep > on doing the same things but they can no longer > be with the ntention of bringing about what in > fact now is.
Sorry, I don't follow that sentence.
> > > (I can oops in third person and
> > > second as well as first,
> >
> > Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be made
> > explicit
> > in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}.
>
> ? What the Hell is {dai} doing here? Since
> "oops" doesn't say anything about anyone's
> feelings, there would be no need to bring in
> empathy in dealing with another person's boo-boo.
Perhaps I misunderstood your second and third person "oops". How does it work if not by your putting yourself in the place of the other person? {dai} says something like: "this is what I would say if I were in your place now".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Mon 26 of Sep., 2005 22:02 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford
> wrote:
> > If I am merely claiming to have
> > an intention rather than committing to it
>
> But that's a strawman. With {ai ba broda} you
> are
> commiting to bringing about broda, in all the
> interpretations of {ai} under discussion.
Sorry, I took it that you explanation of {ai} applied in the same way to past, present, and future. If it does not, why use the same term?
> > I intend that George Bush die > > in office, say, > > How can you possibly intend that? Wish, hope or > expect I can understand, but intend? How could > you > possibly commit to bring that about?
Well, why not? People do thing like this all the time — as witness the number of presidents and the like that do die in office at someone's hands. And for every success there are probably several failed or uncompleted plots, including some at very early stages of development, perhaps no more than taking the vow that the President shall not live out his term.
> > but, if he does, it is unlikely > > that I will — or justifiably could — take > > responsibility for it. > > Then I don't see how you could commit to bring > it about.
You are building something in here that I don't quite understand. I commit to it and it happens but it happens through someone else's agency. Where is my responsibility? And in what way was my commitment bogus?
> > And, of course, I can, with good > > reason take responsibility for thing I did > not > > intend — and did not even do (my daughter's > > court record, for example). > > Yes. {ai} can only serve to take responsibility > for > one's own actions, not for anyone else's.
Not true historically (aside from its not being about responsibility). I can commit to someone else doing something. To be sure, there is implicit in this a commitment to some action on my part (though not to any particular ones). But overtly the commitment is someone else's action and it is that action occurring that releases me from my commitment.
> > Assuming responsibility is > > another act in the general area of promising: > it > > makes one liable to an array of rights and > > duties, which would not be one's own unless > that > > responsibility were either assumed or > assigned. > > Intending (committing or renewing) only opens > one > > up to expectations, not rights and duties, > > {ai} is not about rights and duties either, it > is much more > informal. It is certainly not for formal > admission of > responsibility. It is just owning up to the > actions that lead > to the target event in question. Commiting to > performing > them or admitting to having performed them.
Then it is not about responsibility, since that is a value notion, precisely a matter of duties and the like. I agree that {ai} doesn't do this, which is why I keep objecting to your saying {ia} is about responsibility. Note that "owning up" is already value-laden and so inappropriate here "Admitting" has similar problems. But even did it not, there seems to be no reason to think that there is anything similar about admitting and committing: one is a report, the other is an act of will, for starters. So how come they to be covered by the same term?
> > and, > > as noted elsewhere, these expectations are > pretty > > weak (I can intend and never fulfill any of > > them). > > Of course. If you have a better watered down > expression > for informal assumption of responsibility > please suggest it.
Well, since I am not dealing with responsibility, I won't waste time on that issue. I admit that "commit" sounds awfully powerful for what goes on {ai mi betgo} or "I'm going to bed" but then, in Lojban these things come in degrees and so we can have very weak sense of commitment and very strong ones. What I am looking for is something that is plausibly an attitude that fits in here and "commit" is the enarest I have found ("plan" does not have performative force, I think).
> Even "commit" is much too strong for {ai}. I > don't suppose > the person saying {ai mi ckakla} would say > anything like > "I hereby commit to going to bed" in English. > The next > second they can change their mind and nobody > would > probably reproach them.
That is one of the points about intentions; they may be very unstable. That is one of the things that gives rise to the possibility of repeating a commitment ceremony (to get fancy about it) over and over, even if it really is just an announcement.
> > And, of course, even those expectations > > die with the occurrence of the event: I may > keep > > on doing the same things but they can no > longer > > be with the intention of bringing about what > in > > fact now is. > > Sorry, I don't follow that sentence.
So I intend to kill the President and (as expected) gather a cache of guns. Then the President dies somehow. I may keep on gathering guns, but it is no longer to be explained as part of a commitment to bring down that President.
> > > > > (I can oops in third person and > > > > second as well as first, > > > > > > Yes, I can, empathetically. That would be > made > > > explicit > > > in Lojban with {a'i nai dai}. > > > > ? What the Hell is {dai} doing here? Since > > "oops" doesn't say anything about anyone's > > feelings, there would be no need to bring in > > empathy in dealing with another person's > boo-boo. > > Perhaps I misunderstood your second and third > person > "oops". How does it work if not by your putting > yourself > in the place of the other person? {dai} says > something like: > "this is what I would say if I were in your > place now".
But none of that is operative in "oops" — which is neither a taking of responsibility nor an apology. It just calls attention to the boo-boo. And I can obviously call attention to another person's boo-boo as well as to my own.
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 27 of Sep., 2005 00:44 GMT On 9/26/05, John E Clifford wrote: > Sorry, I took it that you explanation of {ai} > applied in the same way to past, present, and > future. If it does not, why use the same term?
The reason to use the same term is that the expressions involved are useful and close enough that they don't warrant different terms, not to mention that nothing better is at hand.
How about this:
{ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the situation described by broda as a possible consequence and also as the orientation of their actions.
{ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the situation described by broda as a possible consequence but not as the orientation of their actions.
That would apply to past, present and future targets.
> It just calls attention to the boo-boo.
> And I can obviously call attention to another
> person's boo-boo as well as to my own.
We may have different understandings of "oops". For me it is essentially first person and only second or third person when the speaker puts themself in the place of the other. In my view an apathetic speaker would not oops to call attention to someone else's boo-boo. But in any case that's an English expression, not a Lojban one, so its idiosincracies need not concern the meaning of the Lojban words.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Posted by pycyn on Tue 27 of Sep., 2005 12:55 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/26/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > Sorry, I took it that you explanation of {ai} > > applied in the same way to past, present, and > > future. If it does not, why use the same > term? > > The reason to use the same term is that the > expressions > involved are useful and close enough that they > don't warrant > different terms, not to mention that nothing > better is at hand.
Well, I don't see the similarity nor the need for a UI for the proposed meanings (which are still very doubtfully attitudes at all).
> How about this: > > {ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the > situation described > by broda as a possible consequence and also as > the orientation > of their actions.
Consequence of what?
> {ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the > situation described > by broda as a possible consequence but not as > the orientation of > their actions. > > That would apply to past, present and future > targets. "Target" is presumably a match for "orientation of action," but where does "consequence" come in? As I have said, "acknowledgement" at least looks like it might be a performative speech act, but hardly seems of enough use to deserve somehting short from the available space. Perhaps something put together from all those constructive devices later in the chapter would do. In the meantime, we still need something for intentions — which are not acknowledgements even if those are speech acts.
> > > It just calls attention to the boo-boo. > > And I can obviously call attention to > another > > person's boo-boo as well as to my own. > > We may have different understandings of "oops". > For me it is essentially first person and only > second or > third person when the speaker puts themself in > the > place of the other. In my view an apathetic > speaker would > not oops to call attention to someone else's > boo-boo. > But in any case that's an English expression, > not a > Lojban one, so its idiosincracies need not > concern > the meaning of the Lojban words.
Quite true about the meaning of Lojban words (although, of course, we were looking for how to say "oops" in Lojban). Notice, though, that {ainai}, even as you propose it, does not do the job, since it is about orientation or lack of it, not about calling attention to an event (the definition I was using for "oops" was the one you provided, by the way).
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Posted by Anonymous on Tue 27 of Sep., 2005 13:19 GMT On 9/27/05, John E Clifford wrote: > --- Jorge Llambías wrote: > > > {ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the > > situation described > > by broda as a possible consequence and also as > > the orientation > > of their actions. > > Consequence of what?
Of the speaker's actions.
> > {ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the > > situation described > > by broda as a possible consequence but not as > > the orientation of > > their actions. > > > > That would apply to past, present and future > > targets. > "Target" is presumably a match for "orientation > of action," but where does "consequence" come in?
"consequence of their actions". Should I have used a couple of commas there?
The speaker acknowledges the situation described by broda as a possible consequence, but not as the orientation, of their actions.
> In the meantime, we still need something for
> intentions — which are not acknowledgements even
> if those are speech acts.
I intend X = I acknowledge X as a possible outcome of my actions, and I acknowledge orienting my actions towards X.
Where does that fail?
> Notice, though, that
> {ainai}, even as you propose it, does not do the
> job, since it is about orientation or lack of it,
> not about calling attention to an event (the
> definition I was using for "oops" was the one you
> provided, by the way).
The definition I provided was:
oops interj. Used to express acknowledgement of a minor accident, blunder, or mistake.
I took it for granted that it was an accident on the speaker's part. In other words "used to express acknowledgment of an unintentional act on the speaker's part". Whether or not that applies to English "oops" always, in most cases, or sometimes, that's what I'm proposing for {.ai nai}. I'm not saying {.ai nai} is identical to "oops", just that they have considerable overlap.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by pycyn on Tue 27 of Sep., 2005 16:04 GMT posts: 2388
> On 9/27/05, John E Clifford > wrote: > > --- Jorge Llambías > wrote: > > > > > {ai broda}: The speaker acknowledges the > > > situation described > > > by broda as a possible consequence and also > as > > > the orientation > > > of their actions. > > > > Consequence of what? > > Of the speaker's actions. > > > > {ai nai broda}: The speaker acknowledges > the > > > situation described > > > by broda as a possible consequence but not > as > > > the orientation of > > > their actions. > > > > > > That would apply to past, present and > future > > > targets. > > "Target" is presumably a match for > "orientation > > of action," but where does "consequence" come > in? > > "consequence of their actions". Should I have > used > a couple of commas there? > > The speaker acknowledges the situation > described > by broda as a possible consequence, but not as > the orientation, of their actions.
If I say I intend something, it is not just a possible consequence of my action, nor am I acknowledging anything. I am committing, which is a performative speech act, that is the saying of it alone creates a new world and creating that world is its purpose (or one of them). Acknowledging is not a performative > > > In the meantime, we still need something for > > intentions — which are not acknowledgements > even > > if those are speech acts. > > I intend X = I acknowledge X as a possible > outcome > of my actions, and I acknowledge orienting my > actions > towards X. > > Where does that fail?
Lack of commitment to start with plus misplaed emphasis (maybe just reversing the claues would help with this aspect). > > > Notice, though, that > > {ainai}, even as you propose it, does not do > the > > job, since it is about orientation or lack of > it, > > not about calling attention to an event (the > > definition I was using for "oops" was the one > you > > provided, by the way). > > The definition I provided was: > > oops > interj. > Used to express acknowledgement of a minor > accident, > blunder, or mistake.
ac·knowl·edge tr.v. ac·knowl·edged, ac·knowl·edg·ing, ac·knowl·edg·es
1. 1. To admit the existence, reality, or truth of. 2. To recognize as being valid or having force or power. 2. 1. To express recognition of: acknowledge a friend's smile. 2. To express thanks or gratitude for. 3. To report the receipt of: acknowledge a letter. 4. Law. To accept or certify as legally binding: acknowledge a deed.
Nothing here about commitment or something similar.
> I took it for granted that it was an accident > on the > speaker's part. In other words "used to express > acknowledgment of an unintentional act on the > speaker's part".
Nothing in the definition of about "unintentional" nor about the speaker.
> Whether or not that applies to > English > "oops" always, in most cases, or sometimes, > that's > what I'm proposing for {.ai nai}. I'm not > saying {.ai nai} > is identical to "oops", just that they have > considerable > overlap.
At most, {ainai} says of the indicated event that it is none of my business, I had no part in it either way. This does not seem to fit your intended reading very well, since that says (as {ainai} does not) that the event occurred, that it was unintentional (a much weaker attitude, or whatever, than recusal — it allows that I tried to prevent it, for example), that it is undesirable (or at least that seems to be part of what you mean) and, of course, the restriction in this case to the speaker's actions goes against the original {ai}.
The best thing so far for "oops" seems to be the observative {se srera}, which does lack the snap of the English.
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Tue 27 of Sep., 2005 16:35 GMT On 9/27/05, John E Clifford wrote: > If I say I intend something, it is not just a > possible consequence of my action, nor am I > acknowledging anything. I am committing, which > is a performative speech act, that is the saying > of it alone creates a new world and creating that > world is its purpose (or one of them).
I thought we agreed that commitment was too strong for {ai}. If you commit to something, others have a right to expect it of you. If you only express intent, you are free to change your mind without breaking your word. {ai} is simply for indicating to others what was or will be the orientation of your actions.
> Acknowledging is not a performative
Iffy, but that's just a classification anyway. If you admit the existence or reality of something you have changed the world.
> At most, {ainai} says of the indicated event that
> it is none of my business, I had no part in it
> either way.
With my proposal, it doesn't. It rejects that the actions were or will be oriented towards the indicated event, but at the same time it acknowledges that the indicated event was or might be a direct consequence of my actions.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Wed 14 of Dec., 2005 23:41 GMT posts: 14214 So it turns out that .ai / .ai nai mean something rather different than we all though.
According to Bob and Nora, the word comes from the expression "Aye-Aye(, Cap'n)", and is about the intent to be involved in bringing something about, that is, the intent to help directly in something occuring. "Yeah, I'll do it."
We've been talking as though it was about committing, in the abstract, to something occuring, but it's not, it's about committing to engaging in a task. Therefore, ".ai nai" as "accidental" makes no sense. ".ai nai" is "I refuse to get involved".
ma klama le zarci do'e lo sovda .ai nai
Who's going to the store to get eggs? Not me.
-Robin
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 15 of Dec., 2005 00:10 GMT > According to Bob and Nora, the word comes from the expression > "Aye-Aye(, Cap'n)", and is about the intent to be involved in bringing > something about, that is, the intent to help directly in something > occuring. "Yeah, I'll do it."
That's {vi'o}. Even if the original intent was for it to mean something like {vi'o}, that's not what CLL says. The CLL example is:
.ai mi benji do le ckana intent I transfer you to-the bed. I'm putting you to bed.
So that's intent, not compliance.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Tue 10 of Apr., 2007 19:14 GMT posts: 953 I was thinking that now might be a good time to get this section rolling again.
To summarize the main positions, and their proponents:
1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates. - Jorge
2. The connection between {ai nai} and the keyword "refusal" is too entrenched in usage to depart from. - Arnt Richard
3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an error for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same (e.g. {ai nai}) - Jorge
4. {ai nai} cannot impart the same meaning on a sentence as that of {ai} on the negation of that sentence, ie. {ai nai broda} != {ai na broda} - Jorge - Robin
5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental". - Jorge
Have I missed some important issues? Misrepresented who supports them?
There are a number of ways out of this impasse that I can see.
Think long and hard and try to come up with a consistent system for attitudinal negation that applies to all of the attitudinals in such a way that the current keywords are adequate.
Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the delibareteness/accidentalness scale.
Vote on the section straight away. Ignore single vetos.
Feel free to suggest others.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
bancus Posted by bancus on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 52 On 4/10/07, arj wrote: > Re: BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals > I was thinking that now might be a good time to get this section rolling again. > > To summarize the main positions, and their proponents: > > 1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which > the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates. > - Jorge > > 2. The connection between {ai nai} and the keyword "refusal" is too entrenched > in usage to depart from. > - Arnt Richard > > 3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an error > for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same > (e.g. {ai nai}) > - Jorge > > 4. {ai nai} cannot impart the same meaning on a sentence as that of {ai} > on the negation of that sentence, ie. {ai nai broda} != {ai na broda} > - Jorge > - Robin
+ bancus
> 5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental". > - Jorge > > Have I missed some important issues? Misrepresented who supports them?
Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but I think I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we shouldn't be able to express something with attitudinals that we can't express any other way, which is vaguely related.
> There are a number of ways out of this impasse that I can see. > > * Think long and hard and try to come up with a consistent system for attitudinal negation that applies to all of the attitudinals in such a way that the current keywords are adequate. > > * Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the delibareteness/accidentalness scale. > > * Vote on the section straight away. Ignore single vetos. >
-- Theodore Reed (treed/bancus) www.surreality.us
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT On 4/10/07, arj wrote: > > 1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which > the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates. > - Jorge
s/negations/opposites
Opposite is not the same as negation. {nai} indicates opposite, not negation.
> 3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an error > for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same > (e.g. {ai nai}) > - Jorge
I do not subscribe to this. I merely point out that the keyword "refusal" is more appropriate for the opposite of "acceptance", or for the opposite of "compliance", than for the opposite of "intention". I don't have a problem with synonymous or nearly synonymous expressions in general, they are certainly not errors.
> 5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental". > - Jorge
I would call it inconvenient rather than an error.
> There are a number of ways out of this impasse that I can see. > > * Think long and hard and try to come up with a consistent system > for attitudinal negation that applies to all of the attitudinals in such > a way that the current keywords are adequate. > > * Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the > intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the > delibareteness/accidentalness scale.
Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply", as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal scale"?
> * Vote on the section straight away. Ignore single vetos. > > Feel free to suggest others.
Move on to other sections, and come back to this when we've gained some momentum.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > > Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but I think > I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we shouldn't be able to > express something with attitudinals that we can't express any other > way, which is vaguely related.
Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express everything that we can express with attitudinals in some other way as well? The way you put it makes it sound as if you thought there were things that shouldn't be expressible at all.
I suppose every UI can be expressed as {sei broda} for some appropriate broda, but perhaps that still counts as an "attitudinal".
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
bancus Posted by bancus on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 52 On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > > > > Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but I think > > I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we shouldn't be able to > > express something with attitudinals that we can't express any other > > way, which is vaguely related. > > Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express everything that > we can express with attitudinals in some other way as well? The way you > put it makes it sound as if you thought there were things that shouldn't > be expressible at all.
Yeah, you're right. Your wording is better. One of the problems that Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there are irrealis for which there is no brivla.
> I suppose every UI can be expressed as {sei broda} for some appropriate > broda, but perhaps that still counts as an "attitudinal". > > mu'o mi'e xorxes > > > >
--
Theodore Reed (treed/bancus)
www.surreality.us
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 953 On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 05:36:12PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 4/10/07, arj wrote: > > > >1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which > > the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates. > > - Jorge > > s/negations/opposites > > Opposite is not the same as negation. {nai} indicates opposite, not > negation.
Yes, of course.
> >3. If an attitudinal means one thing (e.g. {i'a nai} = refusal), it is an > >error > > for another attitudinal to mean approximately or exactly the same > > (e.g. {ai nai}) > > - Jorge > > I do not subscribe to this. I merely point out that the keyword "refusal" > is more appropriate for the opposite of "acceptance", or for the opposite > of "compliance", than for the opposite of "intention". I don't have a > problem > with synonymous or nearly synonymous expressions in general, they are > certainly not errors.
Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way?
> >5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental". > > - Jorge > > I would call it inconvenient rather than an error.
Does this mean that you would be content with an attitudinal system that lacked the "accidental" UI, as long as it was otherwise okay?
> >* Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the > >intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the > >delibareteness/accidentalness scale. > > Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply", > as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal > scale"?
I mean to keep the meanings of "ai" and "ai nai" more or less the same, and perhaps replacing the keyword "refusal" with another that is kinda sorta the same, but seems like an opposite of "intent".
> * Move on to other sections, and come back to this when we've > gained some momentum.
I fully support this. I've recently started working again on my own unfinished sections, and I encourage everyone to do the same.
Still, eventually we have to come back here and find a way to come to an agreement. It doesn't hurt to have that in the back of our heads in the mean time.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Your speaker should ... not be suffering for a cold, or cough, or a hangover. If something goes wrong ... it is important that the speaker has as similar a voice as with the original recording, waiting for another cold to come along is not reasonable, (though some may argue that the same hangover can easily be induced). --Building Synthetic Voices, by Alan W. Black and Kevin A. Lenzo
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
rlpowell Posted by rlpowell on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 14214 On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 02:05:40PM -0700, Theodore Reed wrote: > On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías wrote: > >On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > >> > >> Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but > >> I think I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we > >> shouldn't be able to express something with attitudinals that > >> we can't express any other way, which is vaguely related. > > > >Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express > >everything that we can express with attitudinals in some other > >way as well? The way you put it makes it sound as if you thought > >there were things that shouldn't be expressible at all. > > Yeah, you're right. Your wording is better. One of the problems > that Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there > are irrealis for which there is no brivla.
There are *lots* of things for which there is no brivla; I'm not sure how that is relevant.
-Robin
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
bancus Posted by bancus on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 52 On 4/10/07, Robin Lee Powell wrote: > On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 02:05:40PM -0700, Theodore Reed wrote: > > On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías wrote: > > >On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > > >> > > >> Then there's my stance against propositional attitudinals. but > > >> I think I'm alone in that. There's also my stance that we > > >> shouldn't be able to express something with attitudinals that > > >> we can't express any other way, which is vaguely related. > > > > > >Don't you rather mean that we should be able to express > > >everything that we can express with attitudinals in some other > > >way as well? The way you put it makes it sound as if you thought > > >there were things that shouldn't be expressible at all. > > > > Yeah, you're right. Your wording is better. One of the problems > > that Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there > > are irrealis for which there is no brivla. > > There are *lots* of things for which there is no brivla; I'm not > sure how that is relevant.
Because we're talking about my dislike of irrealis.
-- Theodore Reed (treed/bancus) www.surreality.us
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > > One of the problems that > Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there are > irrealis for which there is no brivla.
I guess he meant no gismu. Brivla is an open class, so any missing brivla can always be included as a lujvo or eventually as a fu'ivla.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
bancus Posted by bancus on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 52 On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > > > > One of the problems that > > Robin presented with doing away with irrealis is that there are > > irrealis for which there is no brivla. > > I guess he meant no gismu. Brivla is an open class, so any missing > brivla can always be included as a lujvo or eventually as a fu'ivla.
I think his point was that he doesn't want to take away the ability to say something that is currently expressible.
-- Theodore Reed (treed/bancus) www.surreality.us
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not > seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way?
Yes.
One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one intends not to do it, but that does not make refusal the opposite of intention.
Similarly one can express hatred by insulting someone, but that does not make insult the opposite of love.
> > >5. It is an error that there is no attitudinal for "accidental".
> > > - Jorge
> >
> > I would call it inconvenient rather than an error.
>
> Does this mean that you would be content with an attitudinal system
> that lacked the "accidental" UI, as long as it was otherwise okay?
There are other useful attitudes missing, so that would be just one more.
> > >* Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the > > >intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the > > >delibareteness/accidentalness scale. > > > > Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply", > > as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal > > scale"? > > I mean to keep the meanings of "ai" and "ai nai" more or less the > same, and perhaps replacing the keyword "refusal" with another > that is kinda sorta the same, but seems like an opposite of "intent".
"Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
bancus Posted by bancus on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 52 On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > > > Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not > > seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way? > > Yes. > > One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one > intends not to do it, but that does not make refusal the opposite > of intention. > > Similarly one can express hatred by insulting someone, but that > does not make insult the opposite of love.
ITYM:
One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one intends not to do it, but that does not make the expression of refusal the opposite of intention.
I don't see how this is relevant.
> > "Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me. >
Then what is .aicu'i?
-- Theodore Reed (treed/bancus) www.surreality.us
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT On 4/10/07, Theodore Reed wrote: > On 4/10/07, Jorge Llambas wrote: > > On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > > > > > Is your primary problem with "ai nai" as "refusal" that it does not > > > seem to be the opposite of "intention" in an obvious way? > > > > Yes. > > > > One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one > > intends not to do it, but that does not make refusal the opposite > > of intention. > > > > Similarly one can express hatred by insulting someone, but that > > does not make insult the opposite of love. > > ITYM: > > One can express refusal to do something by expressing that one intends > not to do it, but that does not make the expression of refusal the > opposite of intention. > > I don't see how this is relevant. >
You mean you don't see the analogy? I wouldn't use "insult" as the keyword for {iu nai} just as I wouldn't use "refusal" as the keyword for {ai nai}, even if in some specific context one could use {ai nai} to express refusal to do something, and one could use {iu nai} to insult someone. If you ask me to do something, and I express a lack of intention to do it, you can take that as a refusal, even though I haven't expressed it as such. If I express hatred for you, you may feel insulted, even if I haven't directly expressed it as an insult. In other words, expressing a lack of intention might be one way of expressing refusal, but that's just a secondary effect of it and only in some limited contexts.
> > "Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.
> >
> Then what is .aicu'i?
The proposal is:
.ai cu'i (UI*1) Attitudinal. Used to express indecision / hesitation / vacillation / wavering.
.ai cu'i mi ti ba te vecnu I don't know whether I'll purchase these or not.
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Thu 03 of May, 2007 17:52 GMT posts: 953 On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 05:36:12PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 4/10/07, arj wrote: > > > >1. The negations of the attitudinals are part of a system, from which > > the current definition of {ai nai}, {e'o nai} and {e'o cu'i} deviates. > > - Jorge > > s/negations/opposites > > Opposite is not the same as negation. {nai} indicates opposite, not > negation.
I've incorporated this, and other comments in the thread, into: http://www.lojban.org/tiki/BPFK+working+page%3A+Opinions+regarding+attitudinals
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Den tredje dagen* tar jeg en dusj. ... Jeg har ikke savnet � vaske meg engang. --Erling Kagge: Alene til Sydpolen (*dvs. den tredje dagen p� sydpolen, 53 dager etter avreise fra Patriot Hills.)
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Sun 10 of June, 2007 01:28 GMT posts: 953 On Tue, Apr 10, 2007 at 07:25:59PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 4/10/07, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > >> >* Split up {ai} into two cmavo. Keep the current form for the > >> >intent/refusal scale, and make an experimental cmavo for the > >> >delibareteness/accidentalness scale. > >> > >> Do you mean change the meaning of {ai} to "intention to comply", > >> as in "Aye-aye, sir"? Or what do you mean by "the intent/refusal > >> scale"? > > > >I mean to keep the meanings of "ai" and "ai nai" more or less the > >same, and perhaps replacing the keyword "refusal" with another > >that is kinda sorta the same, but seems like an opposite of "intent". > > "Lack of intent" or such would be fine for me.
Should I write up a counter-proposal for this section before August 13?
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Please Note: Some Quantum Physics Theories Suggest That When the Consumer Is Not Directly Observing This Product, It May Cease to Exist or Will Exist Only in a Vague and Undetermined State. --Susan Hewitt and Edward Subitzky
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
Posted by Anonymous on Sun 10 of June, 2007 01:54 GMT On 6/9/07, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > Should I write up a counter-proposal for this section before August 13?
I think what we can do is wait for the deadline, then if as expected the proposal doesn't pass you take over the section and we move the deadline for one week later. But let's get all the other sections out of the way first so as not to get bogged down again, yes?
mu'o mi'e xorxes
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BPFK Section: Irrealis Attitudinals
arj Posted by arj on Sun 10 of June, 2007 15:46 GMT posts: 953 On Sat, Jun 09, 2007 at 10:56:12PM -0300, Jorge Llambías wrote: > On 6/9/07, Arnt Richard Johansen wrote: > > > >Should I write up a counter-proposal for this section before August 13? > > I think what we can do is wait for the deadline, then if as expected > the proposal doesn't pass you take over the section and we move the > deadline for one week later. But let's get all the other sections out of > the way first so as not to get bogged down again, yes?
Okay.
-- Arnt Richard Johansen http://arj.nvg.org/ Assumption is the mother of all screw-ups. (Wethern's Law)